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Summary of thesis
The aim of this thesis is to assess the Irish regulatory approach to asset and wealth 
distribution upon marital breakdown, and to highlight the implications arising from the 
failure to articulate the social policy aims of such regulation. Whilst the main body of the 
thesis considers the regulatory approach of four distinct jurisdictions, it commences with 
a critical overview of the rules versus discretion debate in order to illustrate the nature 
and impact of different approaches to law-making. Thus chapter one incorporates both a 
theoretical examination of rule-based and discretion-based regulation and an examination 
of the significance of such regulatory approaches in the context of asset distribution on 
divorce. Chapter two provides a historical account of the elevated status of the marital 
family under Irish law and the implications for the manner in which the remedy of 
divorce was eventually enacted. Chapter three provides a critical analysis of the content 
and workings of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, which in granting extensive and 
infinite judicial powers to secure justice and proper provision, has evaded the 
responsibility for identifying the objectives of such state intervention, creating a legal and 
social policy vacuum and a system which lacks legitimacy, predictability and fairness. In 
order to fully illuminate these shortcomings and ultimately inform the Irish lawmakers as 
to the need for, and nature of reform, a detailed and comparative analysis of the 
governing regimes of three distinct jurisdictions, California, Scotland and New Zealand is 
presented in chapters four to six respectively. Particular attention will be focused upon 
the willingness of these law-makers to enunciate the social and legal policy objectives of 
their governing laws. Ultimately it will be argued that effective governance demands that 
regulatory processes, howsoever structured, exist within a considered and articulated 
legal and social policy context.
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Introduction
1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to assess the framework adopted to regulate the distribution of 
assets upon marital breakdown in Ireland. This analysis considers the historical context of 
family law regulation in Ireland and the manner in which the remedy of divorce (and to a 
lesser extent judicial separation) has been enacted and applied. This demands an 
explanation of the Irish regulatory process, critically outlining the regulatory structure 
currently in place, and the consequences of the approach adopted. Effective analysis 
inherently requires the identification and assessment of different approaches to 
regulation, necessitating both a theoretical examination of rule-based and discretion- 
based regulation and an examination of the significance of such regulatory approaches in 
the context of asset distribution on divorce. The assessment of the Irish regulatory 
approach will be followed by a detailed and comparative analysis of the approaches of 
three distinct jurisdictions, in order to fully illuminate the underlying critical examination 
of the Irish approach and ultimately inform the Irish lawmakers as to the need for, and 
nature of reform in this context. Whilst the available views of academic commentators 
are intensely explored and relied upon throughout this thesis, significant emphasis is 
placed on primary materials throughout, most especially upon the governing legislative 
and judicial pronouncements and the typically well-informed consultative process that 
has resulted in the particular regulatory approach. In exploring the mechanics of reform 
in each jurisdiction considered, this thesis seeks to understand the need and identify the 
best approach to the reform of the Irish regulatory process on divorce.
2 Why does the current Irish regulatory approach to asset distribution on divorce 
warrant consideration?
The regulation of asset distribution upon the dissolution of marriage is greatly influenced 
by the policy aims and underlying purpose of state regulation. The absence of any such 
express policy goals to structure or direct the very wide discretion given to judges under 
Irish law has created a system which lacks legitimacy, predictability and fairness. This 
reluctance and consequential failure to identify the aims of the regulatory process,
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coupled with the open-ended powers created by the laws, has resulted in the exercise of 
broad judicial powers within a legal and social policy vacuum. The aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate these shortcomings within the Irish regulatory structure and identify those 
aspects in need of reform. Such considerations and deliberations will be informed by the 
detailed comparative analysis of approaches adopted by other jurisdictions, as detailed 
below.
3 How are the weaknesses of the Irish regulatory process to be appraised?
One of the fundamental issues considered in this thesis is the manner in which regulatory 
processes can be structured and the consequential impact of particular choices. The thesis 
essentially utilises a theoretical framework based on the use of rules and/or discretion in 
law-making, considered within a comparative analysis of doctrinal law using jurisdictions 
whose individual regulatory approaches can be placed upon a rules/discretion continuum.
The opening chapter of this thesis will present an overview and critical analysis of the 
contrasting rules and discretion-based approaches to regulation, both abstractly and with 
reference to their impact on divorce. This theoretically-based examination of marital 
regulation forms the backdrop for the subsequent analysis of the four jurisdictions 
considered in the course of this work. Thus in advance of the description and critique of 
the individual regulatory approaches of Ireland, California, Scotland and New Zealand, 
the opening chapter will outline the issues arising from differing approaches to the 
creation and application of laws. In particular, in the course of this overview, the 
concepts of democracy, fairness and predictability will emerge as the three key criteria 
for assessing the impact and effect of various laws and processes. Both generally and in 
the context of divorce, it will become apparent that the manner in which regulation is 
structured will determine whether a particular process results in a democratic, fair and 
predictable regime.
The significance of the various regulatory choices upon the processes adopted forms a 
central part of the analysis. It will demonstrate the manner in which the preferences and 
priorities in respect of the criteria of democracy, fairness and predictability impacts upon
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that jurisdiction’s choice of regulatory process. For example, what a particular 
jurisdiction regards as fair, be it certainty of outcome or conversely individualised justice 
in the circumstances, will greatly influence the form and approach of its laws. Equally, 
each jurisdiction’s view of the respective roles of the judiciary and the legislature 
determines the way in which responsibility for law-making is allocated. Thus it will be 
shown that it is the context within which these laws and powers are applied that can 
impact most significantly upon the chosen regulatory process. Ultimately it will be 
argued that effective governance demands that regulatory processes, howsoever 
structured, exist within a considered and articulated legal and social policy context. The 
thesis will demonstrate that the underlying policy aims and objectives can carry greater 
significance than the regulatory approaches adopted in any jurisdiction.
4 Alternative approaches to asset distribution -  comparative study of the 
regulatory approaches adopted in California, Scotland and New Zealand
Motivated by the need to identify alternative approaches to the open-ended discretionary 
regime enacted under Irish law, this thesis relies significantly upon a comparative study 
of the regimes in operation in California, Scotland and New Zealand. Each jurisdiction is 
considered individually, with a detailed description presented of its governing regime and 
the impact of its particular regulatory choices. This description pays particular attention 
to reforms adopted in each jurisdiction, as a means of identifying perceived shortfalls in 
each jurisdiction and the solutions developed by lawmakers.
The choice of jurisdictions considered represents a divergence of approaches to that 
adopted in Ireland; the rule-based equal division regime of California and the policy- 
driven regulatory processes of Scotland and New Zealand. The approaches in Ireland and 
California represent contrasting extremes along a rules/discretion continuum, with 
Ireland’s individualised discretion-based approach at one end and California’s precise 
rules at the other. The reliance by New Zealand and Scotland upon a mix of 
presumptions, principles, standards and discretion places those jurisdictions at various, 
more central points on that continuum. This more moderate approach by Scotland and 
New Zealand will be shown to reflect their preference for the combined role of the
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judiciary and legislature in law-making, and an awareness of the extent to which policy 
goals can explicitly drive the regulatory system. Such an approach will ultimately be 
regarded as more likely to secure the identified aims of democracy, fairness and 
predictability.
5 Conclusion
A key question posed throughout this work, is whether an optimum approach to 
regulation can be identified. In attempting to resolve this question, the form that rules 
take and the manner in which discretion is exercised will be assessed, and over the course 
of the work these issues will be examined with reference to each of the four jurisdictions 
considered. It will become apparent from the varying approaches to regulating asset 
distribution on divorce that assessing the outcome and success of different approaches 
will depend upon the larger context within which they operate and the capacity of each 
regime to achieve the legal and social goals of the jurisdiction under consideration. 
Ultimately what will be shown is that the clear exposition of the policy goals of the 
process is of greater importance than whether the regulatory approach exists more 
towards the rules or discretion end of the continuum. In fact it will become apparent that 
all systems require a mix of rules and discretion if they are to achieve both predictability 
and fairness whilst equally satisfying the criterion of democratic law-making. Irrespective 
of whether rules or discretion form the basis of a regulatory process, its application 
ultimately depends upon clarity of purpose on the part of the law-maker and law- 
enforcer. Such clarity of purpose, through the identification of regulatory principles and 
purposes allows for a clearer understanding of the ‘correct’ result to be achieved and 
facilitates the laws, howsoever formulated, to be applied to that end.
4
Chapter 1 - Rules v Discretion
1 Introduction
“Law and discretion are not separated by a sharp line but by a zone, 
much as night and day are separated by dawn.”
Hawkins notes the almost unavoidable interplay between rules and discretion in the legal 
process. He is of the view that whilst “the use of rules involves a considerable degree of 
discretion, the exercise of discretion, is largely guided by rules”.2 In the immediate 
context of asset distribution on divorce, despite the significant variations in processes 
adopted in different jurisdictions evident throughout this work, all jurisdictions 
considered appear to incorporate some mix of rules and discretion in their regulatory 
process. Whilst it is difficult to ascertain definitively whether an optimum approach 
exists, the varying configurations of legal regulation serve to demonstrate the workability 
of more than one approach to the ‘rules versus discretion’ dichotomy. The legislative 
emphasis on resolving issues by reference to the ‘particular’ facts before the court is 
equally prevalent in many areas of family law, no less so in divorce cases.3 The greater 
the extent to which a process places emphasis on the particular facts of a case and the 
need for individualised justice, the less likely that such a process will, in any significant 
way, depend on fixed rules.
The four jurisdictions considered in this thesis can be placed upon the ‘rule versus 
discretion’ spectrum where absolute rules are placed on the extreme right and absolute 
judicial freedom exists on the extreme left. Whilst none of the four jurisdictions would sit 
at either extreme end of the spectrum, California and Ireland would be found on alternate 
ends of that spectrum whereas New Zealand and Scotland would be located more closely
1 Davis K Discretionary Justice A Preliminary Inquiry (Greenwood Press) (1969) at 106.
2 Hawkins K The Uses o f  Discretion  (Oxford) (1992) (ed. Hawkins K) Preface, with reference to chapter 1.
3 Garrison has noted that divorce law in particular “has traditionally relied upon judicial wisdom to achieve 
fair results. Instead o f  bright-line rules, legislatures have typically given judges in the divorce court almost 
unlimited discretion, bounded only by indeterminate standards or lists o f  factors that may be considered.” 
Garrison M “How do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis o f Discretionary Decision 
Making” 1995-1996 74 NCL Rev 401.
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towards the mid-point. In setting out the regulatory approach of each of these four 
jurisdictions in individual chapters, this thesis will provide a detailed and critical 
illustration of each regulatory framework with a view to identifying and assessing the 
choice and effect of the regulatory systems adopted.
This chapter will focus upon the two fundamental issues of the creation and application 
of law. In this regard, the manner in which the law can be formulated, whether based on 
rules, discretion or both will be critically examined, in order to ascertain the impact and 
workability of alternative approaches to legal regulation. Over the course of the chapter, 
three key benchmarks will be identified; democracy, fairness and predictability, and 
these will form the backdrop for the analysis and critique of the regulatory approaches of 
Ireland, California, Scotland and New Zealand in the remainder of this thesis. By 
considering the issues, both in the abstract and in the context of the regulatory 
approaches in these jurisdictions, it is hoped that an insight might be provided into 
workable structures for the regulation of asset distribution on marital breakdown.
2 How can the law be framed?
Davis suggests that whilst rule making is generally to be regarded as a superior 
procedural approach in the context of complex subject matter, rules can never provide all 
the answers in advance.4 Even though his preference for rules is premised upon the view 
that rules usually make for even-handedness, he admits that the best system operates at 
the middle of the rules/discretion scale, thereby including an element of discretion which 
is limited as necessary by rules, principles or other guiding factors.5 Similarly Schneider 
acknowledges the primacy of rules but argues that discretion remains both inevitable and 
invaluable. One cannot be systematically preferred to the other; Schneider ultimately
4 Supra n. 1 at 67. Davis concedes that notwithstanding the superiority o f  rules, their use should never go so 
far as to eliminate the development o f  law and policy through case-by-case adjudication.
5 Ibid. Davis in the preface to his book does acknowledge the significant limitations o f a discretion-based 
system, referring to the injustice that arise from it. “Most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end o f  
the scale, where rules and principles provide little or no guidance, where emotions o f deciding officers may 
affect what they do, where political or other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the 
imperfections o f human nature are often reflected in the choices made.” Similarly in the courtroom 
environment Wilentz CJ has noted the limitations on the judiciary regarding rule-making. “It is also quite 
difficult for a court to formulate policy. The talent and resources for that exercise often lie more readily 
with the legislature.” Wilentz RN CJ “Judicial Legitimacy” (1997) 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 859 at 883.
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concludes that the choice is not rules or discretion, but rather, which mix of rules or 
discretion.6
2.1 Rules
Fundamentally, Fuller defines law as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules”.7 Rules, as a traditional means of regulating society and societal 
behaviour, aim to establish and impose obligations on parties, and to provide penalties 
and remedies for any infringement of those pre-determined obligations. Pound recognises 
favourably the fundamental role of the rule in the tradition of the legal process, and the 
associated strict practice of the imposition of rules to circumstances.8 Similarly Dworkin 
confirms the ‘all or nothing’ nature of rules, noting that “if the facts a rule stipulates are 
given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, 
or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.”9 In differentiating rules 
from principles,10 this explanation highlights the strict nature of a rule-based system.11 
Hughes accepts that in contrast to standards and principles, “rules are fairly concrete 
guides for decisions geared to narrow categories of behaviour and prescribing narrow 
patterns of conduct”.12 In addition, where rules are utilised to create legal parameters, 
there exists the presumption of “a precisely defined fixed consequence to a definite
1 i
detailed fact or state of facts”. Thus rules, if properly developed, should not only 
establish legal rights and obligations, but should also identify the consequences for any 
breach of those rules.
6 Schneider CE “Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer’s View”; supra n. 2, chapter 2 at 49-50.
7 Fuller L The Morality o f  Law  (Yale University Press) (1964) at 106.
8 Pound R “Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem o f the Individual Special Case” 35 
NYULR 925 at 925, 926. Yet Pound recognises the limitations o f rules, noting that the judicial process 
“cannot be held solely to rules”. Certainty and predictability also require a “just and wise individual 
discretion”.
9 Dworkin R “The Model o f  Rules” (1967) 35 U o f  Chi LR. 14, 25.
10 The formulation and impact o f  principles is considered in detail below at section 2.3.2.
11 Supra n. 9. Dworkin differentiates between principles and rules by noting that although both point to a 
particular decision about legal obligation in particular circumstances, they differ in the character o f  
direction they give.
12 Hughes G “Rules, Policy and Decision Making” (1968) 77 Yale LJ 411 at 419. Hughes notes that 
principles “are vaguer signals which alert us to general considerations that should be kept in mind in 
deciding disputes under rules.”
13 Per Pound, supra n. 8 at 927. See also Davis, supra n. 1 at 42 where he suggests that whilst it is possible 
to provide rules for all circumstances, he accepts that it is neither “practical nor desirable”.
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One of the primary attractions of a rules-based regime is the certainty and uniformity of 
application and thus the predictability of a rule-based regulatory approach is arguably its 
primary advantage. The emphasis placed upon predictability in the creation and 
enforcement of laws differs amongst jurisdictions with varying weight being accorded to 
certainty as a required criterion of effective regulation.14 Davis notes the views of 
Hayek,15 who strongly advocates the use of rules and refers to the “fair certainty” they 
provide for all parties involved.16 Fairness is a less immediate consequence of 
predictable, rule-based laws and can be perceived in many ways; Hayek regards certainty 
as ensuring fairness, with clear rule-based laws providing such predictability.17 Similarly 
Schneider advocates the use of rules to regulate behaviour, regarding them as capable of 
serving the planning function, as best positioned for the like treatment of like cases, and 
as effective in the organisation of activities and ultimately as operationally efficient. In 
addition he regards legislative rule makers as better positioned than presiding judiciary to 
assess what is in the interests of justice, emphasising the importance of the “existence of 
[the] general authority” to impose rules in order to decide cases.18
Equally, it has been suggested that a rule-based legal system contributes to the 
democratic nature of the decision-making process, allowing for clear communication of 
the norms which the rules reflect.19 Regarding the concept of legitimacy, Jowell notes 
that rules are seen as “a means of both reducing the free exercise of discretion and
14 In the context o f the regulation o f  divorce, this thesis, in chapter 4, will assess the impact o f certainty 
arising from the Californian rule-based system o f regulation and consider whether certainty is automatically 
absent from a discretion-based regime such as Ireland. This in turn will uncover how differing approaches 
to regulation impact upon the individual’s choice to negotiate a settlement, draft a pre-nuptial agreement or 
alternatively allow the courts to resolve the dispute between the parties. See later at chapter 4, especially 
section 8 thereof.
15 Hayek F The Road to Serfdom (Routledge Press) (1944) 72. In his later work The Constitutions of  
Liberty (1960) Hayek asserts that “The decision must be deductible from the rules o f  law and from those 
circumstances to which the law refers and which can be known to the parties concerned.”
16 Supra n. 1 at 32. What values are deemed more important than the elimination o f  arbitrary justice is 
influenced by a number o f  matters, and not simply the prevailing cultural and social policy. The 
motivations and aims o f  both the legislature and the judiciary, together with the practices and norms o f the 
relevant jurisdiction will influence the approach to such matters.
17 The view that fairness mandates individualised justice is considered at section 2.1.2 below.
18 Supra n. 6 at 74-75. He notes that the value o f  rules is to pre-determine the outcome in circumstances 
where their effect is “to narrow and simplify the issues requiring resolution in subsequent cases.”
19 Per Davis supra n. 1 at 68-79.
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providing specific standards against which official decisions may be measured”.20 This 
reflects a more traditional view of law-making with recognition of the distinct separation 
of powers between the legislature as law-maker and the judiciary as enforcer. This view 
of a legitimate legal system of regulation demands such delineation in order to ensure a 
system of democratic and reflective law-making. Pound, in support of this approach, 
celebrates the role of rules in protecting the system from arbitrary decisions. Any 
promotion and use of strict rules, in his view, will, “secure us against the well meant 
ignorance or feebleness of will of the weak judge and ...[is] ...our mainstay against 
improper motives on the part of those who administer justice.”21 If democratic law­
making is the priority he suggests that rule-based governance will be preferred.
If fairness demands that similar cases are treated equally, rules are more likely to ensure 
such consistency of approach. Such certainty and predictability form the bedrock of a fair 
and democratic system of regulation. However in family law disputes, fairness is less 
likely to be guaranteed by the strict application of rules, in light of the nuances and 
individual peculiarities of such disputes. Rules give effect to standards by providing the 
precise criteria and conditions where the rule is to be invoked. But in areas of law that 
react to and regulate human behaviour and create ongoing inter-personal rights and 
obligations, such as those arising from a marital relationship, the effectiveness of the ‘all- 
or-nothing’ nature of rules must be questioned. Given that the strict application of clear 
rules gives rise to pre-identifiable consequences and outcomes, a rule-based legal system 
might in the family law context be regarded as an overly exact science in its operation. 
Where the regulation of human behaviour requires flexibility and evolving laws to reflect 
social policy, the weaknesses and inflexibility of strict rules are often highlighted and 
where individual areas of law require individualised consideration, such rules may 
ultimately be inappropriate and unworkable.
20 Jowell J Law and Bureaucracy (Dunellen) (New York) (1975) at 12. In this regard the decision-maker, to 
allow him to almost ‘hide behind the rule’ and escape accountability, relies upon rules. Jowell notes that 
such instances correlate with Davis’ extravagant version o f the rule o f  law.
21 Pound R Jurisprudence (West Publishing) (Vol 2) (1959) at 383.
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2.1.1 Evolution of legal rules
In promoting the adjudication process, Hughes questions the sufficiency of rules, noting 
that they simply “sketch directive outlines for private and official behaviour but tell us 
nothing of the vital process by which the rules are used and applied in decision- 
making.” He recognises the limitations of a strictly rule-based system of law, noting 
that to refuse to depart from existing rules, however created, would prevent law from 
keeping pace with developing times.23 Rather, Hughes acknowledges the merits of the 
adjudication process which operates in the light of rules, thereby giving effect to a system 
of rules, and ultimately creating an effective system of law.24 In essence he regards the 
decision-making process as “the essential link between prescriptive rules and the 
determination of disputes, between rules on paper and rules in action.”25
2.1.2 Rules as only one aspect of the regulatory process
Certainly it is arguable that the complexities of life necessitate a myriad of laws with a 
multitude of configurations, leading to the call for the identification of governing 
principles and standards, which are less absolute in nature. Thus rather than rely upon 
“the straitjacket of the rule”,26 and absolute predictability, it has been argued that, “a rule 
is merely a means of indicating a series of legitimate starting blocks for the adjudicatory 
performance.”27 Jowell sees a rule as “a general direction, applicable to a number of 
“like” situations that may arise in the future.”28 The possibility of absolute rules giving 
rise to ‘wrong’ results strengthens the argument for a system within which rules play a 
dominant role, but are not absolute and are ultimately subject to judicial interpretation
22 Supra n. 12 at 435.
23 Ibid at 412.
24 Ibid at 432.
25 Ibid. See further, Dworkin R “Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision” 75 Ethics (1964) 47.
26 Per Pound, supra n. 8 at 927. The use o f  rules causes cases to be fitted into the straitjacket o f those rules, 
which causes a failure for the rule in its application to take account o f the circumstances o f  the facts o f the 
case.
27 Schauer, although in favour o f  rules, recognises the limitations o f  a decision making process based 
entirely on rules, noting the “inevitable under-and over-inclusiveness” o f  a rule-based system, the 
acceptance o f which signifies the tolerance o f a number o f wrong results. Schauer Playing by the Rules 
(Clarendon Law Series Oxford) (1991) at 135.
28 Supra n. 20 at 135. Thus the rule also appends legal consequences to follow on from particular 
occurrences.
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and application. Consequently the overarching need for a fair outcome invariably 
impinges upon any attempt to secure absolutely predictable laws.
More specifically, Fuller notes the relative incapacity of rule-based adjudication to solve 
“polycentric” problems,30 explained by Jowell as “a complex network of relationships 
with interacting points of influence”. The complexities typically arsing in the context 
of family law disputes can quite rightly be regarded as polycentric in nature with a multi­
faceted response often required to address the numerous issues arising. Once the decision 
to be made strays outside the “yes/no” or the “how much?” variety, the ability of the 
adjudication process to deal with the issues before it is placed under strain. The resultant 
need for all parties before the court to modify or even convert their claim to fit within the 
boundaries of “a claim of right” or “an accusation of fault or guilt” provides an almost 
artificial formulation of every ‘non-standard’ case presented and the knock-on obligation 
on the courts to select a pre-determined ‘solution’.32 Fuller identifies three possible 
consequences of the use of rule-based adjudicative methods to attempt to resolve 
polycentric problems. The solution will fail, the judge will ignore judicial properties or 
instead of accommodating the procedures to suit the problem, the judge might 
“reformulate the problem” to suit the existing adjudicative structures. However, none of 
these solutions are acceptable to Fuller, as in his view, they make the adjudicative rule- 
based process unsuitable for complex and multi-tiered problems.33 The artificial
29 Dworkin, supra n. 9 at 18 recognises the limitations of a rule-based system, noting that “the sovereign 
cannot provide for all contingencies through any scheme o f orders, and some o f his orders will inevitably 
be vague or have furry edges.” Particularly in the context of regulating social behaviour, Shapiro rejects the 
approach o f treating a rule as an absolute, and regards a rule as properly assessable or workable only when 
implemented. Consequently the weaknesses o f a particular rule and the need to revise its content may only 
become apparent in the course o f  the adjudicatory process. Shapiro D L “The Choice o f  Rulemaking or 
adjudication in the Development o f  Administrative Policy” [1965] 78 Harv L. Rev 921 at 924,925.
30 Fuller L “The Forms and Limits o f  Adjudication” [1978] 92 Harv. L.Rev. 353 at 371. See ahead at 
paragraph 4.3.2 for a discussion o f  the ‘polycentric’ nature of many family law disputes and the difficulties 
encountered with the excessively rigid application o f the doctrine o f precedent.
31 Supra n. 20 at 152. Earlier in his work at 29, Jowell introduces the issue o f  polycentric problems and 
notes that “Matters that are suited to compromise, mediation, and accommodation are not best pursued in 
the structured adversary setting o f  adjudication.”
32 Fuller L “Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator” (1963) Wis. L. Rev. 3. See further Fuller, supra n. 30 
at 368 where he states “The proper province o f adjudication is to make an authoritative determination of 
questions raised by claims o f  right and accusations o f guilt.”
33 Supra n. 30 at 403, Fuller is eager to qualify his position and assert that polycentric problems can be 
solved, but not by individual-issue based legal reasoning, rather by understanding and tackling the issue as 
a whole.
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organisation of cases to fit the overly-rigid rule-based adjudication process and its formal 
definition and requirement of “rights and wrongs” ultimately serves to highlight the 
limitations of the process.34 Fuller outlines the unsuitability of such an approach being 
adopted in the context of decision-making based on reasoned arguments, although he 
recognises that certain areas of human activity are fundamentally unsuited to the need to 
rationalise and provide “an explicit reason for every step taken”. Such an approach 
sacrifices fairness in order to guarantee certainty. In the context of marital breakdown 
disputes, such a categorised, rule-based approach might prove troublesome, restrictive 
and ultimately unworkable.
If rules alone are not enough what is the best means of amending their form or 
manipulating their application? Should the converse approach be adopted and all 
decisions determined by seeking to achieve a fair result with reference only to the 
particular facts? Should the end goal in such a process simply be ‘justice in the 
circumstances’, or should more definite policy goals be pre-identified to provide the 
adjudicating body with a distinct objective? Jowell notes that “the process of legalization 
involves the transformation of broad policies into rules” 35 which suggests that the rule 
begins and ends with the underlying policy and overall objective(s) that have led to the 
creation of that rule. Citing Hart and Sacks, he concludes that a rule “is thus a concrete 
general direction in which legal consequences are appended to the happening or non­
happening of an event or the occurrence of a situation.”36 As an advocate of the need for 
both rules and discretion in an effective regulatory process, Hughes notes the limitations 
of the “modem positivist elucidation of the adjudicatory performance” arising from the 
failure to sufficiently look beyond this body of rules. He suggests there exists a failure to
34 Pound R “The Administration o f  Justice in the Modem City” (1912-1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 315. 
Pound highlights the detrimental societal and individual consequences o f  a failure to protect the moral and 
social life o f an individual. Where an efficient and expensive judicial system fails the individual because of  
the stronger position and powers o f  the more aggressive opponent, he regards the consequences as “an 
injury to society at large”. He regards the real grievance o f the mass o f  the people to lie not with the rule of  
substantive law but with the enforcing machinery.
35 Supra n. 20 at 134.
36 Ibid at 135. (Emphasis added)
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recognise the standards and canons that underlie these rules and which impact upon their 
interpretation and understanding.37
Subjective social standards and attitudes influence the application of rules, and confusion 
and an absence of predictability can arise where there is a re-interpretation or even non­
application of an existing rule. However, Hughes encourages such developments, noting, 
“it is precisely this social phenomenon of acceptance and application that lifts a system of 
rules out of the printed page and makes it a system of law”.38 Similarly Schneider 
highlights the importance of the common law, the discretion exercised by the judiciary 
and the doctrinal flexibility evident in the legal process. Relying upon Dean Levi, he 
regards these judicial freedoms as necessary for the progression of laws and for the 
incorporation of existing social policies.
“The categories used in the legal process must be left ambiguous in 
order to permit the infusion of new ideas...even where legislation or a 
constitution is involved. The words used by the legislature or the 
constitutional convention must come to have new meanings... In this 
manner the laws come to express the ideas of the community and even 
when written in general terms, in statute or constitution, are molded 
for the specific case.”39
Attempting to secure the optimum manner in which any judicial discretion in the 
application of rules should be exercised, is a difficult task.40 Whilst allowing discretion to 
be exercised unmonitored and uncontrolled is not advisable, Pound points to the 
“increasing number of situations where what is to be done or exactly how it is to be done, 
must be left to the court’s individual sense of what is right and just”.41 In such instances, 
flexibility for judicial interpretation in the circumstances may result in a more fair 
decision and may be defensible where it gives best effect to any underlying social policy
37 Supra n. 12 at 436.
n Ibid at 432.
39 Levi EH An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (University o f Chicago Press) (1949) at 4, quoted by CE 
Schneider, supra n 6 at 56.
40 Stewart R “The Reformation o f  American Administrative Law” (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 at 1701. 
Stewart regards such a goal as “unrealistic and unwise” which in itself would turn on subjective judgments.
41 Supra n. 8 at 929. Similarly Wilentz supra n. 5 at 884, notes “there seems to be no steadfast rule as to 
what method to apply to a case nor how a case should be decided. It is as complex as life itself.”
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aims. In this regard, Fuller highlights the importance of identifying the purpose of the 
rule and he regards this purpose as the underlying reasoning behind any application of 
that rule. The understanding of the purpose is more likely to result in the ‘correct’ result 
ultimately being achieved whilst the poor enunciation of any underlying purpose will 
make the process less undemocratic and unpredictable in effect. In this regard, all 
attempts to create and enact laws should seek to diminish the gap, if any, between what 
the law is and ought to be, and in realising the impossibility of successful attainment 
through absolute rules, must in turn recognise the role of the judiciary in bridging this
gap.
In family law, where fairness is a key policy aim, it is typical for both the legislature and 
the judiciary to shy away from the development of absolute rules.42 It is all but 
impossible to create a fixed rule applicable in every case that would fairly decide the 
outcome of all or even most family law disputes and thus such an approach is not 
typically adopted in family law legislation. Rather if a view is adopted that principles of 
fairness supersede those of democracy and predictability, the legislative approach to 
regulation will mandate a capacity for judicial discretion to be exercised. Quite clearly in 
the context of ancillary relief on divorce, the Irish legislature has chosen not to create 
fixed rules; rather at best it has established basic standards, such as ‘proper provision’43 
and ‘reasonable maintenance’;44 deciding that the best means of achieving these goals 
requires the detail of the orders to be left to the courts. The unique facts of each divorce 
case before the courts and the enormous variability in the circumstances of the parties in 
every marriage typically though not always, militate against any suggestion that one rule 
will resolve all cases. The legislative approach to asset distribution, in allocating almost 
absolute discretion to the judiciary suggests such a prioritisation of the principle of
42 The jurisdictions considered in the course o f this work, primarily, Ireland, California, Scotland and New  
Zealand illustrate varying approaches to regulation, with only California adopting a rule-based system o f  
asset division.
43 Section 5 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996.
44 Section 21 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
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fairness in the individual circumstances. The Irish regulatory approach is set out and 
critically assessed in chapter 3 below.45
2.2 Discretion
“Discretion is an authority conferred by law to act in certain conditions 
or situations in accordance with an official’s or an official agency’s 
own considered judgment and conscience. It is an idea of morals, 
belonging to the twilight zone between law and morals.”46
Hughes highlights the importance of discretion-based adjudication in the context of an 
effective legal system. Whilst he recognises the role of rules and the need to observe their 
content, he is of the view that “in a functioning legal system all of these activities are 
carried on with a careful eye to the prospect of adjudication and all are thus influenced 
and affected by the decision making process.”47 In advocating the use of discretion and 
the “reasoned adjudicative decision” Jowell recognises the important role of discretion in 
the context of the application of rules to behaviour in order to avoid the stark application 
of a rule without explanation.
2.2.1 Effect of discretion-based justice
Pound regards discretion as “the effective individualizing agency in the administration of 
justice.”48 He is of the view that once there is scope for the exercise of judicial discretion 
there is a capacity for an individualised approach to each case, causing the particular 
circumstances of the parties to influence the outcome. Whilst the exercise of 
discretionary powers allows each case to be determined by reference to its facts and the 
ubiquitous goal of fairness, in practice the exercise of discretion rarely absolutely 
individualises the law in its application. More typically, an element of discretion is
45 The regime operated under Californian Jaw is the obvious exception to this discretion-based approach to 
asset distribution, even though there does exist a very limited discretion not to apply the equal division rule 
and relatively significant judicial freedoms in respect o f the capacity and circumstances in which to order 
the payment o f ongoing spousal support; see further chapter 4 below.
46 Pound R, supra n. 8 at 926.
47 Supra n. 12 at 414.
48 Supra n. 8 at 925.
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exercisable by the court, with reference to the over-riding rules of governance. Posner 
considers the role of the adjudicator and the task before him, and concludes that “the 
highest realistic aspiration of a judge faced with a difficult case is to make a ‘reasonable’ 
(practical, sensible) decision, as distinct from a demonstrably correct one.”49 Dworkin 
notes the increased judicial willingness in more recent times to overrule existing 
precedents and statutory provisions,50 the former because of conflicting rules or changing 
social policies and expectations, the latter more typically through varied interpretations. 
However he qualifies this acknowledgment with recognition of the limitations on the 
judicial power to change existing doctrine, and the need to invoke acceptable principles 
or policies to legitimate any such departure.51 Davis comments on how discretionary 
justice is often complicated by pressures, personalities and politics, noting the 
complexities of the decision-making process, commenting that even the simplest 
administration of justice “may involve questions of justice, law, facts, policy, politics and 
ethics”.52 As a result, he believes that the operation of modem government is effectively 
impossible without discretionary power. However not every commentator favours 
discretion-based justice. In support of his particular criticisms, Pound quotes from the 
unreported, but oft-cited judgment of Lord Camden, who spoke damningly of discretion.
“The Discretion Of A Judge Is The Law Of Tyrants; It Is Always 
Unknown; It is Different In Different Men; It is Casual And Depends 
Upon Constitution, Temper, And Passion. In The Best It is Often­
times Caprice; In The Worst It Is Every Vice, Folly And Passion To 
Which Human Nature Is Liable.53
49 Posner R The Problems o f  Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press) (1990) at 456. See also Simon D “A 
Psychological Model o f  Judicial Decision Making” (1998) 30 Rutgers L.J. 1.
50 Supra n. 9 at 37.
51 Without such a requirement, Dworkin, ibid  at fn. 20 notes, “no rule could be said to be binding”.
52 Supra n. 1 at 24. Davis identifies an almost accidental source for the development o f  discretionary power 
in the twentieth century, blaming “the zeal o f those who a generation or two ago were especially striving to 
protect against excessive discretionary power. They attempted too much...” He surmises that in attempting 
to eliminate the possibility o f  arbitrary decision making powers, the legal system became rigid and 
inflexible, and ultimately unworkable without discretion.
53 Supra n. 8 at 926.
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2.2.2 Source of discretionary powers
“Discretion is indispensable for individualized justice, for creative 
justice, for new programs in which no one yet knows how to formulate 
rules, and for old programs in which some aspect cannot be reduced to 
rules.”S4
Reliance upon discretion-based regulation can deliberately occur in instances where the 
legislature has considered an issue and chosen to allocate discretionary power for its 
resolution. Equally instances arise where a novel question comes before the court, and 
discretion is by necessity exercised unilaterally by the presiding judge. Dworkin, with 
reference to positivism notes that “when a case is not covered by a clear rule, a judge 
must exercise his discretion to decide that case by what amounts to a fresh piece of 
legislation.”55 In a common law jurisdiction, whilst the power of the judiciary in relation 
to most issues is statutorily governed, the courts will also be guided by principles of 
natural and/or constitutional justice and the fundamental requirements of fairness, equity 
and justice. Pound acknowledges the subjective nature of discretion; the power being 
exercised in accordance with the official’s considered judgment and conscience, and 
often without reference to, or reliance upon, the conferring authority. He highlights in 
particular, the role of morals and their consideration in the decision-making process. He 
suggests that the outcome is in essence, an unknown mix of law and morals, identifiable 
only through reliance upon the judgment and conscience of the adjudicator.56
The exercise of discretion by different adjudicators, even in the same context, will, in the 
words of Lord Camden, vary depending upon each one’s ‘constitution, temper and 
passion’ and inconsistency will invariably follow. Davis suggests that the application of 
different judicial standards is acceptable in American thinking,57 perhaps because of the 
desire to avoid the strict application of the fixed rule of law to trivial incidents. Although 
reliance upon discretionary justice can be defended on the premise that “the prime 
requirement of justice is not to penalize all violators but... to avoid penalizing the
54 Supra n. 1 at 216.
55 Supra n. 9 at 31.
56 Supra n. 8 at 926.
57 Supra n. 1 at 168.
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innocent”, Davis argues that the discretion-based system fails to distinguish between 
“unevenness from unavoidable imperfections in detection systems and unevenness in 
conscious choices made by officers who are administering justice.”58 Essentially, he is of 
the view that the argument for discretion, in whatever form, is weakened by the fact of 
the individual power on the part of the adjudicator.
“The discretionary power to be lenient is an impossibility without a 
concomitant discretionary power not to be lenient, and injustice from 
the discretionary power not to be lenient is especially frequent...”59
Independently both rules and discretion are valuable tools in the decision-making 
process. Discretion, whilst useful for the consideration of the individual case, and the tool 
utilised to ensure fairness, cannot stand alone and justice requires a mix with rules, which 
introduce the benefits of democracy and certainty.60 When utilised together they can 
introduce predictability whilst allowing scope for the individual circumstances of a case 
to be taken into account. To provide for the unexpected case or the peculiar 
circumstances, most jurisdictions considered in this work insist that discretion plays some 
part in the asset distribution process on divorce. The choice of regulatory approach will 
dictate the source of the governing laws and in turn the manner in which family law and 
policy will develop. Whether any of the four jurisdictions to be considered has achieved 
an effective balance between rules and discretion will be assessed in the course of this 
thesis. It will be argued that the relative importance placed upon one or more of the 
benchmarks of democracy, fairness and predictability will greatly influence the 
regulatory approach adopted in each jurisdiction.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid  at 170. Similarly Garrison, supra  n. 3 at 412 notes that “vague rules increase the likelihood that the 
characteristics o f the judge, the court, or the community may affect the outcome.” She further states that as 
distinct from rules, discretion based standards are not capable o f providing as much certainty to litigants 
who might prefer to settle their case.
60 Supra n. 1 at 232-234. Davis calls for a considerably better brand o f  discretionary justice for individual 
parties. He suggests cutting back on unnecessary discretionary power and finding better ways to confine, to 
structure and to check unnecessary discretionary power.
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2.3 Principles, policies and standards
2.3.1 Introduction
It has been suggested that ‘goodness’ is the ultimate test of the work of a Justice.61 The 
use of such a vague and indefinable term to assess the work of the judiciary is indicative 
of the indistinct science of adjudication. Bell highlights the difficulties in devising rules 
with adequate precision to fit the multitude of scenarios that might arise, with 
consequential informal adjustments being repeatedly, yet necessarily, made in their 
application. Certainly, the problem of over-inclusive rules can cause excessive penalising 
of conduct, thereby requiring formal or informal relaxation of those rules in order to 
ensure that justice is achieved. Equally, the drafting of vague rules which deliberately 
rely upon the discretionary powers of the judiciary can give rise to misinterpretation and 
inconsistency. One means of guiding the judiciary to achieve the desired outcome in any 
given case, irrespective of the nature or composition of the law, is an indication of the 
policy objectives that those laws seek to achieve. Both the rigidity of fixed rules and the 
absolute freedom of uncontrolled judicial discretion highlight the importance of legal 
norms which reflect the overriding objectives of the law in a given area and serve to 
guide the application of that law, whatever its form. Principles, policies and standards, 
when considered as a collective, can be regarded as less detailed and precise in their 
impact when compared to rules, thereby retaining an element of flexibility. Such an 
approach places the emphasis upon the over-riding aims of the laws and may facilitate the 
‘proper’ application of the law, whatever its formation.
Whilst the principle of democracy might demand that rules are created by the legislature, 
it is less clear where best to place responsibility for the identification of principles and 
policies. In addition the mere recognition of such principles and polices does not 
guarantee predictability and certainty in the regulation process. They might however 
positively impact upon the parties’ capacity to negotiate a settlement, should they more
61 Skelly Wright J “Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.” (1971) 84 Harv 
L.Rev. 769, 797.
62 Bell J “Discretionary Decision-Making: A Jurisprudential View”, in Davis (ed) supra n. 1 at 90. Earlier 
in that work Davis discusses such ‘informal’ practices, which fail to apply the rule as written, referring in 
detail to the police practice o f  selective enforcement.
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clearly state the aims and intended effects of the law. Certainly Hughes suggests that 
where “laws are incurably incomplete...we must decide the penumbral cases rationally 
by reference to social aims.” Creating a more predictable regulatory system with 
identified policy aims might stabilise the negotiation process and allow for bargaining in 
a less opaque context. In addition fairness might be more easily attained if as a result, it is 
in the first instance more easily identifiable in the context of over-riding principles and 
policy aims.
2.3.2 Principles
Pound insists that a principle is not a rule; rather it “is a starting point for reasoning in 
arriving at a determination, not a fixed prescribing of an exact result.” 64 Consequently 
principles represent the underlying reasons for enacting a statute and for seeking to 
achieve a certain goal. Where legislatively or judicially pronounced, the rule is the 
articulation of the aims of those principles. In addition as the law develops the principles 
remain. Thus Pound suggests that the decision-making process, in relying upon rules 
where they exist, is ultimately guided in its function by the original underlying 
principles65 and notes that the “maturity of the law relies habitually upon principles”.66
In considering the functional limits of legality, Jowell regards principles as “normative 
moral standards by which rules can be evaluated” which address “justice and fairness in 
the judicial situation”.67 In this regard Jowell notes that whilst rules have the capacity to 
be rigidly and mechanically applied, the application of a standard or principles requires,
63 Supra n. 12 at 417. At 431, Hughes recognises the complexity o f  the law, referring to it as “a collection 
o f interwoven prescriptive and purposive statements which we marshall and deploy in the adjudication of  
disputes and also in the tendering o f  advice”. He notes that where “the meaning o f a statute is not plain, or 
where precedent is not massed, such arguments are more likely to succeed.”
64 Supra n. 8 at 925.
65 Ibid. Pound at 927-928 notes that the judge’s function is to reach a reasoned decision in light o f existing 
principles. However despite the impact o f such guiding principles, Pound concedes at 929 that there are “an 
increasing number o f  situations where what is to be done or exactly how it is to be done, must be left to the 
court’s individual sense o f  what is right and just conscientiously applied.”
66 Ibid  at 927. Whilst the complexities o f  life prevent the reduction o f all matters to rules, the presence o f  
principles can form the basis o f  the developing rules and practice.
67 Supra n. 20 at 134. Jowell considers them to arise typically in the form o f  maxims, which arise mainly in 
the context o f  judicial law-making.
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in addition to establishing a certain fact, “a qualitative appraisal of the fact, in terms of its 
probable consequence or moral justification”.68 In family law, principles can often 
constitute the extent of the guidance offered in legislative enactments, leaving the 
judiciary to decipher and adjudicate upon the relevant factors in the case before them. It 
is at this point that the judiciary must rely upon the more general notions of justice, 
equity and fairness. Ely has considered the best means of identifying such fundamental 
values and notes the lack of direction available.69 The consequence of the absence of 
sufficient guidance is the varying emphases that judges will inevitably place on different 
values, not just in light of changing social ideas and ideals, but also more subjectively, in 
light of their own ideas and ideals. The identification of what might constitute 
fundamental rights and values will depend upon matters such as tradition, reason, public 
consensus, morals and the law. What is not clear is whose tradition or reason will be the
70source of those rights and values.
2.3.3 Policies
Legislation can be regarded as a legal instrument to mandate societal and behavioural 
standards and is broadly defined as the process of making written law.71 A legislative 
enactment can, for example, create or confirm legal obligations and/or entitlements, and 
to this end give effect to over-riding social policies in a given area. Similarly a judicial 
ruling, with or without related governing legislation, can identify or extend the direction 
of the relevant underlying social policy. Where clarity exists or develops regarding the 
policy aims of a given area of regulation, the creation or implementation of laws should 
be a far simpler process. If social policy is identified and understood, the drafting of legal 
provisions, or adjudication of disputes should be a far less arduous task. Certainly the 
enactment of detailed legislation identifying the underlying values and policy objectives 
will be more easily and effectively applied by a presiding judge. In addition where there 
remains scope for some judicial development of underlying social policy, in light of the
68 Ibid  at 136, 137.
69 Ely JH Democracy and Distrust: A Theory o f Judicial Review (Harvard University Press) (1980); see 
generally chapter 3 “Discovering Fundamental Values” at 43-72.
See later in this chapter at section 4.2 for a consideration o f subjective legal reasoning.
71 Oxford Dictionary o f  Law (Oxford) (5th ed) (2002) at 285.
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particular circumstances and evolving social norms, such a policy-driven, dual approach 
to law-making is more likely to be both evolutionary and effective. Even in an uncertain 
context, the capacity to refer to political debates as a source of enunciated principles and 
policies can inform and direct the presiding judge, thereby bringing about a more 
democratic and predictable outcome.
However such policies are not always evident, Davis has identified three reasons for the 
frequent lack of policy aims underlying a legislative enactment, reasons which arise in all 
areas of regulation.72 He refers to the lack of confidence in the knowledge of the 
individual legislators as a cause for the overly-vague formulations of objectives, where 
specific and precise objectives are required. Further, he notes that the development of 
policy regarding difficult issues is often regarded as most easily done on the basis of 
considering one concrete problem at a time; generalising in advance is often beyond the 
capacity of the best of minds. Finally, particularly in respect of issues involving 
controversial subject matter, he recognises that it can be difficult for the legislature to 
achieve consensus, typically resulting in a more vague and general statement, if any, of 
legislative objectives.
2.3.4 Standards
Standards, by definition, suggest a community consensus, whereby the adjudicator 
invoking the standard to amend or develop the law, can do so legitimately.73 The 
identification and assessment of shared community values is a transient matter, historical 
and traditional principles are invariably interpreted in the light of current social norms 
and accepted values. Thus although a standard is certainly a legitimate starting point for 
decision making, its sufficiency has to be questioned.74 Whilst it is not unreasonable to
72 Supra n. 1 at 45-46.
73 Supra n. 20 at 138. Jowell notes that standards depend “for their meaningful application upon the 
existence o f a community norm”. Criticisms will arise where there is an unexplained expression o f a 
personal preference on the part o f  a judge. Reliance upon evolving standards is more easily justified where 
reasoned explanations are forthcoming from the decision-maker.
74 Ibid, earlier at 25-26, Jowell highlights the requirement for a decision to “appeal to some decision­
making guide, which ideally is sufficiently specific to qualify as a rule, principle, or standard.” However 
whilst he notes that to decide outside such boundaries is akin to considering the issue in an “intellectual
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conclude that rules and standards need to co-exist properly to create an effective system 
of regulation, Jowell regards standards as “directives more general than rules. Their 
purpose is to specify policies while retaining the benefit of flexibility”.75
In essence, standards are the basic levels of justice that must be achieved by the presiding 
judge in resolving a case. Directions such as “in the interests of justice” and “as the court 
sees fit” are the typical standards required of the judiciary when making decisions in 
family law cases. How the courts secure the standards of justice or fairness will typically 
be determined by the application of the relevant principles and/or rules. Thus standards 
can be likened to policies -  they indicate what should be achieved, with principles being 
utilised as part of the guidance necessary to secure those goals.
2.3.5 Conclusion
The proper understanding on the part of the law-enforcer of the purpose of the rule is 
more likely to result in the achievement of the ‘correct’ result, which might mean, for 
example, the fairest result in the circumstances. In this regard, the law-makers, in creating 
the law, must seek to diminish the gap, if any, between what the law is and ought to be, 
and where this proves difficult to achieve, can in turn recognise the role of the judiciary 
in bridging this gap. Certainly in the context of asset distribution on marital breakdown, it 
is often the identification of the aim of the process that can prove the most challenging 
task for law-makers.76 Once there exists an agreement as to the aims of a particular 
regime, it is perhaps less difficult to both create and apply the laws, in order to achieve 
those end goals. Where the law enforcer understands the aims of the law, applying the 
law in order to achieve those policy aims is more simple and ultimately successful. Even
void”, it is important to the democratic nature o f the decision-making process that one basis o f justification 
does not ignore the importance o f  others.
75 Ibid  at 136.
76 The absence o f  policy aims and objectives to underpin and direct the application o f  the Irish divorce laws 
has given rise to an unpredictable and inconsistent body o f law. This legislative failure has been addressed 
on an ad hoc basis by the judiciary, resulting in continuing uncertainty for parties to a divorce. It is 
suggested later in this work at chapter 3, especially at section 6.6, that the Irish law-makers will need to 
reassess the regulatory process in place with reference to its social and legal policy context.
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in a discretion-based system, the pre-identification of the policy aims and goals of laws 
allows the judiciary to make whatever orders necessary to achieve those policy aims.
Drawing distinctions between principles, policies and standards is neither a simple nor a 
hugely productive task given that they overlap in both theory and practice. They can 
individually or collectively, be regarded as tools for the identification and/or expression 
of the over-riding social policy aims. In this regard principles, policies and standards can 
be said to represent both the context and the end-goal and are typically supported by 
legislative provisions and/or judicial pronouncements. In the four jurisdictions considered 
in this thesis, the policy aims of each regulatory system are considered. It appears that 
where the law-makers have identified policy aims, principles and/or standards, the 
application of the legal rules and the exercise of judicial discretion is typically more
77guided and the process more transparent. It will become apparent that the underlying 
values and social policy aims of a regulatory process are crucial to its correct
7 0
interpretation and application. Whilst principles and policies might not equate to 
absolute rules, it is arguable that they can go far enough as a guiding tool to ensure 
adequate levels of democracy and predictability are achieved whilst still facilitating a 
more subjectively based test of fairness, where necessary.
3 Creating the law
The principle of democracy demands a transparent and accountable system of law­
making whilst fairness demands a just outcome with like cases being treated alike. Within 
the legal system, various parties influence the outcome of a case. The law-makers in 
many jurisdictions are, in fact, typically comprised of both the legislature and the 
judiciary, and the extent of their respective influence is determined by the nature of the
77 The legislature in both Scotland and New Zealand has incorporated principles and policies into the 
governing laws to guide the judiciary as to the intended objectives o f  the regulatory process. This has 
proven a useful method for curbing inappropriate use of judicial direction; see further chapters 5 and 6 
respectively.
78 It is argued in the conclusion o f  this thesis that the fundamental weakness in the asset distribution process 
on divorce under Irish law is its failure to identify the social policy aims o f  the Irish divorce laws, causing 
those laws to operate within a social policy vacuum.
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governing law and the scope for its development upon application to the facts. In the 
process of deciding a given case, laws are either applied as stated, or alternatively evolve, 
given a novel aspect in the circumstances before the court, or a change in the underlying 
social policy. This section will consider the role of the legislature as law-maker, 
responsible for the creation of rules to be applied to all relevant cases and conversely the 
delegation of law-making powers to the presiding judge who acts as law enforcer by 
applying a pre-existing rule, or law creator, by deciding the case and thereby creating 
new law. The approach adopted by each jurisdiction considered in this work and their 
regard for the principles of certainty, democracy and predictability will be considered 
individually in the remaining five chapters.
3.1 Creating rules
Legislative rules greatly impact upon the adjudicatory process and can significantly 
restrict the freedoms and powers of a judge in deciding how to determine a dispute.
Whilst rules can operate to restrict the abuse of excessive discretionary power, the 
legislature will often seek to balance the creation of rules with the exercise of discretion, 
rather than omit discretion entirely. In so doing, the goal of a just decision being reached 
might be more easily attained. Of course, the judiciary can also be a source of rules, such 
rules being created in the delivery of a judgment, which if novel in its reasoning or ruling 
can become the governing rule in future cases.
The form a rule takes can vary enormously, and it is important that the rule maker 
considers the most apt form in the particular area of regulation. The nature of the area of 
the law should influence the composition of the rule, so that the manner in which it is 
enacted takes account of the various possible issues and circumstances to which the rule 
might apply. In this regard experience dictates that all good law cannot be derived solely 
from legislative enactments and for law to be workable it is sometimes necessary for it to 
evolve from judicial practice and application. Fuller recognises the initiation of 
adjudication without definite rules by many regulatory agencies in the hope that “as 
knowledge was gained case by case a body of principle would emerge that would be
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understandable by all concerned and would bring their adjudicative decisions within the
*70rule of law.” Such an approach places responsibility for rule-making very firmly in the 
hands of the judiciary or administrator. Whilst such a scheme might not to be regarded as 
the ideal solution and would certainly be unworkable as the only source of law in a 
democratic society, when operated in conjunction with broad rules and/or principles, the 
end result might be closer to the optimum one. Certainly Ely suggests that the 
“insulation” of judges from the pressures faced by legislators from their constituents frees 
them to make a more dispassionate judgment in many circumstances.80
3.2 Role o f the legislature as law-maker
Nonet favourably considers the practice of transforming policies into legislative rules, a 
practice he refers to as ‘legalization’ and notes the resulting identification and 
establishment of clear substantive rights. In this regard, he suggests that policies are the 
birthplace of legislatively-created laws, such policies identifying legal norms and the 
fundamental rights of the persons subject to the laws.81 By incorporating such rights into 
statutory rules, the legislature not only gives them democratically sound, statutory-based 
recognition, but also places them in the public arena for consideration and debate.82 The 
debate and discussion leading to the legislative enactment can be accessed and relied 
upon in future applications of the rule, particularly as regards the aims it seeks to achieve. 
Another advantage of legislatively-enacted rules is the breadth of issues that can be 
provided for in the legislative process. By way of contrast, Shapiro highlights the 
unsuitability of adjudicative policymaking:
79 Supra n. 30 at 374. Fuller notes that whilst in “some instances this hope has been at least partially 
vindicated; in others it has been almost completely disappointed.”
80 Supra n. 69 at 57. O f course the converse argument is also easily made, particularly with reference to the 
importance o f public scrutiny within a system of democratic law-making.
81 Nonet P Administrative Justice: Advocacy and Change in a Government Agency (Russell Sage 
Foundation) (1969) at 6. See section 2.3 above for a discussion o f the role o f principles, policies and 
standards.
82 Ibid. By virtue o f the debate surrounding the creation o f legislatively-based rights, and the need for 
reasoned argument as to their viability or otherwise, Jowell suggests that the substance o f the rules will 
themselves by positively affected.
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“If an important or novel question is suggested by an adjudication, 
especially one not necessary to a decision, an effort to resolve it may 
end by submerging the actual controversy and delaying its conclusion 
unduly, while at the same time improperly coloring the larger issue 
and thwarting fully informed and objective consideration. Indeed, it 
may be extremely difficult to find a case that adequately presents that 
larger issue, freed from extraneous complications or possible narrower 
grounds for decision. This does not necessarily mean that the issue 
should not be dealt with, but rather that it may be more appropriate for 
“legislative” than for “judicial” treatment.”83
Determining responsibility for the reform of law, once the need has been identified, has 
always been a challenging issue. In the context of Irish divorce law the right to impose a 
clean break is effectively ignored by the governing legislation and conversely, the courts 
are given an indefeasible right to make ancillary relief orders at any time on or after 
divorce. The only attempt to address this issue has been by the judiciary, with distinctly 
different views being expressed as to the extent of judicial capacity to impose a clean 
financial break. In identifying a need for capacity to order a clean break in a suitable case, 
Keane CJ rejected the suggestion that the Irish Oireachtas
“.. .in declining to adopt the clean break approach to the extent 
favoured in England, intended that the courts should be obliged to 
abandon any possibility of achieving certainty and finality and of 
encouraging the avoidance of further litigation between the 
parties...[on] no view could such an outcome be regarded as desirable 
and I am satisfied that it is most emphatically not mandated by the 
legislation under consideration ”84
However, notwithstanding his desire to ‘reinterpret’ the existing legislative scope for an 
infinite right to apply for financial relief, he ultimately conceded the fact and supremacy 
of the legislative law-making role,
“It is of course beyond argument that the Irish legislation precludes the 
courts from giving the same effect as does the English legislation to 
the "clean break" principle.”85
83 Supra n. 29 at 940.
84 T v T  [2002] 3 I.R 334 per Keane CJ at 364.
85 Ibid at 363. The approach o f  the Irish judiciary to existing and under-developed legislative policy is 
considered at length in chapter 3.
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3.3 Role o f the judiciary as law-maker
“Building law through adjudication is a sound and necessary
process’ 6
The courts are traditionally regarded as the forum for the application and enforcement of 
pre-existing rules in a system where such rules are more typically created by the 
legislature. However in practice it is evident that judges typically play a more pro-active 
role than that of mere enforcer. Whether arising from the absence of laws or because of 
the apparent unworkability of an existing law, it is not unusual forjudges to embrace 
their role as law and policy maker. In such a scenario, the significance and importance of 
a judicial law-making role can be difficult to deny. As a deliberate means of progressing 
the law however, the merits and viability of judicial law-making must be considered 
further. Issues of democracy and public scrutiny immediately arise, as do potential 
difficulties with the imposition of subjective judicial views and values.
Whilst reliance upon judicial discretion might not immediately represent a democratic 
basis for law-making, if sufficiently guided by statutory guidelines and policy statements, 
it can more easily be regarded as an acceptable and necessary source of law. In the 
context of asset distribution on marital breakdown the merits of judicially-developed 
legal policy are debatable, given the breadth of possible outcomes in any one case and the 
scope for imposition of moral judgments. The difficulties and uncertainties that this poses 
for litigants and lawyers alike suggests that absolute judicial freedom to decide cases on 
broad principles of justice and fairness might not be the most efficient or fair means of 
developing law and policy in this area. In addition, whilst the particular facts of a case 
may warrant a judge straying significantly from pre-existing decisions, once the judgment 
is delivered it exists as a future guide, and depending upon the status of the court in 
question, may impose a new direction on lower courts. Equally however, an overly 
restrictive view of the scope for judicial law and policy making might prevent the 
delivery of a legitimate and perhaps necessary judicial development of law and/or
86 Hart HLA The Concept o f  Law (Clarendon Press) (1961) at 57.
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R7valuable policy statements. Whilst rules might represent the considered legislative 
answer for regulating areas of human behaviour, both their relevance and workability 
come to the fore upon their application to factual situations. The importance of judicial 
experience and the development of a body of principles in this context have highlighted 
the valid law-making role of adjudicators in the legal process. In fact, Pound regards 
these “logical deductions” by the judiciary as a “most important part of our law”.88
3.4 Who creates the underlying principles and policy aims?
It has already been suggested that the creation of guiding principles and policies would 
not only eliminate the allocation of “too much freedom” to the courts; it might bring the 
process closer to achieving satisfactory results.89 A key issue is the source of the 
underlying principles and policies and the identification of who is best placed to develop 
them. Where identified, such aims can simply be stated by the rule-maker at the time of 
the creation of the rule or can be articulated as governing principles to be utilised as a 
guide by the law-enforcer. Alternatively the creation of principles can be the 
responsibility of the law-enforcer, to be developed alongside the application of rules. This 
might be regarded as the more difficult approach to the creation of principles as they are 
more likely to be developed on an ad hoc basis as part of the learning curve for the law 
enforcer. Parkinson notes that the absence of an indication from the legislature as to the 
outcome that the trial judge should seek to achieve, is evidence of legislative “delegation 
of responsibility”.90 This suggests that the first responsibility for creating policy rests
87 Such policy statements and directions from the Irish judiciary in the context o f applications for ancillary 
relief on divorce are considered in chapter 3, below.
88 Supra n. 34 at 317.
89 Agell A “Grounds and Procedures Reviewed” chapter 3 of Economic Consequences o f  Divorce: The 
International Perspective (Clarendon Press) (Oxford) (1992) Weitzman L and Maclean M (ed). At 60/61 
Agell notes that all participants in the surveyed group o f lawyers agreed on the necessity o f legislation on 
the basic principles for distribution o f  property. See section 2.3.3 above for a consideration o f the 
importance o f  identifying underlying policy aims.
90 Parkinson P “The Yardstick o f  Equality: Assessing Contributions in Australia and England” [2005] 19 
IJLP&F 163 at 166. With reference to Chisholm (1995) Parkinson notes that “[0]ne judge o f the Family 
Court has likened the judge’s situation to a bus driver, who is given countless instructions about how to 
drive the bus, and the authority to do various actions such as turning left or right. There is also the 
occasional advice or correction offered by three senior drivers. The one piece o f information which he or 
she is not given is where to take the bus. All he or she is told is that the driver is required to drive to a 
reasonable destination.”
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with the legislature, and it is only where that responsibility is deliberately or by omission 
transferred to the judiciary that it is then for the courts to bridge the existing policy gap.
Where the judiciary is tasked with the identification of the principles to guide the 
application of the law, they become the law-makers. In this regard, they may continue to 
rely upon available legislative direction or perhaps may themselves identify the over­
riding societal and legal needs. Historically judges have not shied away from imposing 
their social policy views on existing laws, both in their interpretation and application, 
suggesting once again, that the effect of a rule is only determined by the manner of its 
application. Hart supports a limited version of this role for the judiciary, refusing to 
accept the conclusiveness of a rule, noting “there is nothing in the nature of a legal rule 
inconsistent with all questions being open to reconsideration in the light of a social 
policy”.91
The lack of conclusive agreement as to the optimum law-maker is illustrated in the 
analysis of the four jurisdictions considered in this thesis. The Californian legislature has 
resolved the issue of asset distribution in the abstract and the judiciary are essentially 
mandated to apply the equal division rule. In Scotland, the legislature has expressly 
identified the principles governing the distribution of assets on marital breakdown and it 
is for the courts to make the necessary orders pursuant to the attainment of those 
legislatively stated principles. Similarly the New Zealand legislature has taken 
responsibility for stating both the governing rules and principles; whilst relying upon 
judicial adjudication within relatively strict pre-determined circumstances. Conversely 
the Irish legislature has failed to identify governing principles and thus the courts have 
attempted to address this shortfall in the course of determining marital disputes. Davis et 
al refer favourably to the approach taken by the Scottish Law Commission which 
engaged in extensive consultation on the issue of re-framing their process for asset 
distribution. They note that the first task identified for action by the Commission was the 
need “to address the question of what, in broad terms, the objective of financial provision
91 Hart HLA “Positivism and the Separation o f Law and Morals” 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 at 615.
92 The legislative rule o f equal division is not absolute in nature; the extent o f  the judicial discretion 
exercisable is set out in chapter 4, below.
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on divorce ought to be.”93 Notwithstanding the legislative articulation of these principles, 
it still remains for the judiciary to make the necessary orders to achieve them. 
Interestingly, however, although Miles recognises the New Zealand approach as premised 
upon a pro-active legislature that has directed the courts to “resolve cases by reference to 
more or less closely defined statutory rules and principles”, she ultimately concludes that 
the system is flawed because there are “too many principles”.94 Thus, whilst the judicial 
obligation to take account of the particular circumstances remains an important aspect of 
the process, excessive judicial freedom is curbed by the legislatively created duty to 
adhere to the over-riding principles and policies. Relying upon Clive, Davis et al suggest 
that without stated policy, there will remain chaos in family law and particularly in 
respect of ancillary relief orders.95
3.5 Principles and policies -  dual legislative and judicial roles?
The uncertainty that would attach to absolute judicial freedom to develop legal policy 
demands that such an approach should be avoided. However in order to preserve the 
important role of the adjudicator in the decision-making process generally, 
complementary roles can exist for the legislature and the judiciary in the identification of 
policy aims. Legislatively-identified state policy can be supported by the development in 
practice of governing principles, in the course of the adjudication of cases before the 
courts. With such an approach, the legislature or courts might choose to emphasise 
certain principles, such as fairness in the guise of compensation, non-discrimination and 
equal sharing. Ultimately, whatever principles are judicially developed, they can be 
governed by, and subject to, the established statutory rules and directions, thereby 
retaining some level of democratic control and ensuring relatively predictable outcomes.
93 Davis, Pearce, Bird, Woodward and Wallace “Ancillary Relief Outcomes” [2000] 12 CFLQ 43. This, in 
due course, was translated into five ‘principles’ which were then incorporated into Scottish law by section 9 
o f the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
94 Miles J “Principle or Pragmatism in Ancillary Relief: The Virtues o f Flirting with Academic Theories 
and other Jurisdictions” 19 [2005] IJLP&F 242 at 251-252.
95 Supra n. 93 at 61.
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Whilst Hughes does not accept the notion of dual law-making roles for the legislature and 
judiciary and regards the primary function of the courts as the administration of justice 
and not the attainment of policy goals, he recognises the creative role of the judge, given 
that the “laws are incurably incomplete”96 and the need to consider contemporary social 
aims. However, identifying and establishing means to secure policy goals is, in his view, 
a broader issue for the legislature. He regards the legislature as best placed to create 
policy and identify principles with the judicial role to create policy only arising in the 
context of legislative shortcomings or failures. The alternate view is that the judiciary is 
better placed to dictate and develop policy within the context of adjudicating actual cases. 
Where such an approach is favoured, Lord Nicholls has emphasised the need for these 
judicially developed principles to be
“...identified and spelled out as clearly as possible. This is important, 
so as to promote consistency in court decisions and in order to assist 
parties and their advisers and mediators in resolving disputes by 
agreement as quickly and inexpensively as possible.”97
3.6 Conclusion
Independently, both rules and discretion are valuable tools in the decision-making 
process. The creation of an agreed set of principles upon which decisions regarding asset 
distribution are made would be welcomed by most parties who are affected by divorce 
proceedings; litigants, lawyers and the courts. Where there exists capacity to refer to 
stated guiding principles such as compensation, equality or reasonable needs, there 
should be significantly less scope for the delivery of a wayward judgment. Miles supports 
this view, noting that the “[AJdoption of a clearer set of principles... would provide 
increased certainty for litigants and a more satisfactory ideological foundation for the
96 Supra n. 12 at 417.
97 White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981 at 984. Douglas and Perry note the difficulties presented to both the 
courts and to inter partes negotiations by the “lack o f any clear objective in the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 or o f any ranking o f  the factors in section 25(2)”. Douglas G and Perry A “Research: How Parents 
Cope Financially on Separation And Divorce -  Implications For the Future O f Ancillary R elief’ [2001] 
CFLQ 67 at 70. Attempts by the Irish judiciary to fill the policy gap currently existing in the divorce laws 
have been largely unsuccessful, as set out in chapter 3 below.
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law.” Undoubtedly the development of reliable principles and policy would be likely to 
create much greater certainty and consistency within the divorce and asset distribution 
environment, and facilitate the predictable application of the law. In addition, the creation 
of recognised principles and underlying policies might remove the perceived mystique 
and inconsistency surrounding the possible outcomes of a judicial hearing and create a 
greater willingness for a more quickly negotiated settlement of the issues. The potential 
source of these principles is numerous; legislative, judicial or both, as will be evident in 
the examination of the regulatory approaches of the four jurisdictions considered in 
chapters 3 to 6 below.
4 Impact of judicial discretion
4.1 Introduction
“Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.
When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal 
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course 
prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the 
Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of 
giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving 
effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of 
the law.”99
Marshall CJ (above) refutes any suggestion that judges themselves make law, declaring 
that the role of the court is merely to give effect to the will of the legislature.100 
Conversely Jowell rejects the suggestion that the application of rules can always be 
mechanical, referring to the important role of the decision maker,
“ .. .because rules are purposive devices (they are techniques to 
effectuate a broader policy) and thus because language is largely 
uncertain in its application to situations that cannot be foreseen, the
98 Supra n. 94 at 242.
99 Marshall CJ Osborn v. Bank o f  United States 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824).
100 Somewhat less severely, Wilentz CJ supra n. 5 at 865 notes the possibility o f  regarding rules as a means 
o f limiting the power o f  the judiciary, suggesting that “all a judge need do is apply predetermined rules to 
the facts o f a case...the outcome when this technique is used is supposedly predictable and stable.”
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applier of the rule will frequently have a degree of discretion in 
interpreting its scope.”101
Whilst the governing provisions might typically be enacted by the legislature, it is only in 
their application that their impact is apparent. In this regard the effect of the law depends 
upon the implementation of its provisions, within a courtroom, or in negotiations in 
anticipation of a ruling. Thus although a rule might dictate acceptable standards of 
behaviour and the consequences for breach of such standards, in itself it is ineffectual 
until enforced. On this basis, Hughes highlights the importance of adjudication in the 
context of the legal system as a whole, stating,
“.. .in a functioning legal system all of these activities are carried on 
with a careful eye to the prospect of adjudication and all are thus 
influenced and affected by the decision making process.”102
Whilst to have effect the rule might require implementation, its very existence can serve 
to influence the process more generally. In particular rules can provide the backdrop for 
inter parte negotiations, thereby facilitating bargaining based upon the fact and 
consequences of such rules. The fact of an identifiable rule with associated predictable 
outcomes, reduces the possibility of a divergent judicial ruling, places limits upon the 
expectations of divorcing parties, and ultimately encourages resolution through 
settlement.
4.2 Subjective judicial values
Judges are given the task of interpreting and applying law and are often viewed as the
103best group of persons to do so. However the allocation of the task to such a select
101 Supra n. 20 at 135.
102 Supra n. 12 at 414. Should the utopian society be created, where rules were perfectly clear and 
compliance was perfect, judicial decision-making would no longer be necessary. Until then it is regarded as 
“a very important feature o f  the operation o f  a legal system.”
103 In the context o f constitutional law and constitutional justice, Ely supra n. 69 at 56 recognises moral 
philosophy as the basis for such decisions, and equally recognises the basic idea that identifies judges as a 
group better capable than others at identifying and engaging with it. Whilst he does question the veracity o f  
this assertion, he concedes that within the institutions o f government, “ .. .courts are those best equipped to 
make moral judgments, in particular that they are better suited to the task than legislatures.”
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group does not guarantee that they will interpret and apply the law consistently.104 
Shapiro notes that in the context of discretionary power, discrepancies become visible in 
the rulings of different judges. Immediately fears arise as to the impact of subjective 
judicial values upon the key three identified aspects of an effective regulatory process; 
democracy, fairness and predictability. Caution must be exercised in respect of the 
actions of all judges; Fuller expresses a fear of cases where the essence of adjudication 
lies not in the manner in which the affected parties present the case, but rather simply in 
the office of the judge.105 The influence of the mindset and value system of a judge is a 
widely debated topic, the judges’ values arguably representing one of the significant 
factors in the decision-making process.106 Hughes discusses the difficulties for the 
attorney advising his client, and his need to take the personality of the judge into account 
as a relevant consideration regarding the likely outcome of the case. He refers to the 
views of the early American extreme realists who considered that “the concept of law has 
no meaning apart from a prediction of what judges will do.”107 Such an approach regards 
the individual values of each judge as determinative, as distinct from the legal principles 
and rules that regulate and determine issues in a rule-based system of law.
Hart queries the objectivity of the values relied upon by a judge when exercising the 
discretion accorded to him. He refers not to any objective standards used, but to those 
standards the judge “characteristically uses”,108 suggesting a subjective and 
individualised judicial approach. Ely is of the view that unavoidably
“...there will be a systematic bias injudicial choice of fundamental 
values, unsurprisingly in favor of the values of the upper-middle,
104 See the views o f Dworkin, supra  n. 9 at 35. Judges may sometimes agonise over points o f law, and two 
equally trained and educated judges will often disagree. The number and veracity o f  dissenting judgments 
on fundamental interpretations o f  the Constitution are evidence o f this very point.
105 Supra n. 30 at 365.
106 See the views o f Simon D, supra  n. 49. He notes the relationship between judges’ personal 
predispositions and the decisions they make. He regards a judge’s general attitudes, values and other 
socially-determined behavioural traits as a quasi-legal factor, which affects the ultimate decision made in a 
case. See further G. Schubert The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies o f  Supreme Court Justices 
1946-1963 (Evanston: North Western University Press) (1965)
107 Supra n. 12 at 426. Although a detailed consideration o f the realist movement is outside the scope o f this 
work, it is worth noting that political scientists have long suggested that decision-making is significantly 
influenced by a judge’s political ideology and values, reducing the value o f  legal reasoning and precedent.
108 Supra n. 86 at 144.
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professional class from which most lawyers and judges, and for that 
matter philosophers are drawn”.109
In essence what follows is an elevation in importance of the rights regarded as 
fundamental by this class of persons. Rights including privacy, freedom of expression 
and education are respected and there can be a failure to recognise the need to fight for 
the right to housing, food and an adequate standard of living. Such deprivations are 
unknown to this class of persons.110 It is this clash of classes, between the judiciary and 
many litigants, this failure to understand the needs and circumstances of many, which 
highlights one of the main shortcomings of the typically middle-upper class judiciary. In 
this regard, Schneider recognises the narrow social spectrum background of most judges, 
and the consequential influence of their limited life experiences on the adjudicatory 
processes.111 In the context of the ‘rules versus discretion’ debate, excessive judicial 
discretion permits the reliance by a judge on his own values, which can greatly influence 
the decision ultimately reached. Ely agrees, noting the futility and unworkability of 
basing a decision on ‘reason’ regarding it as an “empty source” or alternatively “so 
flagrantly elitist and undemocratic that it should be dismissed forthwith”,112 both views 
reflecting the belief that absolute discretion is fundamentally undemocratic and represents 
an inappropriate basis for decision making.113
Where rules form the basis of the law in a given area, judicial prejudices are more limited 
in effect. Where the enacted law accords discretion to the judge to decide a case ‘as he 
sees fit’ or as ‘justice’ requires, there is every opportunity for personal prejudices to 
influence the decision. The manner in which a judge adjudicates a case and the standards 
upon which he relies will undoubtedly have a bearing on how justice is measured. 
However despite the concerns that are raised concerning the excessive and undemocratic 
judicial powers that arise from aligning judicial discretion with the decision-making 
process, if appropriate checks and balances are in place it is suggested that judicial
109 Supra n. 69 at 59.
110 Ibid. at 58, 60.
111 Supra n. 6 at 84.
112 Supra n. 69 at 59.
1,3 Reason, Ely suggests, lends itself to being filled by the values o f the adjudicator in question.
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discretion can remain a vital cog in an effective legal process. Thus on the basis that there 
exists a need for some judicial discretion, the necessary and appropriate controls will now 
be considered. The importance of transparency and openness within the decision-making 
process will be identified, as will the best means for formalising these controls. Similarly 
the tools currently used to limit the excessive use or abuse of judicial discretion will be 
assessed, with reference to relevant existing laws and practice.
4.3 Structuring and limiting judicial discretion
Whilst discretion is a necessary tool in an effective decision-making process, Davis 
advocates that it be both confined and structured in order to best eliminate abuse. In 
confining discretionary power, Davis does not seek to eliminate it; rather he searches for 
the optimum level of discretion. In this regard, he recognises the weaknesses inherent in 
both excessively broad and excessively narrow discretion, the former resulting in 
arbitrariness or inequality whilst the latter exposes the parties to an insufficient 
consideration of individual circumstances. Two methods of confining discretion are 
suggested; structuring and checking. By structuring discretion its use is clarified, and in 
turn checking allows for the supervision and review of the exercise of that structured 
discretion. Interestingly, whilst the blame for the excessive use of discretion often lies 
with the judiciary who exercise it, perhaps it is primarily for the legislature to take action 
to limit the discretion available. Thus the essence of structuring is not to eliminate 
discretion but to introduce openness where it is or can be exercised; Davis regards 
openness as “the natural enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally in the fight against 
injustice.”114 He encourages the use of policy statements and rules in the context of 
administrative decision-making, regarding them as a means of closing the gap between 
agency policy, and what an outsider knows. Where determinations are made by the 
judiciary, in addition to the identified principles, policies and standards statutory 
guidelines, the common law doctrine of precedent and the delivery of reasoned 
judgments are all tools capable of limiting excessive judicial freedoms. To this end, the 
doctrine of precedent, in requiring the judiciary to follow and maintain existing legal
114 Supra n. 1 at 98.
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reasoning, serves to restrain the judiciary and protects the fundamental requirement of 
democratically created laws.
4.3.1 Legislative guidance
Where a legislative rule exists, the manner in which it is enacted may contribute to the 
judiciary’s reluctance or willingness to depart from its directions. One oft-utilised means 
of limiting judicial discretion, especially in the context of asset distribution on marital 
breakdown, is the creation of a statutory list of factors to which the court must have 
regard when reaching its conclusions. Positive criteria for consideration can be included 
in legislation, thereby requiring certain factors to be considered by the judge. Equally, 
well-calculated and structured rules can be utilised to eliminate reliance upon 
inappropriate criteria.115 Identifying relevant criteria, and demanding an explanation for 
their application might assist in securing the objective(s) of the legislative enactment.
Whilst all law seeks to manage a particular issue, perhaps the elucidation of objectives 
might in themselves provide a clearer picture for the judiciary of the legislative aim(s). 
To ensure fairness and integrity are protected within the adjudication process, the 
exercise of discretionary power by the decision-maker must operate on the basis of some 
agreed standards or principles in order to yield consistency in like cases. Whilst without 
rules a judge can draw inappropriately upon his own views of what constitutes fairness in 
the circumstances, the inclusion of legislative guidance might create the basis for more 
equitable and predictable adjudication.116 The use, to various extents, of statutory 
guidelines by each of the four jurisdictions considered in this thesis, will demonstrate 
varying levels of legislative recognition of their perceived merits and the fundamental 
need for democratically created laws. The particular approach adopted by each 
jurisdiction and the impact of such measures will be considered in chapters 3-6 below. In 
addition the sufficiency of such guidelines as a means of limiting judicial discretion
115 Jowell, supra n. 20 at 25, notes that by citing criteria to be considered by the court in the decision 
making process, the legislature is also, by implication excluding improper criteria.
116 Ibid.
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whilst achieving the over-riding regulatory aims will be gauged with reference to 
judgments delivered to date.
4.3.2 Doctrine of precedent
Another key tool for the monitoring, and where necessary admonishing, of subjective 
judicial decision-making is the doctrine of precedent, which requires that relevant 
decisions are followed. Pound emphasises the importance of the existing body of 
precedent, as a valuable tool to limit the mis-use of discretion. It serves as a supervisory 
tool and by virtue of the hierarchical courts system, wandering court decisions can be 
brought into line on appeal. Adherence to precedent secures the fundamental aims of 
predictability and certainty and more broadly facilitates bargaining in the shadow of those 
predictable outcomes.117 Davis advocates the use of and relative adherence to the doctrine 
of precedent, regarding it as a means of structuring discretion and achieving consistency 
in the decision-making process.118 A failure properly to structure discretionary powers, 
which includes a failure to follow precedent, damages the integrity of the decision­
making process:
“...the resulting case law is often spotty and even self-contradictory, 
the regulatory law remains uncertain over long periods.”119
However, whilst the courts are responsible for the development of a body of precedent, 
judicial adherence to existing decisions will not necessarily guarantee justice. 
Consequently Davis does not advocate following precedents blindly. Whilst recognising 
the importance of equality of application, he notes the difficulties arising from undue 
rigidity and the occasional need for individualised justice. Arguments based on principles
117 The impact o f predictable laws upon both the court process and attempts to negotiate a private 
settlement will be evident both in their presence and absence in the forthcoming assessment o f the 
regulatory processes in Ireland, California, Scotland and New Zealand in chapters 3-6 ahead.
118 Supra n. 1 at 98. Later at 202, Davis considers the role o f precedents in the administrative law context 
and regards them as less successful in that context in limiting the exercise o f discretion. This is primarily 
through ignorance, in so far as decisions are not communicated widely. Davis advocates strongly for the 
development o f a number o f  principles, including a strong, precedent-based prosecution policy. He 
recognises the value o f  judicial involvement in the legal process, noting how guidelines are always 
developing and necessarily yielding to new judicial decisions and new factual studies.
1,9 Ibid  at 99.
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of justice and fairness are more likely to succeed in the absence of a clear statute or 
compulsory adherence to precedent, otherwise “they may have to yield to the plain 
meaning of a statute or the weight of a venerable precedent”.120 Fuller extends this notion 
in emphasising the necessity of precedents being liberally interpreted in order to progress 
the law and to allow complicated or “polycentric problems” to be fairly considered.
“...it should be noted that the efficiency of adjudication as a whole is 
strongly affected by the manner in which the doctrine of stare decisis 
is applied. If judicial precedents are liberally interpreted and are 
subject to reformulation and clarification as problems not originally 
foreseen arise, the judicial process as a whole is enabled to absorb 
these covert polycentric elements. By considering the process of 
decision as a collaborative one projected through time, an 
accommodation of legal doctrine to the complex aspects of a problem 
can be made as these aspects reveal themselves in successive cases.
On the other hand, if a strict or “literal” interpretation is made of 
precedents, the limits of adjudication must perforce be more strictly 
drawn, for its power of accommodation has been reduced.”121
In areas of law that give rise to a different set of facts in every case, such as family law, it 
remains a pre-requisite for the achievement of justice generally, that parties receive like 
treatment before the courts. Whilst fairness might be perceived as mandating 
individualised justice; it is equally unfair to treat similar cases differently. Thus failure to 
follow precedent is only justifiable for an unlike case. Judicial discretion introduces the 
possibility of deviation from pre-existing decisions or laws, and consequently scope for 
abuse. In the particular and peculiar context of family law, the often-complicated set of 
facts that come before the court can reasonably be regarded as examples of “polycentric 
problems”.122 Excessively rigid reliance upon precedent, whilst ensuring predictability 
and consistency, might cause injustice for the parties before the court. In such instances, 
the existence of over-riding policy aims can provide a vital point of reference for the 
presiding judge in determining the fairest outcome in the circumstances.
120 Per Hughes, supra n. 12 at 431. Hughes at 423 also recognises the manner in which the doctrine o f  
precedent operates to limit the freedoms o f the judiciary, noting “precedents are not lightly to be 
disturbed...[and represent a]...hallowed theme injudicial opinions”.
121 Supra n. 30 at 398.
122 The notion o f polycentric problems is introduced earlier in this chapter at para 2.1.2.
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4.3.3 Reasoned judgments
The obligation to provide reasons for any decision reached will lessen the judge’s 
likelihood of reaching a decision without reference to rules or legal reasoning and adds 
legitimacy and transparency to the process generally. Jowell regards the obligation to 
reason as a means of providing a check against the use of improper or arbitrary criteria. 
The obligation publicly to reason the basis for a decision also acts as a check against 
arbitrary decisions, given the associated public accountability and scrutiny. Where a rule 
is avoided or newly applied, a reasoned decision is a basic and fundamental criterion, 
both to allow those affected to gain an understanding of that new reasoning and equally 
to act as a tool to monitor judicial power. Whilst reasoned opinions in themselves are 
more likely to give rise to even-handed justice, this is even more likely where those 
reasoned opinions are made available to the public.123 The publication of the reasoned 
judgment places it in the public domain and subjects it to criticism, where deserved.124 
Jowell suggests that by having to explain the rationale for the decision reached, the 
adjudicator might “look at each case anew, and preserve the flexibility that a rule may 
preclude.”125
Davis calls for a more regular use of the reasoned judgment, noting that it protects against 
careless or hasty action, helps to assure that the main facts and ideas have been 
considered, facilitates supervision of the judicial powers and assists parties to decide 
whether to appeal the decision. The judicial capacity to deliver a reasoned judgement is 
perhaps already supported by the existing adversarial nature of the court procedure. The 
participating parties are afforded the opportunity to present their best case and to propose 
legal reasoning for a ruling in their favour.127 In addition Fuller notes that the adversarial 
process combats the natural human tendency for a swift judgment, whilst affording an
123 Supra n. 1 at 97, 98. Davis recognises the importance o f the delivery o f  reasoned opinions where
discretion is exercised and states that the difference between a system o f precedents and a system o f open 
precedents is enormous. 
f24 Ibid.
125 Supra n. 20 at 24.
126 Supra n. 1 at 98.
127 Jowell supra n. 20 at 26. Adjudication involves the litigant in the decision-making process and 
guarantees the participation o f  the affected parties. Jowell notes that the participants “are well placed to 
advance the strongest case for their proposition”.
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opportunity for all of the “peculiarities and nuances” of the case to be explored.128 In 
higher courts, the availability of researchers to aid the adjudicator further ensures that a 
judge is fully cognisant with the area of law in question, and not limited, for example, to 
the cases chosen by the participating parties to support their arguments.129 Reasoned and 
researched judgments ultimately encourage “judges to contribute to the long-term 
doctrinal or conceptual development of the law.”130
Whilst Davis advocates the continuation of the discretionary power to depart from
existing precedent and to change the rules (where necessary), he states that “secret law”
• • ♦ 1  ^1 has no place in any decent system of justice. By requiring the courts to be cognisant of
any existing legislatively-based directions, demanding adherence to the doctrine of
precedent and accountability in the form of reasoned judgments, the application of rules
and the exercise of judicial discretion can become more predictable and public in nature.
Accountability, transparency and reasoning can serve to legitimate any doubts that might
otherwise surround the exercise of judicial powers. The importance of these qualities for
the individual litigant cannot be overestimated, and ultimately give rise to a better
understanding of the law.
4.4 Conclusion
Whilst it is well recognised and even constitutionally provided that the legislature shall 
be the primary law-maker in most jurisdictions, the role of the judiciary in the fine-tuning 
and interpretation of those laws remains hugely significant. The creation and 
development of law and policy need not be confined to the legislature, and even in the 
application of legislatively-created laws, there can exist meaningful and useful scope for 
the judicial development of law and policy. For example, through judicial interpretation 
and application, it is certainly possible for vague statutory standards to become
128 Supra n. 30 at 383. Fuller regards the adversarial presentation o f a case as the only effective means for 
combating the natural tendency to judge too soon.
129 On a more practical level and outside the remit of this work, there continuously exists an issue as to the 
lack o f expertise on the part o f  the judiciary, and their lack o f opportunity to gain expertise on the bench 
due to rapid rotation.
130 Idleman S “A Prudential Theory o f  Judicial Candor” (1995) Tex. L.Rev. 1307 at 1370.
131 Supra n. 1 at 110.
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reasonably definite rules. In addition, as the experience and understanding of the 
particular rule and its application develops, its content and purpose will become more 
apparent to all relevant parties.132 Arguably attaching legislatively-created guidelines to a 
statutory enactment in order to aid and direct its application serves to limit the abuse of 
discretion, whilst allowing sufficient scope for the law to be applied in light of the 
particular facts. This dual approach affords both the legislature and judiciary the 
opportunity to contribute in a significant, yet appropriate way to the progression of law 
and policy. Where some element of discretion is accorded to the judiciary, such 
discretion is to be welcomed and is often very necessary. Equally however, it is important 
that the use and exercise of that discretion does not go unchecked and the means of 
legitimately yet effectively limiting excessive judicial discretion have been noted. The 
requirement of reasoned judgments can limit the scope of discretionary power, with the 
obligation to account reducing the arbitrary exercise of power and ultimately contributing 
to a more democratic and predictable process of adjudication.133
5 Judicial discretion -  a controllable necessity?
Hughes promotes the legal system that incorporates as “a central role”, the participation 
of a judge to decide a dispute between opposing parties.134 The traditional division of 
roles between the legislature and the judiciary typically sees the legislature concerned 
with law and policy creation, with the judiciary responsible for the application of those 
provisions, with an overall collective aim of securing justice in each case. In theory this 
could represent a sensible division of tasks and create manageable undertakings for both, 
in circumstances where the laws created are sufficiently detailed and precise. Certainly it 
describes a structure whereby law-makers are democratically elected and the politically 
appointed judiciary are the mechanics of enforcement. However, in practice, where the
132 Ibid  at 219. Davis makes a similar point in the context o f the role o f agencies in the application of  
legislative enactments. Further he encourages the development o f a quasi rule-making role for agencies, 
where they would develop guidelines and administrative rules regarding the interpretation o f the legislative 
rules and any use o f  discretion by the agency.
133 Supra n. 20, Jowell recognises the practical limitations on the exercise o f  discretion, including 
availability o f  resources, time, professional norms and political pressures.
134 Supra n. 12 at 416. However his argument is premised upon a fundamentally rule-govemed society, 
with such rules being applied by the judiciary to resolve disputes.
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facts of a case fall outside the rules which purport to govern an issue, the judge may have 
no choice but to draw on less certain notions of public policy, morality and justice.135 In 
the context of family law cases, the application of the rules might expressly require the 
courts to rely upon such subjective issues in order to achieve a fair outcome.
The enactment of rule-based legislation, which encompasses judicial discretion in the 
application of those rules, can as a result of the freedoms accorded to the judiciary, 
potentially negate the effect of that rule. Stewart suggests as a response to this problem, 
that discretion “be exercised in accordance with consistently applied general rules.” He is 
of the view that substituting:
“ ...general rules for ad hoc decision...tends to ensure that officials 
will act on the basis of societal considerations embodied in those rules 
rather than on their own preferences or prejudices, and increases the 
likelihood that the contents of the policies applied will be consistent 
with the preferences of a greater number of citizens.”136
Conversely any shift towards individualised justice avoids the rigid application of law 
and sanctions to particular circumstances and permits a more tailored approach by the 
adjudicator. It can introduce a more individualised form of regulation by moving from a 
simple legal pronouncement to a recognition of the diverse influences and factors in any 
one case. However it is apparent that such individualised justice must be exercised with 
direction and within the confines of identified governing principles and policy aims.
Ultimately Pound cites the need for rules, principles and standards, as well as individual 
discretion, “in the pursuit of certainty and predictability”.137 Whether courts or rules
135 Ibid at 429. Whilst some scholars might suggest that the mechanical approach o f  rules makes the legal 
process quite simple, the more realistic view recognises the lack o f  simplicity in the structure o f legal 
reasoning. Hughes refers to the process o f  judicial decision making as “more typically a rummaging 
through layers o f material in which prescription and policy are more or less express and more or less 
vague.”
136 Supra n. 40 at 1698. Stewart is o f  the view that such an approach would promote a general sense of 
individual and social security. He suggests that to the extent that uncontrolled discretion is exercised, there 
exists an absence o f  formal justice.
137 Supra n. 8 at 926. Pound is o f  the view that “...it has become generally well perceived that the judicial 
process cannot be held solely to rules. But experience has shown also that application o f principles and 
standards cannot be molded to the fashion o f rules. A just and wise individual discretion in the choice o f
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should come first in the law-making process is debatable, Fuller admits to seeing both 
sides of that argument, recognising the role of an “agency capable of determining the 
rights of parties”, whilst highlighting that “you cannot be fair in a moral and legal 
vacuum”.138 Certainly it appears from the discussion in this chapter that the success or 
otherwise of various approaches to legal regulation can be gauged with reference to the 
goals of democracy, predictability and fairness. Following a consideration of both the 
historical and current regulatory approaches to marital breakdown law in Ireland, this 
thesis will consider the approaches of the law-makers of California, Scotland and New 
Zealand as evidence of alternative approaches to the creation of effective processes and 
policies and in so doing will attempt further to progress the identification of the optimum 
process for the regulation of asset distribution on marital breakdown. These four 
jurisdictions will be critically considered with reference to these three key yardsticks 
with a view to measuring the effectiveness of the distinctive approaches adopted.
remedies, in the application o f  remedies, in dispensation from rules prescribing details o f duty and 
obligation, or in mitigation o f  penalties cannot be wholly eliminated in the pursuit o f certainty and
at 372-375.
predictability.’ 
'38 Supra n. 30
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Chapter 2 - A Historical Overview of the Regulation of Marital Breakdown in
Ireland
1 Introduction
In order to understand and evaluate the position of Irish divorce law at the discretion end 
of the rules/discretion continuum, it is necessary first to consider the historical influence 
of the Constitutional ban on divorce, and how this came to be lifted. This chapter 
therefore provides a historical overview of family regulation under Irish law, whilst 
chapter 3 considers in depth, the ancillary relief provisions which now accompany the 
grant of a divorce.
The divorce regime in Ireland is grounded primarily upon an amended constitutional 
provision and more comprehensively by the provisions of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 
1996. The effect of the amended Article 41.3.2 of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish 
Constitution) is to introduce the remedy of divorce to Irish family law and outline the 
basic criteria to be fulfilled prior to the granting of a decree of divorce. This is in turn 
supported by the lengthy and broadly drafted provisions of the Divorce Act which 
statutorily empower the court to order a decree of divorce and in so doing afford the 
judiciary very extensive freedoms in determining what financial ancillary relief orders, if 
any, to make. It appears that the reasoning that underpinned such extensive discretionary 
powers was grounded in a legislative desire to protect and guarantee as much as possible, 
the rights of dependent spouses and children. Such guarantees were required at the time 
of canvassing for the proposed amendment to the Constitution, in an attempt to convince 
the conservative voters of Ireland that it would be impossible for the needs of dependent 
spouses to be ignored or avoided by absconding spouses, seeking to avoid their 
responsibilities.1 By according such extensive discretion to the judiciary the needs of all 
parties, whatever their circumstances, would be provided for and could not be evaded. By
1 The infamous campaign statement o f  Alice Glenn opposing the introduction o f  divorce to Ireland in 1986 
was that “A women voting for divorce is like a turkey voting for Christmas”. In support o f their views, the 
anti-amendment campaigners emphasised the damage that divorce would do to the financial status of  
women and children.
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rejecting the imposition of strict guidelines, it was believed that unfettered judicial 
discretion would facilitate the varying circumstances that would invariably arise;
“ ...every individual is different, every marriage is different and, to 
the extent that it is possible to do so, the legislature must allow the 
courts to recognise that...The legislation must allow the courts 
latitude to deal with the infinity of different circumstances which 
will be brought before them.”
The aim of this chapter is to present a historical overview of the special position of the 
marital family in Irish law and society and the impact of this status on the manner in 
which the divorce laws have been drafted and enforced. The historical approach to the 
issue of marital breakdown in Irish law will be considered, encompassing the influence of 
Catholicism, the protection and perpetuation of the traditional role of the homemaker as 
well as previous attempts to introduce family law remedies, including divorce. The nature 
and effect of the pro-change campaign adopted by the government prior to the 1995 
amendment to the Constitution will be considered, incorporating an overview of the 
particular social and cultural issues which contributed to the adoption of a discretion- 
based regime, lacking in articulated policy objectives.
2 Elevated status of the family under Irish Constitutional law
The Irish Constitution, as enacted in 1937, emphasised the immensely important function 
of the family and in particular the marital family in Irish society. Article 41 declares the 
family to be “the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society... .a moral 
institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to 
all positive law.” Consequently the State guarantees in Article 41.2 to “protect the Family 
in its Constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as 
indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.” This special and very elevated 
status deliberately accorded to the family by the drafters, and the positioning of the 
family effectively above the remit of lawmakers, reflects the view of the family as the 
most important Irish social construct. Whilst the Constitution does not expressly define
2 Dail Debates Second Stage Vol. 467 27/6/1996 at 1953-1954 per Alan Dukes T.D.
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the family, Article 41.3 outlines the State’s pledge “to guard with special care the 
institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.” 
By virtue of the inclusion of the Article 41.3 pledge in respect of the marital family, the 
Irish courts have confined the concept of the family and the consequential constitutional 
rights and protections, to the family based on marriage.
This distinctive constitutional recognition and protection of the marital family, 
compounded by various judicial pronouncements, has influenced greatly state policy as 
regards maintaining and supporting the marital union and for many years acted as an 
almost insurmountable obstacle in debates concerning the remedy of divorce. The case 
law surrounding the impact of Article 41 has centred on two primary issues -  
constitutionally founded personal rights particular to the marital family, and the 
obligations of the State towards that family unit. In Murphy v The Attorney General3 the 
court declared aspects of the Income Tax Act 1967 to represent an unconstitutional attack 
on the married family in circumstances where the earnings of a married couple were more 
heavily taxed than an equivalent unmarried couple.4 One of the most significant cases to 
single out the marital family as one that attracts constitutional protection is McGee v 
Irelanct which concerned the importation of contraceptives by the applicant, a married 
woman with four children, such act constituting a criminal offence under Irish law. The 
Supreme Court held that there existed an unenumerated constitutional right to marital 
privacy and that inter-spousal family planning decisions were not an appropriate matter to 
attract state intervention and regulation. However, such a right to privacy was to be 
strictly limited to persons who were party to a marriage. Similarly, in delivering the 
judgment of the Supreme Court, Walsh J in State (Nichalou) v An Bord Uchtala and the 
A.G.6 confirmed that the rights and duties of the family did not extend to the non-marital 
family:
3 [1982] IR 241.
4 In confirming the decision o f  the High Court, Hamilton J stated that “ ...in  the opinion o f  the Court [the 
relevant sections are in] breach o f  the pledge by the State...to guard with special care the institution of  
marriage and to protect it from attack.”
5 [1974] IR 284.
6 [1996] IR 567.
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“While it is quite true that un-married persons co-habiting together 
and the children of their union may often be referred to as a family 
and have many, if not all, of the outward appearances of a family, 
and may indeed for the purposes of a particular law be regarded as 
such, nevertheless so far as Article 41 is concerned the guarantees 
therein contained are confined to families based on marriage.”7
The Constitutional preferential treatment of the marital family is twinned with a 
patriarchal view of the domestic role of the mother within that family unit, with express 
constitutional recognition in Article 41.2.1 “that by her life within the home, woman 
gives to the State a support without which the common good could not be achieved.” 
Thus a very particular and protective view of the marital family with designated gender- 
specific roles was expressly identified by the 1937 Constitution and has formed the basis 
for the State’s approach to the regulation and almost resolute defence of the marital 
family since then.
Interestingly, despite this quite deliberate Constitutional preference for the marital 
family, the extent to which Article 41 places positive obligations on the state to identify 
rights or entitlements for the family is open to question. The nature, scope and extent of 
the State’s constitutional obligations to the family are a matter that has been left to the 
courts to determine.8 It has been stated that Article 41 does not in itself afford many 
rights to spouses and children.9 Equally in protecting the family as a collective unit the 
individual members of the family are not especially protected. In particular, the 
vulnerable position of the child within the family unit has given rise to a debate on the 
need for independent constitutional recognition of the rights of the child. In the recent
7 Ibid at 643-644. This narrow interpretation o f “the family” continues, the court in WO'R v EH and An 
Bord Uchtala [1996] 2 IR 248  confirmed that the de facto family, in this case unmarried parents o f a child, 
is not recognised as deserving o f  protection under the constitution. Very recently in the context o f the 
guardianship claims o f  the applicant sperm donor, the Supreme Court in McD (J) v. L(P) andM(B) [2009] 
IESC 81 confirmed that the concept o f  a de facto  family does not exist under Irish law and rejected the 
ruling by the High Court judge that the lesbian couple with custody o f  the child could be regarded as a 
family unit capable o f  asserting rights under the Constitution.
8 Hogan and Whyte are o f the view  that the judges, in attempting to interpret the intentions o f  the drafters 
of the Constitution have had to “rely largely on their instinct.” See generally Hogan G and Whyte G JM  
Kelly The Irish Constitution (Butterworths) (4th ed) (2003).
9 Alan Dukes, the then Minister for Justice, interview in The Sunday Press 25/5/1986, as cited by Kennedy 
F. Family, Economy and Government in Ireland ESRI General Research Series Paper no 143 January 1989 
(ESRI) at 74.
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case of N v Health Service Executive and An Bord Uchtala,10 the rights of the child were 
presumed, by virtue of the elevated position of the marital family under Irish law, to be 
best served within that family unit and could not be assessed independently of the family 
unit. Similarly it is only by virtue of statutory enactments that spouses can rely upon state 
measures to claim spousal maintenance, succession rights, or equitable interests in the 
family home and other properties, and those statutory provisions11 merely give rise to an 
inter-spousal obligation. Certainly the Constitutional preference for a woman to work in 
the home for the benefit of her family and society generally, is not supported by any 
associated direct financial support. In the course of the parliamentary debates 
surrounding the drafting and enactment of the Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Act 1989, Deputy Barnes asserted that the Constitution fails to protect women 
who work in the home and adopt the role of the homemaker wife in the preferred 
traditional Irish family composition.
“The Constitution, with its high sounding words with regard to the 
value of woman’s work in the home and the value of the family unit 
to society, in legal terms offered nothing.”12
Notwithstanding the reluctance on the part of both the executive and the legislature to 
positively support the rights of the members of the marital family, historically their 
support of the marital family as a unit in Irish society has been emphatic.
3 Historical influence of the Catholic Church on social and legal policy
The traditional notion of social and family life in Ireland was historically premised upon 
strict Catholic teaching, reflecting the views and lifestyle choices of most Irish citizens in 
193713 and in particular the identity for Ireland and its citizens favoured by Eamon de 
Valera, founder of Fianna Fail and responsible almost entirely for the drafting of the
10 [2006] 4 IR 374.
11 Family Law (Maintenance o f  Spouses and Children) Act 1976; Succession Act 1965; Family Home 
Protection Act 1976.
12 Dail Debates Vol 377 3 Feb 1988 -  Second Stages (Resumed) o f the Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Bill 1987 at 1143 per Deputy Barnes TD.
13 James C P “C6ad Mile Failte? Ireland Welcomes Divorce: The 1995 Irish Divorce Referendum and the 
Family (Divorce) Act o f 1996” 8 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 175 at 222.
50
1937 Constitution. For many years Catholic Church involvement in the State’s approach 
to the legal regulation of personal choice was not only prevalent, but expected by the 
people and lawmakers of Ireland. Burley and Regan refer to the manner in which the new 
Constitution “gave a special place to the moral leadership of the Catholic Church in the 
Irish state”.14 They regard the influence of Catholicism as being particularly reflected in 
Article 41’s limitation of the Constitutional family to one based on marriage, and the 
identification of the woman’s role within the family as one preferably confined to the 
domestic duties of a mother and a wife.15 In 1950/51 the collapse of the proposed Mother 
and Child scheme, intended to provide financial and medical support for mothers and 
children irrespective of the marital or personal circumstances of the mother, directly 
resulted from strenuous objections by the Bishops of Ireland, and served as a reminder of 
the extent of the Church’s influence on state policy. This influence was difficult to defeat 
given the almost absolute affiliation to Catholicism amongst Irish citizens, and perhaps 
even more importantly, the manner and extent to which the Articles of the Irish 
Constitution are premised upon the ultimate authority of the Holy Trinity.16 Such 
deference to the Catholic Church influenced in particular the State’s capacity to regulate 
the family, which was regarded as autonomous and, as mentioned above, “superior to all 
positive law”. Consequently “the prohibition of divorce was a logical consequence of 
upholding the vision of Ireland as a Catholic state and the State was unwilling to 
recognise or regulate the contentious issue of dissolution of marriage.”17
In more recent years the influence of the Catholic Church has waned and Catholic 
teachings in respect of the family and personal autonomy are far less relevant to 
individual and state decisions regarding the regulation of the family and in particular to 
the development of legal remedies for marital breakdown. Kennedy in her Economic 
Social Research Institute (ESRI) research paper, published prior to the introduction of the 
legislative remedies of judicial separation and divorce, noted the undeniable changes in
14 Burley J and Regan F “Divorce in Ireland: the Fear the Floodgates and the Reality” [2002] 16 IJLP&F 
202.
15 Ibid. They note that it was not until the enactment o f legislation from the late 1950’s onwards that 
spousal rights to property, succession and guardianship o f children were recognised.
16 The Preamble to the Constitution commences as follows:- “In the Name o f  the Most Holy Trinity, from 
whom all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both o f men and States must be referred.. .”
17 James CP supra n. 13 at 223.
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“social and economic conditions, and [how the]... accompanying changes in values and 
policies have raised fundamental questions about the nature, role and limits of the
• } Q ,family.” This shift in societal deference towards the marital family and the growth in 
the development of alternate family formations,19 has caused the state to provide 
practical support and remedies for those affected by marital breakdown and has focussed 
recognition upon the very real need for legal capacity to dissolve the union in appropriate 
circumstances. Kennedy has noted the significant developments with regard to the family 
in Irish society in the (then) 50 years since the publication of the Irish Constitution and 
the manner in which the changing family has contributed to “great change in Irish society 
and the Irish economy”.20 Quite sensibly, she recognised that the family does not exist in 
a vacuum but rather in interaction with inter alia, “economic, political and religious 
institutions”. The cultural, societal and moral norms that existed in 1937 and thus framed 
and affected the interpretation of the Constitution had undoubtedly shifted by 1989 when 
the State first enacted a remedy for marital breakdown.21 Such changes were necessitated 
by changing societal circumstances in which marital breakdown was more openly 
admitted and socially acceptable.
Notwithstanding these religious and social developments, and the introduction of the 
remedies of judicial separation and eventually divorce, the significance of the marital 
family in Irish society remains. The 1998 Report of the Commission on the Family 
recognised the role of the marital family in Irish society and the importance of continuity 
and stability in family relationships.
“...marriage as a visible public institution, underpinned by
contractual obligations, presents clear advantages from a public
18 Supra n. 9 at 9. Kennedy cites Goode’s observations regarding the impact o f the expansion o f an 
economic system through industrialisation and the consequential change to family patterns.
19 Legal protection and recognition o f  the rights of co-habitees and legal facilitation and regulation of the 
registration o f civil partnership is now propose under the terms o f the Civil Partnership Bill 2009, published 
26 June 2009.
20 Supra n. 9 at 8.
21 Beale in 1986 noted, with reference to individuals’ histories and cited examples, “ ...the social and 
economic changes o f recent years, during which significant changes in the status o f women have taken 
place.” Beale J Women in Ireland; Voices o f Change (Gill and Macmillan) (1986) at 6.
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policy perspective, in promoting security and stability in family life 
and in providing a continuity in society.”22
4 History of reform and remedies in the context of marital breakdown
4.1 1967 Informal Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution
The express prohibition on the enactment of laws permitting the dissolution of a
‘J ' Xmarriage and the influence of Catholic Church teachings on both the citizens and the 
lawmakers of Ireland, established almost insurmountable obstacles to the reform of this 
area of law. This prohibitive article was examined by the 1967 Informal Oireachtas 
Committee on the Constitution24 which noted the State’s failure to take account of the 
wishes of the minority of the population, who were prevented by the religious beliefs of 
the majority, from securing a divorce. The according of absolute partiality towards the 
religious preferences of the majority led the Committee to propose the rewording of the 
Article 41.3.2 prohibition, which, whilst maintaining the ban on laws permitting divorce, 
would only do so in respect of those who wished to be so restricted:
“In the case of a person who was married in accordance with rites of 
a religion, no law shall be enacted providing for the grant of 
dissolution of that marriage on grounds other than those acceptable 
to that religion.”25
Although no action followed this recommendation, the matter received renewed attention 
from the Law Reform Commission in 1983 and subsequently from the Oireachtas in 
1985.
4.2 Law Reform Commission Report 1983
The primary task for the Law Reform Commission in 1983 was to examine the existing 
laws relating to divorce a mensa et thoro in light of the Constitutional protection of the
22 Strengthening Families fo r  Life (1998) Final Report o f the Commission on the Family to the Minister for 
Social, Community and Family Affairs at 183.
23 Article 41.3.2 as originally drafted in 1937 provided that “...no law shall be enacted providing for the 
grant o f a dissolution o f marriage.”
24 Report o f the Informal Committee on the Constitution, December 1967. Pr. 9817.
25 Ibid at para 124.
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marital family and to consider possible reforms of those laws, without the necessity of a 
Constitutional referendum. The existing remedy of divorce a mensa et thoro26 did not 
dissolve the marital union nor entitle either party to remarry; rather it simply relieved the 
petitioner of his obligation to cohabit with the respondent. The 1983 report was very 
much reform focussed and considered in detail the best way forward for this remedy, 
which it regarded as more appropriately titled ‘legal separation’. The two main concerns 
of the report issued by the Law Reform Commission related to the grounds for securing 
relief and the ancillary financial orders that might attach to a decree.27
At that time and in light of co-existing statutory provisions that empowered the courts to 
make orders providing for inter-spousal financial provision and relief from domestic 
violence, it was noted that the remedy of divorce a mensa et thoro was infrequently 
sought. Notwithstanding this, the importance of retaining a remedy which relieved 
parties of the duty to cohabit was emphasised by the Commission.29 Central to the 
suggestions for reform was the identified need for the reform of the existing laws relating 
to alimony30 and the introduction of legislation “to permit the Court to make orders for 
the payment of a lump sum and for the transfer of property.. .and for related matters”.31 
The immensely significant impact such powers would have on family property law in 
Ireland was expressly recognised by the Commission, cautioning that “this new 
jurisdiction should not be treated in isolation, without reference to more general policy 
questions regarding family property law.” Ultimately the reform of the existing remedy
26 The remedy o f divorce a mensa et thoro was carried over from the Ecclesiastical courts and was available 
on limited grounds; adultery, cruelty and unnatural practices. The jurisdiction for this remedy, originating 
in the Matrimonial Causes (Ireland) Act 1879 passed to the High Court o f Ireland by virtue o f  section 17 of 
the Courts o f  Justice Act 1924.
27 Report on Divorce a Mensa et Thoro and Related Matters (LRC 8 -  1983).
28 Ibid', in Appendix 2 the report details the statistics relating to proceedings for divorce a mensa et thoro. 
The last five years o f  the statistics included in the appendix illustrate the infrequent rate o f  application and 
very limited success o f  such applications. During the period 1978-1982, 146 applications were made and 
only 13 decrees were granted.
29 Ibid at 32.
30 Ibid at 54.
31 Ibid at 57. Interestingly the recommendation of the majority o f the Commission was that such property 
transfer orders should only be made with the consent of the parties. This aspect o f  the proposal has never 
formed part o f the governing law for separation or divorce under Irish law.
32 Ibid. The Commission also discussed at length the various possible approaches to the issue of succession 
rights and the impact upon the statutory spousal legal right share, in the event o f  a legal separation o f the 
parties.
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of divorce a mensa et thoro and its reinvention as legal separation with associated judicial 
powers to make necessary inter-spousal orders for financial relief, was strongly 
recommended by the majority of the Commission. In making these recommendations, the 
Commission expressly limited itself to reform within the confines of the existing 
Constitutional position regarding the prohibition on divorce; thus the Commission 
regarded as outside its function, the making or considering of related questions of 
fundamental social policy.33 Any more significant or fundamental issues were regarded 
as a matter for the legislature to resolve, rather than a law reform agency. Thus the 
reforms proposed were not regarded as radical in nature, and did not represent a 
particularly drastic shift in family regulation and policy.
4.3 The 1985 Report o f the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Marital Breakdown and
the 1986 referendum on divorce
The 1983 Law Reform Commission Report was closely followed by the publication of 
the Report o f the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Marital Breakdown,34 Whilst the 
primary function of the State to protect marriage as an institution was recognised by the 
Committee, its main focus was the issue of marital breakdown and the associated 
problems. Chapter 7, entitled The Legal Remedies, presented a detailed, 58 page account 
of the existing legal remedies available to spouses; namely, nullity, separation 
agreements, judicial separation (divorce a mensa et thoro), maintenance, guardianship 
and custody, matrimonial property and barring orders, together with a critical 
consideration of the reform possibilities in respect of each of these remedies. In this 
context, the existing weak legal position of the homemaker was highlighted. In 
particular, the Committee noted that the governing laws did not permit the homemaker 
contributions to form the basis of a legal claim in respect of the family home.35 This 
vulnerable legal position was certainly at odds with the Constitution’s apparent value and 
support for the woman who provided such a domestic role. What is equally apparent 
from the body of the report is the very real fact of marital breakdown in Ireland at that
33 Ibid', introduction at 1.
34 The Committee was established in July 1983 “to consider the protection o f  marriage and of family life, 
and to examine the problems which follow the breakdown of marriage, and to report to the House o f the 
Oireachtas thereon.” The Report o f  the Committee was published on 27th March 1985.
35 Ibid at paras 7.6.6 - 7.6.8 at 62.
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time and the co-existing lack of any meaningful legal remedies to permit parties to move 
on from the failed marriage and perhaps more importantly in the long-term, to enter into 
subsequent familial arrangements that could be afforded legal recognition and protection. 
Citing the submission of the Church of Ireland, the report highlighted the undesirable 
consequences of such a lack of legal measures:
“The existing machinery suffers from the defect that it deals only 
with matters which, important, and even vital though they may be, 
are only ancillary to the root problem, that of status. Persons whose 
marriages have broken down and who have struggled through the 
complex legal machinery find themselves substantially poorer but 
without the one remedy which they really want, namely the freedom 
to marry.”36
Ultimately the Committee supported the 1983 proposals of the Law Reform Commission 
and opined that the introduction of a statutory remedy of judicial separation with judicial 
powers to make any necessary ancillary financial relief orders was essential. It was 
suggested that such a remedy should be granted by the courts where there is evidence 
that a marriage has irretrievably broken down.37 In addition the Committee supported the 
holding of a Constitutional referendum regarding the removal of the prohibitive Article 
41.3.2. In defence of its position, advocating that the more controversial matter of 
divorce be put to the people in a referendum, the Committee was of the view that such a 
move would still permit the protection and safeguarding of the institution of marriage,
36 Ibid  at para 7.8.11 at 79, 80. Similarly, in the course of the debates surrounding the eventual introduction 
of the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989, Deputy Shatter emphasised the ad hoc and 
piecemeal approach adopted by the legislature in the 1970s and early 1980s, referring to it as “a fire brigade 
legislative response” to particular problems that had been highlighted by pressure groups and the media.
37 Ibid at para 7.3.8 at 49. In considering the scope o f ‘irretrievable breakdown’ the Committee suggested at 
para 7.3.8.2 that a court should be satisfied that such a breakdown has occurred if  the applicant shows 
evidence o f one o f the following:-
“(a) That his or her spouse has behaved in such a way that the Applicant cannot reasonably be expected to 
co-habit with that other spouse.
(b) That his or her spouse has been guilty o f adultery.
(c) That his or her spouse is in desertion or in constructive desertion o f the Applicant.
(d) That the Applicant has been living separate and apart from the other spouse for a continuous period of 
not less than one year and the other spouse consents to the making o f the decree.
(e) That the Applicant has been living separate and apart from the other spouse for a continuous period of 
three years.
(f) That such other facts and/or reasons exist or existed which in all circumstances made it reasonable for 
the Applicant to live separate from, and not co-habit with, the other spouse.”
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albeit in a number of distinct and interlinked forms. It was concluded that whatever form 
the proposed amendment would take, Article 41 could “continue to place a duty on the 
State to protect the family and the institution of marriage and to recognise the family as 
the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society”.38
The referendum to delete the Constitutional prohibition on divorce was held on 26 June 
198639 and was quite strongly defeated by 63% to 37%. It has been suggested that the 
lack of consideration and clarification of the economic consequences of divorce and the 
consequential uncertainty served to fortify the cautious conservative views of Irish 
citizens and ultimately dissuaded voters on the basis that such a change was fraught with 
danger, particularly for the economically vulnerable spouse.40 Kennedy suggests that the 
uncertainty regarding the viability of a claim by a dependent spouse for a share in the 
family home as compensation for her contribution to their joint wealth or for loss 
suffered from foregoing her career needed further consideration, the lack of which had 
led to confusion in the run-up to the 1986 referendum 41 The existence of such 
significant, yet unanswered policy questions in respect of divorce and its financial 
consequences merely served to bolster the position of the anti-amendment lobby, and 
ultimately contribute to the defeat of the referendum.
38 Ibid  at para 7.8.22 at 86.
39 The Tenth Amendment o f  the Constitution Bill 1986 proposed that the prohibition on divorce be deleted 
from the Constitution and be replaced by the following wording in Article 41.3.2:
“Where, and only where, such court established under this Constitution as may be prescribed by law is 
satisfied that:
i a marriage has failed,
ii the failure has continued for a period of, or periods amounting to, at least five years,
iii that there is no reasonable possibility of reconciliation between the parties to the marriage, and
iv any other condition prescribed by law has been complied with,
the court may in accordance with law grant a dissolution of the marriage provided that the court is satisfied 
that adequate and proper provision having regard to the circumstances will be made for any dependent 
spouse and for any child who is dependent on either spouse.”
See further James C P supra n. 13; Binchy W Is Divorce the Answer? An Examination o f No-Fault 
Divorce Against the Background o f  the Irish Debate Irish Academic Press(1984); and Ward P Divorce in 
Ireland: who should bear the cost?  Cork University Press (1993). James notes at 195, 196 that many o f the 
essential financial issues, including pension and succession rights were “not worked out until the very eve 
o f the Referendum”.
41 Supra n. 9 at 86.
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5 Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989
5.1 Absence o f comprehensive statistics on marital breakdown
The lack of any available legal remedy for marital breakdown before 1989 can certainly 
not be regarded as evidence of a lack of marital breakdown at that time. Regrettably, 
comprehensive statistics regarding the prevalence of marital breakdown were unavailable 
for many years. At the time of the publication of the 1985 Report o f the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on Marital Breakdown, it was noted that statistics in this area could only be 
garnered in respect of those who had had recourse to the courts or those relying upon 
state financial welfare support.42 The 2001 ESRI research document by Fahey and 
Russell again noted the lack of comprehensive statistics on marriage breakdown in 
Ireland; rather the available statistics reflects the marital status of the people of Ireland. 
Given the lack of available legal remedies to effectively alter the status of married 
persons, the figures reported in the census are unlikely to have properly reflected the 
realities of marital breakdown in Ireland in the late 1970s/early 1980s.
Whereas the 1979 census recorded 8,000 separated/divorced people living in Ireland,43 
the 2006 census has recently recorded 166,797 separated/divorced people.44 Although the 
1979 figures might appear relatively low, social, religious and financial circumstances at 
that time discouraged strenuously the abandonment of a marital commitment and many 
spouses remained in effectively dead or abusive relationships. In addition the financial 
circumstances of most women in the 1970-80’s saw them relying entirely upon their 
breadwinner husbands for financial assistance, thereby making it impossible financially 
for women to leave the home and the marriage, in particular where there were dependent 
children of the union. Beale has noted that in the early 1970’s “ .. .only one in fifteen 
married women worked outside the home and women’s traditional roles as family-based 
wives and mothers were more firmly established.”45 In addition it was socially 
unacceptable to be a party to a broken marriage, with parties ostracised by their families 
because of the disgrace attaching to such status within the community. Undoubtedly,
42 Supra n. 34 at 31.
43 Central Statistics Office Census o f  the Population o f Ireland 1979 Dublin Stationery Office, 1980.
44 Central Statistics Office Census o f  the Population of Ireland 2006 Dublin Stationery Office, 2007.
45 Supra n. 21 at 5.
58
Catholicism and Irishness were “intertwined as synonymous and gave the Irish people an 
inflated sense of social value grounded in a collective, rigorously Catholic identity.”46 In 
addition, the lack of state response for many years to the fact of broken marriages only 
served to compound these difficulties, failing to give any status or recognition to the 
second families that developed subsequently.
5.2 Lack o f available remedies
As a remedy for marital breakdown, divorce was considered at length by the Joint 
Oireachtas Committee on Marriage Breakdown in 1985, and the advantages of 
introducing divorce were well articulated in their report. In addition to the absence of a 
right to have a marriage dissolved, the absence of divorce also prevented the courts from 
providing for the financial and related needs for parties upon the breakdown of a 
marriage. The consequences of the lack of available remedies on personal autonomy, the 
rights of the minority and freedom of choice generally were considered but it became 
apparent that the lack of divorce and subsequent right to remarry was regarded as 
impacting most significantly upon those in unrecognised and unregulated second 
relationships. Such lack of state regulation and support affected all parties to the second 
relationship, children at that time were regarded as “illegitimate”, no legal status or 
protections attached to the new adult relationship in areas including maintenance, 
succession rights and domestic violence 47 Ultimately it was noted, albeit in the context 
of physically abused spouses, that to deny the right to remarry “has no social advantage 
to the State and is in fact detrimental to society in general and lacking in compassion.”48
46 Dillon M Debating Divorce: M oral Conflict in Ireland (University Press o f  Kentucky) (1993) at 40.
47 Supra n. 34 at 83-85. The illegitimate status previously accorded to children born outside wedlock was 
eliminated by the enactment o f  the Status o f Children Act 1987. Whilst the position o f  co-habitees is 
largely unregulated under Irish law, co-habitees were afforded protections by the Domestic Violence Act 
1996, subject to certain limiting conditions and pre-requisites. More recently the Government has published 
the Civil Partnership Bill 2009 which introduces the right for a couple to register as a civil partnership and 
also proposes statutory rights and remedies for cohabiting couples.
48 Ibid at 79.
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Kennedy, in regarding the right to remarry as “the essence of divorce”,49 emphasised the 
reality of marital breakdown in Ireland at that time, referring to Kearney’s assertion that 
we,
. .have been preaching one set of laws for the nation -  as witnessed 
in our legislation on divorce and contraception for example -  but 
practising quite another set of laws as individuals.”50
5.3 Enactment o f the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989
Although not as far-reaching as the remedy of divorce, the enactment of the Judicial 
Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 (1989 Act) gave rise to the introduction of 
the more accessible remedy of judicial separation51 and was regarded as a “watershed in 
Irish family law”.52 Perhaps most significantly the courts were now empowered to make 
orders for ancillary relief in respect of assets held legally or equitably by either spouse 
and the decision to make such orders was at the discretion of the presiding judge whose 
primary task was to make whatever orders were necessary in the interests of justice. In 
introducing and explaining the provisions of the proposed Bill, Deputy Shatter 
summarised the potential impact of the legislation.
“It confers new comprehensive powers on the court to make 
financial lump sum and property orders to provide additional 
protection, in particular for dependent wives and children, by 
enabling the courts to give to them a far greater degree of security 
than they can obtain at present.”53
However as a remedy for marital breakdown, judicial separation was regarded by the 
Irish Labour Party as “the second best solution”, being enacted when “what the situation
49 Supra n. 9 at 81.
50 Ibid at 137, citing Kearney R “Creatively Rethinking the Breakup o f  the Nation State” The Irish Times 
28 December 1987.
51 Judicial Separation replaced the more complicated procedure attaching to an application for a decree of 
divorce a mensa et thoro.
52 Shatter A Shatter’s Family Law  (Butterworths) (4th ed) (1997) at 383.
53 Dail Debates Vol 377 2 Feb 1988 -  Second Stage (Resumed) o f the Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Bill 1987 per Deputy Shatter at 891. The parliamentary debate surrounding the breadth o f powers 
allocated to the judiciary is discussed in detail in chapter 3 below, especially in sections 1 and 2.
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really requires is divorce legislation”.54 Similarly Deputy McCartan, in the course of the 
Dail debates, regarded the introduction of the remedy of judicial separation as “a 
compromise”, in circumstances where the members of his political party55 “would prefer 
to be talking about divorce legislation”. Conversely in defence of his legislative proposal, 
Deputy Shatter, outlined its far-reaching benefits.
“This Bill will provide a modem, humane framework of legislation. It 
recognises the role that wives play in the home and provides for the 
obtaining of a separation decree without exacerbating animosity 
between the spouses. It provides additional protection for the welfare 
of children, for a modernised and simplified court structure and the 
establishment of a circuit family court. We have taken a great step 
forward in the area of social legislation.”56
It is immediately apparent in reviewing the social and political debates surrounding the 
proposed legislation that the discussion of both the remedy of judicial separation and the 
extent of the available ancillary relief orders was embedded in the over-riding emphasis 
on the vulnerable position of the homemaker. The “numerous [and] innovative”57 
provisions of the Bill were regarded generally as a
“...very valuable addition to the corpus of the legal criteria which are 
to be applied in the divide-up of property between a husband and wife 
in a separation...and looks after a basic instinct of the partners of 
marriage to seek appreciation and recognition for the toil in the home 
-  and outside it -  in relation to the ordinary day-to-day looking after 
the family”.58
For example, section 13 of the Bill, which set out the over-riding statutory requirement 
that justice be achieved, and more specifically, the statutory factors to which the court
54 Dail Debates Vol 387 23 Feb 1989 - Report and Final Stages o f the Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Bill 1987 at 1385 per Mervyn Taylor TD. Despite the shortcomings o f  the remedied proposed, 
Deputy Taylor did recognise at 1455 that nonetheless “it marks a great improvement in family law and will 
be a valuable addition to the remedies for families whose marriages have broken down.”
55 The Workers Party -  members o f  the opposition at the time o f the enactment o f  the Judicial Separation 
legislation, ibid at 1396.
56 Ibid per Deputy Shatter at 1453 -1454.
57Supra n. 12 at 1125, per Deputy Abbott.
58 Ibid.
59 Section 13 o f the Bill, as amended, was enacted as section 16 o f the 1989 Act.
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was to have regard when making orders for ancillary relief, was welcomed as “one of the 
first great steps we have taken towards ensuring an acknowledgement of the partnership 
of marriage and the value of the work done in the home.”60 More generally the enactment 
of legislation enabling the courts to provide for the dependent spouse and to make the 
necessary orders in respect of the family home was applauded as finally empowering the 
judiciary to deal effectively with family law cases. The breadth of these judicial powers 
and the “extra flexibility that is given to the courts” was welcomed by Deputy Colley 
noting that prior to this enactment parties were required to initiate many separate 
proceedings to deal with each aspect of the marriage breakdown.61 Thus it was noted by 
Deputy Cowen during those Dail debates that the “Bill in principle has universal 
approval”.62
Undoubtedly however, the introduction of the remedy of judicial separation with its 
significant associated available ancillary relief was very much a consolation prize for 
those who had supported the unsuccessful divorce referendum in 1986. In this regard it 
was acknowledged by Deputy Taylor in the course of the 1987 parliamentary debates, 
that whilst “[WJhat is required is divorce...the proposal before us is not that far removed 
from it.”63 However given that the remedy did not incorporate a right to remarry, it did 
not conflict with the Constitutional protection of marriage, and therefore was able to 
move more benignly through the parliamentary process, without any great controversy 
arising as to the powers it created. Further, it was certainly more palatable to enact wide 
judicial powers in respect of spousal obligations where spouses retained their marital 
status. The right to return to court for further relief anytime after the granting of the 
separation decree is certainly evidence of a cautious legislative approach. What was not 
envisaged nor discussed at that time was the impact such powers might have in the 
context of divorce.64 Finally, the unprecedented cross-party support for this Private
60 Supra n 12 at 1148 per Deputy Barnes.
61 Dail Debates Vol 377 10 Feb 1988 -  Second Stage (Resumed) o f the Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Bill 1987 at 1874 per Deputy Colley.
62 Ibid at 1150.
63 Supra n. 12 at 1135-1136.
64 Section 6.2 ahead sets out details o f  the relevant parliamentary debates surrounding the proposed 
amendment to the Constitution necessary to introduce the remedy o f divorce, which again lacked any 
significant consideration o f  the financial implications likely to arise.
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Member’s Bill,65 which unusually, was not in principle challenged by the Government, 
contributed to the absence of significant debate surrounding the ancillary relief powers 
created for the courts and the over-riding judicial discretion permitted to achieve 
reasonable outcomes.66 This cross-party consensus arguably deprived the electorate of a 
robust debate concerning the implications of its provisions and the associated social 
policy issues.
The subsequent 1992 Government White Paper, discussed below, regarded the provisions 
of the 1989 Act as “comprehensive” and tellingly, many of its provisions, as amended by 
the Family Law Act 1995, most especially in relation to ancillary relief, were mirrored in 
the provisions of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 when eventually enacted. 
Interestingly Shatter has since observed that the 1989 Act
“.. .put in place most of the ancillary relief orders envisaged by the 
government as forming part and parcel of the divorce legislation that 
it had promised to enact if a majority had voted for constitutional 
change in the 1986 referendum”.67
6 Introduction of the remedy of divorce
6.1 1992 Government White Paper for change
The enactment of the 1989 Act was quite swiftly followed by the publication in 1992 of a 
Government White Paper entitled Marital Breakdown: A Review and Proposed
65 Although the Bill, in its own right, did have cross-party support, it was emphasised by Deputy McCartan, 
amongst others, that such support “must not take away from the demand and need for the Government, and 
all parties in the House, to look at the prohibition on divorce as contained in our Constitution with a view to 
doing something positive about it. Divorce is a civil right and it must be introduced into our corpus o f law 
one way or another without much delay”. Dail Debates Vol 377 9 Feb 1988 -  Second Stage (Resumed) of 
the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Bill 1987 at 1630. Similarly, Deputy Harney had at an 
earlier second stage debate, supra  n. 53 at 910, commented upon the value o f  such cross-party support, 
lamenting its absence in 1986, causing in her view, the unfortunate loss o f the referendum which deprived 
“those unfortunate people who are the victims of marital breakdown a second chance”.
66 In the course o f the second stage o f  the passing o f the Bill, Deputy Shatter noted that it was his first 
experience since being elected to the Dail in 1981 “in which all o f the parties here, o f different ideologies, 
backgrounds and political beliefs, have come together in a non-party political way to confront a major 
social issue and to deal with legislation in a constructive way”; supra n. 60 at 1887.
67 Supra n. 52 at 384.
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Changes. The then Minister for Justice, Deputy Flynn, stated that the White Paper was 
undertaken at the direction of the Government in the context of the “unfortunate reality 
that a minority of those who marry have their hopes and expectations of a permanent 
union dashed through the breakdown of their marriages”.69 He declared that whilst the 
Government position must be to preserve marriage and to take measures to avoid 
marriage breakdown, it must “also endeavour to ensure that there is in our law and social 
policies a proper response where marriages break down.”70 The Paper was both 
retrospectively reflective as well as reform focussed in content and ultimately declared 
the Government's intention to hold another referendum on the possible introduction of 
divorce. Such a referendum was only to occur “after a full debate on the complex issues 
involved”.71 In hindsight it is questionable whether this full debate ever occurred.
6.2 1995 referendum on divorce
Given the failings of the 1986 referendum, a more pro-active governmental approach that 
sought to inform the electorate and eliminate scare tactics was adopted in the lead-up to 
the 1995 referendum on divorce. In addition, the unprecedented cross-party support for 
change in this area strengthened the position of all pro-divorce campaigners. Certainly, 
the more prepared and considered approach of the Government to this socially 
contentious, if not divisive issue, resulted in many of the previously utilised fear tactics 
being dissipated through the dissemination of information to the public.72 In this regard, 
the Government, as part of its pro-change campaign, commissioned a study of divorce 
which resulted in the publication and distribution of an outline of the procedures 
attaching to the proposed Irish remedy of divorce and included the proposed draft 
Divorce Bill.73 The study, entitled The Right to Remarry: A Government Information
68 Marital Breakdown: A Review and Proposed Changes Government Publications 1992 (PI. 9104).
69 Ibid at para 1.1 at 9.
70 Ibid at para 1.2.
71 Ibid at para 1.6 at 9.
72 Supra n. 14; Burley and Regan note that “[H]ighly organised and effective fear campaigns were again 
mounted by anti-divorce campaign groups in the lead-up to the 1995 referendum. The concerns relating to 
the consequences o f  divorce including money, children, property and inheritance and the Irish way o f life 
were again a feature.”
73 It had previously been suggested in the course o f the debates surrounding the enactment of the 1989 Act 
that its speedy passage through the Oireachtas and general cross-party support was greatly aided by the 
detailed nature o f  the draft legislation. Deputy McCartan, supra n. 65 at 1632 suggested that the 1986
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Paper on the Divorce Referendum, was published two months before the referendum and 
did not attempt to disguise the Government’s very pro-change stance. In its introduction, 
the Paper was declared to be “a guide to members of the public who wished to inform 
themselves about the legislative and other provisions which would apply if divorce was 
introduced”.74 This contrasts sharply with the information vacuum within which the 1986 
referendum took place.75 Whilst again the paper emphasised the Government’s strong 
commitment to protecting the family and the institution of marriage, it pointed to the 
“comprehensive” initiatives already in place to deal with marital breakdown under Irish 
family law. The main focus of the information paper and perhaps consequently the 
debate generally, was threefold; whether fault should be a pre-requisite for the granting 
of a decree of divorce, the importance of the right to remarry and, whether in supporting 
the divorce referendum the Irish people were effectively rejecting the ethos and teachings 
of the Catholic Church. As the divorce debate transpired, it became apparent that the 
economic issues attaching to a decree of divorce were quite a secondary issue for the 
electorate. It is further evident from the information paper and contemporary 
commentary, that the emphasis was quite easily placed on the impact of divorce on the 
institution of marriage and Irish society generally, the implication being that to focus the 
debate on the financial consequences was to belittle marriage and the marital union, and 
was thus inappropriate, if not offensive in the eyes of Irish society. Similarly with 
reference to the 1986 referendum, Dillon notes that economic issues never formed a 
central part of the Irish divorce debate, as to do so “would have been perceived as 
trivialising marriage”.76 She is of the view that for the Government to have “initiated 
arguments for divorce grounded in the context of its practical and economic 
consequences would have been to exacerbate the radical nature of their proposals and to
defeated referendum may well have succeeded if  the Government at that time had published “simple 
legislation similar to [the 1987 Bill]...which would have helped people to find an answer to...questions.” 
Deputy McCartan was critical o f  the Government’s failure in 1986 to “have the political courage...to see 
the matter through and to couple it with effective legislation.”
74 The Right to Remarry: A Government Information Paper on the Divorce Referendum (1995) PI 1932; 
introduction at 5.
75 Ward, in advance o f the 1995 referendum, noted that the Minster was taking the steps necessary “to 
avoid the absence o f  a comprehensive legislative framework for the introduction o f  divorce which was so 
apparent during the debate in 1986.” Ward P “The Path to Divorce” (1994) 12 ILT 29 at 29.
76 Supra n. 46 at 46.
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i ide legitimate further their agenda.” Such an analysis, if credible, suggests an extreme 
naivety on the part of the Irish electorate and a general failure to recognise the significant 
impact of divorce on the asset ownership and financial earnings of both spouses. Instead 
in the context of the published Divorce Bill, the proposed extensive and discretionary 
based judicial powers to make infinite orders for financial relief between spouses who 
were no longer legally married merited vociferous public debate.78
The limited focus of the electorate was further facilitated by the Government’s repeated 
reference to the existing legal remedies available, which it suggested were “equivalent to 
divorce in every respect except one -  the right to remarry”.79 The Government relied in 
particular on the extensive and recently enhanced ancillary relief provisions attaching to 
the remedy of judicial separation, thereby suggesting that the proposed amendment to the 
Constitutional ban on divorce would be very minor in effect.80 These existing statutory 
provisions governing ancillary relief orders, which included the right to make pension 
adjustment orders with an infinite right to apply, were simply mirrored in the provisions 
of the Divorce Bill, contained in Appendix 2 of the Information paper.81 Consequently 
the implication was that the proposed change to the Irish legal system was minimal, 
introducing only the right to re-marry and that to challenge the proposals for ancillary 
relief orders was effectively too little too late and thus futile. Ironically, it appears that 
the legislatively created right to judicial separation merited far more consideration that it 
was accorded during its time as a Bill in the late 1980s, given that it was the birthplace 
for the current Irish regulatory approach to asset division on marital breakdown,
77 Ibid.
78 The draft Divorce Bill outlined the proposed process regarding decrees o f divorce and ancillary financial 
relief. Such orders were to be determined on the basis of unfettered judicial discretion and applications for 
financial relief could be made on the granting o f the decree or at any time thereafter.
79 Supra n. 74 at 7.
80 In the section o f the information paper outlining the procedures to govern an application for a divorce, it 
was noted that in “separation proceedings the court already has extensive powers, which have been in place 
since the passage o f  legislation in 1989, regarding maintenance and property o f  spouses.” In addition, it 
was noted that on an application for a decree of divorce, “[A]s in the case o f  judicial separation, the court, 
before making any o f the financial or property adjustment orders referred to, is required to take all the 
circumstances o f the parties into account as well as a range of specified matters.” James, supra n. 13 at 212, 
notes that having learned from the mistakes made in the 1986 campaign, the Government used the 
publication o f the information paper to remind voters of related provisions already in force, in the context 
of marital breakdown.
81 Ward regarded the 1989 Act governing judicial separation as “the blueprint for an Irish divorce law.” 
Ward P “Second Time Around -  The 1995 Divorce Referendum” (1995) 13 ILT 274 at 275.
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including divorce. The far-reaching discretion-based judicial powers to divide assets of 
one or both of the parties, on divorce or anytime thereafter, in effect remained almost 
immune from public debate and policy discussions, given that the vehicle for change i.e. 
the remedy of judicial separation, had not required public sanction by way of 
referendum. By the time the 1995 divorce referendum was being considered, the most 
radical of its elements, apart from the right to re-marry, were already part of Irish law. 
Interestingly thus, the analysis of the proposed divorce process was mostly limited to the 
grounds for divorce and in particular the relevance, or not, of spousal fault.
Unfortunately, the deeper and more crucial issue of state policy in facilitating and 
regulating the dissolution of marriage was also lost in the pre-referendum debate. It is 
still uncertain what the state seeks to achieve in permitting parties to sever the marital 
union, outside the need for second relationships and families to be accorded some form 
of legal status. Equally, why inter-spousal financial ties and dependencies should be 
maintained, notwithstanding the possibility of the formation of new unions and the birth 
of children in such second relationships was never considered, beyond the dampening of 
fears carried over from earlier debates that the State should ensure that the (presumed) 
wayward father could not renege on his responsibilities to his first family.83 Why the 
proposed Irish divorce laws ensured that these responsibilities should survive every 
marriage dissolution is unclear, as is the infinite right of a spouse to make claims for 
ancillary relief orders in respect of earnings and assets of the former spouse, acquired 
well after the marriage ends. The lack of a statutory right to apply for a clean break or 
any judicial right to impose a clean break reflects a conservative approach on the part of 
the drafters, who sought to ensure that financial ties would remain enforceable wherever 
necessary. It appears that in recognising the need to properly inform the public the 
government was forced to take a premature stance on the process to be enacted, arguably 
giving rise to a conservative statutory approach in order to avoid the alienation of 
undecided voters or those who might disapprove of a limited approach to the availability
82 See section 5 above which sets out the context and debate surrounding the enactment o f the Judicial 
Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989.
83 The draft Divorce Bill outlined an infinite and indefeasible spousal right to make applications for 
ancillary relief. This infinite right to apply and the lack of availability o f  a clean financial break are 
considered in detail in the next chapter.
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of financial relief. It is also suggested that the approach adopted was more readily 
acceptable to opposition parties, thereby facilitating the all-important cross-party support 
for change.84
The referendum was held on 24 November 1995 and was carried by a mere 9,114 votes, 
50.28% of the people voting supported the proposed amendment and 49.72% of those 
voting opposed it. Thus although the pro-amendment groups were successful in their 
campaigns, it was immediately apparent that this was not an overly popular mandate, 
especially as only two-thirds of the people had voted, meaning only one-third of the Irish 
electorate had voted in favour of the introduction of divorce.
6.3 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996
The introduction of a divorce regime premised upon broad discretionary judicial powers 
to make financial orders in respect of any and all of the assets of either of the parties, 
with no possibility of a clean financial break, irrespective of the circumstances of the 
parties, certainly merits very real political and social debate. Unfortunately the attentions 
of neither the government nor the electorate in the run-up to the 1995 referendum and the 
enactment of facilitating legislation were focussed in a meaningful way upon the 
consequences of retaining lifelong financial ties between parties who are no longer 
regarded as spouses by law. The government’s desire not to be defeated on the same 
issue twice in 10 years was perhaps the driving motivation for the creation of a system 
which pleased the majority, but especially the fearful, whilst ensuring that irrespective of 
the circumstances of a given case, the courts would retain power to make any and every 
order deemed necessary on every occasion. In the pre-referendum debates, the 
government emphasised the need for societal acceptance of the fact of marital 
breakdown, the importance of regulating and protecting the needs of the second family 
and the significance of creating a remedy that was capable of protecting dependent 
parties, typically wives. What was never queried was why the emphasis was placed 
entirely upon the need to accord unfettered powers to the judiciary to order asset division
84 Burley and Regan supra n. 14 at 207. Similarly, Ward refers to the legislative preparation for the 
referendum as “painstaking, wide-ranging and cautious”; supra n. 40 at 3.
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and in so doing the power to maintain financial dependencies, thereby preventing parties 
from moving on in any meaningful way from a broken marriage.
The value of judicial-led family law policy has equally never been measured, yet the 
broad and unlimited manner in which the Divorce Act has been drafted appears to have 
deliberately left to the judiciary the determination of the manner in which such laws and 
protections should operate in practice. Whilst choosing to create regulatory structures 
which rely primarily upon the exercise of judicial discretion is not an unworkable 
approach, its success requires critical consideration of the underlying state policy in such 
a socially relevant area of law. The Divorce Act places the burden for decision and 
policy-making firmly on the shoulders of the Irish judiciary who are expected to decide 
how best to divide the property of the spouses. The Irish legislature made no attempt to 
identify the policy aims of the new legislation other than to highlight the ongoing 
vulnerable position of the homemaker spouse and any children of the union. Neither, 
perhaps more significantly, did the Irish legislature attempt to identify the principles and 
purposes of the legislation which might ultimately have acted as useful guidance for the 
judiciary. Given the more lengthy experiences of many other jurisdictions with the 
remedy of divorce, some of whom have developed principles and policies to direct the 
application of their statutory provisions, it might have been prudent for Ireland to have 
considered alternatives to its regulatory approach. It seems somewhat short-sighted to 
have failed even to consider the merits of such a policy-driven approach given the 
important social consequences arising from the introduction of the remedy of divorce.
7 Conclusion
The elevated status accorded to the marital family by the Irish Constitution and 
subsequent judicial interpretations prevented the lawful dissolution of the marital 
relationship for many years. Consequently the remedy of divorce has only recently been 
introduced to the Irish statute books, and when enacted, the legislation failed to either 
guide the courts or place parameters on the extent of judicial powers. The short-term gain 
of convincing the Irish electorate to accept the necessary amendment to the Constitution 
may be over-shadowed by the difficulties arising from the regulatory approach adopted.
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In critiquing the current regime, it might be more appropriate to point to the unresolved 
issue of the underlying policies of the Act, such lack of policy direction and state 
objectives simply highlighting the procedural inadequacies and fundamental flaws of the 
remedy as enacted. In order to consider these key issues surrounding the weaknesses of 
the current Irish regulatory approach, the next chapter will outline the relevant provisions 
of the Divorce Act and will illustrate the manner in which they have been interpreted and 
applied by the judiciary. The clear preference for decisions made on the basis of judicial 
discretion rather than strict legislative rule will be considered in the context of the 
decided case law to date. Given the lack of policy discussion or direction offered by the 
legislative or political debate generally, any policy directions evident from relevant 
judgments will be critically considered. Later chapters will examine alternative 
approaches to the regulation of divorce and will seek to provide options for the reform, 
where necessary, of the current Irish regulatory system.
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Chapter 3 - Asset Division as Regulated by the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996
1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present a critical overview of the mechanics of the Irish 
regulatory system on divorce, specifically as it relates to asset division and distribution. 
Given that Irish divorce law lies very much at the discretion end of the rules/discretion 
continuum, this chapter provides a description and analysis of the laws adopted and in so 
doing assesses which, if any, of the over-riding goals of democracy, fairness and 
predictability are achieved under such a system of regulation.
The manner in which the Irish law-makers, both legislative and judicial, have chosen to 
regulate this contentious area of personal and marital property will be assessed with an 
emphasis on the impact of the far-reaching discretionary judicial powers and the lack of 
supporting policy direction for their application. In particular the broad non-committal 
phraseology adopted by the legislature in creating these judicial powers and the 
identification of the vague goals of justice and fairness will serve to highlight a regime 
hugely reliant upon the subjective adjudications of the individual judge. The effectiveness 
of statutory attempts to guide the judiciary in the form of the over-riding ‘proper 
provision’ requirement and the enunciation of statutory factors will be considered. In 
addition the significance of the co-existing remedy of judicial separation with almost 
identical ancillary relief provisions will be acknowledged, taking account of its 
repercussions for social and judicial perceptions of divorce, as part of the peculiarities of 
the Irish family law framework. Ultimately, policy objectives, if any, which have been 
expressly or implicitly developed by the legislature and/or courts will be identified and 
assessed. This chapter will seek to gauge the impact of this discretionary approach to 
securing justice where such notions of justice have not been pre-determ ined.
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1.1 Divorce v separation -  approach to regulation
As is evident from the preceding chapter, the Irish divorce law regime has evolved from a 
historical reluctance to recognise and regulate marital breakdown and more recently it has 
followed on from the introduction of the remedy of judicial separation. Although 
enacting legislation to permit divorce might rightly be recognised as a defining moment 
in Irish family law, in truth, notwithstanding the constitutionally mandated referendum, 
the only adjustment made to the regulation of the marital family on breakdown was the 
right to remarry. By contrast with the decree of divorce, the effect of a decree of judicial 
separation is merely to relieve the parties of their legal obligation to cohabit.1 However 
notwithstanding this important distinction between the two remedies, the Irish legislature 
has chosen to arm the judiciary with the same ancillary relief powers in both instances. 
Thus the assets to which the orders can attach, the nature of the orders that can be made, 
and the factors to which the court must have regard, are effectively identical on the 
granting of both judicial separation and divorce.
1.2 Dearth offamily law research and policy discussions
Despite the undoubted priority accorded to the family by the Irish Constitution, judicial 
pronouncements and legislative enactments, there exists a distinct lack of collected data 
on the family in Irish society and a dearth of research or consideration of what policy 
aims Irish family law seeks to achieve. Kennedy suggests that this lack of any significant 
quantity of studies concerning the family might:
“.. .reflect a fairly widespread failure to grasp the major implications 
for the family itself and the wider society which now arise as a result 
of changes in the pattern of family life, in the social and economic
1 Section 8(1) 1989 Act; as confirmed by the Supreme Court in TF v Ireland [1995] 1 IR 321 “The effect o f  
a decree o f judicial separation is that it is no longer obligatory for the spouses who were parties to such 
proceedings to cohabit”, per Hamilton CJ at 375. Given that the obligation to co-habit is now effectively 
unenforceable, it is reasonable to surmise that judicial separation proceedings are typically commenced in 
order to activate the ancillary relief machinery o f the court.
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environment where families exist, and in values and attitudes which 
impinge on the family.”2
As outlined in the previous chapter, the family has been accorded an elevated position in 
Irish law and society, the Constitution regarding it as “the natural primary and 
fundamental unit group of Society”3 representing “the necessary basis of social order and 
as indispensible to the welfare of the Nation and the State”.4 However one of the main 
criticisms of the approach of repeated Irish governments, as identified by the 
Commission on the Family, is that “family policy has never been co-ordinated or 
separately identified in any way”.5 Their 1998 report identifies the very great need for 
state objectives relating to the family to be clarified, suggesting that:
“...this lack of coherence and clarity of objectives in relation to 
family policy should be rectified so that the valid role of the State in 
supporting the family life and in promoting family well-being can be 
more effective.”6
Similarly in the debates surrounding the Family Law (Divorce) Bill 1995, the lack of 
research on marital breakdown in Ireland was highlighted. Deputy Keogh referred to the 
need for information on
“...the extent to which maintenance orders are being complied with and 
how effective are existing enforcement measures....In the absence of 
research we are reduced to making policy and allocating resources in a 
vacuum. A notable feature of the divorce debate was that.. .there was a 
dearth of reliable information about what was happening [in Ireland].”7
2 Kennedy F Family, Economy and Government in Ireland ESRI General Research Series Paper no 143 
January 1989 at 7. Similarly in their 2001 research paper for the ESRI, Fahey and Russell recognise that it 
is “in the context o f the under-developed state of family research in Ireland that the present study was 
initiated.” Fahey T and Russell H Family Formation in Ireland Trends, Data Needs and Implications 
(2001) Report to the Family Affairs Unit o f the Department o f Social, Community and Family Affairs. 
Policy Research Series 43.
3 Article 41.1.1.
4 Article 41.1.2.
5 Strengthening Families fo r  Life (1998) Final Report o f the Commission on the Family to the Minister for 
Social, Community and Family Affairs at 6.
6 Ibid at 7.
7 Dail Eireann debates Vol 467 27 June 1996 Second Stage at 1794-1795. In addition the lack o f “empirical 
studies, interdisciplinary work and research focussing on the social dimension o f  legislation” has not been
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What needs to be made explicit is what the State is trying to achieve both for and with 
families: the strategic dimension of family policy urgently requires consideration and 
clarification. Nowhere is this more necessary than in the creation of laws to regulate all 
aspects of the dissolution of a marital union. The absence of identified state policy, both 
in respect of the family and marital breakdown is magnified by the lack of definitive 
legislative direction and the limited access to judicial decision-making in this area. 
Buckley has highlighted this “dearth of information”8 which “makes it difficult to 
comment authoritatively on the family property provisions”, obstructing the aims of 
predictability and certainty.9
1.3 Rules v discretion
It is evident from the preceding chapter that Ireland’s turbulent history regarding attempts 
to introduce the remedy of divorce caused the government to create a divorce regime 
premised upon broad judicial powers and freedoms.10 The extensive discretionary powers 
delegated to the judiciary by the legislature were considered in the Dail and Seanad 
debates during the passage of the Divorce Bill. As a starting point for the creation of a 
divorce regime, the legislature appears to have taken the broadest and most discretion- 
based route available. The legislative choice to create a divorce regime with an infinite 
right to apply for a vast array of orders in respect of any assets held by one or both of the 
parties allows the judiciary to deal with whatever circumstances may arise. Given the 
historical fears surrounding the impact of marital breakdown on the vulnerable spouse, it 
is arguable that the promise of an open-ended power to make whatever orders are 
required by justice, ultimately convinced the electorate to accept the constitutional 
amendment.
undertaken in respect o f Irish law. Archbold C and Shannon G “Thinking Globally and Locally -  
Developing a Research Culture in Irish Family Law” [2002] 5(2) IJFL Editorial.
8 Buckley LA “Irish Matrimonial Property Division in Practice: A Case Study” (2007) 21 IJLPF 48 at 49.
9 Ibid. Buckley interviewed 44 family law practitioners in Ireland with a view to analysing patterns of 
property division following marital breakdown under Irish separation and divorce laws. Her study analyses 
89 divorce, separation and judicial separation cases, primarily focussing upon the types o f  
orders/agreements made, and the reasons, if  any, given for the orders/agreements made.
10 See generally section 6 o f  the preceding chapter for an overview o f the introduction o f divorce in Ireland.
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In the course of the Dail debates Deputy Taylor recognised the need for such extensive 
judicial powers, acknowledging that:
“...even in an Act one cannot set out the detailed provisions of the 
huge multiplicity of cases that will arise. Every case is different and it 
is hard to find two cases where the assets, income, prospects, ages, 
length of marriage, needs etc. will be the same. Of necessity, whether 
we like it or not, we have to leave the discretion on those provisions to 
the decision of the court, having heard the circumstances of each 
family.”"
The judicial view of these powers has supported this approach, with the Supreme Court 
emphasising that “the very broad discretion conferred on a judge hearing a case of this
nature will still remain to be exercised having regard to the circumstances of any
1 0 __particular case.” This view was expressly relied upon in a later High Court hearing, 
where O’Higgins J recognised the “...widely different circumstances from one case to 
another [which] make it desirable that there be considerable discretion vested in the court 
of trial.”13 As a policy choice, he recognised the intention of the legislature in adopting 
this approach, relying on the words of Fennelly J.:
“The Oireachtas, in choosing the approach...made a considered 
decision to confer upon the court a duty of a particularly broad 
discretionary character...”14
The apparent benefits have been repeatedly identified as permitting the judiciary to adapt 
the application of the laws depending upon changing social perceptions of fairness and
11 Seanad Eireann debates Vol 144 18 October 1995 at 1655.
n T v T [2002] 3 I.R 334 per Murray J at 401-402.
13 C v C [2005] IEHC 276. O’Higgins J liirther quoted directly from the judgment o f  Keane C.J in TvT ;  “It 
is obvious that the circumstances o f  individual cases will vary so widely that, ultimately, where the parties 
are unable to agree, the trial judge must be regarded as having a relatively broad discretion in reaching what 
he or she considers a just resolution in all the circumstances.”
14 T v T  supra n. 12 at 414 with reference to the 12 statutory factors to which the court must have regard, 
discussed below at section 5.
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justice as well as allowing the resolution of the issues to be individualised to suit the 
circumstances of the case before the court.15
The issue of legal rules versus discretionary powers also arose previously in the context 
of the introduction of judicial separation. In particular there was much debate 
surrounding the attempts by the then Minster for Justice, Deputy Owen, to restrict the 
discretionary scope of judicial powers in respect of spousal succession rights. Following 
the introduction of the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Bill by Deputy 
Shatter, Deputy Owen proposed an amendment to its provisions to provide for the 
automatic extinguishing of spousal successions rights of separated parties. This move was 
strongly challenged in parliamentary debates, and was essentially regarded as an 
inappropriate, absolutist approach and ultimately including scope for the exercise of 
judicial discretion was deemed a fairer approach.
Thus interestingly, where the government attempted in one area to impose a strict policy- 
based rule regarding spousal rights on death, it was strongly contested in both houses of 
the Oireachtas. Deputy Taylor emphasised that the “range of possible cases that can arise 
in this regard is so various and vast that it is extremely difficult to encompass all the 
different possibilities that could arise.”16 Consequently he rejected as inappropriate a 
legislative policy stance on succession rights to be imposed in every separation case and 
emphasised the importance of the court retaining “ultimate discretion in each case”.17 
Given the “various and complex” circumstances that might arise, he stated that “it must 
surely be safer to leave the issue within the powers of the court and not to over tie the 
hands of the court.”18 Notwithstanding his criticism of strict rules which in his view
15 For example, see the views o f  O ’Neill J in M K vJK  [2003] 1 IR 326, noting that the list o f statutory 
factors to which the court must have regard under section 20(2)(a)-(l) is not exhaustive and does not 
confine the discretion o f the court. Similarly Coveney identifies the lack o f  specific direction provided by 
section 20, “the Oireachtas deliberately avoided listing prescriptive guidelines for the application o f the 
section 20 criteria.” Coveney H “Proper Provision in Matrimonial Breakdown: The Debate Continues in the 
Aftermath o f  T v T ’ [2003] 6(1) IJFL 3.
16 Dail Eireann debates Vol 384 23 November 1988 at 1611.
17 Ibid at 1612.
18 Ibid at 1613. Given the complexities that can arise, he stated that it is essential that the court 
retains these powers. Regarding the conflicting aims of certainty and fairness, Deputy 
McCartan, ibid at 1624, highlighted the cost o f prioritising certainty, “...in the cause of certainty
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would no longer “serve the cause of justice”,19 by contrast, Deputy McCartan later 
queried the “ambiguity and wideness” of the broad-based guidance offered by (the then) 
section 18 statutory factors which he concluded was “undesirable for all the reasons that 
have been advanced ... [given the importance of the principles of] certainty, clarity and 
letting people know exactly where they stand.”20
Unsurprisingly very differing views were evident in the Houses regarding the nature and 
extent of the discretion-based judicial powers in the proposed Divorce Bill. Ultimately 
however those judicial powers were enacted as proposed. The suggested automatic 
extinguishing of spousal succession rights was abandoned, the issue being accepted by 
the Oireachtas as one to be subjectively determined in each case.
2 Ancillary relief orders under the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996
Part III of the Divorce Act is entitled Preliminary and Ancillary Orders in or after 
proceedings for divorce and is comprised of sections 11 -  30. In essence this Part grants 
wide-ranging powers to the court to make one or more of an extensive array of orders to 
provide for the financial needs of the applicant, respondent and any dependent members 
of the family. Immediately the breadth of the powers of the judiciary in divorce 
proceedings is apparent. It is open to either spouse to apply for any or every form of 
ancillary relief provided for by the Divorce Act21 at the time of making the initial divorce 
application to the court,22 or at any time into the future save where the proposed applicant 
has re-married.23 Once any such application is before the court, the judiciary is entitled to 
make whatever order it considers appropriate, once it is satisfied that “ . . .it would be in
so much has to be sacrificed....[conversely] fairness, equity and protection o f the vulnerable 
spouse in matrimonial law in Ireland is what should guide us in this legislation and to hell with 
certainty.”
19 Ibid at 1625.
20 Ibid at 1687. The draft section 18 was enacted as section 20 o f the Divorce Act.
21 Section 13 -  periodical payments and lump sum orders; section 14 -  property adjustment orders; section 
15 -  miscellaneous ancillary orders; Section 16 -  financial compensation orders; Section 17 -  pension 
adjustment orders; section 18 -  provision from estate o f deceased spouse; section 19 -  orders for the sale of 
property.
2 Or if  the respondent, upon the filing o f the defence and counterclaim.
23 The provisions governing each form o f ancillary relief exclude a former spouse who has re-married from 
the category o f persons who can apply for such relief.
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the interest of justice to do so.”24 It is for the court to decide if this is the case and any 
directions in the Divorce Act simply act as guidelines for the judiciary.
As will become evident in this chapter, the provisions of the Divorce Act are deliberately 
replete with terminology that is designed to maximise the breadth of discretion available 
to the judiciary in providing for the parties to an application for divorce. In addition 
despite the over-riding obligation on the court to ensure that proper provision is made for 
the parties and any dependent children, there is a distinct lack of instruction as to the best 
means to determine this. Under Part III, the judiciary can make an order in respect of any 
assets held legally or equitably by the parties, jointly, individually or otherwise. The court 
is the ultimate and only adjudicator as to whether the asset is to be divided and can 
determine the nature and scope of any order made. However notwithstanding these broad 
powers to make whatever orders are necessary, there is no requirement that ancillary 
relief orders be made in every case.25 The guidelines that might assist the court to reach 
its decision on ancillary relief orders are couched in broad terms in section 20, criteria 
which can be followed where the court deems them to be relevant, but again there does 
not appear to be any compulsion for any or all of the criteria to be considered. By 
incorporating a provision such as section 20, the legislature has effectively empowered 
the court to make whatever order(s) it sees fit and in turn enables the court to justify such 
orders on the basis of one or more elements of the widely-drafted section 20. For the 
most part the Irish judiciary have welcomed this delegation of power, which in failing to 
create strict principles and policies has encouraged the judiciary to decide each case on its 
own merits. This has led to a suggestion from the Supreme Court that judges should 
equally avoid the creation of judicially developed principles and guidelines, preferring 
that the courts retain their freedom to decide each case in its own right:
24 Section 20(5).
25 O’Higgins J emphasised in MP v AP Unreported High Court 02/03/2005 that the law “does not mandate 
any particular ancillary relief form o f  order in divorce cases.”
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“It is only with the greatest care, therefore, that one should formulate 
any general propositions. The judge must always and in every case 
have regard to the particular circumstances of the case.”26
3 Over-riding pre-requisite of proper provision
3.1 Overview o f *proper provision 9 requirement
The Irish government succeeded in convincing the electorate to accept the deletion of the 
Constitutional ban on divorce by promising a divorce regime which would protect the 
vulnerable spouse. By enacting legislation that requires a four-year period of separation 
prior to divorce, that prevents a clean financial break between the parties upon divorce 
and that empowers the judiciary to make whatever financial orders are necessary, such a 
spouse could not be left destitute as a result of the dissolution of the union. Further, the 
government inserted in both the proposed amendment to the Constitution and the draft 
Divorce Bill the requirement that prior to the granting of a decree of divorce the court 
must be satisfied that:
“...such provision as the court considers proper having regard to the 
circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses and any 
dependent members of the family”.27
At the second stage of the passage of the Bill through the Dail, Minister Taylor for the 
government explained this double-statement, outlining the government’s determination 
“to protect and support the institution of marriage and the family in so far as is 
possible”, thereby eliminating scope or capacity for a divorce to be too easily obtained.
The inclusion of the proper provision requirement, without an explanation or definition of 
the required standard, caused much concern in the course of the legislative process. The 
decision not to define proper provision and to leave it to the presiding judge to determine
26 T vT su pra  n. 12 per Fennelly J at 418. Similarly Murray J in the same case emphasised at 409 that 
“...Each case will necessarily depend on its own particular circumstances.”
27 This quote represents part o f  the wording of the proposed amendment to the Constitution, now contained 
in Article 41.3.2 o f the Constitution, also included in section 5(1) o f the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996.
28 Dail Eireann debates Vol 456 27 September 1995 at 18.
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was regarded as an abdication of responsibility by the legislature. Deputy Harney, then a 
member of the Opposition, expressed grave concerns about the importance of the 
proposed proper provision test, given, that it is such a “vague concept”. For this reason 
she was additionally uneasy with its inclusion in the Constitution.29 She regarded the 
proposed approach as “writing vague, ambiguous and uncertain words in the 
Constitution” and thereby “storing up enormous difficulties for the victims of marital 
breakdown.” In her view this represented an abdication of legislative responsibilities and
• • • mthe “passing [of] the buck to the Judiciary”. In response to these concerns, Minister 
Taylor emphasised the importance of judicial discretion in family law, given the myriad 
circumstances that might arise. In defence of die government’s approach, he also referred 
to the “terms and details” set out in the statutory factors listed to guide the courts in the 
decision-making process. Rather than attempt to define proper provision, the legislature 
chose to set out an exhaustive list of criteria, which if applied by the courts, should secure 
proper provision in each set of circumstances. In BD v JD, McKechnie J recently stated 
that his obligation was to
“...apply the individual factors therein listed to the particular circumstances 
of this case, so that by way of doing justice between the parties I should 
ensure that "proper" provision is made for each of them. Moreover, when 
looking at these individual matters one must consider the facts pertinent to 
each such matter and must ascribe to them the appropriate weight in 
accordance with the evidence as tendered. Furthermore I must ensure that 
neither spouse is discriminated against and that whatever provision is made,
29 Dail Eireann debates Vol 456 3 October 1995 at 818-819.
30 Ibid. Noting at 821 the “doubt and debate about the meaning o f the various words”, she proposed that a 
different course be taken by the legislature. “The preferring o f a formula involving that level o f uncertainty 
represents a grave failure o f  leadership”. This position was supported by Senator Cassidy, supra n. 14 at 
1653-1654. He was o f the view that democracy demands the legislature decide and define such issues. 
Conversely Finlay Geoghegan J in RG v CG [2005] 2 IR 418 has highlighted in the context o f a judicial 
separation case, what might be regarded as the nonsense o f attempting to predict what might constitute 
proper provision at the time o f  a future divorce, which in her view can only ever be regarded as some 
“future unknown date”.
31 Section 20 is the vehicle for such direction. Section 20(2) provides that in determining what orders are 
required to achieve the proper provision standard demanded by both sections 5 and 20(1) o f the Divorce 
Act, the court shall, in particular, have regard to the 12 factors contained therein. In addition, the court is 
also required by section 20(3) to “have regard to the terms o f any separation agreement entered into by the 
spouses and is still in force.” The peculiarities and judicial interpretations o f  the detailed provisions of  
section 20 are considered in section 5 below.
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is so made in the context of judicial separation proceedings and with the 
court’s inability to achieve asset finality between the parties in mind.”32
3.2 Reasonable provision v proper provision
As a regulatory standard of provision to be achieved on marital breakdown, the concept 
of ‘proper provision’ when introduced in 1996, was a novel benchmark under Irish 
matrimonial law. The 1995 Act, when first enacted, included in section 16 a reference to 
the making of “adequate” and “reasonable” provision for the spouses and dependent 
members of the family on separation. When defending the ‘proper provision’ requirement 
on divorce, Minster Taylor argued that it “is similar to the situation that pertains at 
present with regard to separation applications”, noting that this requirement “would be 
the position on divorce as it is now on separation”. Of course, this is not strictly correct, 
given that the statutory requirement on separation up to the enactment of the Divorce Act 
was the making of adequate and reasonable provision.33 However subsequent to the 
passing of the referendum and the enactment of the Divorce Act, proper provision was 
substituted as the new test for judicial separation by section 52(h).34 Thus whatever 
distinctions between the remedies of judicial separation and divorce that might be 
identified by the courts, the statutory approach has deliberately avoided such distinctions 
and has ensured almost identical governing statutory regimes.
3.3 Judicial interpretation o f proper provision
It is arguable that the only identifiable policy objective upon the passing of the 1995 
referendum was to secure proper provision for the parties and dependent children. This 
pre-requisite has since been regarded as the central focus of the remedy, such provision 
being determined with reference to other aspects of the Divorce Act:
32 Unreported High Court 5 December 2003.
33 As per section 16 o f  the Family Law Act 1995, as originally enacted.
34 In AK  v JK  [2008] IEHC 341, in the context o f an application to vary existing ancillary relief orders 
made on granting a decree o f  judicial separation, Abbott J noted that the test o f  proper provision for 
separating parties “is to be informed by the test o f justice.”
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“The scheme established under the Act of 1996 is not a division of 
property. The scheme established under the Act of 1996 provides for 
proper provision, not division. It is not a question of dividing the 
assets at the trial on a percentage or equal basis. However, all 
circumstances of the family, including the particular factors referred to 
in s. 20(2) of the Act of 1996, are relevant in assessing the matter of 
provision from the assets.”35
Pursuant to its constitutional and legislative obligations, the court must be so satisfied and
the parties cannot contract out of this inter partes obligation.36
Despite varying judicial statements on the matter, it appears that the time for assessing 
whether proper provision has been made for the parties, is at the date of the divorce 
hearing.37 More typically perhaps, proper provision is often secured over an extended 
period of time, thereby allowing a decree to be granted in limited resources cases. 
Although the parties may not be able to afford to finalise matters immediately, the decree 
is not necessarily denied by the courts. To meet the pre-condition of proper provision, 
such circumstances often require the ordering of ongoing maintenance and other 
arrangements to allow the goal to be achieved in the long-term, as necessary. In JC v 
A/C, Abbott J considered the proper provision requirement in light of the economic 
realties of the family circumstances and emphasised that the making of proper provision 
at the time of the decree or into the future is a “condition precedent” to the granting of a 
divorce, creating a situation
35 T v Tsupra  n 12 per Denham J at 383. Buckley has suggested, with reference to this Supreme Court 
judgment that “the emphasis o f  the Supreme Court on “proper provision” rather than the “division” of 
assets was designed to rule out any strict rules or principles on division, and to ensure that the prescribed 
statutory factors were fully considered in each case”. Buckley LA ““Proper Provision” and “Property 
Division”: Partnership in Irish Matrimonial Property Law in the Wake o f T v T” [2004] 7(3) IJFL 8.
36 See below at section 5.4 which considers the relevance o f pre-existing separation agreements.
37 See the views o f the Supreme Court in T v T  and those o f Finlay Geoghegan J in RG v CG supra n. 30, as 
set out in section 5.4 below, in the context o f a pre-existing separation agreement or court order. In B v B 
(Unreported High Court 8/12/2005) O’Higgins J re-affirmed the obligation on the court in the context of 
divorce proceedings to “be satisfied at the time of this hearing proper provision exists or will be made for 
the spouses and children.” Conversely, and somewhat controversially, Hardiman J appears to suggest in A v 
A [2004] 1 IR 1 that a 13-year old settlement satisfied the proper provision test on an application for 
divorce, given that it was deemed sufficient by the parties when executed, as discussed at section 5.5 
below.
38 Unreported High Court 22 Jan 2007 per Abbott J.
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“...where a court is obliged as a preliminary to a divorce to assess the 
capacity in the future for provision but leaving the actual delivery of 
such provision to the future as in the case of maintenance or other 
executory possibilities including the frequently-occurring pension 
provisions the effects of which may only “kick in” in certain cases well 
into the future.”39
3.4 How to calculate *proper provision ’
The term ‘proper provision’ has not been defined in any part of the Divorce Act and thus 
must be determined judicially in the circumstances of each case. In the course of the 
passage of the Divorce Bill, Deputy Gallagher recognised this constitutional pre-requisite 
as “a general statement which is open to wide interpretation.” 40 Consequently he 
welcomed the inclusion of statutory factors to which the court is obliged to have regard, 
and emphasised the importance of the “specific criteria that must be taken into account by 
the court” as set out by the legislature.41
As a starting point it has been emphasised by the courts that proper provision does not 
mean that the dependent spouse should receive financial support to provide merely for 
her basic needs. It has been clearly stated that any surplus wealth remaining after the 
needs of both parties are satisfied, should be available for distribution, and not retained 
by the earning spouse:
“But the Oireachtas did not limit the ‘proper provision’ for a spouse 
solely to his or her financial needs and responsibilities.. .Proper 
provision should seek to reflect the equal partnership of the spouses.
Proper provision for a spouse who falls into the category of a 
financially dependent spouse...should seek, so far as the 
circumstances of the case permit, to ensure that the spouse is not only 
in a position to meet her financial liabilities and obligations and 
continue with a standard of living commensurate with her standard of 
living during marriage but to enjoy what may reasonably be regarded 
as the fruits of the marriage so that she can live an independent life and
39 Ibid at 22. Notwithstanding the doubts expressed by some members o f  the court in the earlier case o f T v 
T, Abbott J at 23 referred to the yardstick o f equal contributions and one-third/two-third division of assets 
between the breadwinner and homemaker as having “the authority o f the Supreme Court”.
40 Supra n. 7 at 1802.
41 Ibid.
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have security in the control of her own affairs, with a personal dignity 
that such autonomy confers, without necessarily being dependent on 
receiving periodic payments for the rest of her life from her former 
husband.”42
This Supreme Court explanation of the concept of proper provision represents a helpful 
judicial statement of the over-riding aims of the pre-condition, and allows it to be aligned 
with the ‘marriage as partnership’ approach which is evident in other jurisdictions.43 In T 
v T the five Supreme Court judges made effective use of this ample resources case to 
expound upon the parameters and impact of proper provision. Keane CJ preferred a 
formulaic approach, suggesting ai starting point of one third of the assets for the 
dependent spouse, and he received some support for this view from Denham J.44 
However a more typical view is that proper provision is more rightly a matter that should 
be determined with reference to the individual circumstances of each case, in the context 
of recognised legal principles:
“Each case must be decided on its own circumstances. However, there 
are relevant fundamental legal principles -  such as to recognition of 
spouses’ work in the home -  as to spouses’ rights under the Succession 
Act -  as to the place of the family in our society.”45
42 T v T  supra n. 12 per Murray J at 408. Similarly in the more recent Supreme Court appeal hearing in MF 
v EF [2005] IESC 45, McGuinness J affirmed as "entirely correct” the view o f the lower court regarding 
the extent o f the applicant’s entitlements. “I approach the issue o f asset share on the basis that the court 
should provide not only for the needs o f  the applicant (where there is provision to do so) but also should 
assess a fair lump sum to reflect her interest in the family assets (not necessarily 50%) even if  this is greater 
than her specific needs...” per O ’Sullivan J (Unreported High Court May 2002), although on the facts, 
O’Sullivan J was deemed to have erred lin including 22 adjoining acres within the definition o f the family 
home.
43 Buckley, supra n. 35 at 8 regards sharing principles and partnership as being o f  “fundamental concern to 
the issue o f marriage and our resulting altitude to property regulation.” She regards marriage as “more than 
simply a legal bond between individuals...hence it is appropriate to think o f  needs and objectives, including 
financial needs, in joint rather than individualistic terms.” The notion o f marriage as a partnership and its 
impact upon regulatory approaches is considered later in the concluding chapter o f this thesis.
44 Denham J, supra n. 12 at 384 acknow ledged that a figure o f one-third o f the assets may be a useful 
benchmark to fairness against which could be aligned, “both positively and negatively, the specific 
circumstances o f a case, and in particular the factors set out in s.20(2)(a)-(l) o f the Act o f 1996.”. However 
she later noted that such a formulaic approach “may have no application in many cases”, in particular it 
would be an unsuitable benchmark for a family with inadequate assets or one o f  adequate means, where 
such a sum could only be achieved by a sale o f assets which might ultimately destroy a previously viable 
business.
45 Ibid. Unfortunately Denham J offers no further clarification on these “recognised legal principles.” It was 
later suggested by O’Neill J in M K  v JK supra n 15 at 349-350, quoting from the judgment of Keane CJ in 
T v T  at 367-369, that the one-third starting point, although far from appropriate in every case, has evolved
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Irrespective of the varying views of the five presiding judges in T v T,46 regarding the 
judicial creation of yardsticks or formulaic approaches general agreement was evident 
amongst them as to the fact of the trial judge’s over-riding broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes proper provision in the circumstances of a particular case. 
Even Keane CJ, who favoured a formula-based division of assets where the wealth of the 
parties so permitted, recognised that notwithstanding the section 20(2) factors:
“...the circumstances of individual cases will vary so widely that 
ultimately, where the parties are unable to agree, the trial judge must be 
regarded as having a relatively broad discretion in reaching what he or 
she considers a just resolution in all the circumstances.”47
Thus whilst the efforts of the legislature to guide the decision-making process were 
acknowledged, ultimately it was declared that the “discretion given by the legislature to 
the trial judge under this scheme is ample.”48
More recently in C v C49 O’Higgins J rejected the suitability of relying upon percentages 
as a means of adjudicating upon the merits of an application for ancillary relief:
“In the present case the property assets of the parties were inherited and 
brought to the marriage by the Applicant. The concept of one-third as a 
check on fairness is not in my view useful in the present case.”
from the historical approach o f  the Irish courts to spousal entitlement on death, which has traditionally 
influenced applications for spousal maintenance. “The Irish courts...dating from times when family law 
cases were far less frequent and complex, traditionally approached the assessment o f  maintenance on the 
basis that, all things being equal, the amount o f maintenance should be one third o f  the disposable income 
o f the earning partner, then almost invariably the husband.”
46 The judicial views o f yardsticks or formulaic approaches to asset distribution, as evidenced in the 
judgments delivered in T v T  are discussed in section 4.2 below.
47 Supra n. 12 at 365. It was emphasised subsequently by O’Higgins J in CD  v PD  [2006] IEHC 100 that 
where there is significant wealth, this must be taken into account in determining what constitutes proper 
provision. Citing Thorpe LJ in Parlour v Parlour [2004] EWCA Civ 872, O’Higgins J stated that “it is o f  
course correct that the proper provision must be assessed on the basis o f the assets and that the concept of  
proper provision cannot be assessed without taking into account the assets.”
48 T v Tsupra  n. 12 per Denham J at 388.
49 Supra n. 13.
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By way of contrast he regarded “the purchase of a suitable home and a suitable and 
proper level of maintenance” as his priority and quite simply the clearest means of 
ensuring that proper provision would be achieved. Equally in MS v PS50 Sheehan J made 
no reference to percentage-based spousal entitlements, rather, having considered the 
section 20 statutory factors with reference to the circumstances of the case, he made six 
orders for financial and property relief, the combination of which he deemed necessary to 
make “proper provision for the applicant and the children of the marriage”.51 
Interestingly O’Neill J identified a role for the parties in the calculation of what might 
constitute proper provision in the circumstances - he commended “the approach adopted 
by the parties in setting out at the start of the trial what they considered to be a proper 
provision” and regarded their views as being “of great assistance to the court”.52 In her 
recent analysis of the decision-making trends as they relate to ancillary relief orders, 
Buckley has attempted to gauge the manner in which the proper provision requirement is 
being secured by way of order/settlement.53 She identifies periodic payments and 
property transfers as by “far the most common outcomes” of consensual cases, noting 
that the majority of property transfers relate to the family home. In non-consensual cases, 
again Buckley notes that periodic payments were the most common orders made, and 
where made, were always in favour of the wife. Certainly, both in respect of the nature of 
the orders made, as well as property ownership during and after marriage, Buckley’s data 
uncovers evidence that marital relationships in Ireland remain predominantly in the 
traditional format, with dependent homemaker wife and breadwinner husband. 
Consequently the securing of proper provision necessitates utilisation of the armouiy of 
judicial powers, with arrangement typically consisting of a combination of a periodic 
payments order, a property transfer order and/or lump sum order and where available, a 
pension adjustment order. Confirming the trends identified by the orders made, Buckley 
notes that “periodic payments were invariably paid to the wife”54 and though not
50 Unreported High Court 21/11/2008.
51 Ibid at 10. McKechnie J in BD  v JD supra n. 32, in deciding what constituted proper 
provision for the parties in the circumstances, had recognised his obligation to “be guided by 
section 16” and his duty to “utilise the facts o f this case within the provisions o f that section so 
that the resulting orders are fair, just and equitable.”
52 MK  v JK, supra n. 15 at 344. This view was echoed by O’Higgins J in CD  v PD, supra n. 47 above.
53 Supra n. 8.
54 Ibid at 63, 64.
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particularly common, “wives were almost the exclusive beneficiaries of pension 
adjustment orders”.55
3.5 Impact o f proper provision requirement
On divorce, failure to secure the standard of proper provision for the parties, howsoever 
determined, ought to prevent the ordering of the decree sought. In the course of the 
Seanad debates prior to the divorce referendum, the capacity of most individuals to make 
proper provision for a spouse and children was queried, with reference to the “limited 
capacity, even for professional or business people” to locate the necessary resources.56 
The general unsuitability of the proper provision requirement to the financial capacities 
of Irish families was raised, as was what was regarded as the unavoidable “diminishing 
[of] the rights of the wife and children” of the first marriage because of the limited funds 
available.57 It was regarded as a suitable test only in cases where one or both spouses has 
significant financial resources, but being of “little or no relevance for the majority of 
divorce cases” that would arise.58 Deputy Wallace noted that “the sad reality is that 
relatively few divorce applicants provide adequate material support for their former 
families to allow them to maintain or enhance their previous standard of living.”59 In 
truth, financial limitations often require the court to maintain financial ties for many years 
after the decree is granted, in order to ensure that proper provision is made for the parties 
into the future.
In her recent analysis of the decision-making trends as they relate to ancillary relief 
orders, Buckley has attempted to gauge the manner in which the proper provision 
requirement is being secured by way of both court orders and negotiated settlements. 
Interestingly she has identified very distinct approaches to the need to maintain financial
55 Ibid at 64.
56 Supra n. 11 at 1675 per Professor Lee.
57 Ibid at 1679 per Senator O’Kennedy.
58 Supra n. 7 at 1820 per Deputy Wallace. Ultimately Deputy Wallace suggested that the economic realities 
of post-divorce life were likely to cause many spouses to be reliant upon the State for financial support.
59 Ibid  at 1821-1822.
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ties depending upon whether the dissolution is resolved by way of inter partes settlement 
or non-consensual court adjudication. She has noted, that
“...maintenance orders were much less frequent in consent divorces 
than in non-consensual ones, while property adjustment orders and 
pension adjustment orders were much more common in consent 
divorces.’ 0
It appears that where given the opportunity to agree post-divorce financial arrangements, 
avoiding ongoing ties was preferred by spouses. Conversely where the matter was left for 
the courts to determine, post-divorce payments were typically retained. Although these 
ongoing payments may have been necessary to fulfil the proper provision requirements, 
given that periodic payments were made in 53% of consent divorces but in 85% of non- 
consensual cases,61 this judicial reluctance to break the marital ties seems to reflect a 
particularly conservative approach to post-divorce independence. It is certainly arguable 
that in the course of negotiations, spouses may be more willing to forego the extent of 
their ‘proper provision’ rights simply for conciliatory purposes. Buckley surmises that the 
courts “may be less focussed on establishing a clean break between the parties as this is 
not legislatively mandated and therefore may be less resistant to ongoing obligation.”62 In 
consent cases, she suggests that the data collected may indicate that parties may “prefer a 
clean break property division to ongoing obligations such as maintenance”.63
4 Statutory sources of judicial guidance
4.1 Introduction
Despite the breadth of judicial powers under the Divorce Act, the governing provisions 
are remarkably bereft of statutory guidance or direction. The Irish legislative framework 
includes neither the statutory rules of Californian divorce laws nor the principles and
60 Supra n. 8 at 66.
61 Ibid at 80, fn 53.
62 Ibid at 66.
63 Ibid.
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policies pronounced in the New Zealand legislation.64 Rather, the Irish Divorce Act is 
distinctly silent on the over-riding aims of the legislation, preferring to identity basic pre­
requisites, financial and otherwise, for the granting of the decree, and to set out a series of 
issues and factors which may particularly, but not exhaustively, influence the 
deliberations of the presiding judge. The terms of section 20(1) of the Divorce Act 
require the court, when making virtually any order for ancillary relief,65 and in 
determining the provisions of any such orders, to ensure that proper provision is made for 
the spouses and any dependent member of the family. Notwithstanding the generality of 
that section, section 20(2) requires in particular, that the court have particular regard to 
the matters set out in section (20)(2)(a) -  (1):
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each 
of the spouses concerned has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the spouses has 
or is likely to have in the foreseeable future (whether in the case of the remarriage 
of the spouse or otherwise);
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family concerned before the proceedings 
were instituted or before the spouses commenced to live apart from one another, 
as the case may be;
(d) the age of each of the spouses, the duration of their marriage and the length of 
time during which the spouses lived with one another;
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the spouses;
(f) the contributions which each of the spouse has made or is likely in the foreseeable 
future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by 
each of them to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of 
the other spouse and any contribution made by either of them by looking after the 
home or caring for the family;
(g) the effect on the earning capacity on each of the spouses of the marital 
responsibilities assumed by each during the period when they lived with one
64 The regulatory approaches o f  these two jurisdictions will be considered later in chapters 4 and 6 
respectively.
65 The provisions o f section 20(1) relate to orders made by the courts under sections 12, 13, 14, 15(1 )(a), 
16, 17, 18 and 22 o f the Divorce Act.
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another and, in particular, the degree to which the future earning capacity of a 
spouse is impaired by reason of that spouse having relinquished or foregone the 
opportunity of remunerative activity in order to look after the home or care for the 
family;
(h) any income or benefits to which either of the spouses is entitled by or under 
statute;
(i) the conduct of each of the spouses, if that conduct is such that in the opinion of 
the court it would in all the circumstances of the case be unjust to disregard it;
(j) the accommodation needs of either of the spouses;
(k) the value to each of the spouses of any benefit (for example, a benefit under a 
pension scheme) which by reason of the decree of divorce concerned, that spouse 
will forfeit the opportunity or possibility of acquiring;
(1) the rights of any person other than the spouses but including a person to whom 
either spouse is remarried.
The detailed contents, in particular of section 20(2)(a)-(l),66 setting out the factors to 
which the courts must have regard merely confirm the power, if not duty, of the court to 
decide each case with primary and almost absolute reference to the individual 
circumstances before the court. In addition, section 20(3) of the Divorce Act requires the 
court in deciding whether to make an order for ancillary relief, to have regard to the terms 
of any separation agreement, which has been entered into by the spouses and is still in 
force. Section 20(4) is similar to section 20(2) in that it sets out specific criteria to be 
considered by the court,67 except that these additional seven criteria are to be taken into 
account only when considering whether to make any orders in favour of a dependent 
member of the family. Finally, section 20(5) is perhaps the most vague element of section 
20 in that it stipulates that the court “shall not make an order under a provision referred to 
in subsection (1) unless it would be in the interest of justice to do so.”
66 As the content and impact o f  each aspect o f section 20 is considered in the course o f  this section, it has 
been cited in full.
67 These factors are to be considered by the court without prejudice to the generality o f section 20(1) and 
the extensive factors to be considered by the court as outlined in section 20(2)(a)-(l).
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4.2 A bsence o f legislative principles and yardsticks
Power has commented upon the absence of a rationale underlying the statutory powers to 
make property and maintenance awards. He notes the lack of a statutorily-stated aim 
which, if articulated, would give court orders “a legitimacy and transparency that may 
make for better compliance and enforcement...a welcome and necessary objective.”
The judiciary has also recognised the lack of statutorily-stated principles of division and 
in particular the absence of rules or preference for equal division. In T v T, Fennelly J was 
not in favour of embracing any of the suggested yardsticks, stating that the Irish 
regulatory approach:
“...does not erect any automatic or mechanical rule of equality. Nor does 
it institute any notion of family resources or property to be subjected to 
division. Several considerations militate against the adoption of such 
rules of thumb.”69
In particular he cautioned against any such rule or yardstick of equality being implied 
from the requirement under section 20(2)(f) that the court have regard to both monetary 
and non-monetary spousal contributions. This view was supported by Murray J who 
rejected the view that “in making financial provision for spouses that their assets should 
be divided between them. Neither the Constitution nor the Act of 1996, requires that, 
expressly or implicitly.”70 Thus, as has been outlined above, in rejecting a principle of 
equal division, the Supreme Court has refused to regard the Divorce Act as mandating an 
approach which might focus judicial attention upon a division of the assets of the 
spouses.71
With reference to the constitutional and statutory pre-requisite of proper provision, Keane 
CJ has recognised the distinction between the Irish and English/Welsh jurisdictions, 
noting that under Irish divorce law, “.. .the appropriate criterion is the making of proper
68 Power C “Maintenance: No Clean Break with the Past” (1998) 1(1) IJFL 15 at 19.
^ Supra n. 12 at 417.
10 Ibid at 407.
71 In attempting to define the impact and role o f the proper provision requirement, the courts have 
emphasised that the focus o f  the Irish regulatory system must be provision and not division. See section 
3.3. above.
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provision for the parties concerned” as distinct from the English/Welsh approach which 
seeks to divide the assets fairly.72 Thus whilst proper provision can not be achieved 
without some division of the available assets, the latter is simply the means to achieve the 
former and once proper provision is secured it appears that the courts may not be willing
n'xto act beyond this. The extent of the available assets will ultimately determine the 
nature and scope of the asset distribution; cases of limited resources may well see an 
equal division of the assets whereas in the ample resources case of Tv T the Chief Justice 
noted that:
“...in cases such as the present where there are substantial assets 
which have admittedly been brought into being in circumstances 
where it would be unjust not to effect some form of division between 
the parties, the court will inevitably find itself having to determine, 
where the parties are unable to agree, how the assets should be 
divided between them.. .”74
However the apparent distinction drawn by Keane CJ between the approaches of Ireland 
and England/Wales is not entirely clear. Although he has suggested that the 
England/Wales determination is premised upon what is regarded as fair, this basis 
undoubtedly informs the Irish proper provision calculations. In CD v PD, O’Higgins J 
explained that “the court should strive not for equality but for fairness” and similarly in 
AK v JK15 Abbott J, in refusing to vary the orders made at the time of the granting of the 
decree of judicial separation, stated that the court determines the division of the assets 
“on the basis of the question of fairness and justice”.
The numerous factors contained in section 20, seek to provide guidance to the courts in 
making an adjudication regarding the nature and amount of ancillary relief orders. 
Broadly, section 20 identifies general statutory aims of justice and fairness but does not 
seek to define them nor identity how they might best be achieved. The individual factors
72 Supra n. 12 at 368.
73 It is worth noting, however the comments o f O’Higgins CJ in CD  v PD, supra  n. 47 regarding the 
relevance o f significant available wealth and its necessary impact on the awards made, and the large award 
made in favour o f the homemaker wife in T v T.
74 Supra n. 12 at 365.
75 Supra n. 34.
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to which the court must have regard are numerous, perhaps to the point that every aspect 
of the union is potentially relevant to the decision-making process. The impact of such a 
broad-brush approach to statutory guidance, the duplication of ‘relevant’ statutory factors 
on separation and divorce76 and the judicial interpretation and application of those factors 
will be considered in section 5 below which will focus exclusively upon the statutory 
factors and assess their impact and effectiveness on the asset distribution process.
4.3 Concept o f marital property
The related issue of the legislature’s decision not to define marital property represents 
further evidence of the broad delegation of power to the judiciary and the decision to 
avoid the abstract imposition of a definitive view. The only attempt to identify what 
might be available for distribution is found in the Rules of the Court and relates to the 
content of the mandatory affidavit of means which must be signed and sworn by both 
parties to the proceedings. The affidavit of means must accompany the family law civil 
bill when filed with the court to commence proceedings, or equally the defence and 
counterclaim where the proceedings are being defended. The Rules of the Circuit Court77 
require the deponent of the affidavit to declare all the assets to which he or she is “legally 
or beneficially entitled”.78 Thus the issue of what constitutes the property available for 
consideration and/or division is a further matter to be determined by the courts in light of 
the individual circumstances arising. In T v TFennelly J, confirmed the absence from the 
Divorce Act of “any notion of family resources or property to be subject to division.”79 
He further noted the potentially significant impact of such a non-committal approach to 
statute drafting giving rise to the reality:
“.. .that any property, whenever acquired, of either spouse and 
whenever and no matter how acquired, is, in principle, available for
76 Whilst on an application for a decree o f divorce the court may well be influenced by issues such as the 
fact or potential o f  a second family and perhaps a consequently greater need for a clean break between the 
parties, it appears that the duplication in legislative approach reflects a policy decision not to distinguish 
between the remedies.
77 Order 70A as enacted by the Rules o f the Superior Courts (No.3) 1997 S. I. No 343/1997.
78 As per form no. 2; schedule to Order 70A.
79 Supra 12 at 417.
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the purposes of the provision. Thus, property acquired by 
inheritance, by chance, or the exclusive labours of one spouse does 
not necessarily escape the net.”
Once again the undecided issue has been regarded as determinable only in the particular 
circumstances of each case.81
5 Statutory factors
5.1 Section 20 factors
Section 20 is entitled Provisions relating to certain orders under sections 12 to 18 and 
22, and sets out the statutory factors to which the court must have regard when 
determining the merits of an application for ancillary relief orders. It consists of five 
subsections which in turn contain guidance and direction for the courts. Section 20(1) sets 
out the over-riding obligation of the court when making virtually any order for ancillary 
relief, and in determining the nature of any such orders, to ensure that proper provision 
is made for the spouses and any dependent member of the family. In the context of 
judicial separation proceedings, ancillary relief is governed by the statutory factors set 
out in section 16(l)-(5) of the Family Law Act 1995 which effectively mirror the factors 
set out in section 20(l)-(5) of the Divorce Act.
The precise status of these statutory factors is unclear. They certainly represent a 
substantial part of the legislative guidance offered by the Divorce Act and exist in lieu of
80 Ibid at 416.
81 Ibid, See further the views o f  Murray J at 409; “That is not to say that the resources o f  one spouse which 
could be said to have been acquired completely independently o f the marriage should be excluded from 
consideration by the court. Each spouse has a continuing obligation to make proper provision for the other 
and the resources which are available to each o f them may be taken into account, so far as is necessary, to 
achieve that objective. Each case will necessarily depend upon its own particular circumstances. Where 
there are quite limited resources available it may only be possible to provide for the basic needs o f each 
spouse. On the other hand, different considerations would also arise where one spouse was independently 
wealthy before the marriage and the marriage was o f a very short duration.”
82 The provisions o f  section 20(1) relate to orders made by the courts under sections 12, 13, 14, 15(l)(a), 
16, 17, 18 and 22 o f  the Divorce Act.
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stated objectives. Whilst section 20(2) requires the court to “in particular have regard” 
to these criteria, suggesting that the twelve factors are one possible source of influence 
for the decision(s) of the courts, there is no express mandatory obligation to apply each 
factor to the circumstances of a case before the courts. This is evident from the reported 
judgments which illustrate varying levels of judicial references to aspects of section 20(2) 
(a)-(l). Thus the impact of these twelve statutory factors differs depending not only on the 
facts of the case, but also on the attitude and approach of the presiding judge. 
Furthermore, the absence of a statutory obligation on the courts to declare the basis upon 
which ancillary relief orders are made weakens the capacity to assess the impact of this 
statutory approach to guiding the judicial adjudication process. In MP v APU O’Higgins J 
noted the extent of the list of factors and the reality of their variable influence in every 
case and suggested that in drafting section 20 in such a broad manner, the Oireachtas had 
“studiously avoided giving any prescriptive guidelines”, leaving instead a broad 
discretion for the court. The “ambiguity and wideness” of the statutory factors listed can 
not be reconciled with the principles of “certainty, clarity and letting people know where 
they stand”.85 In this context, Power has lamented the legislature’s failure to identify or 
explain the goals which the application of the section 20 factors seeks to achieve:
“What is missing is the bigger picture. What outcome are the criteria 
designed to achieve between the couple? To ask this is to speculate on the 
aim that underlies the making of orders and there is little legislative 
guidance on this, except that, it must be proper in the circumstances.”86
The lack of contextual debate and subsequent failure to identify the purpose of these 
criteria causes them to exist in a policy vacuum and invariably makes their correct 
application by the judiciary a speculative task.
83 Report o f the Study Group on Pre-Nuptial Agreements presented to the Tanaiste and Minster for Justice 
Equality and Law Reform in April 2007; at 73.
84 Supra n. 25.
85 Supra n. 17 at 1687, discussed in section 1.3 above. In relation to predicting the future income and 
financial needs o f a spouse, Deputy McCartan queried whether the courts would require the employment o f  
a soothsayer to provide the necessary foresight.
86 Supra n. 68 at 16.
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5.2 Judicial interpretations o f section 20(2) factors
Most fundamentally it appears that the purpose of the 12 factors enunciated in section 
20(2) is to highlight for the court those factors which, where relevant, must be taken into 
account, in order to fulfil the obligation to make proper provision for the parties. This is 
not a matter of interpretation; rather the wording of section 20(2) expressly relates its 12 
factors to the attainment of the over-riding obligation, as repeated in section 20(1). The 
workability of this approach to statutory guidance is best assessed with reference to the 
pronouncements of the courts. Just as the legislature regarded it as unnecessary to 
incorporate novel statutory guidelines on divorce, the courts have mostly applied the 
factors in a similar fashion in the context of both separation and divorce. For the most 
part the legislature regards the factors to be applicable equally on separation and divorce, 
mirroring the general similarity of treatment of these two remedies. In practice however, 
the courts have on occasion referred to the fact of the right to remarry on divorce and 
have considered the weight to be attached to this distinguishing factor.
The decision-making powers of the judiciary and the impact of the provisions of section 
20 were considered by McGuinness J in the Irish Supreme Court in the original appeal
0*7
from the judgment of Lavan J in MK v JK. In the body of her judgment, although 
McGuinness J acknowledged that the provisions of the Divorce Act “leave a considerable 
area of discretion to the Court in making financial provision for spouses in divorce 
cases”, she emphasised that this discretion is “not to be exercised at large”.88 Against this 
background, she proceeded to set out almost the entire provisions of section 20, and 
referred to these statutory factors as “mandatory guidelines”.89 This reflects her earlier 
interpretation of section 16(2) in relation to judicial separation; in JD v DD90 she noted 
that when calculating the appropriate lump sum and/or periodic payment orders to be 
made, “.. .full regard, of course, must be paid to the guidelines set out in s. 16 of the Act 
of 1995”.91 However in so stating, it was noted that even given these guidelines, the court 
still had “a wide area of discretion particularly in cases where there are considerable
87 [2001] 3 IR 371.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid at 384.
90 [1997] 3 IR 64.
91 Ibid at 94.
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financial assets”.92 Budd J subsequently regarded this interpretation of section 16 as “a
Q 'y
helpful review of the law and the relevant provisions governing the situation”. He 
considered at length the factors set out in section 16(2), the relevant facts of the case 
before him and how they would ultimately influence his decisions regarding the ancillary 
orders to be made by the court. In a similar approach to that adopted by McGuinness J, he 
thought it appropriate to cite in full the terms of section 16(2). In so doing he noted the 
compulsory obligation on the court to pay “full regard” to these guidelines in making the 
“necessary calculations”.94
A question which repeatedly arises, and is not assisted by the provisions of the Divorce 
Act, is the weight and/or prioritisation, if any, to be accorded to the 12 statutory factors. 
Keane CJ in T v T’ in acknowledging the detail of section 20(2), recognised the broad 
discretion that they necessarily afford the judiciary and accepted that such breadth of 
discretion will unavoidably give rise to elements of inconsistency.
“.. .it is obvious that the circumstances of individual cases will vary 
so widely that ultimately, where the parties are unable to agree, the 
trial judge must be regarded as having a relatively broad discretion in 
reaching what he or she considers a just resolution in the 
circumstances. While an appellate court will inevitably endeavour, 
so far as it can, to ensure consistency in the approach of trial judges, 
it is also bound to give reasonable latitude to the trial judge in the 
exercise of that discretion.95
To this end, referring to the judgment of Lord Hoffmann in Piglowski v Piglowski96 
Keane CJ confirmed that there is no hierarchy of factors under Irish divorce law. 
Notwithstanding this however, he did accept that in a more typical, limited resources 
case, the first task of the court must almost certainly be to consider the financial needs of 
the spouses and dependent children. This stance was accepted by his co-presiding 
colleague Denham J, who, whilst considering the provisions of section 20(2) (a)-(l) to be
92 Ibid at 91.
93 PO ’D v JO ’D  [2000] IEHC 173.
94 These views o f McGuinness J were again approved by O’Sullivan J in CF  v CF  [2002] IEHC 64.
95 Supra n. 12 at 365.
96 [1999] 1 WLR 1360.
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mandatory when determining what constitutes proper provision, equally confirmed that 
the relevance and weight o f the individual factors would depend upon the circumstances
Q7of each case. Fennelly J agreed, declaring that it “is for the High Court judge to decide 
on the weight to be accorded to each of the statutory matters.”98
It appears from these cases that the Irish judiciary is slow to embrace any responsibility 
for the development o f guiding principles, given the repeatedly-stated need for an 
underlying safety-net o f  judicial discretion. The transparency o f the process appears to 
fall at this final obstacle. This weakness is equally identified by Buckley; she comments 
on the difficulties encountered when trying to identify precise “trends or principles in 
asset division, given the dearth o f reported cases in this area.”99 Even where written 
judgments are delivered, she regards them as evidence o f the highly inconsistent judicial 
views on the matter.100
5.3 Judicial obligation to account for orders made
Whilst the statutoiy factors require the presiding judge to consider the relevance o f 12 
separate aspects o f the familial arrangements, the exact impact o f these factors is rarely 
explained. Greater transparency might be achieved by an express judicial 
acknowledgment o f the relevance and impact of particular factors as to do so might 
directly or indirectly allow for the identification of the over-riding judicial policy aims. 
Such an approach was advanced by McGuinness J in MKvJKm  where she stated that:
“The court must have regard to all the factors set out in s. 20, measuring 
their relevance and weight according to the facts o f the original case. In 
giving the decision o f the court, a judge should give reasons for the way 
in which his or her discretion has been exercised in the light o f the
97 Supra n. 12 at 379.
98 Ibid at 419.
99 Buckley LA “Matrimonial Property and Irish Law: A Case for Community?” [2002] 53(1) NILQ 39 at 
64.
100 Ibid.
101 Supra n. 87 at 384.
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statutory guidelines. In his judgment in the instant case the trial judge 
has notably failed to do this.”1 2
It appears that in delivering this judgment, McGuinness J has attempted to establish 
greater judicial accountability, in that not only must decisions be made in light of the 
requirements of section 20, such decisions must also be reasoned and elucidated in light 
of those provisions. She suggested that the decision of the trial judge in relation to the 
relevance and weight o f each o f  the statutory factors should be judged “according to the 
facts of the original case”.103 Her judgment is certainly evidence o f an appeal for greater 
judicial policy-making and seeks to extend the existing statutory obligations of the court. 
In particular, McGuinness J has highlighted the legislature’s failure to demand the 
explanation of the impact o f the section 20 factors upon each judicial determination. 
However despite her best efforts, there remains a general reluctance on the part of the 
judiciary to embrace the role o f policy-maker with reference to the impact o f the statutory 
factors.104
For example, in TvT,  despite the concerns expressed by various members o f the court, 
and the statement o f Denham J. that “...[BJetter practice would be to consider all the 
circumstances and each particular factor ad seriatim and give reasons for their relative 
weight in this case...”, the consideration of the factors contained in section 20(2) was 
mostly general and non-specific in nature and it is difficult to conclude that the court did 
in fact consider all twelve factors. Whilst obviously if a factor is not deemed relevant 
there is little point in discussing it further, where the judicial determination as to the 
relevance is not openly made, the logic or policy-based adjudication remains 
unexplained. Rather it appears that mTvT ,  despite the concerns expressed, the judiciary 
took a collective view o f the parties’ circumstances and the judgments delivered failed to 
provide any factor-based explanation for the decision reached. Whilst an overview of the
m lbid.
103 Ibid
104 Notwithstanding the general reluctance to explain judgments with reference to the section 20 factors, a 
minority of judges have developed a practice o f accountability by expressly identifying he factors that they 
have had regard to in the circumstances. In MR v PR [2006] 1 ILRM 513, Quirke J expressly identified 
sections 20(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (1) as relevant in the circumstances, concluding that the applicant was 
thus entitled to the ancillary relief sought. Ultimately he was o f the view that he was alleviating the 
unbalanced financial circumstances o f the parties “in a just and equitable fashion”.
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circumstances might deem the significant assets to have been fairly divided, providing 
the homemaker with a substantial share o f the breadwinner’s assets, as a precedent it is 
difficult to apply to future cases. The failure to require the courts to account for the 
decisions reached merely contributes to an already unclear and unpredictable regime that 
is likely to confuse and frustrate the parties to the proceedings.
Buckley has attempted to analyse the level o f juridical reference to the statutory criteria 
in her examination of the ancillary relief orders made in 89 divorce, separation and 
judicial separation cases.105 She qualifies her findings by noting the absence of written 
judgments in the majority of cases and her research is thus reliant upon either the order 
made or upon a solicitor’s contemporaneous note of the judgment delivered.106 She notes 
that the general perception of family law practitioners is that judges do not commonly 
refer to the statutory criteria, although “many felt that judges did have certain factors in 
mind in reaching their decisions”.107 Thus notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision in 
Kv  K, her research demonstrates a lack of reliance upon, or at least reference to the 
section 20 factors. In the 48 divorce and judicial separation consensual cases, only one 
judicial separation case contained any reference to the statutory factors.108 However in 
the context of non-consensual cases, the judgments delivered only referred the statutory 
criteria in 46% of cases. Thus in the slim majority o f objectively determined cases, the 
presiding judge chose not to articulate with reference to the established statutory criteria, 
the reasons for the orders made. Where the influential factors were identified, emphasis 
was generally placed upon financial and economic factors and less so on past and future 
contributions or the duration of the marriage. Interestingly, little mention was made of 
spousal roles and responsibilities in the course of the marriage.109
105 Supra n. 8.
106 Ibid. Buckley, at 72, concedes that references to statutory criteria may have been made orally but not 
recorded.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid at 73. Given the typical format of such an agreement, it is arguable that the reasoning for the agreed 
terms is not normally regarded as necessary for restatement within the agreement.
109 The lack o f consistent reliance upon the identified section 20 factors suggests a preference for judicial 
discretion exercised based on a general overview o f the circumstances o f the marriage rather than the 
identification o f particular aspects o f the union. Buckley presents a statement and analysis o f her findings, 
ibid at 72-76, helpfully including tables (consensual and non-consensual cases), setting out the extent and 
detail o f the judicial reference to the statutory criteria.
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Thus most fundamentally the weaknesses in the Irish divorce process appear to evolve 
from the lack of underlying legislative policy together with a dearth of any consistent 
judicially-developed policy, as distinct from the existence o f any inherent weaknesses in 
the process itself. Perhaps a mandatory obligation to explain the impact o f the section 
20(2) factors might contribute to a more considered approach to their relevance, thereby 
encouraging the judiciary to more actively identify and cultivate policy in this context.110 
The current regulatory approach, given the lack of legislative direction and general 
reluctance to develop policy aims gives rise to an undemocratic and unpredictable system 
of regulation. This is enhanced by the failure to disseminate the details o f rulings made, 
which are typically not available for consideration and analysis. Whilst the individualised 
approach to the determination of disputes may allow for a ‘fair’ as opposed to ‘correct’ 
outcome to be achieved, such fairness is difficult to gauge in light o f the dearth of 
enunciated judicial reasoning.
5.4 Relevance of pre-existing separation agreement or court ruling
Section 20(3) o f the Divorce Act requires the court in deciding whether to make an order 
for ancillary relief, to have regard to the terms of any separation agreement which has 
been entered into by the spouses and is still in force.111 On the basis o f a literal
110 See section 6.2 below for a consideration of the judicially-developed policy that can be identified to 
date.
111 Despite the obligations under section 20(3) arising in the context o f an existing separation agreement, 
the judiciary have repeatedly referred to its obligation under section 20(3) equally where on divorce there 
pre-exists a decree o f judicial separation. In MP v AP, supra n. 25, O’Higgins J in the context o f an existing 
decree o f judicial separation cited section 20(3) and noted the variable weight that can attach to an existing 
settlement, depending on many factors including the length of time since it was reached, the financial 
background against which such settlement was reached, when compared with the present circumstances, 
and the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time o f the settlement. In the circumstances he 
regarded the terms o f the separation order to be of very great importance and he did not make any 
distinction between the settlement by way of judicial order and an inter-partes settlement, as expressly 
referred to in section 20(3). However more recently the issue has been complicated by the suggestion that 
an existing separation order should not be treated in the same manner as a separation agreement. In MB v 
VB (Unreported High Court 19/10/2007), Birmingham J highlighted the very differing circumstances that 
might exist in securing these alternate forms of judicial settlement; “It seems to me that there is a 
significant difference between a court order, even a court order that was not appealed by either side as is 
the case here, and a separation agreement. In the case o f a court order either or both parties may regard the 
order as entirely inappropriate and may have been dissuaded from appealing only by the costs that they
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interpretation, section 20(3) is the only element of section 20 to place a mandatory 
obligation on the courts. However, the extent of the impact of this statutory obligation is 
also uncertain. Section 20(3) does not require the court to enforce the terms of the 
agreement, rather it simply requires it to “have regard” to its contents. Couching the 
court’s obligations in this manner empowers the court to decide without any further 
guidance, the extent of the regard to be had for the agreement. Arguably the court could 
“have regard” to its terms and in so doing, decide to ignore it entirely or equally could 
strictly enforce it. This uncertainty o f interpretation is evident from the quite varying 
approaches adopted by members of the Irish judiciary when assessing applications for 
divorce where the parties have previously separated either by agreement or court order. 
Depending upon the circumstances of the case and the views o f the presiding judge, the 
courts have both enforced absolutely the terms of an existing separation agreement, and 
equally have reviewed entirely the ownership of all available assets on divorce.112 This 
approach evidently prioritises fairness over predictability and even freedom of  
contract.113 More fundamentally it is also necessitated by the constitutional pre-requisite 
of proper provision. However, such judicial discretion might be more evenly exercised if 
the legislature, in drafting the Act, had adopted a more definite position on the 
significance o f a pre-existing inter-spousal contract and indicated the relative value, even 
in broad terms, to be attached to such a significant agreement. Even a policy discussion 
as to the importance of encouraging inter-partes settlement by agreement as against the 
need for capacity to review, might prove helpful to a court wrestling with these 
conflicting aims. The lack of clearer legislative guidance impacts particularly in the Irish 
context, where there has traditionally been significant reliance upon separation
would have been likely to incur.” As distinct from this, Birmingham J noted that a separation agreement 
reflects a “shared understanding” between the parties, and he suggests that it should be given significance 
and weight accordingly.
112 There have been six reported judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court where a divorce 
application has been made in the context of a pre-existing separation agreement or judicial separation order, 
and these have illustrated very differing approaches to the relative weight to be given to the prior 
agreement/order: MK  v JK  supra n. 13; A v A supra n. 35; RG v CG supra n. 28; MP v AP supra n. 23; B v 
B supra n. 35 and NF v EF (Unreported High Court 4/772007).
113 Monaghan notes the broad powers created by the Divorce Act which permit the court to override 
“fundamental principles o f contract law”. Monaghan L “The Slicing o f the Marital Cake -  The relevance 
of separation agreements to the making o f property adjustment orders” [ 1999j 2(2) IJFL 8.
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agreements and private ordering to regulate matters by private contract, given the 
historical lack of statutory remedy for separation and/or divorce.
For example, in MK v JK] 14 at first instance, notwithstanding the execution of a separation 
agreement by the parties in 1982 which purported to finalise matters between the parties, 
Lavan J ordered that the respondent pay an additional lump sum of IR£1.5 million to the 
applicant on divorce. This order was appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis of his 
failure to have any due or sufficient regard for the agreement as mandated by section 
20(3). Without conducting a substantive hearing o f the issues, McGuinness J recognised 
the shortcomings of the approach of the trial judge and ordered that the matter be returned 
to the High Court “so that the question of proper provision for the parties to the divorce 
may be considered in the light of the mandatory provisions o f the statute”.115 At the 
eventual rehearing of the application for ancillary relief, O’Neill J ordered a significant 
reduction of the IR£1.5 million award.116 He regarded it as still necessary to vary the 
terms of the original inter-partes settlement in circumstances where the applicant had not 
been adequately catered for by the terms of the agreement.117 Thus, notwithstanding the 
existence of a written, negotiated agreement, the court was willing to vary what was 
previously regarded as a binding full and final settlement.
“Section 20(3) of the Act of 1996 places upon the court an obligation 
to have regard to the terms of any separation agreement which is still 
in force. Section 20 (1) places upon the court an obligation to [make 
proper provision for the parties]...Thus, the court has two unavoidable 
mandatory obligations.” 18
In discussing how these mandatory obligations should be fulfilled, O’Neill J regarded the 
order in which they should be applied as best left to the discretion o f the courts in each 
case but placed emphasis on the “length of disconnection” between the parties, i.e. the 
extent of the lapse of time between the execution of the agreement and the application for
114 Supra n. 15.
115 Supra n. 87 at 384.
116 Supra n. 15 at 361. O’Neill J reduced the award to the value o f €511,000, comprising a lump sum order 
of €450,000 and the transfer of half the value of the family home to the applicant, valued at €61,000.
117 Coulter “Ruling shows how costly divorce can be” Irish Times 27 January 2003.
118 Supra n. 15 at 344-345 per O’Neill J.
103
further relief. He suggested that the greater the “antiquity of the agreement”, the more 
likely the court will be required to intervene to guarantee that proper provision exists on 
divorce. In RG v CG119 the court considered the weight to be attached to the pre-existing 
judicial separation consent order secured by the parties, such order including a 
declaration that its terms constituted a full and final settlement of all matters arising at 
that time and in the event of proceedings being issued under the Divorce Act. In 
concluding her judgment, Finlay Geoghegan J stated that the content of section 20 and all 
the circumstances o f the family in question were each to be regarded as “influencing 
factors” in determining the issue of ancillary relief. Given the court’s obligations under 
both Article 41.3.2 of the Constitution and section 5(1) o f the Divorce Act, Finlay 
Geoghegan J rejected the suggestion that parties could effectively enter into an agreement 
to relieve the court of its future obligation to be satisfied that proper provision is made 
between the parties upon the granting of a divorce:
“These provisions require the Court to exercise its judgment as to 
what constitutes proper provision. The obligation on the Court to 
make such determination cannot be removed either by an 
acknowledgement or agreement such as that contained in .. .the 
Consent between the parties herein.”120
Finlay Geoghegan J was particularly influenced by the argument that at the time of the 
drafting of the agreement, even if it could be said that divorce proceedings were 
contemplated, they could not be regarded as imminent and thus she refused to gauge the 
ordering of proper provision with reference to that agreement. Rather she stated that the 
test for proper provision had to be assessed at the date of the divorce hearing. Adopting 
this position in respect of the relevance of the agreement, it was unavoidable that the 
court would prove itself receptive to the wife’s application for further financial relief.121
119 Supra n. 30.
120 Ibid at 424.
121 The case concerned an application for divorce by the husband who sought to enforce the terms of an 
existing judicial separation settlement, thereby preventing any application for periodic maintenance. The 
respondent successfully challenged the sufficiency o f the financial arrangements in place, claiming that 
they failed to make proper provision for her and the children o f the marriage.
104
Interestingly, and an illustration o f the extent of judicial discretion exercisable under the 
Act, a contrasting view was taken by Hardiman J in A vA ,122 where he showed a 
willingness to distinguish the decision o f O’Neill J and ultimately refused to alter or add 
to the terms of the separation agreement, executed by the parties in 1993. He did so 
primarily on the basis o f the seventeen-year disconnection between the parties and the 
availability of the remedy of judicial separation at the time o f the execution of the 
agreement. However Hardiman J appears to have placed the emphasis on the validity and 
effect of the agreement rather than the position o f the parties at the date o f the divorce 
hearing, refusing to order additional ancillary relief on the basis that the agreement 
represented proper provision for the parties at the time of its execution and it would be 
unfair and unjust to unilaterally alter the agreement. This judgment certainly represents a 
departure from the pre-existing case law and arguably from the mandatory obligations of 
the court regarding proper provision at the time of divorce but was defended on the basis 
of the court’s over-riding obligation under section 20(5) not to make any order that would 
not be in the interests o f justice.
In considering the above judgments of both Hardiman and Finlay Geoghegan JJ, 
O’Higgins J in MPvAPm  considered the impact of section 20(3) on his deliberations 
where the parties had previously secured a decree o f judicial separation with ancillary 
relief orders, as distinct from executing a separation agreement. It appears that O’Higgins 
J, in complying with his perceived obligations under section 20(3), did not differentiate 
between the two methods of regulating the separation, Whilst he noted that the weight to 
be attached to a prior settlement between the parties would vary from case to case, 
depending on many factors, he specifically highlighted the importance of the length of 
time since the matters had previously been compromised, the financial background when 
compared with current financial circumstances, and the reasonable expectations of the 
parties at the time of separation. In the circumstances, given that the intention was that 
the judicial separation order would be “long term and lasting”, that the bulk of the family 
assets were transferred to the applicant and that the circumstances had not changed from
122 Supra n. 37.
123 Supra n. 25.
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those anticipated at the time o f the separation settlement, O’Higgins J ultimately 
determined that the terms o f the prior separation order were of “very great importance”, 
and that it was not necessary to make any further property orders, notwithstanding a 
significant economic disparity between the parties. He did, however, vary maintenance 
upwards in favour of the applicant. The sufficiency of the separation order and the 
thirteen-year period before divorce proceedings were issued undoubtedly limited greatly 
the success of the applicant-wife who was regarded as having been effectively provided 
for by the terms of the original settlement. The distinction between this and the earlier 
ruling of Hardiman J is the willingness of O’Higgins J to consider and evaluate the 
sufficiency of the existing agreement prior to rejecting the application for property 
orders. Finally in this context, although the court in MB v VB regarded it as appropriate 
to give “very considerable weight” to the pre-existing settlement between the parties and 
assessed the agreement as having made proper provision for the parties, Birmingham J 
ordered the payment of a further lump sum to the applicant, given the significant increase 
in the value of the family home in the interim period.
Thus whilst it remains impossible to predict the outcome o f a divorce application where a 
separation agreement or order exists, the Irish courts have shown a general unwillingness 
to bind the parties to their agreed terms. Equally however, whilst there remains both 
scope and willingness to supplement the agreement made, the courts do not appear 
willing to allow one party unilaterally to repudiate it entirely. Although fairness is 
preferred at the cost of certainty and predictability, it appears that where an existing 
agreement has already provided generously for the applicant, fairness equally demands 
that a spouse not mis-use the right to return to the courts where she has already been 
provided for.
5.5 Over-riding obligation to ensure that justice is done
Section 20(5) is perhaps the most vague aspect of section 20 in that it provides that:
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“The court shall not make an order under a provision referred to in 
subsection (1) unless it would be in the interest of justice to do so.”
This subsection unquestionably adds further to the discretion of the judicial decision­
making powers. Whilst the express inclusion o f twelve criteria in section 20(2) is an 
attempt to ensure that the court considers such pre-identified factors, the decision to 
include such a vague over-riding requirement could in theory permit the court to 
circumvent the provisions of section 20(2) and simply order whatever justice requires. So 
long as ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ remain the ultimate statutory goals it is hard to be overly 
critical of such an outcome. Unquestionably any order made in family law proceedings 
should meet the interests of justice test and the making of orders that are unjust is never 
advocated. However by including such a clause, the legislature might simply, albeit 
unintentionally, encourage the courts to ignore the criteria set out in section 20(2) and 
fashion a solution to a case that is based upon no other legislative guideline than that 
contained in section 20(5). For example, in the judicial separation case o f AK v PK124 
Murphy J. made a number of orders, including a periodical payments order, a property 
adjustment order, a right of residence order and a preservation of pensions entitlement 
order without any reference to section 16 or the factors that he deemed relevant. Thus 
although it may be appropriate to presume that Murphy J made these orders because he 
believed it to be “in the interests of justice to do so” he failed expressly to identify the 
specific basis for his decision. This judgment supports the suggestion above, that the 
“catch-all” clause of section 20(5) might lead to and even permit the making of any order 
on the obvious basis of “necessity of justice” However the net effect o f permitting such 
leeway is that it might serve to over-extend the discretion exercisable by the judiciary and 
ultimately permit the trial judge, effectively to ignore the detailed provisions o f the 
remainder of section 20.
In setting out 12 individual factors, the legislature has created an expectation that the 
judiciary will rely upon this list and utilise it as a base reference point when explaining 
the orders to be made by the court. However in practice, it appears that apart from section 
20(3), all other parts o f section 20 can be viewed as merely containing a choice of factors
124 [2000] IEHC 24.
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to be considered by the court, at its absolute discretion. In CF v CF,125 in the context of 
an application for a decree o f judicial separation, O’Sullivan J noted that he was guided 
primarily by the requirements o f the statute and thus in his judgment he cited in full, the 
lengthy provisions of sections 16(1) and 16(2) in the 1995 Act. However having quoted 
them, he did not consider them any further in his judgment nor did he expressly apply 
them to the facts before him. As a result it is not possible to establish whether O’Sullivan 
J considered each factor and decided whether it is was in itself influential to the outcome 
of the case or whether he was selective in applying certain factors. However he did 
recognise the more general requirement of section 16(5) when noting that he was under 
an obligation to ensure that:
“.. .the court shall not make any order under a provision referred to 
in subsection (1) unless it would be in the interest o f justice to do 
so.”
In citing and relying upon the broad and discretion-based section 16(5), O’Sullivan J 
clouded the basis for his decision and made it difficult to identify the reasoning upon 
which the orders were made. Similarly in N  v N U6 Abbott J indicated that in accordance 
with section 16(5) he considered his orders to be commensurate with the interests of 
justice. Principles of justice demanded recognition o f the respondent’s position “as the 
holder of the family inheritance” and to allow him to “pursue as best he can.. .his calling 
as a cattle dealer”.127
Finally i n A v A 128 in the context of an application for a divorce decree with ancillary 
relief orders where there was a pre-existing separation agreement, Hardiman J recognised 
the need to factor into his determinations, the “twelve matters set out” in section 20(2) 
but concluded that he was statutorily prevented from making further ancillary relief 
orders by virtue of section 20(5) as to do so would be contrary to justice. His decision not 
to vary the financial arrangements between the parties, as settled in the separation
125 Supra n. 94.
126 Unreported High Court 18/12/2003 per Abbott J.
127 Ibid at 12.
128 Supra n. 37
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agreement between the parties in 1993 was ultimately premised on his view that justice in 
all its interpretations demanded such an outcome:
“In all the circumstances, I do not consider it proper, that is, “fit, apt 
or suitable”, much less “correct or in conformity with rule”, to make 
any ancillary relief order against the husband in the circumstances of 
this case. Still more fundamentally, I do not consider it just to do so 
and therefore I am precluded from doing so by the terms o f s.20 
(5).”129
Thus the judiciary have indicated a general willingness to utilise the generalities of 
section 20(5) to import judicial freedoms to make any order that is required. Although the 
specific criteria set out in section 20(2) might be considered capable o f placing limits on 
the scope of judicial discretion, section 20(5) serves potentially to negate any such limits.
5.6 Impact o f  statutory guidance on ancillary relief adjudication process
The Irish judiciary has demonstrated a distinct lack of willingness to develop policy 
objectives in the context of resolving marital disputes. Evidence and case law to date 
suggest an over-reliance on individualised decision-making and an apparently deliberate 
avoidance of pre-existing court rulings.130 It is not surprising that McGuinness J in K v K 
identified the need for judicial elucidation and explanation o f decisions reached, to allow 
for a body of consistent judicial precedents to develop.
The decision of Hardiman J in A v A is interesting, in that Hardiman J identifies the role 
of the section 20(2) factors as merely part of the process o f achieving the overall aim of 
proper provision. Thus he states that the task of the courts is to secure proper provision 
for all the parties, and into this exercise “must be factored firstly the twelve matters set 
ou t... [in section 20(2) (a)-(l)] as well as all other matters which the Court considers 
relevant and the terms of the Separation Agreement”. It appears that he relegates slightly
129 Ibid at 20.
130 Coveney, supra n. 15 at 10, laments these judicial freedoms, noting that “Whilst the increasing 
jurisprudence from the courts is o f undoubted assistance to practitioners, the sine qua non is that each case 
will turn on its own particular facts. It therefore, remains difficult to predict an outcome at the outset o f a 
case as many financial aspects often come to light only after exhaustive discovery and raising of queries.”
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the significance of the section 20(2) factors and appears very willing to add to the proper 
provision calculations, any other factor or issue which the court deems relevant. A similar 
approach was adopted by Birmingham J in MB v VBm  where, apart from considering the 
factors contained in section 20(2), he identified two further considerations which might 
influence the nature of the orders to be made, namely the claim by the applicant that she 
was entitled to a lifestyle equivalent to that of the respondent, and the effect of the 
existing judicial separation order. These developments are not typical but they represent 
the first suggestions of judicial policy preferences and a desire to move away from the 
parameters identified by the legislature.
Whilst section 20 seeks to guide the judiciary in reaching their decisions regarding 
applications for ancillary relief, only a limited amount o f consistency is evident from the 
reported judgments in the area. Certainly there exists a lack o f transparency as to the fact 
and extent of the influence of individual factors. The lack o f judicial obligation to explain 
the decisions reached and the extent of the influence of the guidelines in section 20 
further hampers the development of a consistent and transparent application o f these 
provisions. The apparent failure of McGuinness J’s attempt to require the courts to 
explain their decisions by reference to the statutory criteria illustrates the difficulties 
faced in seeking to impose expectations of judicial accountability as well as the 
development of policy in this area, judicially-led or otherwise. Ultimately the application 
of the section 20 factors with reference only to the need to do justice provides significant 
legitimate scope for varied judicial approaches. Clearer legislative policy regarding the 
significance and reasoning for maintaining/severing financial ties, the value and 
importance of spousal self-sufficiency at some point in the future and the over-riding 
policy aims of the marriage dissolution process would add predictability and legitimacy 
to the decision-making process, without necessarily restricting the exercise of  
discretionary judicial capacity to achieve a fair outcome.
131 Supra n. 111.
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6 Underlying policy goals
6.1 Legislatively stated policy
In the course o f the debates surrounding the enactment of the judicial separation 
legislation there was a particular emphasis placed on the capacity of the proposed regime 
to provide for the dependent homemaker spouse and to recognise her contributions to the 
family assets. With reference to the section 13 statutory factors to be included in the 
Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Bill 1988, later to be enacted as section 
20(2) of the 1989 Act and replaced by section 16(2) o f the 1995 Act,132 Deputy Shatter, 
who was responsible for the introduction of the Judicial Separation Bill, stated that it 
requires the court
. .specifically to take into account the manner in which family 
property was acquired and the relevant contributions o f both spouses 
during the course of the marriage. It also incorporates the view 
expressed by the committee that a dependent spouse should not be 
prejudiced in the ownership o f family property by the fact that he or 
she gave up employment in the course o f the marriage to attend to 
family duties in the home.”133
He further reflected that the enactment o f a separation regime which required the court to 
give recognition to such non-financial contributions would
“.. .for the first time in our law, afford a substantive recognition o f the 
work done by the wife in the home and for the first time in legislation 
give statutory expression to the constitutional duty imposed on the 
State to recognise the worth of the work done by a wife in the 
home.”134
132 Repeated verbatim in section 20(2) of the Divorce Act.
133 Dail Eireann debates Vol 377 2 Feb 1988 at 885.
134 Ibid. This position was later supported by Deputy Barnes who applauded the relevant provisions of 
section 16 which “for the very first time in the experience of women in this State acknowledged full and 
broadly their contribution, the sacrifices they had made, the cutbacks on their financial independence for 
the good of others, particularly their husbands and children who are the basic unit o f a healthy society, and 
was accepted by women in the home.” Dail Eireann debates, supra n. 16 at 1692.
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Although Deputy Shatter concluded his introduction of the Judicial Separation Bill by 
presenting an overview of the aim and scope of the legislation he did not demonstrably 
identify the policy aims that might be achieved by the application of the Act.
“The Bill is designed effectively to take Irish family law out of the 19th 
century and into the 21st century. It seeks to minimise the hardship and 
distress that can occur when marriages break down and attempts to 
ameliorate rather than exacerbate marital conduct.”135
Later in the course of the debates surrounding the 1988 Bill, the proposed amendment 
that separated parties should automatically lose their spousal succession rights of 
inheritance was regarded critically as “using the big stick on the women o f Ireland”, 
given that “Society has ordained that the married woman is more often than not the 
dependant”. Once again, in challenging the proposed amendment, which was ultimately 
defeated, it was argued that Ireland as a society “must protect the dependent spouse”.136
The over-riding aims and obligation to guarantee that both justice and proper provision 
are achieved were identified as pre-requisites in the development and enactment of both 
marital remedies. Proper provision as a legislative requirement has been considered in 
detail above, as have the uncertainties and scope for the varied interpretations that 
surround it. Similarly the vague concept of ‘justice’ and the subjective nature of any such 
adjudication have been examined above. Both over-riding statutory aims ultimately serve 
to illustrate the breadth of judicial powers as their impact as over-arching goals can only 
be assessed upon a consideration of their interpretation by the courts. Consequently given 
their ambiguity in the legislation, they cannot rightly be regarded as legislative goals; 
they more rightly form the starting point of the judge-led policy that might govern the 
Irish divorce process.
135 Supra n. 133 at 890.
136 Supra n. 17 at 1635-1636 per Deputy Flanagan; see earlier at section 1.3 where the debates surrounding 
this proposal are considered in the context o f the rules versus discretion debate.
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6 . 2  J u d i c i a l l y  d e v e l o p e d  p o l i c y
The case law following the enactment of the Divorce Act has highlighted the vague and 
discretion-based approach to this remedy with little statutory direction being offered 
other than that each case is to be dealt with fairly. O’Neill J has referred to the Divorce 
Act and particularly the co-existence o f the section 20(2) factors and the section 20(5) 
requirement of justice as a “complex statutory scheme” which necessitates the judicial 
discerning of “clear overriding principles” in an attempt to give it practical application.137 
However the weaknesses of excessive reliance upon judicial policy-making have also 
become apparent; the views adopted by the courts to date have primarily highlighted the 
continuing lack of clarity surrounding the Irish divorce regime.138 Fennelly J has stated 
that the need for any distribution of assets to be fair and just is “a clearly stated 
objective”,139 similarly McCracken J has declared the test as “not equality but 
fairness”.140 However as an apparent objective of the process, it is far from clear what 
this means and how it can be achieved. It has been suggested that the best method of 
securing a fair and just outcome “requires the court to weigh in the balance the infinite 
variety and complexity of the elements of human affairs and relationship and to arrive at 
a just result.”141 In addition, the importance of flexibility, given the ever-evolving 
standards of fairness, has been emphasised. It has been suggested that the discretionary 
powers accorded to the judiciary in family law arise from the capacity for “accepted 
standards of fairness in a field such as this [to] change and develop, sometimes quite 
radically, over comparatively short periods of time.”142 It has been noted in the opening 
chapter on rules versus discretion, that principles must be regarded as a starting point for
137 MK  v JK supra n. 15 at 346.
138 Buckley, supra n. 99 at 64 is critical o f judicial attempts to identify policy; “...it is difficult to establish 
precise tends or principles in asset division...a brief analysis o f some o f the leading cases clearly 
demonstrates that judicial views of “proper” provision, in terms o f both maintenance and equitable 
redistribution o f capital assets, are highly inconsistent.” More recently Buckley, supra n 35 at 10 has again 
criticised the inconsistency displayed by the Irish judiciary noting that “Judicial applications of the current 
marital breakdown provisions have also not been noted for consistency, or the regular application of 
partnership principles, or an emphasis on factors such as sharing moral support and contributions to home 
life”.
139 T v Tsupra n. 12 at 413.
140 MK v JK  (No. 3) [2006] 1 IR 283 at 292.
M 2 l b i d 'Supra n. 15 at 347, per O’Neill J quoting favourably from the judgment o f Lord Nicholls in White v 
White [2001] 1 AC 596.
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reasoning143 and standards represent a transient community consensus which can 
legitimately be amended by the adjudicator invoking the law.144 With reference to the 
yardstick of equality and its application (or not) by the court, according discretionary 
judicial powers has “enabled the courts to recognise and respond to developments of this 
sort”.145 The difficulty however is that such an approach can give rise to an infinite 
number of outcomes. The extent o f the discretion, which although in place to protect 
vulnerable parties, is being exercised and applied without any significant identifiable or 
articulated policy objectives and ultimately gives rise to uncertainty in the application of 
the law. Only in very recent cases has there been any meaningful evidence of judicial 
attempts to develop governing principles and precedents to direct the future application 
and interpretation of the law. This is evident in respect o f the right to vary or make new 
orders where a pre-existing divorce decree or settlement exists. In JC v MC (preliminary 
issuej146 Abbott J created a distinction between what he referred to as a post-divorce 
application for “strategic relief’ as distinct from an application for the “fine-tuning” of 
existing orders. In assessing the suitability o f an application for variation he demonstrated 
a judicial willingness to place parameters on the statutory right to vary; enunciating the 
following test;
“...the test as to whether a change, or changes, in circumstances ought 
to ground a strategic application going outside the limited 
circumstances envisaged by s. 18 should be that...if they were o f such a 
fundamental nature that it would be unfair and unjust to ignore such 
change or changes....with the final overriding test o f fairness and 
justice....”147
Similarly, in F  v F ,148 in a case where the ongoing economic recession prevented the
execution of the orders made, Abbott J directed that a variation o f the existing orders,
previously regarded as necessary to make proper provision for the parties, would not 
jeopardise the validity of the original decree o f divorce. To this end he identified three
143 See section 2.3.2 o f chapter 1 above.
144 See section 2.3.4 o f chapter 1 above.
145 Ibid.
146 Unreported High Court 31/10/2008.
147 Ibid at para 14.
148 Unreported High Court 19/12/2008.
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governing principles which should apply in such circumstances; the court does have 
jurisdiction to vary the terms o f the orders where the circumstances have fundamentally 
changed, but such variation must strike a “balance and symmetry” with the original order; 
the court must consider alternatives so as to ensure proper provision under the Divorce 
Act; and the court will only exercise this discretion provided that the alternative provision 
is in accordance with the Constitution and the Divorce Act.149
Prior to these recent developments, the attention of the courts, in attempting to develop 
judicial policy, had focussed upon its scope to impose a clean financial break upon the 
parties; the protection of the homemaker and the importance o f securing a home for the 
dependent spouse; and to a lesser extent, the conduct of the parties.
6.3 Clean break
The divergent judicial views on many of the provisions of the Divorce Act present clear 
evidence of the excessively broad manner in which it was drafted and the extent of the 
discretion available to the presiding judges. Nowhere has this been more evident than in 
the debate surrounding the right of the court to impose a clean financial break. The 
conflicting decisions and interpretations delivered on this issue serve to substantiate the 
view that the provisions of the Divorce Act provide excessive scope for interpretation, 
resulting in the development of an inconsistent and unpredictable body o f law. The lack 
of legislative clarity on this key issue has permitted scope for very conflicting judicial 
pronouncements, as evidenced below.
The notion of a clean break refers to the possibility that spouses may at the time of the 
decree of divorce being granted, or at some time in the short-term future, be in a position 
whereby their financial ties are permanently severed. In such a situation, the prospect of 
re-opening in the future any or all of the financial issues between them would not be 
permissible. Post-divorce, the current Irish legislative position makes it possible for one
149 Ibid at para 8. For further commentary see Aylward R, “Dissolved Marriages and the Recession: The 
Variation of Orders for Ancillary Relief’ [2009] 12(1) IJFL 9.
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or both of the parties to return to court to alter the existing arrangements in two ways; 
firstly by seeking an order at any time after the decree o f divorce has been made150 or 
secondly by seeking the variation o f an existing order.151 The right to apply to the court 
after the granting of the original decree is very clear and almost indefeasible, unless the 
applicant remarries. This infinite right to apply for ancillary financial relief exists in 
relation to almost all the orders that can be made by the court under the Divorce Act and 
can only be restricted in very limited circumstances.152 As set out in chapter 2, anti­
amendment arguments surrounding the introduction of divorce relied heavily upon the 
vulnerable position of the homemaker spouse and the fear that divorce would excuse the 
husband from his spousal financial obligations.153 As a result a very cautious approach 
was taken by the legislature when drafting the provisions o f the Divorce Act, which duly 
sanctioned the right to return to court at any time after the granting o f a divorce. By 
awarding a spouse the right to return for further ancillary relief where necessary, 
irrespective of the length of time that had passed since the granting o f the decree, it was 
reasoned that any negative impact of the introduction o f the remedy o f divorce and the 
breadwinner’s consequent right to re-marry would be sufficiently eliminated.
In addition to the right to apply to the court at the time o f the granting of the decree of 
divorce or at any time thereafter, the alternative means o f returning to court is to do so by
150 Applications can be made at the time o f the granting o f the decree o f divorce or at any time thereafter in 
relation to periodical payments and lump sum orders under section 13, property adjustment orders under 
section 14, miscellaneous ancillary orders under section 15, financial compensation orders under section 16 
and pension adjustment orders under section 17. This right to apply at any time after the granting o f the 
decree does not extend to applications for preliminary relief under sections 11 and 12 o f the Divorce Act.
151 Section 22 permits the court at any time after the granting o f the decree o f divorce, to vary the following 
orders: a maintenance pending suit order, a periodical payments order, a secured periodical payments order, 
a lump sum order if and in so far as it provides for the payment o f the lump sum concerned by instalments 
or requires the payment o f any such installments to be secured, a property adjustment order under 
paragraph (b), (c) or (d) o f section 14 (1) in so far as such application is not restricted or excluded pursuant 
to section 14 (2), an order in respect of the family home under section 15, a financial compensation order, a 
pension adjustment order under section 17 (2) insofar as such application is not restricted or excluded 
pursuant to section 17 (26) and a variation order under this section 22.
152 Limitations can be placed upon the right to make or vary an order at any time after the decree of divorce, 
e.g. in relation to the family home, section 14(7) states that a property adjustment order cannot be made in 
relation to a family home if, following the grant of a decree o f divorce, either o f the spouses concerned, 
having remarried ordinarily resides there. In relation to pension adjustment orders, section 17(26) provides 
that an order made under that section could restrict to a specified extent or exclude entirely the right to 
make an application to vary under section 22 in relation to the order made by the court. Finally, where a 
lump sum is ordered to be paid in instalments that order cannot subsequently be varied by the courts.
153 See in particular section 4 o f the preceding chapter.
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way of application to vary. The right to vary an existing order is clearly stated in section 
22 of the Divorce Act and empowers the court on application by either of spouses to vary 
or discharge an existing order, if  it considers it proper to do so having regard to any 
change in the circumstances o f the case and to any new evidence.154 The orders to which 
the section can apply are clearly stated in section 22(1) but the basis of the decision to 
vary any existing order(s) again relies ultimately upon the exercise of judicial 
discretion.155 In the course of his judgment in T v T Murray J (dissenting), again 
confirmed the traditional view that the marital family holds an elevated place in Irish 
society, rejecting any suggestion that a decree of divorce should remove the spousal 
obligations arising from the original union.
“The moment a woman and man marry their bond acquires legal 
status. The relationship once formed, the law steps in and holds the 
parties to certain obligations and liabilities. Even where a marriage is 
dissolved by judicial decree the laws of many if not most states 
require that the divorced spouses continue to respect and fulfil certain 
obligation deriving from their dissolved marriage for their mutual 
protection and welfare, usually in a financial nature. This reflects the 
fact that marriage is in principle intended to be a lifetime 
commitment and that each spouse has fashioned his or her life on that 
premise. If the law permitted a spouse to cut himself or herself adrift 
of a marriage on divorce without any continuing obligation to the 
former spouse it would undermine the very nature o f the marriage 
contract itself and fail to protect the value to which society has placed 
on it as an institution.”15
The absence o f a judicial power to achieve a clean break on both separation and divorce 
was, until recently, accepted by the courts. Admittedly, depending upon the extent of the 
parties’ assets, the court might be in a position to make sufficient financial orders 
effectively to defeat any post-divorce applications for further orders. However the 
Divorce Act does not directly or indirectly suggest that the courts should seek to secure a 
clean financial break between the parties. Thus even in circumstances where both parties
154 Section 22(2). Such an application can be made by either o f the spouses, or in the case of the death of 
either of the spouses, a person with a sufficient interest, or in the case o f the re-marriage of either of the 
spouses, by his or her spouse.
155 See section 5.5 above for a discussion o f the limits o f the statutory right to vary, and the courts assertion 
of its own inherent jurisdiction to vary where justice so demands. See further Aylward R, supra n. 149 for 
an illustration of the workings and limitations o f section 22 o f the Divorce Act.
156 Supra n. 12 per Murray J at 405.
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might express a preference for a clean financial break, the existing legislative structure 
does not permit the court to block absolutely the right o f the spouses to return to the court 
at some time in the future.
In JD v DD] 57 McGuinness J left little room for doubt on the matter and provided a 
succinct analysis of the intention o f the legislature in this context in enacting both the 
1995 and the Divorce Acts. In this case, the respondent had considerable means and 
sought orders that would introduce an element of finality to the union, thereby preventing 
the applicant from returning to court for further relief at any time in the future. In 
delivering the judgment of the High Court, and indicating that a clean financial break was 
an impossibility on separation, McGuinness J noted that in enacting both Acts, the 
Oireachtas had intentionally legislated to permit repeated ancillary relief applications so 
that finality could never be achieved. Thus this seminal case produced a definitive 
statement regarding the limits placed on the power of the court and the lack of judicial 
discretion in this regard
“.. .the Oireachtas has made it clear that a “clean break” situation is 
not to be sought and that, if anything, financial finality is virtually to 
be prevented. Under both the Act of 1995 and the Act of 1996, as 
pointed out earlier in this judgment, there appears to be no limit on 
the number of occasions on which a property adjustment order may 
be sought and granted. The court, in making virtually any order in 
regard to finance and property on the breakdown of a marriage, is 
faced with the situation where finality is not and never can be 
achieved...The statutory policy is, therefore, totally opposed to the 
concept of the “clean break”.”
Interestingly, although determining an application for judicial separation, McGuinness J 
deemed it within her remit to comment definitively on the impossibility of a clean break 
both on separation and divorce. Following this judgment, it was widely accepted that a 
clean break did not constitute an available option and a party to a decree of divorce or 
indeed separation, could not prevent the other party from making future applications to 
the court. It is certainly arguable given that on separation the parties do not lose their
157 Supra n. 90.
i5iIbid at 89.
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status as spouses and that McGuinness J was justified in seeking to maintain inter-spousal 
financial ties. However the extension of this policy to those securing a divorce might 
properly be regarded in the context of JD v DD as obiter. Spouses who divorce are no 
longer legally married, however the Divorce Act does permit ongoing applications, 
thereby preventing equally, the severing o f financial ties.
The viewpoint of McGuinness J was reiterated by Budd J in PO'D vJO'D,159 again in a 
hearing arising from judicial separation proceedings. Budd J stated that finality is not and 
never can be achieved, and recognised that:
“.. .no agreement on property between the parties can ever be 
completely final since such finality would be contrary to the policy 
and provisions of the legislation.” 60
In adhering very closely to the judgment of McGuinness J, he noted her views that this 
policy
“.. .is not only clear on the face of the statutes but was most widely 
discussed, referred to and advocated in the considerable debate that 
surrounded the enactment of the divorce legislation.”161
However the decision of the Supreme Court in T v T is evidence o f a new willingness on 
the part of Ireland’s highest court to break the ties of financial obligation between the 
parties to a dissolved marriage. This novel interpretation o f the Divorce Act by the 
Supreme Court, which is difficult to reconcile with the governing statutory provisions, has 
arguably been facilitated by the broad language and phraseology adopted by the 
legislature. Alternatively it simply reflects a judicial decision to create and direct policy in 
an area that has been left unrestricted by the legislature.162
159 Supra n. 93.
160 Ibid at 87.
161 Ibid, quoting from McGuinness J in JD v DD supra n. 90 at 89.
162 For further analysis o f the five judgments delivered by the Supreme Court, see further Crowley L 
“Divorce Law in Ireland -  facilitating or frustrating the resolution process?” [2004] 16(1) CFLQ 49.
119
In T v Tat first instance, Lavan J considered and ultimately reinforced the views of 
McGuinness J in relation to the impossibility of a clean break on divorce. He rejected 
counsel’s argument that Irish courts should follow the lead of the English/Welsh cases and 
consider the implementation of a clean break in big money cases. He confirmed that there 
was no clean break under Irish divorce law, with the Divorce Act specifically providing 
for capacity to review several areas o f ancillary relief, including maintenance and lump 
sum awards. Although in the circumstances the applicant was ordered to make a lump 
sum payment of IR£5 million to the respondent, Lavan J stated that he did “not see the 
making of a lump sum payment as introducing the ‘clean break’ concept into Irish law.”163
Notwithstanding that Lavan J stated that he was making a lump sum order “. . .without the 
payment of continuing Maintenance.. .”164 and although he failed to make any reference to 
the respondent’s right to re-apply into the future, this right remained and it was open to 
the respondent to seek a variation of the terms of the lump sum order165 or to seek further 
orders, including property adjustment orders166 or periodic payments orders167 into the 
future. The only prohibitions on such subsequent proceedings are where the applicant has 
re-married or where the respondent spouse was deceased.168 The fact that the respondent 
had provided for the applicant on divorce would only constitute one o f the criteria to be 
considered by the court and would not prevent the application being made. This judicial 
stance confirmed the capacity for future reviews in the event that they were necessary 
because of inadequate or dishonest disclosures by the respondent,169 or because of a future
163 Supra n. 12 at 347.
Im m d '6 Section 22 permits the variation of, inter alia, lump sum orders made at the time o f the decree of 
divorce.
166 Section 14 permits the making of an application for a property adjustment order at any time after the 
granting of a decree of divorce.
167 Section 13 permits the making of a periodical payments order not only at the time o f granting a decree 
of divorce (as was not ordered in this case), but also at any time thereafter.
168 The right to apply for a periodical payments order, a financial compensation order, or an order for a 
payment from a contingency or death-in-service benefit cease upon the death o f either spouse or upon the 
re-marriage of the applicant spouse. However the right to apply for a lump sum order under section 13(c) of 
the Divorce Act survives the re-marriage of the spouse seeking the order. There is no question of any rights 
of the applicant spouse ceasing upon the re-marriage o f the respondent spouse, however the fact of the re­
marriage must be taken into account by the court under section 20(2)(1).
169 As occurred in P O ’D v JO ’D supra n. 93.
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change in the circumstances o f the parties.170 However when the five judgments of the 
Supreme Court were delivered in Tv T,171 it was evident, apart from the dissenting 
judgment of Murphy J, that the previously indisputable stance regarding the impossibility 
of a clean break was no longer the absolute view of the Irish judiciary.
Somewhat ironically, given the eventual outcome o f the Supreme Court appeal, counsel 
for both parties presented their arguments premised on the belief that a clean break was 
not permitted under Irish law. Counsel on behalf o f the applicant argued that in ordering 
the lump sum payment of IR£5 million, Lavan J had failed to take into account the right 
of the respondent to seek further financial relief, post-divorce. As the right to return to 
court remained an option for the respondent, such a significant financial order was 
excessive. Whilst counsel for the respondent equally accepted that the clean break 
doctrine did not apply in Ireland, he stated that where the resources were sufficiently 
ample and a relatively large financial order could be made, there was no reason to 
anticipate future applications by the respondent and the IR£5 million financial payment 
order should stand.
In his judgment, Keane CJ recognised the distinctions between the divorce regime in 
Ireland and in England/Wales, but noted that whilst section 20(2)(a)-(i) o f the Divorce Act 
was modelled on the English/Welsh equivalent, it did not include the 1984 statutory 
amendment which now permits and encourages the court to impose a clean break.172 In 
considering this distinction, he noted that in the English/Welsh jurisdiction, a clean break 
was first judicially imposed in the case of Minton v Minton173 where Lord Scarman 
expressed the following views in relation to the adoption and application of such a 
principle:
170 As was suggested in JD v DD supra n. 90.
171 The judgments were delivered by a five-judge Supreme Court, thus adding to the weight of the 
judgments and to their worth as judicial precedents.
172 Section 25 A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as inserted by section 3 o f the Matrimonial and 
Family Proceedings Act 1984. Section 25(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 requires the court to take 
into account the eight different factors set out in that subsection. Douglas notes that these factors are not 
ranked in order of priority. She regards them as perhaps the ‘obvious’ factors that the parties themselves 
would consider relevant to reaching a decision as to how the financial and property consequences of the 
divorce should be dealt with. Douglas G An Introduction to Family Law (Clarendon) (2nd ed) (2001) at 196.
173 [1979] AC 593.
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“The law now encourages spouses to avoid bitterness after family 
breakdown and to settle their money and property problems. An object 
of the modem law is to encourage the parties to put the past behind 
them and to begin a new life which is not overshadowed by the 
relationship which has broken down. It would be inconsistent with this 
principle if the court could not make, as between the spouses, a 
genuinely final order...”174
Keane CJ declared his decision, in favour of a clean break, to be based upon the right of 
the courts under section 22 to vary orders made previously in divorce proceedings. He 
concentrated upon the wording of section 22, which, although allowing for the variation 
of lump sum orders, is only exercisable where the original order is to be paid by 
instalments. Similarly he regarded the right to apply for the variation o f a pre-existing 
maintenance order as an unavailable future option for the respondent, as a periodic 
payments order was not being made at the time of granting the decree. In such 
circumstances he deemed it appropriate to confirm the payment o f a lump sum of IR£5 
million to the respondent, a payment he regarded as effectively operating to prevent any 
future applications.
The contention made by Keane CJ that a clean break is permissible in appropriate cases is 
defended in the first instance, by the need for certainty and finality in litigation, and by 
way of support relies upon the judgment of Denham J in F  v F .175 Whilst he accepted that 
there are undoubtedly cases where finality is not possible and as a result the Divorce Act 
provides scope for the future variation of many orders, he rejected the notion that the 
intention of the Irish legislature was:
174 Ibid at 608. This case was heard in October and November 1978, seven years after the applicant had 
obtained a decree nisi o f divorce. Since obtaining that order the parties had resolved matters by way of an 
agreement, which had been made an order o f the court. However notwithstanding the respondent’s 
compliance with the requirements o f said orders, the applicant sought further financial relief by way of 
variation of the earlier orders. Ultimately the House o f Lords rejected her petition as the court had approved 
the earlier financial provision for the applicant. Thus it was found that the lower court had been correct in 
deciding that the court lacked jurisdiction to vary the consent order, executed by the parties and made an 
order of the court.
175 [1995] 2 IR 354. The case was decided in the context o f the 1989 Act whereby a property adjustment 
order could only be made on one occasion only, under section 15 o f the 1989 Act.
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“...that the courts should be obliged to abandon any possibility of 
achieving certainty and finality and of encouraging the avoidance of 
further litigation between the parties”.176
Keane CJ challenged the previously undisputed views of McGuinness J regarding the 
imposition of a clean break and specifically disagreed with her observation that financial 
finality is to be prevented in Irish family law. Whilst recognising that the Irish divorce 
regime does not go as far as the English/Welsh system in relation to the power to order a 
clean break, Keane CJ did not accept that the Irish system entirely prevents financial 
finality. He stated that:
“On no view could such an outcome be regarded as desirable and I 
am satisfied that it is most emphatically not mandated by the 
legislation under consideration.”177
It appears thus, that the then Chief Justice was motivated by a desire to introduce finality 
in appropriate cases and regarded this as a suitable exercise o f his judicial powers. Given 
that the pre-enactment debates in favour of not permitting a clean break focussed on the 
over-riding need to protect the vulnerable spouse, certainly it could be argued that a wife 
who is in a position to receive a payment of millions of euro can not be regarded as part 
of that ‘vulnerable’ category.
Similarly Denham J noted that whilst a clean break divorce “.. .is not part o f the Irish 
Constitution or legislation”, its absence does not exclude the making o f a lump sum 
order. Whilst she agreed with Keane CJ by declaring that the principles o f certainty and 
consistency must apply to family law, she noted that such concepts are subject to the 
requirement of fairness. The prior ordering of a lump sum payment becomes one of the 
circumstances to be taken into account on a future application, and in this way may 
ultimately greatly limit or even exclude any further orders being made by the court.178 
Thus, despite differing approaches, the over-all aims o f the presiding judges appear to be
176 T v Tsupra n. 12 at 364.
177 Ibid at 365.
178 Ibid. Fennelly J also approved the ordering o f a lump sum to bring about financial finality, as it was 
possible in the particular circumstances. However Murphy J followed the earlier decisions by refusing to 
accept that the Irish legislature had included or intended to include scope for a clean financial break.
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similar. However, as distinct from the quite definite position adopted by Keane CJ, 
Denham and Fennelly JJ appear more willing to concede the capacity for repeated 
applications, although noting that such relief would be near impossible to secure.
Notwithstanding the reality that there may be cases where relief will be justifiably sought 
and granted many years after the granting o f the decree of divorce, there is certainly 
scope for the argument that the absence o f even the possibility o f applying a clean break 
solution in certain cases is both unjust and inequitable. It would undoubtedly be foolish to 
suggest that a clean break resolution would be unsatisfactory in every instance. In a case 
where the parties have assets sufficient to permit the making o f adequate orders necessary 
to provide for the dependent spouse and/or children into the future, a facility should 
perhaps exist within the terms of the Divorce Act to allow the courts to have the authority 
to make such final orders, thereby giving rise to the breaking o f the ties o f further 
financial responsibility. Such a possibility would facilitate and encourage the parties to 
move away from what evidently is an unsuccessful marriage. Where there are sufficient 
funds, it is hard to see the negatives in the development o f such a policy.
Certainly the introduction o f a clean break option might improve the predictability of the 
Irish divorce regime, but it is crucial that it is introduced honestly and deliberately, in an 
appropriate and democratic manner. Keane CJ does not appear to be aware o f the 
weaknesses that exist in his own reasoning. Ultimately he is o f the view that in light of 
the failure by the legislature to expressly exclude the right to apply a clean break, it must 
remain permissible:
“It seems to me, that, unless the courts are precluded from so holding 
by the express terms of the Constitution and the relevant statutes,
Irish law should be capable of accommodating those aspects of the 
“clean break” approach which are clearly beneficial.. .1 do not 
believe that the Oireachtas, in declining to adopt the “clean break” 
approach to the extent favoured in England, intended that the courts 
should be obliged to abandon any possibility o f achieving certainty 
and finality and of encouraging the avoidance o f further litigation 
between the parties.”179
179 Ibid at 364.
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His assertion that a clean break can be imposed on the basis o f the non-inclusion of lump 
sum orders payable by instalments in section 22, appears to ignore the statutory 
entitlement of every party to a decree o f divorce, to return to court for further relief at any 
time after the granting of the decree.180 The fact that it is incumbent upon the respondent 
to overcome the evidentiary burden regarding a sufficient change in the circumstances, 
cannot in itself deny the applicant o f his/her statutory right to make that application.
Keane CJ defends his insistence that a clean break can be permitted in certain cases, on 
the basis that despite the constitutional requirements for proper provision and the various 
statutory provisions permitting applications at the time of the divorce or at any time 
thereafter, the legislature chose not to expressly exclude the possibility o f a clean break. 
To base the reasoning for the introduction of a right to impose a clean break in divorce 
proceedings upon a section that has not been included in the terms o f the Divorce Act and 
to create a right to impose a clean break simply because it has not been expressly 
excluded by the legislature is difficult to defend. If the logic proffered by Keane CJ is to 
be followed, the failure on the part of the legislature expressly to exclude the power to 
vary lump sum orders paid by instalments, could equally permit the omission to be 
ignored, ultimately allowing the orders to be varied.
Notwithstanding the position adopted by Keane CJ in the course o f his judgment, he 
claims to recognise the limitations of judicial-led policy and in particular judicial law­
making, in light of Article 15.2.1 of the Irish Constitution which limits to the Oireachtas, 
the power to make law.181 When considering this, he acknowledges that;
180 Whilst the returning applicant may be prevented from varying a lump sum order payable by instalments, 
she remains capable of applying for other orders, including property adjustment orders, at any time after the 
decree of divorce is granted and is not prevented from so applying even in circumstances where the court 
has already made one or more property adjustment orders on divorce.
181 Article 15.2.1 o f the Irish Constitution declares that the “sole and exclusive power of making laws for 
the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas...” The Oireachtas comprises the two houses of the legislature; 
the Dail and the Seanad and the President o f Ireland.
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“It is of course beyond argument that the Irish legislation precludes 
the courts from giving the same effect as does the English legislation 
to the “clean break” principle.”182
Keane CJ seems determined to introduce the policy of the possibility of a clean break into 
Irish divorce law and whatever the shortcomings o f his arguments, perhaps he should be 
applauded, given the legislature’s avoidance o f any such predictability or finality in its 
regulatory framework.
6.4 Protection of the homemaker
It has already been established that the protection of the homemaker has been one of the 
unwavering focuses of the Irish regulatory process on divorce. Notwithstanding the 
creation of powerful judicial armoury to protect the vulnerable homemaker, the 
interpretation and application of the relevant provisions have proven unclear. Thus from a 
protective starting position, it has been left to the judiciary to determine the effect of the 
provisions and more particularly to resolve the conflicting arguments regarding the 
impact of the legislative approach.
In the aforementioned judicial separation case of JD v DD McGuinness J was required to 
determine what might constitute suitable financial provision for a wife where her husband 
had amassed relatively substantial wealth. It is immediately apparent from her judgment 
that McGuinness J regarded the 12 statutory factors included in section 16(2) as failing to 
deal comprehensively with the issue of spousal support. Despite the combination of the 
statutory guidelines and the over-riding judicial discretion, McGuinness J was required to 
raise the following questions:
(i) In these cases should the court seek simply to provide for actual day-to-day
needs o f the dependent spouse or should it endeavour to divide the family
assets in a more equal way by the operation of a lump sum and/or property
adjustment order?
182 Supra n. 12 at 363.
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(ii) In such a division o f the family assets should the “stay at home” wife be
treated differently from the wife who works outside the home?
McGuinness J lamented the absence o f decided case law on these issues since the 
enactment of the 1989 Act, noting that even where written judgments were delivered, 
each case had been dealt with on its own facts. The approach o f the legislature left these 
key issues unanswered and placed responsibility for the development o f policy squarely 
at the feet of the Irish judiciary.
O’Donovan J in CO’R v MO’Rm  considered the criteria to be applied by the court when 
deciding the appropriate orders to be made in respect of a dependent spouse on an 
application for judicial separation. In making orders for ancillary relief, and in particular 
when considering the orders to be made in relation to the family home, he noted that the 
duty on the court was to have regard to the welfare of the children and to the relative 
circumstances of the spouses, such that the ancillary relief would enable them to follow 
an appropriate lifestyle having regard to their means and prospects, and their lifestyle 
while living together, and having regard to their ages and the length o f the marriage.184 In 
the circumstances, he stopped short o f transferring ownership o f the home to the custodial 
mother:
“.. .given that the marriage of the husband and wife only lasted the 
three and a half years, that in my view, both of them contributed to its 
breakdown, that, while, undoubtedly, Mrs. O’R made a major 
contribution to the marriage, while it subsisted, there does not appear 
to have been any financial input on her part and that both parties are 
relatively young, I think that it would be a grave injustice to transfer 
the family home to Mrs. O’R.”
In PO ’D v JO ’D Budd J, in ordering the equal division of the available assets between 
the breadwinner spouse and the applicant homemaker wife, concluded that,
183 [2000] IEHC 66.
184 In light o f the circumstances before the court, O’Donovan J ordered that the applicant should have a 
right of exclusive residence in the family home until such time as the children completed their full-time 
education.
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. .the parties both contributed to a partnership with regard to the 
building up of the property portfolio and the justice of the situation 
requires that a half a share o f the properties known at present should 
be transferred into the Applicant’s name.”185
Echoing this approach, Dunne J in PB v PF186 ordered the 60/40 division in favour of the 
wife, of the proceeds of the sale o f the marital property notwithstanding the greater 
financial contributions o f the respondent to the acquisition o f the property, noting that 
“The parties embarked on a marriage together and not a property transaction.”187
In the financially significant case of T v T Keane CJ recognised that where one spouse is 
working and the other spouse has taken on the role o f homemaker, section 20(2)(f),188 
which relates to contributions in the home environment, must be regarded as a 
particularly relevant factor. In this regard Denham J in the same case was o f the view that 
there exists a requirement on the court to take into account the home-based contributions, 
such recognition being in line with the acknowledgment in the Irish Constitution of the 
work done by women in the home:
“In this case the learned trial judge assessed correctly the family role 
of the respondent and gave a significant weighting for her time spent 
in the home. A long lasting marriage, especially in the primary 
childbearing and rearing years o f a woman’s life, carries significant 
weight, especially if the woman has been the major home and family
In all five judgments in TvT,  section 20(2)(g),190 which deals with the impact of spousal 
sacrifices on career opportunities, was emphasised in light o f the sacrifices made by the
185 Supra n. 93 at 91.
186 Unreported High Court 4/12/2008.
187 Ibid at 13.
188 Section 20(2)(f) requires the court to have regard to the contributions which each o f the spouses has 
made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare o f the family, including any contribution 
made by each o f them to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources o f the other spouse 
and any contribution made by either o f them by looking after the home or caring for the family.
189 Supra n. 12 at 382.
190 Section 20(2)(g) requires the court to have regard to the effect on the earning capacity o f each of the 
spouses of the marital responsibilities assumed by each during the period when they lived with one another 
and, in particular, the degree to which the future earning capacity o f a spouse is impaired by reason of that 
spouse having relinquished or foregone the opportunity o f remunerative activity in order to look after the 
home or care for the family.
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applicant in respect o f her own medical career. Keane CJ supported the position adopted 
by Lord Nicholls in White v White191 that the entitlements of a homemaker could not be 
confined to her future reasonable requirements simply because of the non-financial nature 
of her marital contributions.192 Alternatively Murray J grounded his support for the non- 
discriminatory treatment of differing spousal contributions in Article 41.2.1 of the 
Constitution and the evident state support for the role o f the homemaker and its 
importance to the common good. However as is evident from the final orders made in T v 
T and the discussion above at section 3.4 regarding the use o f formulae to calculate 
proper provision, the Supreme Court ultimately ordered (approximately) a 65:35 split of 
the assets in favour of the breadwinner spouse. Later in K  v K, O’Neill J, commenting on 
this approach, and notwithstanding the extent of the homemaker sacrifices and 
contributions, supported the view of Keane CJ that the Divorce Act does not mandate an 
equal division of assets in an “ample resources” case.193 However he regarded it as clear 
from the judgments of Keane CJ, Denham, Fennelly and Murray JJ “.. .that the role of the 
dependent homemaker and child carer, usually the wife is not to be disadvantaged in the 
distribution of assets by reason of having a non-economic role.”194
O’Neill J presented an interesting analysis o f his perception o f the yardstick o f equality in 
the English courts, regarding it:
“...not as a starting point or as the presumptive basis for the 
distribution of assets but as a device to guard against a historical 
bias, favouring the breadwinner as distinct from the home maker in 
the distribution of assets, in essence a mental exercise or discipline 
to be observed to ensure that the value o f the role o f homemaker and 
child carer, particularly in a long marriage, is given equal weight to 
that of the role of the breadwinner.”195
Supra n. 142.
192 Notwithstanding the willingness o f Keane CJ to quote favourably from White v White, it was more 
generally accepted that the Irish regulatory approach differs from the English/Welsh approach. Despite 
calling for the recognition of differing but equal spousal contributions, Fennelly J did not regard this as 
introducing or requiring a yardstick o f equality o f division.
193 Supra n. 15 at 349-350.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid at 349.
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In practical terms, O’Neill J suggested that the use of a yardstick only becomes relevant 
after the court has considered the entirety of the section 20(2) factors and reached a 
tentative conclusion, which “would then be measured against the yardstick in question, to 
ensure that no bias or invidious discrimination has crept in because the wife has adopted 
the traditional role of homemaker”.196
Conversely in N v N197 following a lengthy marriage as homemaker with two children, 
the applicant sought a 50% share of the family farm, which had been inherited by the 
respondent. Abbott J found in her favour, stating that in complying with his obligation to 
ensure that proper provision is made for the parties prior to granting the decree of 
divorce, the court should
“...in principle, attribute the same value to the contribution o f a 
spouse who works primarily in the home as it does to that o f a 
spouse who works primarily outside the home as the principal 
earner.”198
Consequently he was of the view that
“.. .by reason of the duration of her marriage and the length o f time 
which she lived with the Respondent the Applicant is entitled to be 
treated on the basis of a full partnership with the Respondent in 
relation to the income earning capacity of the family.”199
He regarded the applicant’s continuous work in the farm and in the home as an equal 
contribution on her part meaning it would be unjust to deal with her on any basis other 
than equality, notwithstanding that the farm had been inherited and thus entirely provided 
by the respondent.
More recently, in an appeal concerning costs and the implications o f currency 
fluctuations, the Supreme Court emphasised the importance o f the dependent wife being
196 Ibid.
197 Supra n. 126.
198 Ibid at 12.
199 Ibid
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provided for to the extent o f allowing her to secure a home.200 McCracken J supported the 
view of the trial judge that “providing for the purchase o f a house was a proper provision 
to be made for the wife”.201 Consequently the husband did not succeed in his application 
to reduce the amount of the lump sum order, given the decline in the value of the dollar 
and the added cost this required him to bear. This fundamental requirement of securing 
a property for the dependent wife was reiterated by Sheehan J in MF v AF:202
“Taking all the circumstances o f this case into account the interests 
of justice require at the very least that the wife be enabled to 
purchase a property.. .Accordingly, the net proceeds o f the sale of 
the land should be divided in such a way that the wife’s share of 
these proceeds exceeds that of her husband’s share by € 1 15,000.”203
Moore has very briefly considered the valuation of homemaker contributions in divorce 
proceedings, concluding that such contributions are devalued by the courts.204 Her 
empirical research is based on twelve High Court rulings, by definition involving a 
couple or at least individuals of high net worth and thus is o f limited scope and value.205 
However notwithstanding the limitations of the research it is interesting to note Moore’s 
observations that “equality ideals have resulted injudicial pronouncements advocating 
equality of treatment of the partners upon marriage breakdown” 206 Similarly, Buckley 
has observed that although the individual spousal arrangements and activities in the 
course of the marriage are not highlighted by the courts in determining the orders to be 
made, the majority of the financial relief orders are made in favour o f the wife.207 Thus 
whatever the view of the nature and merit of the inter marriage contributions, the 
willingness to identify an end goal o f equality must be applauded as at least evidence of 
policy-driven outcomes. In the context of a relative dearth of judicially-developed policy,
l w MKvJK,  supra n. 140.
201 Ibid.
202 Unreported High Court 23/5/2008.
203 Ibid at 5,6.
204 Moore E “The significance o f “home-maker” contributions upon divorce” [2007] 10(1) IJFL 15.
205 In addition, given the distinctions identified elsewhere by Buckley between outcomes in consensual 
versus contested cases, the lack o f a consideration o f settled outcomes further weakens the probative value 
of the work.
206 Ibid
207 Supra n. 8 at 63-66.
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the importance of protecting the homemaker can be identified as one of the few areas of 
policy statement and development embraced by the Irish judiciary to date.
6.5 Conduct
When calculating proper provision in the circumstances, the court is required to have 
regard to the conduct of each of the spouses, “if  that conduct is such that in the opinion of
• 90Rthe court it would in all the circumstances of the case be unjust to disregard it”. The 
legislature does not provide any further explanation or examples o f what might constitute 
such conduct. Dissatisfaction with the legislative delegation o f responsibility in respect of 
this “fundamental term” was evident in the course of the parliamentary debates.209 The 
issue was addressed in Tv T and the Supreme Court ultimately determined that conduct 
should only influence the court’s determination of asset division where such conduct can 
be regarded as “obvious and gross”. The marriage in question was described in evidence 
as turbulent, and the applicant admitted to a number of extra-marital affairs over a period 
of time. In addition, at the time o f the hearing, the applicant’s new partner o f two years 
had recently give birth to their child. Quoting from the judgment o f Lord Denning MR in 
Wachtel v Watchtel, 210 Keane CJ agreed that the court should not vary its orders simply 
because of guilt or the apportionment of blame. Such a punitive approach would be 
inappropriate as it would in effect cause the imposition o f a fine for supposed
misbehaviour in the course of an unhappy life. Thus, on the facts, Keane CJ was not
• • 211 willing to regard the adulterous behaviour of Mr T as “gross and obvious”. Similarly
the court in C v C212 refused to classify the adulterous conduct o f the applicant husband
as “gross and obvious” notwithstanding the apparent "huge upset” caused to the
respondent and children of the marriage. With reference to the dicta o f Keane CJ,
O’Higgins J concluded that “the actions of the husband at the time of his infidelity do not
208 Section 20(2)(i).
209 See section 1.3 above.
21°, [1973] Fam. 72 at 90.
211 Supra n. 12 at 370. In T v T, the wife’s share o f the pension was increased by 5% to 56% as recompense 
for the adulterous misconduct o f the husband, but this was reversed by the Supreme Court, regarding such 
conduct as not so “gross and obvious” as to influence the ancillary relief orders to be made.
212 Supra n. 13.
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come within the type o f conduct -  “obvious and gross” which would justify the 
implication o f section 20(2)(i).”
Conversely in R v R,213 in the context o f judicial separation proceedings, McMahon J, 
relying upon the ratio in Tv T concerning conduct, did consider the nature and extent of 
the respondent’s behaviour in the course of the marriage sufficiently bad to justify 
influencing the orders to be made. Despite doubts concerning certain elements of the 
evidence proffered by the applicant, he was satisfied that:
“...there was sustained verbal abuse of a sexualised nature addressed 
to the applicant over the years in the presence o f the children which 
was meant to, and did, seriously demean her. There was also some
9 1 Aphysical violence over the years.”
Consequently McMahon J regarded the respondent’s conduct as “obvious and gross” and 
thus declared that it would be unjust to disregard it when contemplating his obligations 
under section 16 of the 1995 Act. He did clarify that such a finding in respect of the 
conduct of one of the parties “does not mean that a person against whom such a finding is 
made has no rights, or that he or she is to be punished in some analogous fashion as a 
criminal is treated in our criminal justice system.”215 Rather, he emphasised that once the 
relevance of the conduct is established, it is then another factor that the court is required 
to have regard to in determining the issue of adequate and reasonable provision.216
6.6 Consequences of current approach to policy aims
The weaknesses in the current Irish divorce regime appear to derive from the creation of 
a statutory regime which has failed to identify over-riding policy aims and has accorded
21J [2006] 2 ILRM 467.
214 Ibid at 475.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid. In the course of his judgment, McMahon J stated that the financial relief orders made in favour of 
the applicant wife, including a 60% share in the proceeds o f sale o f the family home and an ongoing 
maintenance order o f €150 per week reflected his attitude towards the conduct of the respondent.
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excessive and effectively unfettered powers to the presiding judiciary.217 Thus 
notwithstanding the objective merits o f judicial discretion in this context, under Irish law, 
such powers are currently exercised within a policy vacuum. The capacity, and perhaps 
need, for individuals to be lawfully empowered to avoid this regulatory system has 
recently received significant attention in Ireland in the context of the validity and 
enforceability of pre-nuptial agreements. In December 2006 the then Minister for Justice 
Equality and Law Reform established the Study Group on Pre-Nuptial Agreements which 
was tasked with the function of reporting on the law governing such agreements and to 
propose any necessary reforms. Given the state’s obligation to protect the family and to 
ensure that proper provision is secured on divorce, the Group recommended that whilst 
they could not be automatically binding, a degree of recognition should be afforded to 
such agreements, to be considered in light of other relevant factors in divorce and 
ancillary relief proceedings.218 Thus the Group was of the view that the common good 
would be best served if  the validity and effect of a pre-nuptial agreement could be 
determined by the courts in each individual case.219 The potential benefits of supporting 
this means of private ordering of financial affairs were recognised, including the likely 
increased predictability and reduced costs of the process.220
Ultimately the Study Group made a series o f recommendations to the Minster as to how 
the proposed role for pre-nuptial agreements might best be regulated under Irish law and
217 The weaknesses of this regulatory approach are further compounded by the dearth o f reported judgments 
in this area. Ward has recognised this limitation, noting in 2006 that “In the near 9 years since the 
availability of divorce, little instructive case-law has been handed down”, Ward P “Ancillary Reliefs on 
Divorce: The Emerging Jurisprudence from the Superior Courts” The International Survey o f Family Law 
(2006 edition) ed Bainham A at 245. Similarly, Flockton in outlining the aim and scope of her family law 
reporting project, concluded that given the workings o f the in camera rule and the failure on the part of the 
judiciary to properly explain case outcomes, she concludes that “family law is shrouded in secrecy”. 
Flockton S “The Family Law Reporting Project” [2003] 6(1) IJFL 17 at 17.
218 The Report o f the Study Group on Pre-Nuptial Agreements was published in April 2007; supra n. 83.
The Report considered the following issues; constitutional considerations; current legal status o f pre-nuptial 
agreements in Ireland, the legal Status o f pre-nuptial agreements in other jurisdictions; public policy 
considerations; the common good; private ordering o f financial affairs; and arguments against pre-nuptial 
agreements. The recommendations o f the Group are set out in chapters 9-12 o f the Report.
219 Ibid at chapter 6.
220 However it was also recognised that invariably couples may embark on litigation on the preliminary 
issue of contesting the enforceability of a pre-nuptial agreement in advance o f seeking ancillary relief 
orders and thus in certain instances might cause an increase in costs overall.
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made recommendations for legislative reform.221 The Study Group recommended that 
express statutory provision be made for pre-nuptial agreements allowing them to be 
scrutinised by the court in separation and divorce proceedings in much the same way as 
separation agreements are currently dealt with. However given the Group’s view that pre­
nuptial agreements are subject to different considerations when compared to separation 
agreements, it was suggested that a discrete provision be enacted to require a court to 
have regard to these agreements.222 Although the safeguards mandated by Irish divorce 
laws operate to prevent parties from definitively determining the financial terms of their 
divorce, the proposed legislative reforms relating to the recognition o f pre-nuptial 
agreements would give validity and some weight to private negotiations and positively 
recognise the benefits of private autonomy in marital disputes. Whilst the government’s 
motives for raising this issue in December 2006 may have been mixed, the fact that the 
legal status of such agreements was debated and reviewed hints at a growing awareness 
of the goals of predictability and fairness; goals that might be perceived as currently 
absent from the system of regulating divorce and ancillary relief under Irish law.
7 Conclusion
The Irish legislature has deliberately eschewed a prescriptive regulatory model in favour 
of an entirely discretion-based regime. Equally the Irish judiciary has declined to 
interpret the provisions o f the Divorce Act in a policy-based manner. Rather, for the most 
part they have elected to employ the various factors so that each case is given 
individualised treatment before the courts. It is evident from the judgments considered, 
particularly those delivered in TvT,  that there is no hierarchy o f factors and the factors 
that will influence the court’s determination o f what constitutes proper provision in the 
circumstances o f any case will depend upon the facts o f that case. Thus whilst the
221 It now appears likely that these recommendations will be included in a draft Family Law Bill, due to be 
published in mid-2010.
222 In addition, the Group recommended that procedural safeguards be imposed as a matter o f law and thus 
any governing legislation should include a definition o f a pre-nuptial agreement such that an enforceable 
agreement must be; in writing, signed and witnessed; made after each party has received separate legal 
advice; made with disclosure of financial information; and made not less than 28 days before the intended 
marriage.
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legislature has accorded substantial discretion to the judiciary in relation to the 
determination o f what constitutes proper provision, rather than attempting to structure 
such powers, the judiciary have embraced this discretion-based divorce regime. Although 
Denham J has in two different cases espoused the importance of certainty and finality in 
family law, she and her colleagues prefer to ignore the need for certainty as regards 
predicting the outcome o f a case, and have elected to decide each case individually, 
without any great reliance upon existing legislative guidelines or judicial precedents.
Most recently, Abbott J in JCv  MC222 considered what he regards as the “Keane C.J and 
McGuinness J. dichotomy that falls to be considered in the clean break debate.”224 
Equally he recognised the:
“...spectrum of authority between the Hardiman J. decision in WA v.,
MA and Finlay Geoghegan J. in G v. G and the K. v K. [2003] 1 I.R.
3 decision where these cases defined the spectrum going from black 
to white, and the choices in between depending on the 
circumstances...”.
Whilst he recognised that considerations o f fairness and justice might be best suited to 
allow each case to be determined on its facts, he ultimately regards such an approach as 
“a far from satisfactory view from the public policy perspective.”225 Thus he concluded 
that whilst the Divorce Act and the Constitutional provisions neither admit nor require 
the courts to provide a clean break solution, he suggests that they may in certain cases 
seek to do so. He reaches this conclusion with reference to what he regards as the “broad 
scheme” of the governing provisions and the lack o f any legislative demand or 
expectation of transparency or judicial accountability. As a result the developing 
jurisprudence in Irish divorce law is neither coherent nor predictable. Irrespective of the 
type of cases that come before the courts in the future, it is unfortunately apparent that it 
has become acceptable for the provisions o f the Divorce Act to be applied in an ad hoc,
Supra n. 38.
224 Ibid at 20.
225 Ibid.
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inconsistent manner with little attempt being made to establish a coherent body of case 
law.
Where strict legislatively imposed rules are avoided in favour of judicial discretion, that 
discretion must be directed if  it is to form the basis o f a workable and effective system, as 
discussed and outlined in chapter one. The vast distinctions uncovered by Buckley in her 
empirical research, between the terms o f negotiated settlements and what the Irish 
judiciary perceive to be the best approach to asset division, suggests that what is 
judicially regarded as required under the governing provisions may differ significantly 
from what is workable within Irish society and in light o f the circumstances of divorcing 
spouses.226 Buckley queries whether it is simply a case of “incorrect guesswork” on the 
part of practitioners advising on divorce settlements or whether the “financial packages” 
negotiated by the parties better reflect what the parties actually need or would prefer by 
way of over-all system.227 Unfortunately the Irish judiciary, much like the Irish 
legislature has largely eschewed any responsibility for policy-making and instead, has 
utilised discretion generously in individual cases. Thus although the issues o f the 
homemaker, clean break and conduct have received some judicial attention, it is difficult 
to identify any significant and consistent policy direction to date.
The three benchmarks identified in the opening chapter as an effective test for 
ascertaining the success of individual approaches to regulation are worth considering in 
light of the approach of the Irish law-makers to date. Certainly the entire spectrum of 
democratic approaches has been utilised, with absolute democratic principles 
underpinning the referendum of the people that sanctioned the introduction of divorce, 
whilst the laws that give effect to this change depend greatly upon subjective judicial 
determinations. As regards the ideal of a predictable regime, the existing regulatory 
structure is not structured to encourage certainty, neither in its enactment nor its practice. 
The combination of the extensive breadth of judicial powers to make whatever orders are 
deemed necessary, coupled with the legislative decision neither to define nor limit the
226 Supra n. 8 at 77.
221 Ibid.
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concept of marital property has resulted in an absence of parameters and thus 
predictability in the system. Further, it has become evident that the judiciary have not 
bridged this gap through effective law or policy directions. Finally as regards fairness, 
whilst the Irish legislature might argue that the avoidance of strict rules facilitates the 
delivery of individualised justice and thus ultimately promises a greater likelihood of a 
fair outcome for the parties involved, equally it might be argued that such an open-ended 
system of regulation, lacking in principle and purpose might be excessively unbounded 
and simply operate to facilitate unfairness.
Evidently, a discretion-based process is not the overriding difficulty; a rule based system 
is simply more likely to be based upon pre-considered motives, such an approach forces 
the legislature to identify in advance, the outcome of an application o f those rules. A 
discretion-based system has the potential to be entirely effective and perhaps more 
equitable, once operated within defined parameters. What these parameters should be and 
who should be responsible for their creation and interpretation is the more difficult 
question, one that might be assisted by reference to contrasting approaches o f other 
jurisdictions. The next three chapters will outline and critically assess alternative 
approaches as adopted by the jurisdictions of California, Scotland and New Zealand.
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Chapter 4 - Equal Division of Community Property under Californian Divorce Law
1 Introduction
The manner in which the Californian legislature has approached the issue of asset 
distribution upon divorce is distinctively different from both Ireland and the other 
jurisdictions studied in the course o f this work. First, the Californian legislature has 
adopted and created a system that is almost entirely dependent upon rule-based 
governance. This removes the capacity for subjective judicial adjudication and evaluation 
of the rights of the parties in the individual circumstances. Secondly the application of the 
rule-based approach requires an equal division o f the marital property. In essence the 
Californian regime vests its law-making powers in the legislature, and for the most part 
the judiciary has the more rudimentary task of simply applying the governing rules. Thus 
very definite positions have been taken on the best approach to governance and the form 
such governance should take. In the context o f this thesis, the regulatory approach 
adopted by Californian law-makers will be assessed with reference to the identified 
benchmarks of democracy, fairness and predictability. On the face o f it, it is arguable that 
California’s system is democratic, in that it is based on legislatively drafted rules; is 
predictable insofar as property division is concerned and is fair in that all cases are 
treated equally and all marital property is divided equally. However this chapter will 
ultimately demonstrate that notwithstanding the apparent merits o f the system in place, 
the lack of clearly articulated policy goals causes the Californian model to fall short of 
achieving the identified benchmarks. In addition, in analysing this rule of equal division 
and its impact in practice, this chapter will provide an illustration o f the regulation of 
divorce from the rule-based end of the regulatory continuum and will serve as a very 
worthwhile comparator in later attempts to critique and reform the discretion-based Irish 
divorce law regime.
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2 History of Californian asset distribution laws
The division of property under Californian divorce law, judicially or by agreement, is 
governed by the provisions o f the Family Law Act 1970 which was re-codified as the 
California Family Code, effective from 1 Jan 1994.1 The statutory regime contains 
important reforms from the pre-1970 position, including a requirement that property 
earned or gained in the course o f the marriage is regarded as community property and 
that such community property is divided equally without regard to the circumstances of 
the marriage or the reasons for its dissolution.2
California’s current community property system has historical roots. Its 1849 
Constitution affirmed its continuation o f Spanish-Mexican community property 
principles.3 However under the pre-1970 position, the Californian courts were entitled to 
avoid the equal division of the matrimonial property where the divorce decree was 
granted on grounds of extreme cruelty, adultery or incurable insanity.4 As almost all 
divorces were granted under one of these three grounds, most cases resulted in an 
unequal division of the matrimonial property. It was confirmed in Tipton v Tipton5 that 
the Californian courts had discretion to assign more than one-half o f the community 
property to an innocent spouse, if the other spouse was found guilty o f adultery or 
cruelty. The decision of the court regarding the unequal division was influenced by the 
statutory obligation to divide the property in such a manner “as the Court, from all the
1 The statutory references in this work are cited from the California Family Code.
2 Since the enactment o f the Family Law Act 1970, there has been little reform o f the substantive 
provisions, with the rule of equal division remaining the bedrock o f the Californian regulatory approach. It 
will be evident from this research that the case law since 1970 equally has not generated any particularly 
radical policy developments. Thus the materials relied upon in the course o f this analysis include both 
current caselaw and commentary and judicial pronouncements and academic analysis from the period 
immediately after the enactment of the 1970s reforms, with many such longstanding decisions remaining 
valid today. Equally, whilst the research considering the economic effect o f the equal division rule 
commences with the seminal work o f Lenore Weitzman, published in 1985, more recent empirical research 
has also been identified, which reflects the shift in spousal roles from the more traditional 
breadwinner/homemaker, gender-based division o f responsibilities to contemporary norms where often 
both spouses work outside the home, typically generating an independent income for each spouse.
3 See further McMurray OK “The Beginnings o f the Community Property System in California and the 
Adoption of the Common Law” (1914-1915) 3 Cal. L. Rev. 359.
4 California Code Sec 138.
5 (1930) 209 Cal. 443 p.65
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facts of the case and the condition o f the parties, may deem just.”6 Thus there existed a 
financial incentive to identify and allocate blame for the marriage break-up.
The division of matrimonial assets upon divorce was one o f four issues referred to the 
California Governor’s Commission on the Family, established in 1966 as part of 
substantial reform efforts at that time.7 The Commission recognised that proof of spousal 
fault on divorce acted as a powerful determinant of the division o f community property 
and called for the close ties to be eliminated.8 In essence the Commission sought to 
“establish procedures for the handling of marital breakdown which [will] permit the 
Family Court to make a full and proper inquiry into the real problems of the family”, as 
distinct from merely focussing on the allocation of blame.9 Whilst in the body of its 
report the Commission regarded an equal division o f the community assets to be 
“desirable”, it equally recognised that “an absolutely equal division is impracticable, if 
not impossible, in many cases”.10 The Report cited examples o f such circumstances, 
including where there is only one principal asset, the division of which would most likely 
eliminate the whole, where the assets are miniscule, and finally where equal division 
would fail sufficiently to provide for the wife and children. Given the distinct possibility 
of such circumstances arising, the Commission recommended a regulatory approach 
premised upon a general presumption o f equal division with a co-existing, wide scope for 
the exercise of judicial discretion.11
“We believe that as it examines the total picture o f the family before 
it, the Family Court must be able to take account o f these and similar 
contingencies. We therefore recommend that the law provide for 
division of the community and quasi-community property equally 
between the parties where possible, except that if  the Court should
6 Ibid.
7 Report of the Governor’s Commission on the Family (California) (1966) submitted to Edmund Brown, 
Governor o f California on 15 December 1966.
8 Ibid at 1-2.
9 Ibid at 2. The Commission sought to “minimize the swords-point hostility o f the parties rather than 
exacerbate it [and thereby] eliminate the element o f fault as a controlling factor in the division of marital 
property, alimony and child support.”
10 Ibid at 45.
11 Ibid at 5-16.
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find that the economic circumstances of the parties require it, an 
unequal division may be ordered.”12
It was suggested that the Commission’s proposal would operate on the basis of a judicial 
consideration of the economic circumstances o f the individual parties in each case.13 
Ultimately however, this proposal was not adopted by the Californian legislature. Rather 
the suggested presumption of equal division was enacted as a rule, with much less scope 
for individualised discretion-based justice. It has been suggested that in establishing a 
rule-based system of equal division o f community property, the new regime sought to 
“reduce the acrimony and bitterness surrounding divorce proceedings”14 with reformers 
hoping “to create conditions for more rational, equitable, and uniform settlements.”15
3 California Family Code -  current regulatory framework
3.1 Introduction
Contrary to the more liberal proposals of the Governor’s Commission, the Californian 
legislature ultimately adopted a rule-based equal division regime with very limited scope 
for avoidance of that rule. The California Family Code deals primarily with two 
fundamental issues, the definition and categorisation o f the property at issue and the 
manner in which that property is to be divided. The statutory rules mandating equal 
division of community property work in tandem with complementary legislative 
presumptions as to both the status o f property and the intentions o f the parties as regards 
that status. When the equal division rule was enacted in 1970, it related to “the 
community estate of the parties”, as defined below in section 3.2. Thus the court is 
expected to divide equally, property earned or gained during the course o f the marriage, 
such claim arising from the fact of the marriage, as distinct from a test of legal title or 
direct monetary contributions.
12 Ibid at 46.
13 Ibid at 45-46.
14 Dixon R and Weitzman L “Evaluating the Impact o f No-Fault Divorce in California” (1980) 29 Family 
Relations 3 297 at 297-298.
15 Ibid at 302.
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3.2 Status o f contested property
The governing provisions regarding classification of property, seek to provide definitive 
answers to the property status and distribution issues that arise on the dissolution of a 
marital union. In the event o f a dispute, the Californian community property regime relies 
upon a judicial capacity to delineate the property o f the parties into separate and 
community property in order for its divisibility to be determined. However there are 
ongoing criticisms of the effects of the definition as stated, for example Parkman has 
suggested that the lack of a clear understanding o f property has given rise to much 
confusion as to the status o f earning capacity and professional goodwill.16
Section 760 of the California Family Code defines community property as;
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or 
personal wherever situated, acquired by a person during the marriage 
while domiciled in this state is community property”.17
The community estate is typically comprised assets and liabilities, thus requiring the 
court to distribute equally the net community assets of the union, i.e. after the deduction 
of community liabilities.18 Attempts privately to agree the status of property outside the 
rules of the statutory provisions are permitted by legislation, but the comprehensive 
approach of the Californian legislature includes the incorporation o f statutory
16 Parkman A “Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements on Divorce” (1998/1999) 87 Ky LJ 51 
at 64.
17 In addition section 2581 provides that all property held in joint names is presumed to be community 
property, absent a written agreement to the contrary. Further improvements and expansions o f the concept 
of community property, typically benefitting the homemaker spouse, were judicially-driven and over time 
gave rise to the inclusion of pensions, military payments post-retirement and severance/retirement 
payments.
18 In re Marriage of Harrington (App. 2 Dist. 1992) 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1847. In the earlier 
decision of In re Marriage ofBarnert (1978) 149 Cal. Rptr. 616, 85 Cal. App. 3d 413, the court had 
suggested a similar formula to comply with the statutory requirement o f equal division; that the trial court 
is required to add all community property assets, deduct all community obligations and divide residual 
assets equally.
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requirements as to the form such an agreement must take. The strong presumption in 
favour of community ownership of property acquired during the marriage prevents 
reliance upon an oral statement.19
Section 770(a) defines separate property as follows;
“Separate property o f a married person includes all o f the following:
(1) All property owned by the person before the marriage.
(2) All property acquired by the person after marriage, by gift, 
bequest, devise or descent
(3) The rents, issues and profits o f the property described in this 
section.”
Given the separate status of such property, section 770(b) confirms the right o f a married 
person to convey such property without the consent of his/her spouse.
In the light of the almost indisputable equal division mandated by the governing 
legislation, the central issue in a divorce application typically relates to the status of the 
available property, the ‘owner’ invariably seeking to categorise it as separate property in 
order to avoid the imposition o f the equal division rule.20 Whilst Krauskopf recognises 
the unavoidable fact of frequent disputes as to what constitutes community property, she 
still advocates the benefits o f automatic spousal entitlements in respect o f community 
property, regarding such a system as less contentious in practice.21 In addition she 
promotes the capacity of such a system to ensure a fair division of marital assets, 
premised upon the equalising of spousal contributions to the marriage, whatever their 
form.22
19 See further section 8 below, for a consideration of the role o f private agreements within the Californian 
divorce regime.
20 The very significant impact of the choice o f approach to defining the scope o f the property available for 
distribution will be considered in the conclusion o f this work, as a key, often underestimated influence on 
the outcome of a regulatory process.
21 Krauskopf JM “Theories of Property Division/Spousal support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery”, 
Family Law Quarterly Vol XXIII No 2 Summer 1989 253, 259.
22 Ibid.
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Komhauser suggests that the adoption of community property based divorce laws by 
some US states, including California, reflects an articulation of the partnership model, 
which is reliant on the notion o f the community of marriage.23 The statutory definition of 
community property which presumes a joint and equal ownership of gains from spousal 
endeavours reflects the view of marriage as a partnership “to which each spouse makes 
different but equally valuable contributions”.24 Krauskopf regards this approach as 
reflecting the reformers’ desire to authorise a right to property on a basis other than 
title 25 She notes that whilst
“...much litigation has questioned what benefits should be included 
as property, few debated the right to share in whatever gains the 
courts finally classed as property. The legislation clearly recognizes 
a right or entitlement to share in property because o f contributions to 
the marriage.”26
Californian divorce laws rely upon this presumption of equal contribution as the basis for 
the equal division of marital property.27
Ultimately Kahn-Freud has identified the importance of the marital community property 
system, suggesting that a system not relying upon the rule or even a presumption of 
community property is unimaginable:
“Since in our societies, marriage is the basis for the normal family, it 
follows that marriage must have a profound effect on the property of
23 Komhauser ME “Theory versus reality: The Partnership Model o f Marriage in Family and Income Tax 
Law” 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1413. For a contrasting view, see Dagan H and Heller M “The Liberal Commons” 
110 Yale L.J. 549 (2001) at 586-87.
24 Smith J “Why the Community Property System fails Divorced Women and Children” 7 (1998) Tex 
Journal of Women and the Law 135 at 135,136.
25 Supra n. 21.
26 Ibid.
27 A related issue is the mutual rights of spouses to control, manage and dispose o f community property, 
particularly prior to the granting o f the divorce. Legislative amendment in 1975 provided for the mutual 
right of both spouses to manage community property during the course o f the marriage. [Act of Oct 1 1973, 
ch. 987, 1973 -  codified at California Family Code 751] The decision to extend the rights of both spouses 
to use and manage the community property in the course o f the marriage further confirms the view of 
marriage as a partnership. It seems only logical that the rights of a spouse arising from his/her status as a 
spouse should equally exist in the course o f the marriage and not require the breakdown of that marriage 
for those rights to become actionable.
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the spouses... It is difficult to imagine any system of law which, in its 
regulation o f the impact of marriage on property, could completely 
ignore these elementary social facts, i.e. confine itself to a strict rule 
of “separation o f property” in the sense that marriage has no effect 
on the property o f the spouses at all.”28
4 Equal division
4.1 Introduction
The reform of Californian divorce law, culminating in the enactment of the Family Law 
Act 1970, was focussed primarily upon two central issues. The first major achievement of 
the reforms was the elimination of fault as a necessary proof, in turn eliminating much of 
the acrimony and hostility attached to many divorce applications. The second reform 
related to the economic consequences o f a divorce order, with the court now mandated to 
order an equal division of the parties’ community property 29 Kay suggests that those 
pushing the reform of the Californian process at that time did not originally include the 
achievement of equality amongst its stated goals.30 Rather she suggests the main focus of 
the reform lobbyists, particularly the feminist movement, was to secure no-fault 
divorce.31 In California, in the late 1960’s, the historic reliance upon fault as a basis for 
determining the division of matrimonial property settlements was increasingly criticised 
and was regarded as “outmoded and irrelevant, often producing cruel and unworkable
32results”. In order to reduce the time and expense being spent on proving the 
wrongdoings of the other party, by the elimination o f the relevance of spousal fault and 
the creation of the rule of equal division, “reformers hoped to create conditions of more
28 Kahn-Freud O Matrimonial Property Law (Stevens & Sons London) (Friedman M ed) (1955) at 267 at 
268.
29 Developments -  The Law o f Marriage and Family” 2002-2003 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1996 at 2092, with 
reference to the reforms of the late 1960’s, the Harvard Law Review editorial comment notes that “the 
same reform movement that led to the elimination o f fault-based divorce also began a trend away from 
alimony and toward property division.”
30 Kay HH “An Appraisal o f California’s No — Fault Divorce Law” (1987) 75 Calif. L. Rev. 291 at 300. 
Interestingly, despite its less than primary status for the lobbyists for change, California’s lead was 
followed by many, with equal division being adopted as a priority by states seeking reform, post-1970.
31 On the back of its support and drive for an equal rights amendment to the Constitution, the women’s 
movement was largely focussed on three issues; the equal rights amendment; abortion rights and no-fault 
divorce reform.
32 Krom HA “California’s Divorce Law Reform: An historical analysis” (1970) Pacific Law Journal 156 at 
181.
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rational, equitable, and uniform settlements”. In line with this, it is interesting to note 
that the two key recommendations of the Governor’s Commission related to the 
introduction of a no-fault divorce regime and the establishment of an independent Family 
Court.34 In the general context o f strengthening the position and protection of the woman 
in the home, the proponents for change recognised, albeit belatedly, the importance of 
equal division of community property on divorce as a key aspect of the equal rights 
amendment movement.35 So it appears that the momentum gathered by those pushing for 
reform in the context of equal rights ultimately embraced the notion of equal economic 
treatment on divorce as part o f their ideology o f equality.
The elimination of judicial discretion and the legislative shift to equal division of 
community property was ultimately regarded by some as being more significant than the 
elimination of fault-based divorce.36 Equality of division was introduced to the 
Californian legislative framework at a time when gender equality had recently been 
achieved in most aspects of civil rights. The manner in which the provisions were drafted 
reflected a new absolutist approach to equality, insofar as women could now secure 50% 
of their husband’s earnings and gains in the course of the marriage, men could similarly 
secure 50% of their wives’ marital assets and wealth. The imposition of gender-neutral 
equal-division rules further eliminated any possibility of a compensation-based model
33 Supra n. 14 at 302.
34 The Governor’s Commission was charged with considering four issues central to what he referred to as 
the existing inadequate social and legal procedures for dealing with divorce;
1. revision of the substantive laws o f California relating to the family
2. to determine the feasibility o f developing significant and meaningful courses in family life 
education
3. to consider the possibility and desirability o f developing uniform nationwide standards of 
marriage and divorce jurisdiction
4. to examine into the establishment o f Family Courts on a state-wide basis and to recommend the 
procedures whereby they may function most effectively.
Due to time constraints the Commission chose to focus its attention on two o f those issues; the revision of 
the substantive law and the operation o f the Family Court. In reviewing the law governing divorce, the 
Commission focussed on the elimination o f fault as the basis for granting a decree o f divorce. One 
consequence of so doing was the removal o f fault as a determinant in the division of community property.
35 For an explanation of the historical background see generally Kay HH “From the Second Sex to the Joint 
Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth 
Century” (2000) 88 Calif. L. Rev. 2017 at 2054-2066, citing the works o f Ginsburg (1979), Brown (1971) 
and Mansbridge (1986).
36 Freeman M, Hogoboom W, MacFadden W and Olson L Attorney’s Guide to Family Law Act Practice 
156 (1970), cited by Kay HH supra n. 30 at 301.
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which might favour the financial contributions or achievements of the breadwinner or 
alternatively the career sacrifices and non-financial contributions of the homemaker.
4.2 Rule of equal division
Section 2550 o f the California Family Code provides for the manner of division of the 
community estate as follows:
“Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral 
stipulation of the parties in open court, or as otherwise provided in 
this division, in a proceeding for dissolution o f marriage or for legal 
separation of the parties, the court shall, either in its judgment of 
dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment o f legal separation of the 
parties, or at a later time if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to make 
such a property division, divide the community estate o f the parties 
equally.”
Thus, the statutory obligation to divide the community assets o f the parties equally is 
essentially mandatory, subject to these permitted exceptions.37 Waggoner regards the fact 
of this right to negotiate a settlement outside the terms of the legislative rules as 
effectively demoting the statutory rules to the position o f “default rules”, which “must 
yield to a contrary intention”.38 However given that the rule o f equal division is so 
unambiguously stated in legislation, it is arguable that once the dependent spouse is 
properly advised, the wealthier spouse is unlikely successfully to negotiate a significantly 
better arrangement in the course o f the marriage. A wealthy spouse seeking to protect 
his/her assets is more likely to succeed by executing a pre-nuptial agreement to govern 
the terms of the marital breakdown. Where a pre-nuptial agreement is not executed, the 
favourable default position available to the applicant spouse is 50% of the community 
property of the spouses.39
37 For further discussion o f the permitted exceptions to equal division see below at section 4.4.
38 Waggoner L “Tribute to William F. Frathcer: Marital Property Rights in Transition” (1994) 59 Mo. L. 
Rev. 21 at 27.
39 See section 8 below which considers the role o f pre-nuptial agreements in a jurisdiction where the 
outcome of the governing regime is almost never influenced by the exercise o f judicial discretion.
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4.3 Why choose equal division?
Frantz and Dagan refer to the concept of equal division on divorce, which underlies the 
Californian system, as “the cornerstone of the contemporary law of marital property”.40 
McRae regards the Californian Family Code and its reliance upon the rule of equal 
division as a reflection o f the legislature’s commitment to the equitable treatment of 
spouses during marriage, which extends to the State’s goal o f equal distribution upon the 
termination of the marital economic community.41 In adopting this system of equal 
division, the Californian legislature has eschewed the judicially-determined equitable 
basis for dividing the marital assets of the parties, as adopted by a significant number of 
other US states.42 Undoubtedly the Californian approach exemplifies democratic law­
making whereby the threat o f the imposition of subjective judicial views is avoided and 
instead the governing provisions represent considered governance by those elected to 
state legislature for this purpose. In support o f the approach o f the Californian legislature, 
Gardner rejects the subjective accounting-based approach to marriage and subsequent 
asset division, preferring to advocate communality, which he regards as “incontestably 
the right approach”.43 The equal division rule eliminates the notion of dividing assets to 
meet individual needs and instead reflects an implementation o f the partnership theory of 
equality. As an equal investor in the investment partnership model o f marriage promoted 
by Singer, on divorce each spouse is entitled to “an equal share in the fruits of the
**44marriage.
40 Frantz CJ and Dagan H “Properties o f Marriage” 104 Colum. L. Rev. 75 at 100. Whilst they recognise 
the relatively recent arrival o f the notion o f equal division, equally they acknowledge its widespread 
application. “Equal division is a relative newcomer to marital property law, but by now we can hardly think 
of the law without it.”
41 McRae MC “Contribution or Transmutation? The Conflicting Provision o f Sections 852 and 2640 of the 
California Family Code” 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1187, 1188.
42 Given that the equal division rule is premised upon the notion o f marriage as partnership, it is typically 
associated with the concept of community property, discussed at section 3.2 above. Only nine US states 
rely upon a community property system o f classification and division upon divorce: Arizona, California, 
Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
43 Gardner S “Rethinking Family Property” (1993) 109 L.Q. Rev. 263, 291. He regards as an obvious 
connotation of marriage, the commitment to organise the parties’ whole lives according to the values of 
trust and collaboration, echoing the views o f Kahn-Freud O, cited above at section 3.2.
44 Singer JB “Divorce Reform and Gender Justice” 67 N.C.L. Rev 1103 at 1114.
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By way of contrast with the Irish discretion-based system which places a heavy emphasis 
on the spousal contributions and circumstances in the course of the marriage,45 the 
Californian legislature has rejected the practice o f the subjective calculation and 
rewarding of spousal contributions. The automatic equalisation of contributions and in 
turn spousal property rights, attempts to equalise the position of the two spouses at the 
time of the divorce, irrespective o f the form or extent o f those contributions. Glendon 
supports this approach and regards it as likely “that the average couple would choose a 
simple equal division o f what they had acquired through their respective efforts during 
the marriage over the discretion system with its uncertainty and its controversy- 
provoking guidelines”.46 Blumberg notes the considerable symbolic force of the ‘equal 
rights in marital property’ approach, noting that it “clearly announces that spouses are 
understood to contribute equally to the family without regard to the actual division for 
labor”.47 In practice, the Californian courts have repeatedly relied upon simple 
mathematical equality in guiding the manner in which assets should be divided. In re
4ftTammen, the appeal court emphasised the need for “mathematically equal division” 
when complying with the equal division requirement49
The legislative approach adopted by the Californian law-makers has in effect been 
endorsed by the American Law Institute (ALI).50 In encouraging reform of the 
approaches of states across America, the ALI demonstrated support for both the 
legislative rule of equal division and the specific classification rules regarding the status 
of separate and marital properties.51 Quite simply the ALI argues that once there is
45 Section 20 Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, as considered in detail in section 5 o f chapter 3, above.
46 Glendon MA. “Family Law Reform in the 1980’s”, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553 at 1562.
47 Blumberg GG Community Property in California (Aspen) (3rd ed) (1999) at 7.
48 (App. 1 Dist. 1976) 134 Cal. Rptr. 161, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927.
49 However as noted below at section 4.4 in the context o f the residual judicial discretion exercisable under 
the Californian regime, section 2601 permits the court to offset one asset against another, where this will 
give rise to a substantially equal division o f the community property.
50 The ALI was founded in Washington DC in 1923 and according to its Certificate o f Incorporation the 
ALI seeks to “promote the clarification and simplification o f the law and its better adaptation to social 
needs.”
51 Although the remit of the ALI is wide, it has given significant attention to the regulation of families with 
the publication o f the ALI Principles o f the Law o f Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 
(2002). This was the Institute's first comprehensive work in the area o f family law. The project comprises 
six principal parts: Child Custody; Child Support; Division o f Property at Dissolution; Spousal 
Compensatory Payments; Domestic Partners; and Agreements. Chapter 4 o f the Principles addresses the 
issue of asset division on divorce. Dallon notes that this chapter “thoroughly discussed property division
150
acceptance of the principle that both spouses have a claim on some or all of the marital 
assets of the parties, an equal division of the relevant assets is “the allocation that least 
requires justification”.52 On the basis that it is difficult to offer a convincing rationale for 
any other formula for division, the ALI advocates the 50:50 rule. The ALI prefers not to 
take an absolute stance on the ‘rules versus discretion’ debate, stating that whilst “no 
formulation can eliminate all need for judicial discretion” it regards the rule of equal
53division as “the inevitable choice”. Such an approach operates on the basis of the 
partnership theory simpliciter and avoids any attempt to value financial and/or non 
financial contributions, preferring to assume that they are equal.
The ALI regards the Californian regulatory approach as contributing significantly to the 
attainment of fairness and consistency. Dallon commends the ALI for supporting the 
principle of the equal division o f marital property, regarding this approach as promoting 
“reliable and simplified property division rules” which should ultimately cause “the cost 
and complexity of divorce litigation ... [to be].. .reduced and settlements [to be] 
encouraged”.54 Thus the rule of equal division does bring certainty not only to the court 
process, but also to inter-spousal negotiations. The presence of a rule which creates a 
very definite indication of the outcome should the parties proceed to trial, more easily 
facilitates and encourages a settlement between the parties. In this regard Dixon and 
Weitzman look favourably on the greater possibilities offered by the requirement of equal 
division, noting that it should “allow divorcing couples and their attorneys to predict the 
types of settlement they can expect in court.. .Consequently we expect more couples to 
agree on the division of property out o f court”.55 Similarly Glendon has referred to the 
“old principle of the Spanish community o f gains” as
law and proposes a careful framework o f rules with illustrations and comments to guide property division”. 
Dallon CW “The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles o f the Law o f Family Dissolution on Property 
Division” (2001) BYUL Rev. 891 at 892.
52 Ibid 4.09 cmt. B at 734.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid at 896.
55 Supra n. 14.
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. .serving as a framework for private ordering of the financial 
aspects o f divorce by enabling the spouses to know what the likely 
result will be if their affairs are settled by a judge”.56
On the face of it, a strict legislative rule o f equal division ensures a democratic and 
predictable approach to regulation. However empirical research relating to the divorce 
process in practice does not support the prediction that a system of fixed rules lends itself 
to an uncomplicated divorce resolution process. The research conducted by Dixon and 
Weitzman, considered below in section 5, suggests that the aims of predictability and 
certainty of outcome are not necessarily evident in the course o f settlement 
negotiations.57 Weitzman has previously outlined the many shortfalls and inherent 
weaknesses of private settlements.58 The shortfalls o f the negotiation process impact both 
generally and in a gender specific manner, referred to by Weitzman as the “sex-role 
socialization” that gives rise to differing perspectives on the process and outcomes of 
negotiated settlements.59 Weitzman emphasises the differing tolerance for conflict 
between men and women and suggests that women are more likely to shy away from 
negotiation and conflict. The main impact o f this is a frequency o f inadequate settlements 
for women. She rejects any suggestion that women fail themselves in simply accepting 
inadequate support awards, pointing to the social context and structures of the negotiation 
process. Weitzman concludes that women, who are more risk-averse than men, may 
regard the cost of bargaining to be greater than the pay-off to be expected. In addition she 
cites the lack of available information as serving to further prevent women from 
negotiating and securing a fair and adequate settlement on divorce.60 Thus whilst reliance 
upon fixed rules is likely to enhance the predictability o f the eventual outcome of the 
application of those rules, a rule-based system does not necessarily discourage those 
desirous of a court hearing from proceeding to trial. Equally given the myriad of factors
56 Supra n. 46 at 1562.
57 Supra n. 14 at 306. The research, although largely positive did note that the “liberalized provisions of the 
new law” did not seem to encourage parties to divorce more quickly, and although the level of litigation 
had lessened, the percentage of parties requiring their issues to be resolved by way o f trial had not 
diminished.
58 Weitzman LJ The Divorce Revolution The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women 
ad Children in America (Free Press) (\ 985) at 315-318.
59 Ibid at 316.
60 Ibid at 316-318. Ultimately Weitzman suggests that even though the terms o f a settlement may be 
inadequate, “it may well be a “rational” decision for her to “agree” to what he offers.”
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that can influence the negotiation process, the fact of a rule-based regime does not of 
itself eliminate the complications arising nor guarantee predictable negotiation outcomes.
4.4 Residual judicial discretion -  limited by rules
Notwithstanding the equal division rule, there still exists scope for the unequal 
distribution of assets, with the California Family Code expressly setting out such 
circumstances.61 Whilst these exceptions represent a move away from the primary rule of 
equal division,62 such deviations, although often necessitating an element of judicial 
discretion, exist within the confines o f the governing legislation.63 Thus, unusually, they 
rely minimally upon judicial discretion and instead seem to be a further extension of that 
rule-based system, both in their creation and application. Arguably, these exceptions 
indicate that the Californian legislature accepts that an absolute equal division rule is not 
always appropriate but in so recognising has maintained regulatory control for the 
identification of the scope of such exceptions. Rather than enacting statutory provisions 
which leave the identification o f ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to the judiciary, the 
legislature has identified and drafted the detail o f each permitted exception. Such 
instances o f unequal division include the court’s power to defer the sale o f the family 
home even where it is the only community asset, the right to assign community debts as it 
deems ‘just and equitable’ where such debts exceed the value o f the community assets, 
and the power to award a community property asset to one spouse and thus effect a
61 S 2601 -  Awarding community property asset to one party
S 2602 -  Unequal division where there is evidence o f deliberate misappropriation of community property 
S 2622 - Community debts valued in excess o f community liabilities 
S 2623(a) -  Family expenses incurred post separation 
S 3801 -  Deferred sale o f the family home 
S 2604 -  Community estate valued at less than $5,000 
S 2603 — Personal injury awards assigned to injured spouse
62 The equal division rule is referred to at times in this work as the ‘primary rule’ given it is the central rule 
governing the division of the assets o f the parties.
63 In re Marriage o f Brown (1976) 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561 which confirmed that 
the trial court retains discretion to divide community assets in any fashion which complies with statutory 
provisions. This rule-based approach to the limiting o f judicial discretion exists in only two other states, 
Louisiana and New Mexico, with the other six community property states preferring to rely upon the 
exercise of more open-ended judicial discretion to equitably divide the community property of the parties.
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“substantially” equal division of the community estate.64 Although these exceptions are 
specific and limited by legislation, their existence represents a concession to the 
significance of individual claims and circumstances.
Ultimately it appears that in California the tasks o f law and policy-making remain firmly 
within the remit of the legislature. Given this rigid rule-based approach, the only 
alternative means of resolution appears to be through private ordering which is permitted 
and regulated by the Californian legislature. In the light of the absence of scope for 
individualised justice in the particular circumstances, parties who wish to avoid the equal 
division of community property will be required to do so by way o f pre- or post-nuptial 
settlement. Unfortunately as is recognised by many commentators, it is difficult to 
establish the extent to which parties are choosing to execute such agreements, in order to 
self-determine the outcome of any future divorce.
“Little useful data has been gathered regarding how many couples 
sign premarital agreements or the economic situation o f the people 
who enter such agreements.”65
5 The equal division rule and the homemaker spouse
The partnership theory of marriage requires the court to have equal regard to the 
contributions o f the homemaker and those of the breadwinner. Fineman has noted that the
“...partnership model is urged because of its symbolic significance in 
reflecting the preferred or correct vision o f women, and also, 
secondarily, because it addresses need. Through ideological fiat, the
64 For the most part, the statutory exceptions to equal division comprise those exceptions previously 
identified in the report o f the Governor’s Commission on the Family as necessary to avoid injustice in 
certain circumstances.
65 Bix B “Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution” (2001) 8 Duke Journal of 
Gender, Law and Policy 231 at 232. Similarly Glass has noted that there exists “little demographic 
information on people who enter into prenuptial agreements”. Glass R “Trading Up: Postnuptial 
Agreements, Fairness, and a Principled New Suitor for California” 92 (2004) Cal. L. Rev. 214 at 218. The 
role of pre-nuptial agreements in the context o f the rigid, rule-based Californian regime will be considered 
at section 8 below.
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dependent woman is considered to be benefited in being “brought up” 
to partnership status and made an “equal”.”66
The Californian system effectively equalises the non-financial contributions of the 
homemaker with those market-based contributions of the spouse working outside the 
home. Thus the right o f the non-earning spouse to an equal share of the community 
property of the marriage arises from the fact o f the marriage, as distinct from the 
circumstances of the union. As mentioned above, Glendon has acknowledged the 
capacity for a community property based approach to reflect the concepts of partnership 
and equality.67 By statutorily categorising all property and income earned or secured in 
the course of the marriage as community property, Californian law-makers have simply, 
but definitively determined that the marital union is a partnership o f equals and that all 
gains arising from the union are equally owned by the spouses. This rights-based model 
was preferred by the Californian legislature to a system of asset division premised either 
upon an examination o f the individual spousal contributions or equally upon the 
identified future needs of the previously dependent spouse.
Although the laudable aim of equal division may be the equalisation o f spousal 
contributions, it often fails to put the parties on an equal footing after the divorce. In 
identifying the “rule equality approach” as inappropriate, Fineman identifies three 
relevant, related factors:
“...women’s unequal social and economic position in society, the 
ways in which marriage and family decisions are affected by these 
and other economic and social circumstances, and the impact of
• ASdivorce on women with dependent children.”
Singer observes that in most marriages priority is given to one career, typically the 
husband’s, and the wife is more likely to either forego her career to care for their
66 Fineman MA The Illusion of Equality The Rhetoric and Reality o f Divorce Reform University of Chicago 
Press (1991) at 45. Later, at 174, she notes critically that “The newly-fashioned gender-neutral law creates 
an appearance of equality, but the consequences o f divorce are far from equally borne.”
67 Supra n. 46 at 1557.
68 Supra n. 66 at 36.
155
children, restrict her working hours or forego opportunity for advancement.69 Whilst the 
earning spouse can simply continue in the workplace in his established position, the 
homemaker has not had the opportunity, supported by a spouse, to establish and/or 
improve herself within the workplace. Thus a regulatory system premised upon the 
partnership model may equalise asset ownership on divorce but is likely to fail to address 
the post-divorce earnings and opportunity inequalities. Fineman criticises the partnership 
concept of sharing responsibility and contribution and views it as “typically translated 
into assuming equal economic responsibility after divorce, a result that is unrealistic, 
even cruel, given the material situation of many women.”70 In support of this weakness, 
Komhauser regards the partnership model of marriage where it mandates an equal 
division of assets upon divorce, as having “precipitated a slide into poverty for many 
divorcing women and their children”.71
“The partnership model of marriage and the consequent changes in 
domestic law have proved to be disastrous for women and children, 
thrusting many into poverty when the marriage ends”.72
The seminal work of Lenore Weitzman73 is regarded by many as “by far the most 
influential evidence” of the divergence in the standards o f living o f mothers and fathers 
post-divorce.74 The work which is based upon a ten-year empirical research study, charts 
the economic consequences of divorce for women and children in America. In particular 
Weitzman assesses the real impact o f the rule o f equal division on the parties post divorce 
and identifies the system’s failure to take account of the economic inequalities arising 
from the marriage and the individual spousal roles. The strength of the work lies in the 
depth of the research carried out, with both parties to divorce proceedings interviewed at 
the time of the divorce and in the years after the financial arrangements have been
69 Supra n. 44 at 1115, citing Goldfarb Marital Partnership and the Case fo r  Permanent Alimony (1988) 
and Berk S The Gender Factory (1985).
70 Supra n. 66 at 176.
71 Supra n. 23. Similarly, Fineman, supra n. 66 at 36 notes that “Economic inequalities persist in our 
society in spite of decades o f attempted reforms.”
72 Supra n. 44 at 1418.
73 Supra n. 58.
74 For example, see the views o f Braver S; “The Gender Gap in Standard o f Living After Divorce: 
Vanishingly Small?” (1999) 33 FLQ 111 at 113. Braver traces the significant impact o f Weitzman’s 
research noting it to be amongst the “most cited demographic statistics o f the 1980’s”.
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executed. The comprehensive nature o f the work is reflected in the breadth of the 
categories of parties interviewed, with Weitzman producing an analysis of financial 
implications of divorce from the perspective o f all relevant stakeholders in the process. 
Ultimately she regards men as “rewarded” by divorce whereas women are 
“impoverished” or at the very least suffer a significant diminution in their standard of 
living. In addition, she notes the almost unavoidable, related impact upon the children of 
the marriage.
Singer recognises the work as the “starting point for virtually all o f the current research 
on the economic consequences o f no-fault divorce.”75 One o f Weitzman’s central theories 
is that the elimination of fault-based divorce and the mandatory equal division rule led to 
the further impoverishment o f women and in fact “worsened women’s condition,
76improved men’s condition, and widened the income gap between the sexes”. 
Notwithstanding Singer’s recognition o f the impact of Weitzman’s work, she does 
question the research and the conclusions reached, noting Weitzman’s failure to provide 
any comparative research premised upon the pre-existing, fault-based divorce system in 
California.77 Certainly it is difficult to identify the shift from fault-based to no-fault-based 
divorce as the solitary cause of spousal impoverishment. Rather it is perhaps more 
reasonable to surmise that both fault- and no-fault-based systems have the potential to 
impoverish one or both spouses; it is the fact o f divorce, not the fact o f the fault, that 
impoverishes the wife in Weitzman’s research, or even both spouses in some instances.
Despite the doubts cast over the precision of Weitzman’s statistics by Peterson,78 even the 
revised and less dramatic figures still indicate a 27% decline in the standard of living for 
mothers and a 10% increase in the standard of living for fathers.79 Thus notwithstanding
75 Supra n. 44 at 1104.
76 Supra n. 58 at 378. Weitzman originally claimed that following a decree o f divorce women and children 
suffered on average a 73% drop in standard o f living whereas the average divorced man’s standard of living 
increased by 42%.
77 Supra n. 44 at 1105. Singer states that the conclusions reached by Weitzman are “both flawed and 
potentially dangerous”.
78 Peterson RR “A Re-Evaluation o f the Economic Consequences o f Divorce” (1996) 61 Am. Soc. Rev.
528
79 Further research carried out by Mauldin subsequent to Weitzman and Peterson, noted that 89% of the 356 
women interviewed by Mauldin experienced a decrease in their economic well-being. Mauldin T “Women
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the proven inaccuracies o f the statistics originally produced by Weitzman, it appears 
well-established that the economic consequences o f divorce are significantly worse for 
long-term homemakers and their children than they are for the breadwinner spouse.80 
Further research has indicated that the factors which are most likely to reduce the 
financial wellbeing o f mothers post-divorce are: the presence of children under the age of 
6, race, geographical location and the type o f marital disruption.81 Although accepting the 
original statistical error,82 Weitzman has defended the essence of her work and argued 
that it had “a real impact on public policy and resulted in the passage of 14 new laws in 
California”.83 She cites the example o f the judicial power to defer the sale of the family 
home as the first legislative amendment enacted as a direct consequence of her research. 
As her work focussed on the experiences of participants in the legal process, Weitzman 
was able to produce evidence o f the “direct link between specific features of the law and 
the economic hardships experienced by women and children after divorce”.84 One 
example of such hardship was the negative consequences arising from the sale of the 
family home which was often necessitated by the strict operation o f the equal division 
rule. Weitzman, in noting the significant hardship that such a sale placed on children at a 
very vulnerable time in their lives, recognised the continuity and stability that the 
legislative amendment could bring.85
More recently conducted research has focussed on the impact of marriage and 
motherhood on the earning capacity o f women, presenting further evidence of the 
sustained cost of family circumstances for women. The disproportionate costs borne by
Who Remain Above the Poverty Level in Divorce: Implications for Family Policy” (1990) 39 Family 
Relations No 2 141 at 142.
80 McLindon JB “Separate but Equal: The Economic Disaster o f Divorce for Women and Children” (1987) 
21 Fam. LQ 351; Peters HE “Marriage and Divorce” Informational Constraints and Private Contracting” 
(1986) 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 437
81 Ibid.
82 Weitzman LJ “The Economic Consequences o f Divorce are still unequal: Comment on Peterson” (1996) 
61 American Sociological Review 537-538 noting at 537 that her work “did not receive scholarly awards or 
attention because of the magnitude o f that single statistic”.
83 Ibid at 538.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid', Weitzman claims credit for other legislative amendments, including; provisions for alimony, child 
support enforcement, regulation of attorney’s fees and judicial education in California.
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women were illustrated by the research of Budig and England;86 later analysed by 
Oldham in the context o f US divorce laws.87 One of the intriguing findings from their 
research was that on average, young American women suffer a 7% wage penalty per 
child.88 Whilst in many instances o f marriage, such losses and any residual needs arsing 
can be supplemented by the other spouse, upon divorce, the economic implications of this 
wage penalty become especially relevant.
The primary purpose of the work o f Weitzman was to attempt to determine the impact of 
a divorce regime which relies upon a rule-based system of equal division. What the work 
ultimately achieved was to provide a stark illustration of what has been labelled the 
“feminization of poverty”,89 thereby strengthening the arguments against reliance upon 
absolute equal division as an effective tool to equalise the positions o f the spouses. 
Whether 25 years on from Weitzman’s findings such statistics remain relevant is of 
course a matter for serious consideration. Certainly Oldham has cited the results of a 
more recent study, which presents evidence that the economic costs suffered by the 
homemaker spouse are in decline. With reference to the work o f Johnson90 and his 
analysis of the employment patterns o f first-time mothers, based upon US Census Bureau 
data, it was noted that more women are working during most o f their pregnancy and 
returning to work more quickly.91 However, it has also been observed that as “family 
income increases, mothers with children younger than 18 are less likely than other 
mothers to work full time”.92 Where such a marital unit breaks down, the dependent 
spouse’s vulnerability to post-divorce poverty undoubtedly arises, unless the asset and 
wealth distribution system can provide adequately for her. Finally, one other recent body
86 Budig MJ and England P “The Wage Penalty for Motherhood” (2001) 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 204.
87 Oldham JT “Changes in Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958-2008” 42 Fam. L.Q. 419 at 426.
88 Supra n. 86, where, by way o f introduction, it was noted that “Motherhood is associated with lower 
hourly pay ... [and].. .the costs o f child rearing are borne disproportionately by mothers.”
89 The “feminization o f poverty” refers to the concentration o f poverty amongst women, particularly 
amongst female-headed households. The term originates in the work o f  Diana Pearce; Pearce D “The 
Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare” (1978) 11 Urban and Social Change Review 28.
90 Johnson TD Maternity Leave and Employment Patterns o f First-time mothers: 1961-2003 (Washington 
DC: Bureau of the Census) (2008)
91 Johnson notes, ibid at 12, that “women in the most recent first-birth cohort o f 2000-2002 worked longer 
into their pregnancy and started work after childbirth sooner than their counterparts in the early 
1960s....most o f the increases in the percentage o f women working later into their pregnancy and working 
after their first birth came about in the early 1980’s.”
92 Ibid.
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of research has suggested that marital disruption has a modest economic impact on many 
women, given the significant changes in contemporary labour force participation by 
women. McKeever and Wolfinger have concluded that women are less dependent upon 
the income of their former spouses as they are now more likely to be independently 
engaged in the workforce.93 Their analysis suggests that “women’s postdivorce incomes 
are primarily attributable to their labor force participation and secondarily attributable to 
income transfers from their former husbands.”94 Thus they conclude that “changes in 
women’s labor force participation in recent years have begun to positively affect how 
they fare after marital disruption.”95 The previously vulnerable homemaker spouse with 
little potential for well-paid employment is gradually being replaced by a woman who 
either works outside the home in the course of the marriage or is in a position to assert 
her position in the workplace upon divorce. Undoubtedly where a previously financially 
dependent spouse is in a position to become financially self-sufficient post divorce, the 
equal division of the property at the time of the divorce become less unequal in its effect.
Notwithstanding changing social and work-place norms, the lack o f flexibility and 
consequently individualised fairness is a key consequence o f a strict rule-based regime. 
Internationally, and particularly within the two jurisdictions considered in the next two 
chapters of this thesis, namely Scotland and New Zealand; the need for some element of 
flexibility, depending upon the circumstances of the parties, and in particular the 
financially vulnerable spouse, has been recognised.96 In those two jurisdictions, despite a 
willing reliance upon a presumption of equal division, this presumption is not 
automatically applied and co-exists with judicial powers to order unequal division in 
order to secure equality of result in individual circumstances. The divergent approaches 
to asset division, all initiated with a view to protecting the financially vulnerable spouse, 
demonstrate very different means o f attempting to secure this outcome. However the fact 
of residual discretion, even within the Californian regime, arguably confirms that the
93 McKeever M and Wolfinger NH “Re-examining the Economic Costs o f Marital Disruption for Women” 
82 (2001) Social Science Quarterly 202.
94 Ibid at 215.
95 Ibid.
96 See further, chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
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predictability associated with a rule-based system of governance cannot achieve a fair 
outcome without scope for some level o f individualised justice.
6 Equal Division -  fair or unfair?
Although the application o f a rule o f equal division promises fairness and predictability, 
the impact of such a strict universal rule upon very varying circumstances can ultimately 
give rise to unfair outcomes. In questioning the fairness o f a rule o f equal division, Stark 
highlights the importance o f property being divided “fairly”, and the unavoidable 
relevance of need as a determining factor in the asset division process.97 She notes that 
except for California and Arizona, which operate equal division regimes, all other states 
divide property according to equitable principles by which property is divided “fairly,” 
with reference to various statutory factors.98 Although traditionally separate property 
states have approached division o f the relevant assets on an equitable basis, there is 
evidence of a growing reliance upon a presumption of equal division as a starting point. 
This shift in approach has “made separate property states’ treatment o f property on 
divorce virtually identical to that o f community property states”.99 Dallon notes that 
“many equitable division states already impose a presumption o f equal division”100 and 
slightly less definitively, it has also been suggested in respect o f those states that provide 
statutorily for equitable division o f property upon divorce, “approximately half of these 
states start with a presumption of equal division.”101 Thus whilst an absolute rule of equal 
division irrespective of the circumstances, has the potential to result in unfair outcomes in 
some instances, the merits of applying a norm of equal division, subject to variation 
where equity so demands, have been identified by many. Whilst in practice the ordering 
of equal division is in fact often the fairest outcome, a rule o f equal division is perhaps a 
step too far.
97 Stark B “Marriage Proposals: From-One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law” (2001) 89 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1479, 1482 at fn. 8.
98 Ibid.
99 Supra n. 29 at 2092.
100 Supra n. 51 at 905. Dallon refers at footnote 76 to the statutory position adopted in Arkansas, Florida, 
Idaho, Indiana and New Hampshire as evidence o f a starting point o f equal division in states which 
mandate equitable divisions.
101 Supra n. 29 at 2092.
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Internationally, attempts have been made to define both the concept and scope of fairness 
in the marriage and divorce context. Scottish matrimonial laws rely upon a rebuttable 
presumption that fairness can best be secured through equal division102 whereas the New 
Zealand legislature permits the presiding judge to adjudicate what orders are necessitated 
by fairness, with reference to guiding factors and governing principles.103 Whilst fairness 
in the circumstances might be more readily achievable in a system of equitable division, 
such success remains dependent upon a sufficiently detailed and considered regulatory 
system. A rule-based system of equal division, at the very least ensures equality of 
treatment, predictability and consistency. Which approach is preferable ultimately 
depends upon the policy priorities of the law-makers in question.104
7 Spousal support
7.1 Introduction
Despite the apparent position o f Californian divorce law on the rules end o f the 
rules/discretion continuum, the issue o f spousal support receives particular treatment in 
contrast with the automatic equal rights share of community property. By permitting the 
courts to exercise discretion when considering the issue o f spousal support, the 
Californian regime moves away from a strict rule-based approach to regulating divorce 
and in so doing California law-makers lose the certainty and predictability associated 
with the equal division rule. The co-existing distinct legislative approaches to property 
division and alimony certainly suggest that a strict rule-based approach does not 
necessarily operate successfully in every instance and lends weight to the suggestion that 
an element of discretion is always necessary for justice to be achieved, a theory to be 
considered further in the conclusion of this work. Certainly this approach contrasts
102 See further, chapter 5 below.
103 See further, chapter 6 below.
104 See chapter 1 above at sections 2.1 and 2.2 for a discussion o f the relative merits o f rule and discretion- 
based governance.
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significantly with the Irish system which looks at spousal support and property division 
as part of one collective package.105
Carbone recognises the distinctive structural approaches to property and alimony, 
classifying property division as a final decree and spousal support as modifiable.106 Yet 
despite the clear distinction drawn between the two forms o f support, she regards law­
makers as not at all clear as to what purpose the distinction should serve. Parkman has 
suggested that “while the basic ideas behind a property settlement are to return the 
parties’ separate property and to divide the property acquired during the marriage, 
alimony is meant to serve other purposes such as providing for the basic financial needs 
of a spouse.”107 To this end the Californian legislature has expressly enunciated the 
factors to be considered by the court in respect of an application for post-divorce spousal 
support in order to identify the particular spousal needs and ultimately to calculate 
accordingly, the payments, if any, to be made.108 In reaching a decision to award 
alimony, the court is obliged to take an overview o f the financial position o f the parties, 
together with a consideration of the parties’ circumstances and contributions during the 
course of the marriage. In deciding to award spousal support, the importance of the 
generalised overview has been highlighted,
“...the court should consider the needs of the parties and their 
abilities to meet such needs, the earning capacity and actual earnings 
and property owned and obligations to be met by each”.109
105 The four jurisdictions considered in this work demonstrate differing approaches to the inter-play 
between property orders and ongoing spousal support. The regulatory approaches and the impact of their 
distinctive elements will be considered in the conclusion o f this work with a view to identifying the 
potential for the reform o f this aspect o f the Irish divorce law process.
106 Carbone J “The Futility o f Coherence: The ALI’s Principles o f  the Law o f Family Dissolution, 
Compensatory Spousal Payments” (2002) 4 J L & Fam Stud 43.
107 Supra n. 16 at 63. In light of the absence o f articulated distinctions as to the purpose o f property and 
alimony orders, Carbone, ibid at 54, suggests that the difference seems to arise from practice more than 
from principle.
108 The list of 14 factors that currently exist in the Californian Family Code represent an expansion of the 
original two factors enunciated in the 1969 statute, and the eight factors included in the 1987 version of the 
Californian Family Code. See section 7.2 below for the exhaustive list o f factors.
109 Todd v. Todd(1969) 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786.
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Whist it might be argued that the very detailed legislative provisions represent an attempt 
by the legislature to retain control over the structure and exercise of the judicial power to 
award spousal support, such legislative parameters are undoubtedly weakened by the 
residual judicial obligation to rely upon any factor where it is deemed just and equitable 
to do so. Thus despite a more focussed and detailed consideration o f the circumstances 
particular to the ordering o f spousal support, this section illustrates the weaknesses 
inherent in the Californian approach to spousal support and ultimately identifies 
similarities with the open-ended approach adopted by Irish law-makers in this context.
7.2 Legislative provisions governing spousal support
The court’s power to award spousal support is influenced by both statutory factors and 
the underlying discretion of the court to “achieve a just and reasonable result under the 
facts and circumstances o f the case”.110 Section 4300 sets out the apparently compulsory 
nature of the inter-spousal duty to provide financial support, subject to the relevant 
statutory provisions.
“Subject to this division, a person shall support the person’s spouse”. 111
Evidently, section 4300 is limited to a one-sentence mutual inter-spousal statutory 
obligation and thus relies upon the succeeding sections of the Family Code to place limits 
on that duty. Section 4330(a) addresses the power o f the court to award orders of spousal 
support on the dissolution of the marriage, noting that it may order the payment of “an 
amount, for a period of time, that the court considers is just and reasonable, based on the 
standard of living established during the marriage”. The circumstances o f the parties, the 
duration of the marriage and the future possibility o f self-sufficiency are some of the 
factors that can influence the decision to award spousal support, as well as the amount 
and nature of any such order.112 Such determinations of justice and reason must be
110 In re the Marriage o f Cheriton (App. 6 Dist. 2001) 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 92 Cal. App. 4th 269.
111 The inclusion of “when in need”, with reference to the claimant spouse, in the former Civil Code section 
242 was omitted in section 4300, being regarded as surplus and unnecessary.
112 By way of contrast an equal share in the community property is ordered as a right.
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calculated with reference to the 14 statutory factors,113 all o f which must be considered 
by the court in deciding whether to grant the order sought.
Section 4320 requires the court to consider the following fourteen factors where relevant
to the circumstances o f the parties:
“(a) The extent to which the earning capacity o f each party is sufficient to 
maintain the standard o f living established during the marriage, taking into 
account all o f the following:
(1) The marketable skills o f the supported party; the job market for those skills; 
the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate 
education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining 
or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
(2) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earning capacity is 
impaired by periods o f unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to 
permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.
(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an 
education, training a career position, or a license by the supporting party.
(c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account 
the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and 
standard of living.
(d) The needs of each party based on the standard o f living established during the 
marriage.
(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, o f each party.
(f) The duration of the marriage.
(g) The ability of the supporting party to engage in gainful employment without 
unduly interfering with the interests o f dependent children in the custody of the 
party.
(h) The age and health of the parties.
(i) Documented history o f any history of domestic violence, as defined in section 
6211, between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of 
emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the 
supported party by the supporting party, and consideration o f any history of 
violence against the supporting party by the supported party.
(j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
(k) The balance o f the hardships to each party.
(1) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable 
period of time. Except in the case o f a marriage o f long duration, as described in 
section 4336, a “reasonable period o f time” for purposes o f this section generally 
shall be one-half length o f the marriage. However, nothing in this section is 
intended to limit the court’s discretion to order support for a greater or lesser 
length o f time, based on any o f the other factors listed in this section, section 
4336, and the circumstances o f the parties.
113 Sections 4320-4323, as discussed below.
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(m) The criminal conviction o f an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a 
reduction or elimination o f a spousal support award in accordance with section 
4325.
(n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable.”
In practice the court has regarded the term “circumstances” as including any aspect of the 
parties’ circumstances that might have a legitimate bearing upon the present and 
prospective lives of both parties.114 The statutory obligation on the courts to consider the 
facts in determining a just outcome in each case stands in marked contrast with the stark 
application of the equal division rule to the statutorily defined concept o f community 
property, irrespective o f the circumstances of the parties.115
Citing the views of Hawkins, Krauskopf accepts the validity o f the argument that a 
legislative list of factors, in the absence o f a stated purpose or underlying theory, can 
ultimately please both sides in divorce proceedings.116 Hawkins states that a laundry list 
of factors without weighting allows a judge to emphasise whichever factor appeals to him 
or her.117 Such a list o f potentially relevant factors is a much-utilised tool by domestic 
legislatures, perhaps as it avoids the need for a definite position to be asserted in respect 
of what can prove to be controversial matters. Certainly the extensive list o f factors in 
section 20 of the Irish Divorce Act has failed to encourage the Irish judiciary to develop 
any hierarchy of factors or aims in dividing assets upon divorce. In addition the 
legislature has relied upon the creation o f this list as sufficient guidance for the
114 The word “circumstances” within section 4320 includes “practically everything” which has a legitimate 
bearing upon the present and prospective matters relating to the lives o f both parties; Vogel v Vogel (1960) 
6 Cal Rptr. 402, 182 Cl. App. 2d 628, and is based on facts and circumstances existing at the time the order 
for divorce is made; In re Marriage ofTydlaska (App. 4 Dist. 2003) 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 594, 114 Cal. App. 4th 
572. The court In re Marriage o f Morrison (1978) 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 573 P. 2d 41, in 
defining the concept o f circumstances, repeated the views o f the court in Vogel v Vogel, adding that such 
circumstances also referred to the needs o f parties and their ability to meet such needs. In measuring such 
circumstances it was mentioned that consideration should be given to property owned and obligations to be 
met as well as ability to earn, as well as actual earnings.
115 The appeal court In re Marriage o f Baker (App. 1 Dist. 1992) 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 3 Cal. App. 4th 491 
presented a summary o f the factors to be considered by a trial court in determining the amount and duration 
of spousal support; the earning capacity o f each spouse, the spouses’ respective needs, the obligations and 
assets of each spouse, the duration o f the marriage, the time required by the supported spouse to acquire 
appropriate education and employment, the ability o f the supported spouse to engage in gainful 
employment, the age and health o f the parties, the spouses’ standard o f living, and any other factors 
deemed just and equitable.
116 Supra n. 21 at 256.
117 Hawkins K “Discretion in Making Legal Decisions” (1986) 43 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1161 at 1186.
166
extensively empowered judiciary.118 Undoubtedly, such an approach does not lend itself 
to achieving the goal o f predictability. Similarly, Krauskopf regards this lack of precise 
legislative direction as contributing to existing difficulties and inconsistencies.119
Carbone has commended the ALI’s statement of principles noting that such a considered
approach has the capacity to “bring a measure of coherence to an area of law lacking
consistent justification for almost as long as the law has been willing to recognize divorce
itself.”120 When comparing the divergent statutory approaches to the calculation of asset
division versus ongoing maintenance obligations, it appears that an equal share in the
community assets o f the parties exists as a right by virtue o f the fact of the marriage
whereas the right to post-divorce spousal support requires a more individualised
subjective determination o f the circumstances of the parties, the nature of their marital
roles and standards and ultimately the merits of the application in question in light of an
array of potentially relevant factors. Thus in the context of spousal support, the applicant
is required to prove a meritorious case before a court can make an order granting relief.
The justification for such contrasting approaches to these distinct judicial powers is
unclear.121 Certainly Krauskopf has written at length on the “property/support 
122mystery”, querying the different purposes of these distinct means o f dividing assets 
and wealth. Ultimately rather than solving the ‘mystery’, she suggests its resolution 
through purpose-driven regulation, and to that end to allow the use o f a “whole range of 
orders, including equitable orders, to best achieve the economic settlement.”123
118 For a detailed consideration of the impact, and ultimately the weaknesses o f the statutory list o f factors 
contained in the Irish Divorce Act; see earlier, chapter 3 at section 5.
119 Ibid.
120 Supra n. 106 at 43.
121 The fact that the Report o f the Governor’s Commission on the Family, supra n. 7, favoured a regulatory 
system incorporating discretionary-based property division and spousal support powers, resulted in a report 
which detailed the reasons for such a preference, at the cost o f any published substantive debate on the 
merits of a rule-based equal division regime. Consequently, if  any such debates occurred the final report 
did not include them and thus research in this area is deprived o f the Commission’s views, if any, regarding 
the merits and potential impact of a rule-based approach to the issue o f asset division.
122 Supra n. 21 at 266.
123 Ibid at 278.
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7.3 Judicial approach to spousal support
In making any order for spousal support, judicial discretion must be exercised in light of 
the aforementioned statutory factors, with the ultimate goal being to accomplish 
“substantial justice for the parties” before the court.124 In particular, cases involving long­
term marriages and/or homemaker spouses have been identified as typically cases 
justifying spousal support beyond the dissolution of the marriage. Where it is shown
that a trial court has adjudicated on the issue of spousal support without regard to the 
relevant statutory factors, the decision is reviewable. In Fransen v Fransen,126 the trial 
judge was deemed to have erred where he failed to have regard to the parties’ respective 
earning capacities, their station in life, the wife’s educational and work-skill background 
and the duration of the marriage. Similarly, in criticising the inadequate spousal support 
order of the trial judge in a case involving a seventeen-year marriage where the wife had 
not worked outside the family home, the appeal court in Re Marriage o f Rosanul rejected 
the notion that the statutory provisions indicated
“...any legislative intent that a wife o f a marriage o f longstanding 
whose attentions had been devoted during the marriage to wifely and 
parental duties and whose earning capacity has therefore not been 
developed should be, at a time when the husband is reaching his 
peak of earning capacity, relegated to a standard o f living 
substantially below that enjoyed by the parties during the marriage 
or to subsistence from public welfare.”1 8
It is also necessary for the court to present adequate reasons for the decision made 
regarding the provision or termination of spousal support. The trial court in Re Marriage 
of Bower129 was regarded by the appellate court as having provided adequate reasons for 
its decision to reduce and ultimately terminate the former wife’s spousal support after a
124 In re Marriage of Kerr (App. 4 Dist. 1999) 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374, 77 Cal. App. 4th 87.
125 See further Kay HH, supra n. 30 at 294.
126 (App. 2 Dist. 1983) 190 Cal. Rptr. 885, 142 Cal. App. 3d 419.
127 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972).
128 Ibid.
129 App. 2 Dist. 2002 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 96 Cal. App. 4th 893.
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year, whereas it was decided on appeal in Re Marriage of Cheriton130 that the trial court 
had failed to sufficiently provide reasons for denying spousal support to the former wife.
7.4 Limitations for childless couples
Section 4322 as an unusual legislative provision, seeks to exclude a certain category of 
potential applicants for spousal support. It provides that where a childless party has or 
acquires a separate estate sufficient for self-support, the court is prevented from making 
an order or continuing an order for spousal support. What in effect this section does, is to 
create a legislative bias towards the need to compensate the spouse with children, who is 
presumed to have made various sacrifices in the course of the marriage and provided 
homemaker contributions at some level. Once again a legislative presumption serves to 
dictate the nature of the entitlements o f the parties to a divorce, and eliminate any 
exercise of judicial discretion. However notwithstanding this legislative presumption, 
section 4322 does require the childless spouse to have a sufficient separate estate to 
ensure self-support, thereby in fact allowing such a spouse to claim spousal support 
where inability to self-support is proven, perhaps negating the purpose o f the section in 
the first instance.131 The courts have considered the distinction between the childless and 
non-childless applicant noting that the prohibition is mandatory if the sufficiency 
threshold is met, irrespective of co-existing circumstances that might otherwise influence 
the court.132 The policy aim of the legislature in targeting the childless spouse as 
undeserving of spousal support is difficult to identify, although it appears to be premised 
on a presumption of greater self sufficiency or capacity for self sufficiency. Glendon 
supports this approach in principle, stating that “childless and child-rearing marriages 
involve different social, political and moral issues and should therefore be analyzed 
separately”.133 However, notwithstanding this ‘capacity to self-support’ provision, the 
attempt by the legislature to impose an exclusionary rule in particular circumstances
130 Supra n. 110.
131 The sufficiency of income requirement makes the section unwarranted and excessive, as any spouse 
with or without children would find it difficult successfully to seek spousal support (as distinct from child 
support) if he/she is sufficiently financially independent.
132 In re Marriage o f Terry (App. 1 Dist. 2000) 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760, 80 Cal. App. 4th 921.
133 Supra n. 46 at 1560.
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seems arbitrary and unwarranted, particularly given the otherwise broad discretionary 
approach of the legislature to the issue o f spousal support generally.
7.5 Identifying underlying policy
In placing an emphasis on subjective factors such as the standard of living of the parties, 
the needs of the dependent spouse and the future earnings of one or both of the spouses, 
the court has relatively wide powers to order spousal support. The broad underlying 
requirement is that a just and reasonable result be reached. The decision of the trial court 
will be reversed where there has been an abuse of judicial discretion, which will only be 
established in circumstances where the court has exceeded “the bounds o f reason” or 
where it is accepted that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same 
circumstances.134 The legislature chose to draft wide and numerous factors to permit the 
court to explain an award o f spousal support whatever the circumstances. However it did 
so whilst failing to identify the overall objective for the presiding judge. Safeguards such 
as requiring the court to base any orders made on the facts and circumstances existing at 
the time of the order,135 the promotion o f self-support and an underlying goal of 
termination of spousal support where possible,136 have been developed by the courts in an 
attempt to streamline and regularise the decision-making process. The section 4330(b) 
reference to a claimant’s duty to make reasonable efforts to become financially self- 
supporting where appropriate was confirmed as state policy in In re Marriage of 
BrantnerP1 In that instance, the court stated that an order for spousal support should be 
for a ten-year period, reversing the less generous two-year period o f payment, to be 
followed by reduced payment for a further two years, as ordered by the trial court. The 
Superior Court regarded the orders o f the lower court “that provided for the “automatic
usIbid'In re Marriage o/Tydlaska supra n. 114.
136 In Pekar v Pekar (App. 2 Dist. 1985) 218 Cal. Rptr. 823, 173 Cal App. 3d 367, the appeal court 
confirmed the decision o f the trial court to terminate spousal maintenance after five years despite a 24-year 
marriage and the wife’s return to further education.
137 (App. 4 Dist. 1977) 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416.
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reduction and eventual termination” o f the appellant’s spousal support as “an abuse of 
discretion”.138 It was noted by the court that whilst
“...the legislative policy is that wherever possible orders for spousal 
support be for a time certain and terminate at the end of the [period 
specified.. .nevertheless... [A]fter a lengthy marriage retention of 
jurisdiction to modify spousal support should be the norm and the 
burden of proof o f justification for terminating the order should be 
on the party seeking termination”.139
Similarly in In re Marriage o f HeistermannXA0 whilst the court confirmed the power of 
the lower court to set a termination date based on existing evidence o f likely capacity to 
become self-supporting, it insisted that the court retain jurisdiction to allow for the 
possibility of continuing support.
Arguably the evolution of no-fault divorce brings with it an implied recognition of the 
entitlement of each spouse eventually to exit the marriage and all associated financial 
responsibilities. Consequently the notion o f “rehabilitative alimony” has grown in 
popularity, whereby a court might require the breadwinner spouse sufficiently to provide 
for the dependent spouse, but only to the extent necessary to allow her to avail of the 
necessary education or job training to result ultimately in self-sufficiency. In rejecting 
long-term alimony as too high a price to exit a marriage, Frantz and Dagan regard 
rehabilitative alimony as “a reasonable compromise” as it is aimed towards self - 
sufficiency.141 In noting the specific goal of self-sufficiency, they regard rehabilitative 
alimony as neither compensation nor contribution based, and with very few exceptions, 
they suggest that the courts do not consider a spouse’s pre-divorce standards of living or 
even spousal contributions to the other’s earning potential. Although this suggests that 
the basis for calculation is solely the financial cost o f rehabilitation, it is difficult to
Ibid at 423.
139 Ibid at 421.
140 (App. 4 Dist. 1991) 286 Cal. Rptr. 127, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1195. In Marriage o f Stallworth App. 1 Dist. 
1987, 237 Cal. Rptr. 829, 192 Cal. App. 3d 742, on appeal, the right o f the trial court to exercise discretion 
not to fix the duration o f spousal support was acceptable, although it would have been preferable to do so.
141 Supra n. 40 at 122-123. Frantz and Dagan are o f the view that rehabilitative alimony is based on the 
importance of giving women the tools to overcome their market disadvantages, and the measure of 
rehabilitative alimony should be calculated with that specific goal in mind.
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accept entirely that the current and future level of income of the earning spouse will not 
have some impact on the calculations o f the presiding judge.142 Conversely Krauskopf 
notes that the courts in their judgments appear to have denounced the notion that support 
is limited to a period o f rehabilitation and have favoured more significant support 
awards.143 The courts have viewed such awards as a means fairly to share personal losses 
and gains caused by the marriage, the most common loss being the decreased earning 
capacity of the dependent spouse. Thus, in justifying a spousal support order in excess of 
rehabilitative alimony, Krauskopf regards it as fair for the other spouse to share that loss 
of earning capacity, at least to the extent that he has benefited from the arrangement that 
caused the loss, typically by means o f an increased earning power on his part.
More generally, Kachroo is heavily critical o f the ambiguous role of alimony in the 
divorce process and the “inchoate or tenuous position occupied by spousal support in a 
culture steeped in equality and self sufficiency rhetoric” suggesting that it gives rise to 
“inconsistencies in post-divorce spousal economics”.144 Similarly Parkman has stated that 
the “logic and purpose of alimony has been unclear for a long time.”145 He notes that as a 
direct consequence, the current structures for decisions in respect o f spousal applications 
for alimony “lack a consistent framework resulting in injustice and inefficiency.”146
Given the existence and strict imposition o f rules relating to the classification of property 
and the equal division of what is regarded as community property, it is not surprising that 
the Californian courts are reluctant to maintain the marital ties by ordering the payment 
of ongoing spousal maintenance. Although it is difficult to determine the extent to which
142 Ibid. Frantz and Dagan suggest that the courts would be well advised to calculate the amount and 
duration of the alimony on the basis o f the balance between the need to facilitate a w ife’s new beginning 
and the need to minimise the burden on a husband. They are o f the view that such a basis for calculation 
would cause the courts to exercise their judicial discretion more effectively.
143 Supra n. 21 at 263.
144 Kachroo G “Mapping Alimony: From Status to Contract and Beyond” (2006-2007) 5 Pierce L. Rev. 164 
at 169. By way o f illustration Kachroo refers to the confusing statement o f the presiding judge in a New 
Jersey Court in Turner v Turner 385 A.2d 1280 at 1282: “The law should provide both parties with the 
opportunity to make a new life on this earth. Neither should be shackled by the unnecessary burdens of an 
unhappy marriage. This is not to suggest that women o f  no skills, or those who suffer a debilitating 
infirmity, or who are o f advanced age should be denied alimony for as long as needed. But such is the 
exception not the rule.”
145 Supra n. 16 at 71.
146 Ibid at 93.
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orders for spousal support are being made,147 the editorial of the Harvard Law Review 
has identified as a consequence of the 1960s Californian reforms, a trend away from 
alimony and toward property division. They note that alimony increasingly became 
“temporary and rehabilitative... was forward-looking and focussed on need”.148 Ellman 
suggests that the introduction o f no-fault divorce at this time altered significantly the 
basis for alimony given that the new blameless process normatively grants divorce to 
either party and eliminates this bargaining leverage from the spouse who is no longer 
regarded as the innocent victim in need o f recompense.149 Consequently he is of the view 
that since the reformulation o f the divorce regime in California, the payment of alimony 
lacks foundation in law. Notwithstanding the expression o f varying academic views on 
the function and aim of spousal support, the failure on the part of the legislature to 
identify their motivations for spousal support results unavoidably in a failure sufficiently 
to restrain and/or direct the powers o f the judiciary. In a similar manner to the competing 
academic views on this issue, a presiding judge can declare and rely upon his subjective 
perceptions of spousal support and determine his calculations accordingly. Given the 
delegation of responsibility for this aspect o f financial relief to the discretionary powers 
of the judiciary, until the aim o f spousal support is legislatively agreed and enunciated, 
there remains scope for such judicial liberties.
8 Private settlements: role of marital agreements within a rule-based regime 
8.1 Introduction
An obvious consequence of a system premised upon rigid rules is the development of 
means to avoid the imposition o f those rules. Except for the very limited stated 
exceptions, the Californian courts are only permitted to avoid the strict statutory rule- 
based system of equal division o f community property where a valid written agreement to
147 Schneider laments the lack of empirical research on the extent to which spousal alimony orders are 
being made, implying that an excessive reliance upon this judicial power might represent evidence of abuse 
of that judicial discretion. Schneider C “Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse” 
(1991) BYULR 197 at 253.
148 Supra n. 29 at 2092.
149 Ellman IM “The Theory o f Alimony” (1989) 77 Cal L Rev 1 at 7.
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the contrary has been executed by the parties, or following an oral stipulation of the 
parties in open court.150 One form such an agreement can take is a pre-nuptial agreement 
between the parties, drafted and executed prior to the marital ceremony. A pre-nuptial 
agreement can regulate the manner in which property is classified as well as the manner 
in which it is to be divided.151 Weitzman has advocated the value of such “intimate 
contracts”,152 recognising the capacity o f an agreement to conform to contemporary 
social reality and afford freedom and privacy to the couple as to the order of their 
personal relationship.153
It has been recognised earlier in this work that by adopting a rule-based system of equal 
division there often exists little financial incentive or other compulsion for the less 
wealthy spouse to execute a post-nuptial settlement.154 Conversely the parties can elect 
prior to the marriage, by way o f agreement, to avoid the 50:50 default position mandated 
by law. Whatever the circumstances or motivation, pre-nuptial agreements as a means of 
avoiding the statutory marital regime have grown in favour under Californian law and are 
now regarded as a legitimate means o f private arrangement between spouses.155
S 2250 California Family Code.
151 Whilst section 2550 permits the parties to avoid the equal division o f community property by agreement, 
section 2581 permits parties to define and categorise property owned other than as defined under the 
Californian Code. Following the decision In re Marriage of Lucas 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P2.d 285, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 853 (1980), the right to provide evidence o f an oral agreement as to status o f the property was 
eliminated and parties must now complete in writing an agreement confirming their intentions in respect of 
what would otherwise be regarded as community property. It was determined that to permit oral statements 
to rebut the presumption o f community property would frustrate the strong public policy that favours 
community ownership o f property acquired in the course of the marriage.
152 Weitzman L The Marriage Contract (Free Press) (1981) at 226.
153 Ibid at 227-228. Weitzman also recognises the social and psychological benefits o f the contractual 
model, regarding it as facilitating open and honest communication and assisting in the clarification of 
individual expectations.
154 See section 4.4 above concerning the impact o f a rigid equal division rule on the capacity to negotiate a 
settlement.
155 Marston AA “Planning for Love: The Politics of Pre-Nuptial Agreements” (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 
891.
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8 . 2  P r e - n u p t i a l  a g r e e m e n t s  —  l a w  a n d  p r a c t i c e  i n  C a l i f o r n i a
Historically a pre-nuptial agreement that contemplated divorce was regarded in California 
and all other US states as contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable.156 California 
was one of the first states to embrace the growing importance of contractual freedom, 
even in the family context. Thus the Californian Supreme Court in In re Marriage of
1 ^ 7Dawley elected to uphold the terms o f a pre-nuptial agreement, asserting that neither:
“...the reordering o f property rights to fit the needs and desires of 
the couple, nor realistic planning that takes account o f the possibility 
of dissolution, offends the public policy favoring and protecting 
marriage.... [Rather] It is only when the terms of an agreement go 
further -  when they promote and encourage dissolution, and thereby 
threaten to induce the destruction of a marriage that might otherwise 
endure -  that such terms offend public policy.”158
Glass regards this judicial shift in attitude, evident also in Florida159 as being driven by 
“recognition of women’s de jure equality, the increasing number o f women in the 
workplace, and the expanding emphasis on contractual freedom.”160 These judicial 
developments were subsequently supported by legislative shifts in favour of the 
autonomous decision-making powers o f parties who intended to marry. The legislative 
lead was taken by the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) in 1983 which in 
essence regarded the pre-nuptial contract as a standard contract which should be 
subjected to the norms and rules o f contract law, subject to some restrictions relating to 
specific policy concerns.161 Unsurprisingly, California’s willingness to support private 
ordering saw it adopting in 1985, the facilitative provisions o f the UPAA, and was the 
first state to do so.162
156 Supra n. 65, per Glass at 221.
157 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976)
158 Ibid at 333, quoted by Harvard Law Review Editorial supra n. 29 at 2078.
159 The first US court to recognise the validity o f a pre-nuptial agreement was the Florida Supreme Court in 
Posner v Posner 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
160 Supra n. 65 at 221.
161 For example, section 3 prohibits parties from contracting on a matter that would be regarded as being in 
violation of public policy and in particular prevents pre-marital agreements from adversely affecting the 
right to child support.
162 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 9C U.L.A. 35 (2001) as amended.
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Whilst California supported the emphasis on contractual autonomy and otherwise gave 
effect to the terms o f the UPAA, it did draw the line at the parties’ capacity to waive, 
absolutely, future claims to spousal support. This singling out of spousal support for 
separate treatment from all other aspects o f property and wealth division mirrors the 
separate treatment given to spousal support within the Californian Family Code. In the 
context of pre-nuptial agreements under Californian law, it remains outside the absolute 
remit of parties, who otherwise appear relatively free to self-determine the division of 
wealth and assets on divorce.
In implementing the Californian version o f the UPAA, the Californian Supreme Court 
took an even more permissive view o f pre-nuptial agreements, giving effect to them in
1 A3the controversial cases o f In re Marriage o f Bonds where the wife had signed the
agreement without legal representation, and in In re Marriage o f Pendleton164 where the 
pre-nuptial agreement provided inter alia for the mutual waiving o f rights to spousal 
support. This increasingly liberal view o f pre-nuptial agreements by the Californian 
courts, whilst applauded by some,165 was quickly dampened by the state legislature, with 
the passing of a Bill to amend California’s version of the UPAA in relation to spousal 
support.166 The amended section 1612 provides that spousal support waivers will be 
automatically unenforceable where the challenging party was not represented by 
independent counsel at the time o f execution and/or where such a waiver is deemed 
unconscionable at the time o f enforcement.167 In addition the amended provisions 
clarified the concept o f ‘voluntary’ by setting out what would be regarded as an
163 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
164 5 P. 3d 839 (Cal. 2000).
165 Supra n. 65 per Glass at 230, 231, citing Wasser D “Prenuptial Disagreements” L.A. Law Dec 2000 26, 
notes the comments o f the attorney acting for the husband in Pendleton that the California Supreme Court 
had now “strongly indicated that a more favorable judicial climate lies ahead regarding the allowable scope 
of pre-nuptial agreements as well as the factual circumstances under which they will be enforced.” 
Similarly, citing Blumberg P, “Supreme Court Rules in Favor o f Barry Bonds” L.S. Daily J Aug 22 2000 at 
1, Glass at 231, refers to the views o f the attorney for the husband in Bonds that “the Supreme Court is 
trying to make it easier for people to enter into prenuptial agreements as consenting adults.”
166 S.B. 78, 2001, Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
167 Cal. Fam. Code s 1612(c)-(e).
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involuntary execution.168 Whilst there has been much criticism of these legislative 
restrictions on the freedom o f parties to contract as they wish, these criticisms have 
mostly come from practitioners who regard these developments as unnecessary and 
paternalistic in nature.169
8.3 Unequal bargaining powers
Relative to other US states,170 California, notwithstanding the 2001 legislative 
restrictions, operates quite a permissive approach to pre-nuptial agreements. In essence, 
the Californian approach regards pre-nuptial agreements as deserving o f the same 
treatment as other (non-marital) inter-partes contracts. Such an approach, embraced for 
the most part by both the legislature and judiciary in California, suggests a belief in the 
willingness and capacity o f parties to self-determine their arrangements on divorce. In 
addition, it emphasises the need to respect the choices o f independent adults and to resist 
the temptation to dictate the nature and extent of their responsibilities to each other.
Given the private and intimate relationship between married parties, it has been suggested
168 Cal. Fam. Code s 1615(c) provides that a pre-marital agreement will be regarded as not executed 
voluntarily unless the court finds in writing or on the record all o f the following:
(1) The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent legal counsel at 
the time o f signing the agreement, or after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, 
expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel.
(2) The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the 
time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal 
counsel and the time the agreement was signed.
(3) The party against whom enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by legal counsel, was fully 
informed o f the terms and basic effect o f the agreement as well as the rights and obligations he or 
she was giving up by signing the agreement, and was proficient in the language in which the 
explanation o f the party’s rights was conducted and in which the agreement was written. The 
explanation o f the rights and obligations relinquished shall be memorialized in writing and 
delivered to the party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party shall, on or before 
the signing if  the premarital agreement, execute a document declaring that he or she received the 
information required by this paragraph and indicating who provided that information.
(4) The agreement and the writings executed pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) were not executed 
under duress, fraud or undue influence, and the parties did not lack capacity to enter into the 
agreement.
(5) Any other factors the court deems relevant.
169 Seastrom PG and Seastrom BG “Drafting and Litigating Premarital Agreements” Orange County Law, 
July 2003 44 and Sanders J “Law Aims to End Bonds-Like Prenups” Sacramento Bee Oct 28 2001 at A3, 
both cited by Glass, supra n. 65 at 232.
170 For example, the state o f Wisconsin will not enforce what it regards as an “inequitable” agreement; see 
Button v Button 388 N.W. 2d 546 (Wis. 1986) which applied a fairness test, with reference to both the time 
of the execution o f the agreement and the time o f the divorce.
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by Bix that states must be “more receptive to the parties’ private ordering of the terms of 
their marriage”.171 The counter-argument naturally relates to the vulnerable spouse who 
has historically been viewed as requiring the support of the state to identify and enforce 
(typically) her rights against her resisting husband.
Brod has criticised excessive private autonomy in marital affairs, arguing that current 
permissive legislative and judicial approaches over-emphasise the need for freedom of 
contract and personal autonomy whilst ignoring the importance of the “attainment of 
economic justice for the economically vulnerable spouse at the end o f marriage”.172 
Equally the argument that marital agreements should be treated like any commercial 
contract has been strongly criticised by Glass, who highlights the oft-unavoidable
1 7^cognitive limitations arising in the marital context. Even though the private and 
consensual exercise o f autonomous powers by consenting adults might be the policy basis 
for facilitating pre-nuptial agreements in law, such an argument pre-supposes the 
informed and full consent o f both parties. Whilst such consent may in some instances be 
both informed and forthcoming, agreements can equally be entered into as a means of 
avoiding a less desirable situation. For the wealthy spouse, the choice is an easy one, as 
the effect of the pre-nuptial agreement is most likely to reduce the entitlements of the 
dependent spouse upon divorce. Conversely for the dependent or less wealthy spouse, the 
choice can be the execution o f the agreement or the forfeiture of the marriage. Whilst the 
issue of choice and the study o f human behaviour on marriage may be outside the remit 
of this work, the suggestion that both parties are choosing to enter into the pre-nuptial 
agreement is questionable. Bix suggests that a vulnerable spouse might “in a sense 
“prefer” marriage with an agreement to no marriage at all” and that ultimately the “moral 
significance of the choice depends on the alternatives available”.174 Further, in relation to 
the position of the less-wealthy spouse, who typically limits or waives her statutory rights 
on divorce, it has been observed that “to the extent that this acquiescence is a reflection
171 Supra n. 65 at 231.
172 Brod G “Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice” (1994) 6 Yale J. L. & Feminism 229 at 295.
,73 Supra n. 65 at 241. Glass notes that in “addition to increasing the risk o f unconscionable agreements, the 
relative lack o f knowledge and resources o f many parties to marital agreements may also increase cognitive 
errors”.
174 Supra n. 65 at 241 citing Nussbaum M.C Sex and Social Justice (2000) Oxford University Press, USA.
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of unequal bargaining positions at the time of execution, the agreements themselves will 
likely magnify these disparities.”175
A regime which provides for an equal division outcome in every instance of divorce 
enhances the impetus for the wealthy spouse to execute a pre-nuptial agreement in order 
to prevent the potential loss o f half o f his future fortune. Arguably, rather than protecting 
the position of the vulnerable spouse, a rigid rule-based system might only serve to 
encourage the avoidance of the supervisory role of the courts, effectively forcing the 
wealthy spouse to circumvent its provisions and demand the execution of a pre-nuptial 
agreement.
9 Conclusion
When the procedure for asset distribution on divorce was enacted by the Californian 
legislature, it might have been perceived as a deliberate attempt to compel the court to 
resolve all financial issues between the parties at the time of dissolution and thereby 
eliminate post-dissolution claims. However to counter any such interpretation, the 
California Family Code deliberately accords the court the discretionary power to order 
spousal support in light o f the circumstances of the parties. Frantz and Dagan are critical 
of these mixed messages from the legislature, noting that spousal support which seeks to 
compensate a dependent spouse “contradicts the principle of free exit reflected by no­
fault divorce”.176 By contrast, it could be argued that the discretionary powers are crucial 
given that the partnership model upon which both the underlying community property 
and equal division rules are premised ignores the individual and particular circumstances 
of each marital relationship. In this regard, Frantz and Dagan recognise the merits of the 
co-existing alimony scheme insofar as “it is tailored to address the problem societal 
gender discrimination poses for marriage.”177 The tension that exists between the finality 
and certainty of the equal division rule and the scope for individualised justice in the 
guise of alimony orders gives rise to an intriguing contradiction in regulatory approaches,
175 Supra n. 29 at 2096.
176 Supra n. 40 at 120.
177 Ibid at 121.
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which primarily serves to acknowledge the inadequacies of a system based entirely upon 
rules.
Certainly this combined approach o f the Californian law-makers confirms the 
conclusions reached in chapter 1 o f this work that ultimately a mix of rules and discretion 
is required, a system premised entirely upon rules will invariably yield to some element 
of discretionary justice. In this regard, exceptions to the rule may develop, such as the 
discretionary-based power to order spousal support as evidenced in California, or equally 
there may develop a growing reliance upon means of avoiding the strict application of 
pre-determined rules, as evidenced by the growing use and regulation of pre-nuptial 
agreements. Whilst it is difficult to pronounce definitively whether these exceptions and 
avoidance mechanisms are reactions to the rules themselves or whether the impact of the 
equal division rule has necessitated alternative means o f securing a fair outcome, 
ultimately the absolute application o f a universal rule in itself, has proven to be an 
insufficient means of regulating asset division on divorce. Further, whilst the manner in 
which Californian divorce laws are structured might suggest that all three benchmarks of 
democracy, predictability and fairness can be achieved, these successes are not so evident 
when the effect of the rule-based approach is assessed. The more traditional view that 
equal division of assets on divorce gives rise to equality of outcome has long been 
queried, particularly given the very different starting points for the breadwinner and the 
homemaker spouse upon divorce. The economic disparity between the parties is not 
addressed by the award o f an equal share in the assets and represents an inherent 
weakness in the arguments presented in favour of the introduction of the equal division 
rule in the late 1960s. Further, the empirical evidence gathered to examine the impact of 
the equal division rule suggests that its effect is in fact to impoverish women to some 
extent, and not to equalise the historical gender divide in the home. Until the Californian 
law-makers consider the merits o f their current approach and clarify the aims of the 
regime, its laws are likely to continue to fall short of securing the three benchmarks
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identified above.178 Thus it is perhaps only in the articulation of the policy goals of its 
regime that Californian law-makers can assess the merits and effect the workability of its 
current regulatory approach. Fineman has advocated the benefits of result-oriented law­
making, calling upon “policy- and lawmakers to inquire into and specifically define what 
factors should be considered fundamental in making allocation decisions during 
divorce”.179 Specifically in the context of ongoing spousal alimony obligations, Ellman 
has identified an absence o f justification for such orders.180 He is critical of the lack of 
express policy goals in this context, and has called for “more attention... [to be paid]...to 
the policy choices implicit in guideline writing” given that spousal support orders have 
“long been a matter o f trial judge discretion”.181
The imposition of equal division as a rule in every instance has the capacity to give rise 
to injustice, and in such instances residual scope for a more equitable division is useful, 
as enacted in Ireland, and included as a statutory option in Scotland and New Zealand. By 
way of contrast to the significant reliance placed on rules by the Californian regime, this 
thesis will, in the following two chapters explain and critically assess the more dual­
based approaches o f law-makers in Scotland and New Zealand which identify law and 
policy-making roles for both the legislature and the judiciary, arguably providing a more 
balanced and individualised approach to governance. Whilst their respective regulatory 
systems remain premised upon statutory rules and guidelines, ultimately it is for the 
judiciary in these two jurisdictions to make the final determinations regarding asset 
distribution, with reference to the statutorily-stated principles and purposes. What will 
follow is a critical analysis o f the regulatory approaches of Scotland and New Zealand in 
order to evaluate alternative regimes, located somewhere in the middle o f the regulatory
178 Fineman, supra n. 66 at 179, has suggested that in ardently striving for equality, the Californian law 
reforms have impeded the development o f legal doctrine that might more effectively represent the views 
and needs of financially vulnerable spouses.
179 Ibid. In considering the need for reform o f existing laws, Fineman at 22 identifies that a “contemporary 
perception of a need for “protective” or result-oriented legislation has been at the base of many recent 
battles in the public arena.” Here and again later at 179, Fineman is critical o f the “equality rhetoric” for its 
failure to address the circumstances o f many women.
180 Ellman IM “The Maturing Law o f Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and Guidelines” 33 Fam. L.Q. 801.
181 Ibid at 808, 809.
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continuum, with the discretionary-based Irish system at one end and the contrasting 
Californian rule-based approach at the other.
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Chapter 5 -  Scotland’s Approach to the Regulation of Asset Distribution on Dfc®rce
1 Introduction
In critically outlining the regulation of asset distribution on divorce in Scotland, this 
chapter will illustrate the manner in which Scottish laws have been deliberately mod^d 
to provide overarching guidance in respect of the implementation o f its provisions. '^ 1S 
guidance articulated as a set o f expressly formulated principles, sets out the policy 
of the regulatory system and operates to both limit and structure the co-existing judi^  
discretion. Whilst the fact o f such discretion distances Scotland from the essentially i°le" 
based system operated in California; on the rules/discretion continuum, it will be shflW*1 
that Scotland is best placed at a midway point between the regimes o f California and 
Ireland. This jurisdiction provides a clear illustration of the beneficial impact o f 
principles in both driving and guiding the implementation o f the law, and highlights^1, 
value as quasi-rules within a regulatory framework. Ultimately it will be demonstrate 
that in elucidating the underlying policy goals of its regulatory provisions, the Scottish 
law-makers have moved closely towards a system capable o f securing the three 
benchmarks of democracy, predictability and fairness.
The approach of Scottish law-makers to the governance of asset distribution on marit^  
breakdown has benefitted greatly from the lessons o f its past and its willingness to 
embrace considered reform.1 Historically there existed little by way o f identifiable 
objectives in the drafting or implementation of the law in this area, which depended tfPon 
judicial powers of adjudication reliant almost entirely upon notions o f fairness and
1 Scotland has been regarded as “leading the way in the reform o f  divorce matters”, with its more rec^  
reforms including the reduction in time periods for the demonstration o f  separation and the waiting til*6 f°r 
uncontested divorces; Booth P “Newsline — Picking faults in Divorce Law” [2004] Fam Law 556. Sirt^hy 
Lord Hope has noted that it is best “to go north for modem family law”, acknowledging both the Scotch 
Executive and Law Commission for its “careful and imaginative” work. Lord Hope o f  Craighead “Do We 
Still Need a Scottish Law Commission” [2006] Edin LR 10 at 25. However Lord Hope has equally be®11 
critical o f  certain aspects o f  these reforms, most notably in Miller v Miller and McFarlane v McFarla&
[2006] 3 All ER 1 where he highlighted the harsh impact on the previously dependent spouse, o f  the 
Scottish aim to secure a clean financial break as quickly as possible, considered in more detail in secti«,ns 
4.7 and 4.8 below.
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justice. As the legislative approach developed and shifted, so too did the nature and 
extent of the judicial powers exercisable. Thus whilst the legislature has enhanced the 
capacity of the courts to make orders in respect of a growing category of assets, these 
powers are contemporaneously limited by the identification and imposition of over-riding 
policy objectives and measured legislative guidelines. In adopting this approach Scottish 
law-makers were heavily reliant upon the views and studies o f the Scottish Law 
Commission and have attempted to strike a balance between relatively strict legislative 
principles and the necessary levels of co-existing residual judicial discretion. In so doing, 
the use of quasi-rules in the form of legislative presumptions, supported by governing 
principles and statutory factors has allowed the legislature to retain primary control over 
the manner in which the issue of asset distribution on divorce is governed in Scotland. 
Thus as an exercise of comparative study, the careful approach o f the Scottish laws to the 
need for and creation of democratic statutory controls of this nature will serve as an 
interesting and perhaps informative lesson for the potential reform o f the existing Irish 
regulation of divorce. This analysis of the approach adopted by Scottish law-makers 
lends itself to a significant reliance upon the primary legal materials both currently and 
historically governing divorce in Scotland. In particular the manner in which reforms 
have been considered, most particularly by the Scottish Law Commission, demonstrates 
the value o f detailed, informed consultation whereby existing weaknesses can be 
identified and utilised to structure effective reforms. Whilst the main texts relied upon in 
the course of this study are those from Clive and to a lesser extent Dick, contemporary 
commentary where available is also used to inform and where appropriate, support the 
analysis presented. It is suggested that the analysis to follow might demonstrate a future 
approach that could be adopted by the Irish legislature and in turn the Irish judiciary.
2 Historical approach to asset distribution
Beyond avoiding outcomes whereby the dependent spouse became a charge on the 
community, Scottish matrimonial laws historically lacked any definite strategy regarding 
the purpose of ancillary financial relief.2 Traditionally Scottish family law and policy­
2 Until 1964 marital breakdown was legislatively governed by a number o f  enactments, originally by the 
Act o f  1573 which was updated by the Married Woman’s Property (Scotland) Act 1881 and the Divorce
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makers dictated that financial relief upon divorce was only payable to the spouse who 
was the ‘victim’ of the misconduct o f the other spouse. In divorce actions commenced 
prior to September 1964 the guilty spouse was prevented from securing financial 
provision of any kind.3 The effect o f the law was to regard the guilty spouse as having 
died at the date of the decree of divorce, allowing the innocent spouse to receive what she 
would otherwise be legally entitled to on his death. However despite the entitlement to 
apply for financial relief being premised upon the guilt or innocence of the other spouse, 
the underlying aim was not the provision of compensation to the ‘victim’ but rather to 
avoid his/her destitution and dependence upon the state for support.4
The Morton Commission5 which issued its report in 1956 endorsed long-standing calls, 
including those from the earlier Mackintosh Committee6 for the enhancement of the 
powers of the judiciary. The existing statutorily-based judicial powers were confined 
solely to the making o f a financial lump sum order. The Morton Committee called for a 
judicial power to order not only the payment of a lump sum to a wronged spouse but also, 
where appropriate, a periodical payments order to ensure that even in the absence of any 
available fixed assets, the court was still sufficiently empowered to provide for a 
dependent party.7 However the right to seek such financial relief was to remain the 
exclusive right o f the innocent spouse. In addition to this the Morton Commission 
recommended the cessation of spousal entitlement to claim financial relief upon the 
claimant’s remarriage, judicial capacity to vary the provisions o f a marriage settlement,
(Scotland) Act 1938. For a brief outline o f  the history o f  Scottish laws see further Report on Aliment and 
Financial Provision (Scot. Law Com. No 67) (1981) at para 3.4.
3 One exception to this quite-draconian rule was where the marriage breakdown occurred as a result o f the 
incurable insanity o f  one spouse, such circumstances permitting the court to order the payment o f  a lump 
sum or periodical payments for the benefit o f  the insane spouse and any children o f  the marriage, section 
2(2) Divorce (Scotland) Act 1938.
4 In taking this view, the Morton Commission recommended that on the death o f  the paying spouse, the 
surviving spouse should have a power to apply for a share in the deceased’s estate, not only to allow the 
courts to counteract avoidance transactions but also to prevent him or her from having to rely upon the 
community for support. See further Report on Aliment and Financial Provision (1981) supra n. 2 at paras 
3.4 -3.8.
5 The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (Cmd. 9678 (1956)), so called after its Chairman, Lord 
Morton o f Henryton, a Lord o f  Appeal in Ordinary. The report concerned the regulation o f  marriage and 
marital breakdown in England, Wales and Scotland.
6 Report o f the Departmental Committee on the Law o f Succession in Scotland (1950).
7 Supra n. 5 at para 553-559.
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and the capacity for a surviving spouse previously in receipt o f spousal maintenance to
o
apply for provision from the deceased’s estate.
Some of the proposed changes were incorporated in the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 
in the context of the reform of spousal succession rights. Notwithstanding the succession 
law context, Part V, entitled Financial Provision on Divorce9 dealt with a wide range of 
financial relief issues arising on divorce. The right to claim an automatic legal share on 
divorce was abolished and in place the 1964 Act established a discretionary judicial 
power to award a lump sum or periodical payments order to the applicant spouse.10 This 
judicial discretion extended to a subsequent right on the part of either spouse to apply for 
the order to be varied on a proven change of circumstances.11 In creating discretionary 
powers for the presiding judge, it was suggested by the Scottish Law Commission that 
the effect of the 1964 Act was to improve upon the pre-existing rule-based system of 
financial relief, thereby broadening the scope of the judiciary.12 Unfortunately these 
significant changes to the process of statutory regulation were not supported by any 
identifiable contemporaneously-developed policy direction. On reflection the Law 
Commission concluded that the 1964 Act had failed to establish the purpose o f allowing 
or requiring financial provision on divorce.13
Interestingly one key aspect not addressed or affected by the 1964 Act was the restriction 
of the right to apply for financial relief to the ‘innocent’ spouse. The lack o f debate on 
this central issue at the time is surprising. The 1981 report notes that the “Mackintosh 
Committee assumed, without debating the matter, that only the innocent spouse should 
have a claim.”14 The Morton Committee appears to have taken the implicit view that the 
innocent spouse was entitled to the ongoing support of which she would otherwise be in
8 Ibid.
9 Sections 25-27, later repealed by the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976.
10 Section 5 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 permits the court at its own discretion to order either spouse to 
pay the other a capital sum or periodical payment or both.
11 Section 26(4).
12 Supra n. 2 at paras 3.9-3.10.
13 Ibid, considered in detail at section 3 below.
14 Ibid at para 3.8.
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receipt, but for the enforced divorce application, arising from the ‘wrongful’ actions of 
the respondent spouse.
The Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 was the last significant enactment prior to the 
publication of the Law Commission reports on Aliment and Financial Provision and 
Matrimonial Property. Essentially the impact of this Act was twofold; divorce could now 
only be secured on the basis that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and the right 
to seek financial relief was now available to both parties. Irretrievable breakdown could 
be proven in one or more ways, including proof of fixed periods o f separation. Where 
proven, this amendment allowed a divorce to be granted without the need to prove 
spousal fault. One o f the major consequences of this statutory change was to allow a 
‘guilty’ spouse to act as the applicant in divorce proceedings as they could now rely upon 
grounds other than misconduct to seek the decree of divorce. Thus section 5 o f the 1976 
Act permitted the court to make a periodical payments or lump sum order in favour of 
both the applicant and/or respondent spouse. In its review of this Act, the 1981 report15 
noted that this change was necessitated given that an innocent spouse could now be 
divorced against his or her will, making it necessary to allow either spouse to apply for 
relief from the court.
3 1981 Report of the Law Commission
3.1 Introduction
Notwithstanding the changes brought about by the 1976 Act,16 as part o f its programme 
on family law reform17 the Scottish Law Commission in its 1981 Report on Aliment and 
Financial Provision, considered at length the existing law governing financial provision 
and readjustment on divorce and nullity, and in particular the obligation o f financial 
support amongst family members. In tracing the development o f the governing laws, and 
in considering the need for reform, the Law Commission restricted its focus to inter-
15 Ibid at para 3.11.
16 The Law Commission in its introduction to the 1981 report regarded the changes brought about by the 
1976 Act as “the minimum necessary to take account o f  the changes then made in the grounds for divorce”.
17 Second Programme of Law Reform (Scot. Law Com. No. 8, 1968) Item 14.
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spousal obligations,18 with its central focus being on the redistribution of spousal 
property on divorce.19 The Commission further limited the scope of this report by 
admitting to being concerned only “with the powers of the courts on divorce and with the 
principles on which those powers should be exercised”.20 One of the primary aims of the 
statutory reforms proposed in the 1981 report was to “modernise, simplify and improve” 
the law relating to aliment in Scotland.21 Ultimately the Commission observed that
“...the disadvantages of the current system are such that an attempt 
must be made to provide some more specific guidance to the courts, 
the legal profession and the public on the purpose or purposes of  
financial provisions on divorce, and on the principles to be applied 
and the factors to be taken into consideration in connection 
therewith”.22
3.2 Proposals for reform
Part III of the 1981 report contained substantive recommendations for reform. In essence 
it sought to resolve what were regarded as the “two major defects” o f the existing law; 
that the law lacked any ascertainable objectives and that it gave the courts an inadequate 
range of powers. To this end, the Commission identified Part III o f the report as being
“...designed to put forward for consideration by Parliament a system 
of financial provision on divorce which is firmly based on fair and 
clearly stated principles but which leaves adequate scope for the 
exercise of judicial discretion to cater for the different circumstances 
of different cases”.23
18 This is justified by the Commission at para 3.1 o f  the 1981 Report given the separate regulation o f  
parent/child obligations by the law o f  aliment. In addition it is noted that the ordering o f  a divorce does not 
impact upon the fact o f  a child’s right to be maintained by his or her parents.
19 This, as distinct from upon death, or during the subsistence o f  the marriage.
20 Supra n. 2 at para 3.2.
21 The pre-existing multiple obligations o f  support were to be reduced to create a “restricted list o f  
alimentary relationships and one set o f  rules for all actions o f  aliment”, ibid  at para 1.4.
22 Ibid at para 3.39.
23 Ibid at para 1.5. The Commission reviewed but chose not to recount the approaches o f  many 
jurisdictions, identifying general trends in recent foreign legislative enactments, ultimately pinpointing 
three main aspects o f  current international trends:
• The sharing o f  matrimonial property (howsoever defined)
• Restrictions to ongoing maintenance
• The diminishing o f  the role o f  conduct in the assessment process
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It was envisaged that such reforms would incorporate enhanced judicial powers with 
sufficient scope to make the most appropriate orders for financial and ancillary relief on 
divorce. As a means of articulating aims o f a regulatory system, principles have been 
identified earlier in chapter 1 as an effective tool to guide the decision-making process.24
3.3 Judicial discretion v legislative rules
When considering the crucial issue of the objective of financial provision on divorce, the 
Report highlighted the lack of legislative guidance offered by the 1976 Act. Part III of the 
Report considered the existing scope of the discretionary judicial powers regarding the 
redistribution of property on divorce and the basis upon which decisions were being 
made. The power of the court to make “with respect to the application, such order, as it 
thinks fit”,25 highlighted the existing absolute discretion of the court.26 Furthermore the 
lack of a judicial policy direction was apparent in the judgment o f the Second Division of 
the Court o f Session in McRae v McRae27 where it was stressed that the financial amount, 
if any, to be awarded was “essentially a matter for the discretion o f the Court which 
grants the decree of divorce”.28
In weighing up the impact o f the existing discretion-based approach, the benefits and 
shortfalls of this longstanding ‘objective-free’ approach were considered. In short, the 
Commission regarded flexibility as the sole identifiable gain. Whilst the Report 
recognised the advantages that can flow from such flexibility, the “serious disadvantages” 
arising from the lack of stated objectives were unashamedly denounced as “an abdication 
of responsibility by Parliament in favour of the judiciary... [and] also an abdication of all 
collective responsibility in favour of the conscience of the single judge”.29 The 
Commission noted the unavoidable subjective adjudications that would be imposed by
24 See earlier in chapter 1, at section 2.2.2.
25 Section 5(2) Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976.
26 Supra n. 2 at para 3.35.
27 1979 SLT45.
28 Supra n. 2 at para 3.35.
29 Ibid at para 3.37, quoting from the judgment in McKay v McKay 1978 SLT 36.
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different presiding judges and rejected the repeated suggestion by counsel in reported 
judgments that there existed at that time, “rules of thumb” that were followed by most 
Outer Court judges.30 Such an approach was deemed unacceptable by the Commission, 
regarding as unsatisfactory, an approach that permits “questions of social policy, which 
have very important financial consequences for individuals” to be determined based on 
“informal understandings and somewhat arbitrary rules o f thumb based on no
• • T 1 •ascertainable principle and known only to a small circle o f court practitioners”. This 
undemocratic approach to the development and dissemination o f legal principles was 
denounced by the Commission. The consequential unavoidable lack o f certainty and 
predictability was highlighted, particularly as it affected parties to a divorce hearing. 
Finally, given these uncertainties the scope for fear and bullying tactics to be 
incorporated into the negotiation process was recognised. Thus not only were the three 
benchmarks of democracy, predictability and fairness being defeated by the mechanics of 
the existing regime, the Commission concluded that the established system served only to 
increase bitterness and acrimony and did little to facilitate amicable or mature resolution 
of issues.
In considering the possibilities for reform the Commission undertook an examination of 
the governing provisions in force in many other jurisdictions, including more recent 
statutory developments in Canada and New Zealand. Recognising that guidance was 
required by the courts, the legal profession and the public on the purpose o f financial 
provision on divorce, the Commission confirmed the very great need for the enunciation 
of stated objectives and specific guidelines to ensure certainty and fairness and to curb 
the excessive freedoms of the judiciary. However the Commission also accepted a co­
existing need for the retention of some element of judicial discretion, in light of the 
excessive rigidity o f a rule-based regime.32
30 The 1981 Report, supra n. 2 made reference in para 3.37 to the representations made by counsel in both 
McRae v McRae and Lambert v Lambert 1980 SLT 77 as to the customary use by the courts o f  capital 
awards ranging from one third to one half and periodical allowance awards o f  a quarter to one third o f joint 
gross incomes.
31 Ibid at para 3.37.
32 Ibid generally at paras 3.35 to 3.40.
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3 . 4  D e v e l o p i n g  u n d e r l y i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  o b j e c t i v e s
In light of this policy vacuum within which the courts were regarded as operating, the 
need for the development of underlying principles and objectives more closely to steer 
the process of asset distribution formed the central reform proposal o f the 1981 report.33 
The Commission’s proposals, which identified the principles to govern the asset 
distribution process followed on from the detailed examination o f all possibilities.34 
Under various guises, including objectives, models and aims, a total o f sixteen possible 
objectives were considered in the body of the Report.35 The merits o f each objective were 
considered, with the Commission ultimately concluding that no single objective, with or 
without a list o f factors would be sufficient to serve as the sole objective when awarding 
financial provision on divorce. Basing a system of financial provision upon a 
combination o f principles was regarded as being more readily workable. Further, it was 
the view of the Commission that given the inevitable variation in circumstances that 
would arise, the recognition of more than one governing principle would more typically 
correspond to reality and give rise to clarity in the law generally.36 This realisation led to 
the conclusion that several o f the considered objectives could “usefully feature in a 
scheme based on a combination of principles or objectives.”37
3.5 Unworkable models for reform
Following lengthy deliberation the Commission rejected numerous policy bases for asset 
division including: the preservation of the pre-divorce economic positions o f both parties,
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid at para 3.63. The Commission recognised that in order to reform the laws in an effective and 
workable way, it was imperative that such reforms be developed in a manner that would be justifiable to 
reasonable husbands and reasonable wives, i.e. not be discriminatory between men and women, would be 
capable o f  application to many different types o f  marriage and would be capable o f  application to cases 
where the marriage ended as a result o f  the fault o f  the applicant or respondent party, or the fault o f  both or 
the fault o f  neither.
35 Ibid at paras 3.41-3.57.
36 Ibid at paras 3.59-3.60.
37 Ibid at para 3.59.
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the securing of justice as determined by the presiding judge, the relief of need, individual
o o
rehabilitation and reward for spousal contributions.
Firstly, the reinstating of the spouses to their financial position had they remained 
married, previously enshrined as an objective in section 25 o f the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 in England/Wales but deleted in 1984, was rejected by the Scottish Law 
Commission as inappropriate, regarded as typically giving rise to a continuing obligation 
of inter-spousal support.39 Similarly, a system which would rely upon the delegation of 
responsibility to the courts to determine the best orders in the circumstances was quickly 
rejected as perpetuating the weaknesses of the existing system. It was recognised that to 
centre the regulation of the division of marital assets solely upon needs would be to place 
a mandatory support obligation on the wealthier spouse, which would only be defeated 
when the dependent spouse could no longer prove financial need. Such a policy approach 
would have the potential to place the wealthier spouse at the eternal mercy of the 
dependent spouse and would serve to make the financial ties between the parties almost 
indefeasible.40 The Commission expressly recognised the “life-long obligation of 
support”41 that this might give rise to, and considered that as a stand-alone model for 
division, this proposed basis for ancillary relief orders was not justifiable. Further, 
dividing marital assets on the basis o f needs alone would not permit the court to make 
property adjustment orders to achieve an over-all equitable distribution o f the wealth of 
the parties and the marriage.42 Similarly rejected as possible underlying policy aims or 
objectives of any reformed process of division were both the rehabilitation model and 
reliance upon a formulaic method for the division of assets. Whilst a rehabilitation-based 
model was regarded as not capable of operating as a stand-alone objective of asset 
distribution, the Commission did recognise its overlap with the transitional periodical 
payments structure that was ultimately proposed.43 As regards the adoption o f a formula-
38 Ibid at paras 3.41-3.57.
39 Ibid at para 3.47.
40 Ibid at para 3.49.
41 Ibid.
42 The issue o f  need and its use as the basis for both justifying and calculating ongoing inter-spousal 
payments was discussed again by the Commission specifically in the context o f  ongoing spousal support 
obligations, considered at section 3.7 below.
43 Supra n. 2 at para 3.50.
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based approach, although the Commission noted the value o f the predictability and 
consistency likely to arise, it was rejected as an unsuitable objective in itself.
“Predictability of results ceases to be a virtue if the results are 
predictably unsatisfactory and unjustifiable.”44
However the Commission was willing to recognise that given the “obvious attractions in 
such an approach”, it should be used to “some extent in relation to the division of 
property on divorce”.45
Although the Commission recognised that a share in the matrimonial property of the 
parties was the typical means of rewarding spousal contributions,46 the view of the 
Commission was that it was more suited “as an ingredient” in a system o f financial 
provision on divorce with justice for the parties demanding that the law provide the 
machinery for “the due recognition of contributions”. The Commission acknowledged 
that the desirability of taking spousal contributions into account was evident in the laws 
governing financial provision on divorce in several jurisdictions, citing in particular 
England/Wales and Australia. Ultimately however, the Commission concluded by 
indicating a preference for “the idea of equal sharing” rather than simply calculating and 
rewarding past contributions. To choose the latter approach would be overly 
“retrospective” and “narrow” in approach.47
Thus many of the models and potential policy objectives, whilst discounted as the sole 
basis upon which to develop the new system, were recognised as relevant and necessary 
in the development of any new approach.
44 Ibid at para 3.52.
45 Ibid.
46 For further discussion o f  the relevance and impact o f spousal contributions, see paras 3.91-3.99 o f  the 
1981 Report.
47 Supra n. 2 at para 3.56. In this context the Commission considered the various forms that such spousal 
contributions could take, noting the various levels o f  direct and indirect contributions that might be 
measured Interestingly, and somewhat controversially, the Commission regarded contributions which do 
not result in an improvement o f  the other spouse’s economic position as not a suitable premise upon which 
to base a claim for financial relief on divorce.
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3 . 6  O v e r - r i d i n g  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  e q u a l i t y  o f  d i v i s i o n
In advocating the strengths of a presumptive starting point of equal division, the Law 
Commission relied upon significant public support.48 The 1981 Report details the extent 
of support received, collated through surveys and questionnaires together with 
suggestions and comments submitted. The Law Commission emphasised the underlying 
concept of marriage as a partnership, with fairness demanding a norm of equal division 49 
In light of this, the Commission regarded any fixed proportioning of assets other than one 
based on equal sharing as being difficult to justify. Requiring the courts to award a fair 
share to each spouse was deemed to be “too vague” and would have simply represented a 
perpetuation of the existing discretion-based system,50 whereas equally, the Commission 
regarded a “fixed rule of apportionment for all cases” as too rigid an approach.51 In this 
context the Commission stated that irrespective of how a couple might hold title to a 
property, this should not be regarded as a reflection of how they regard the property.52 
However given the peculiarities of any given case, the need for a capacity to vary from 
the starting point o f equal division was noted and it was suggested that the scheme 
proposed should include the power of the court to adjust where necessary, the position of 
the parties following the equal division, allowing the court to award a capital lump sum 
or property transfer order as necessary. To strengthen the inclusion o f this discretionary 
capacity to order unequal division, the Commission referred to the additional child care 
costs that might arise as an example of where such a power might prove valuable.
48 Ibid at para 3.67. The Commission referred to submissions and comments received directly together with 
the 1979 survey o f  family property in Scotland conducted by Manners and Rauta on behalf o f  the 
Commission, which indicated that over 90% o f informants believed that property acquired jointly during 
the marriage should be divided equally and 65% considered that property obtained by one spouse in the 
course o f  the marriage should be divided equally; Manners AJ and Rauta I Family Property in Scotland 
HMSO (London) (1981).
49 In commenting on this norm o f  equal division, Dick highlights the view  o f  the 1981 report that “any 
departure from the principle o f  equal sharing o f matrimonial property should be kept to the minimum...” 
Dick A “Using the 1985 s.9 principles in negotiation and their implications for negotiations involving 
cohabitants” 2007 25 SLT 186 at 187.
50 Supra n. 2 at para 3.66.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid at para 3.67, with reference to para 3.27 which outlined data gathered to illustrate the various ways 
in which the family home was held by married people.
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In determining the principles that might best govern an award of financial provision on 
divorce, the Law Commission set out what it perceived as the fundamental components 
of an effective approach to regulation. It emphasised the need for non-discriminatory, 
reasonable laws that could readily be applied to all types o f marriages, irrespective of the 
circumstances of the parties or the cause o f the breakdown. More specifically the 
Commission recommended that any financial order should be justifiable on one or more 
of the following principles; the fair sharing of matrimonial property, the fair recognition 
of contributions or disadvantage, the fair sharing o f economic burden o f child care, the 
fair provision for adjustment to independence and the relief o f grave financial hardship
These principles were regarded as reflecting the underlying idea o f marriage as a 
partnership with “the only fair solution” demanding a norm of equal division of the 
assets. The Law Commission’s proposals ultimately formed the foundations of section 9 
of the 1985 Act, which identifies the five governing principles o f asset distribution and is 
regarded as “the heart o f the financial provision in divorce” under Scottish law.54
3.7 Spousal Support
The issue of post-divorce spousal maintenance and the continuation o f support 
notwithstanding the termination of the marriage also received much consideration prior to 
the enactment of the 1985 Act. In particular the Law Commission recognised that, 
typically the ordering of continuing inter-spousal support was inconsistent with the 
concepts of divorce and the termination of marriage. Thus as a starting point the 
Commission identified many instances where an obligation continuously to maintain 
would be unjustifiable, including a short childless marriage or an application made 20 
years after the divorce is ordered. The Commission was strongly o f the view that a 
maximum time-line should be placed on the duration o f the obligation to support, in order 
to prevent transitional financial assistance from evolving into “permanent life-long
53 Supra n 49; Dick summarises the starting point as “equal sharing based o n .. .views o f  fairness as regards 
recognition o f  both material and non material contributions.”
54 Dick A Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 Greens Annotated Acts (Sweet & Maxwell) (2000) at 18.
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support”.55 From the submissions and correspondence received in preparing its report the 
Commission noted the multiple criticisms of the existing system which had permitted the 
ordering of life-long periodical allowances notwithstanding the dissolution of a 
marriage.56 Such an ongoing payment obligation was regarded as an “unjustifiable 
burden” particularly in circumstances where the recipient was not incapacitated or where 
there were no minor children of the union.57 Ultimately the Commission regarded the 
existing regime as “an unsatisfactory one for both parties” and preferred the ordering of a 
capital lump sum or a transfer of property order “whenever this would be sufficient and 
appropriate”. Interestingly what might be regarded as sufficient or appropriate was not 
commented upon and was regarded as more correctly “left to the discretion of the court in 
each case”.58 It was conceded by the Commission however that the scope for the ordering 
of periodical payments would have to be retained and should exist alongside the right to 
order a lump sum or property order to fulfil the identified underlying principles of fair 
sharing of the burden of child care and the relief of grave hardship.
The Commission acknowledged the importance of the retention by the courts of a 
capacity to make such a transitional inter-spousal order upon divorce. This eventually 
manifested as the Commission’s proposal for inter-spousal maintenance orders for a 
maximum time period of three years post divorce. In the body o f its Report, the 
Commission recognised the relevance of the individual circumstances o f the parties 
before the court:
“... .cash awards based on the principle of fair sharing o f the value of 
matrimonial property, or on the principle of fair recognition o f  
contributions and disadvantages, should be in the form o f a capital 
sum, (payable by instalments if necessary) rather than in the form of 
a long-term periodical allowance. Cash awards based on the 
principle of easing the adjustment to independence are based partly 
on past dependency and partly on future needs and may
55 Supra n. 2 at para 3.107.
56 Ibid at para 3.38. Those consulted by the Commission on this issue unanimously rejected long-term 
spousal support as an objective o f  financial provision on divorce but did call for the retention o f  a 
flexibility to allow for such support in appropriate cases.
57 Ibid at para 3.121 which highlighted the fact o f  “avoidable human suffering” arising from the existing 
law, given the continued financial dependence implicit in the post-1976 system.
58 Ibid at para 3.122.
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appropriately take the form of either a capital sum or a periodical 
allowance”. 9
It was envisaged that by permitting the court to relieve the financial needs of the 
previously-dependent spouse by way of inter-spousal periodic payments order, the 
possibility o f the dependent spouse otherwise becoming a charge on the public purse 
would be significantly lessened.60
The Commission’s proposal of a payment period of three years, which it regarded as “an 
adequate maximum period” was included as a key aspect o f the legislative reform 
provisions adopted by the legislature. However it is not an absolute rule, as section 
9(1 )(e) permits a party who is likely to suffer serious financial hardship to be awarded 
reasonable financial provisions for a reasonable period.61 The three year limit expressed 
in section 9(l)(d) o f the 1985 Act is a commendable legislative inclusion, signalling quite 
clearly that whilst post-dissolution spousal support can be necessary where a previously- 
dependent party needs to adjust to their post-divorce financial circumstances, such 
support is not permanent and the claimant is expected to adjust their earning/financial 
capacity within a stated time period. Wilson has referred to this approach as representing 
“a much fiercer propulsion towards the clean break” than is evident in neighbouring 
England/Wales and thus providing certainty and predictability within a democratic 
framework.62 The three year presumption reflects a legislative policy to provide financial 
support to avoid immediate injustice, but is ultimately predicated upon a severing of 
financial ties into the future. However the inclusion of the aforementioned section 9(1 )(e) 
power to order spousal support to avoid serious hardship63 seems to ensure the 
satisfaction of the final benchmark of fairness, where fairness in the circumstances 
demands ongoing financial support.
59 Ibid at para 3.123.
60 Such an instance would more likely arise where 50% o f  the available assets might fail to relieve the 
spousal hardship.
61 See further at section 6.3 below.
62 Wilson N  “Ancillary R elief Reform: response o f  the judges o f  the Family Division to Government 
Proposals” [1999] Fam Law 159 at 161.
63 The wording and application o f  section 9(l)(a)-(e) are discussed in detail below at section 4.4.
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Finally in this context, the impact o f the post-divorce economic burden arising from 
caring for a child was also considered, with recognition of the career and earning 
sacrifices often required in such circumstances.64 The 1981 Report identified the 
importance of the sharing of the economic burden o f child care between both spouses 
post-divorce. In recognising the reality that one of the parties, typically the woman, takes 
on the burden of child care, the Commission identified the need for some form of 
“equitable adjustment of the financial burden”, be it payment for the actual financial cost 
of child care and/or payment in respect of the career sacrifices made by one parent in 
order to take responsibility for the care of the children.65 Whatever the child care 
circumstances post-divorce, the Law Commission admitted that where a spouse is unable 
to work or to work fulltime because of the presence o f young children or where she does 
work but is required to incur the expense of child care, there should be no question of an 
equal financial division and “some form of equitable adjustment o f the financial burden 
of caring for children of the marriage is required”.66 In assessing the possibilities for 
statutory reform, the Commission rejected both the notion o f a child care wage payable 
by the other parent and the suggestion that the burden be shared through increased levels 
of aliment for the child. The Commission was of the view that whilst there can be no 
question of a clean break where child care responsibilities arise, it regarded the payment 
of a wage to the homemaker spouse as attracting the “objectionable connotation” that she 
was now an employee of her former husband. As regards the payment o f increased 
aliment for the child to cover the child care costs, the court preferred to keep distinct, the 
issues of child aliment and aliment in respect of child care costs. Ultimately the 
Commission proposed the principle of the fair sharing o f the economic burden arising 
from the care of the children of the marriage, requiring the court to have regard to 
arrangements made regarding child maintenance, any expenses and losses incurred by the 
need to care for the child, as well as the age, health and other circumstances of the child 
and the cost and availability o f any necessary child care. The suggestion that in the case 
of ongoing child care obligations post-divorce, the three year period of inter-spousal
64 This issue was ultimately expressly provided for by section 9(1 )(c) o f  the 1985 Act.
65 Supra n. 2 at para 3.100.
66 Ibid where the Law Commission considered the purpose and scope o f  the fair sharing o f  the economic 
burden arising from child care obligations.
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support should only commence upon the termination of those obligations, was rejected by 
the Commission as unjustifiable. Rather the post-divorce period of child care should 
equally be regarded as a transition period within which the spouse could adjust to the new 
arrangements.67 Ultimately the reform proposals of the Law Commission resulted in the 
legislative inclusion of two governing principles relevant to this issue; section 9(1 )(b) 
requires the court to take ‘fair account’ of any economic disadvantage suffered in the 
interests o f the family and section 9(1 )(c) requires the court to share fairly between the 
parties any economic burden of caring for a child of the family.68
3.8 Inadequate judicial powers
Considered in tandem by the Commission, was the need to enhance the statutory powers 
of the judiciary to provide as necessary for the parties. In its preliminary section the 
Report highlighted the absence of any judicial power under the 1976 Act to order the 
transfer of property or to regulate the use and occupation o f property. Rather the existing 
law limited the judicial powers to ordering the payment o f a capital sum or a periodical 
allowance or both, and/or to varying marriage settlements. Although clearly in favour of 
the enhancement o f the powers of the courts in respect of property orders, the 
Commission was anxious to restrict the court’s power to award long-term periodical 
payments orders except where absolutely necessary.69
67 Ibid.
68 See section 4.4 below.
69 Such a need might arise with the presence o f young children or other such circumstances, where not to 
order periodical payments would cause grave hardship. Given this restriction, Bissett-Johnson highlighted 
that for a “wife in her 40 ’s, the problem in Scotland is generally one o f  establishing that a clean break using 
s 9(l)(b)-(c) is inappropriate or unavailable given the resources o f  the would be transferor.” Bissett- 
Johnson A “Lifestyle support o f  provision for the middle aged w ife” 1999 SLT 37 at 37, 38. Ultimately, as 
noted, the law regulating the payment o f  long-term maintenance was reformed and such orders can now 
only last for up to three years except in exceptional circumstances. For further discussion o f  the limited 
time frame for the payment o f  spousal maintenance see section 4.7 below.
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3 . 9  C o n c l u s i o n
Having identified the many shortfalls o f the existing system, the 1981 Report aimed to 
identify the rightful objectives of the redistribution of marital wealth on divorce. It called 
for the introduction of comprehensive legislative enactments, regarding it as unlikely that
70“any systematic body of case law will develop” to fill the existing gaps. The 
Commission, in identifying the five principles that were eventually transported into the 
1985 Act, took into account the importance of the need for a balance between strict 
legislative principles and judicial discretion, particularly in light o f the existing unfettered 
judicial discretion exercisable by the Scottish judiciary.71
4 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985
4.1 Introduction
The primary outcome of the 1981 reports of the Law Commission was the enactment of 
the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 which introduced a two-tier test to be applied by the 
court prior to the making of any order for financial relief. To this end the 1985 Act firstly 
sets out guiding principles, one or more of which must justify the financial order(s) 
made72 and, secondly, highlights the need for any orders to be reasonable in light of the 
financial resources of the parties.73 The dual test to be satisfied has been regarded by the
70 Supra n. 2 at para 1.5. In essence the detailed proposals contained in the 1981 report were adopted in full 
and enacted as the essential features o f  the 1985 Act.
71 These five principles, the merits o f  their elevation to statutory guidelines and the manner in which they 
have been statutorily framed will be considered below at para 4.4 with reliance upon case law to date, to 
illustrate their application in practice. The approach advocated by the Scottish Law Commission was 
reiterated in two subsequent reports dealing with property ownership in the context o f  an ongoing marriage; 
Law Commission Consultative Memorandum (No. 57) Matrimonial Property and Family Law -  Report on 
Matrimonial Property Report o f  the Scottish Law Commission No. 86 (1984).
72 Section 9(l)(a)-(e).
73 Section 8(2). Although the pursuer in Adams v Adams 1997 SLT 144 sought to retain sole ownership of 
the family home, thereby requiring the court to depart from the norm o f  equal division, the court was 
restrained from doing so because o f  the financial pressure and budgetary constraints such an order would 
impose upon the lifestyles o f  the pursuer and the children o f  the union. Bissett-Johnson noted that relative 
to the approaches adopted in other jurisdictions such as England, Canada or Australia, “[W]hen it comes to 
making awards o f  financial provision on divorce, the level o f  judicial discretion is less in Scotland...” 
Bissett-Johnson A “Cases From the Trenches but only Modest Legislative Responses” contributor to The 
International Survey of Family Law 2006 Edition, 329 at 334, discussed further at section 4.4 below.
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courts as “cumulative” in nature, “with the result that unless both are satisfied the court 
has no power to make an order”.74 In enacting the 1985 Act it appears that the legislature 
has created a statutory, goal-orientated structure o f laws within which judges can exercise 
subjective judgment as to the best outcome in the circumstances. Thus on the 
rules/discretion continuum, the Scottish law-makers have recognised the merits of both 
rules and discretion and ensured that the regulatory approach combines a mix of the two. 
In light of the use of both presumptions and principles, the benchmarks of democracy and 
certainty appear more attainable; but not at the expense o f fairness, which remains within 
reach, whatever the circumstances before the court. The effect o f this legislative approach 
and the extent o f any residual judicial discretion will be considered below in the course of 
the analysis of these statutory provisions.
4.2 Statutory objectives and principles
When enacted, the 1985 Act was drafted to reflect the Law Commission’s concept of a 
system based upon a combination of principles, regarded as necessary to deal with the 
variety of circumstances that might arise.75 Sutherland regards the approach adopted by 
the 1985 Act in a very positive light, regarding it as providing the courts with “a 
principled approach to financial provision on divorce and sufficient flexibility to meet 
most cases”.76 This principled approach presents a system which in her view has the 
important consequence of enabling “practitioners to advise clients on what is a reasonable
77 •settlement to agree, thus avoiding much costly and acrimonious litigation.” In seeking 
to give effective guidance to the decision-making process, the Act outlines the five 
fundamental principles identified by the Scottish Law Commission, one or more of which 
must justify any financial relief orders to be made, in order to guide the judiciary, the 
conflicting parties and their legal advisors.
74 Wallis v Wallis 1993 S.C. (H.L.) 49 at 56 per Lord Jauncey o f  Tullichettle.
75 Supra n. 2 at para 3.60. The Law Commission concluded that to create laws premised upon a single 
policy objective would “fail to cover all the situations in which an award o f  financial provision may be 
called for.”
76 Sutherland E “Scotland Consolidation and Anticipation” The International Survey of Family Law 2000 
Edition, 329 at 339.
77 Ibid.
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4 . 3  D e f i n i t i o n  o f  m a t r i m o n i a l  p r o p e r t y
Section 10(4) of the 1985 Act defines matrimonial property as
. .all the property belonging to the parties or either of them at the 
relevant date which was acquired by them or him (otherwise than by 
way of gift or succession from a third party), before the marriage for 
use by them as a family home or as furniture or plenishings for such 
home; or during the marriage but before the relevant date.”
The 1984 Report o f the Law Commission78 considered a number of quite varied 
approaches to the ownership of matrimonial property in an ongoing marriage, ultimately 
preferring a continuation of separate property rules of ownership to be supplemented by
• 7Q
principle-driven rules for the division of property upon the dissolution o f the marriage. 
Although outside the remit of the 1984 Report, the Commission suggested that “there is
room for a more principled approach” to the division of matrimonial property on divorce;
80referring specifically to the earlier recommendations contained in its 1981 report. As a 
starting point, the Commission stated “that the key idea is that o f sharing what is acquired
O 1
by the spouses’ efforts or income during the effective period o f marriage.” The 
Commission relied upon the work o f Manners and Rauta,82 utilising the data collected to 
ensure that their conclusions were supported by public opinion. Thus the basis for 
determining the definition of matrimonial property was the idea that what should be at 
issue is property acquired by one or both spouses during the marriage. It was concluded 
that such property should, as the norm, be divided equally between the spouses.83 Any 
danger of this approach giving rise to inequity or unfairness could be prevented by the 
co-existing judicial power to depart from this norm where property was deemed not to be 
derived from the spouses’ efforts or income during the marriage; in such instances “the
78 Supra n. 71.
79 Ibid, the conclusion and recommendations o f  the report are set out in para 3.13-3.14.
80 Ibid at para 3.13.
81 Ibid at 3.69.
82 Supra n. 48.
83 Supra n. 70 at 3.72.
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court could take a fairly broad axe.”84 Thus, for example, where a spouse could show that 
pre-marital funds had been used in the course of the marriage to purchase an asset, it 
would remain within the remit o f the court, where appropriate, to exclude such an asset 
from the presumption of equal division. Thus whilst for the most part the Scottish regime 
relies upon a broad definition of matrimonial property, there remains residual scope for a 
more restrictive approach to be adopted in particular circumstances, where justice so 
requires. In a regulatory system premised upon legislative presumptions requiring the 
exercise o f judicial discretion, this approach to defining matrimonial property is not 
surprising. In essence it reflects the over-all approach o f Scottish law-makers to asset 
distribution on divorce, relying upon a presumptive starting point, with scope for judicial 
freedom to avoid where necessary. Whilst such residual discretion does provide scope for 
dispute and uncertainty, the co-existing benchmark of fairness arguably necessitates its 
existence.
4.4 Judicial application of section 9 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985
The primary aim of the enunciation of the five statutory principles was the creation of 
policy-driven laws which would require the judiciary to make orders for financial relief 
with a view to securing one or more of those policy aims. Whilst sensibly the legislation 
is framed in a manner that permits the court to be affected by the extent o f the parties’ 
capacity to pay, ultimately the identification of the goal o f fairness, pre-determined 
typically to require equal division, together with the stated objectives o f the regulatory 
process, has created purpose-driven statutory powers of asset distribution. As a result, the 
purpose of state intervention might be less influenced by the subjective preferences of a 
presiding judge and more likely to conform to the overall aims o f state regulation as 
debated and decided by the legislature.85 Dick favours this combined approach, noting 
that the “1985 Act provides a starting point with potential discretionary variations”.86 
Judicial commentary on the revised approach has recognised this shift from “what had
84 / bid.
85 For a more general discussion o f  the role and impact o f  principles, policies and standards on the 
regulation process, see section 2.3 o f  chapter 1 above.
86 Dick A supra n.49 at 186.
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been an unfettered discretion in the court” to a legislative approach that includes 
specified principles which “certainly impose some constraints on the court’s discretion, 
but some areas remain in the application o f the principles for the court to exercise its own 
judgment on the facts of the particular case so as to achieve a fair result”.87 However 
Dick has noted that no “clear shape has emerged from case law as to the use of the 
discretionary elements of the 1985 Act”. In particular she refers to the complications that 
have arisen in respect of the use of “special circumstances” as a means of interpreting the 
concepts of financial advantage and disadvantage and in considering the economic 
burden arising from child care responsibilities.88 Given these case law shortcomings,
Dick emphasises the importance of identifying and understanding the underlying 
statutory principles, noting that Scots law has traditionally “relied on principle rather then 
precedent”.89
The five governing principles are set out in section 9 o f the 1985 Act as follows:
Section 9(l)(a): The net value of the matrimonial property should be sharedfairly 
between the parties to the marriage;
Whilst the use of the nebulous term ‘fairly’ might suggest a resulting judicial freedom to 
make whatever orders deemed appropriate by the presiding judge, section 10(1) explains 
that property shall be deemed to be shared fairly when it is “shared equally.. .save in 
special circumstances”. Thus the primary presumption governing the process is that the 
equal division of matrimonial property is the “normal result which the legislation 
contemplates”.90 Where special circumstances are established and proven to justify a 
departure from equal division, the court has discretionary power, subject to the five
87 Jacques v Jacques 1997 SLT 459 per Lord Clyde at 462. Lord Clyde further noted that “the task of 
applying the Act and in the working out o f  the detail o f  the matter must essentially be one for the judge 
who first hears the case.” Similarly in Aliv Andrew or Ali [2001] SCLR 485 at 493 Lord Hamilton stated 
that whilst the court continues to have a discretion in relation to claims for financial provision on divorce, 
sections 8 and 9 o f  the 1985 Act have directed the court “to exercise it within more precisely defined 
parameters.”
88 Supra n. 49 at 186.
89 Ibid at 187.
90 Per Lord Gill, Adams v. Adams supra n. 72.
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governing principles and various section 11 factors,91 to determine the nature of the asset 
division.
This norm of fairness and its resulting presumption of equality has regularly been applied 
by the Scottish courts, confirming that “sharing [was] required to be equal unless one or 
more special circumstances could be averred and proved to justify a different 
proportion.”92 It was similarly confirmed by Lord Keith in Wallis v Wallis that the “effect 
of sec. 9(l)(a) combined with sec. 10 is that in the absence o f special circumstances the 
net value o f the matrimonial property at the relevant date.. .is to be shared equally 
between them”.93 Thus as a “matter of construction” it has been noted that “it is sufficient 
to understand that in the ordinary course an equal division will be fair”.94
The use of a presumption rather than a rule of equal division allows scope for flexibility 
depending on the facts before the court and thus alternative sharing arrangements will be 
permitted where they are “justified by special circumstances”.95 However the fact of the 
identification o f a special circumstance is not sufficient to depart from equal division; 
rather such departure must also be justified by those circumstances.96 To control this 
exercise of judicial discretion, the legislature has enacted detailed and “intricate” 97 
statutory provisions to direct the court in its dealings with the assets o f the parties. These 
statutory provisions, considered in detail below in section 4.6, have been commended as 
retaining scope for the court in the particular circumstances, “to divide a particular item
91 See below at section 4.6.
92 Calder or Crockett v Crockett (1993) Inner House Cases 30 June 1993 per Lord Murray.
93 Supra n. 73 at 53 per Lord Keith o f  Kindel.
94 Jacques v Jacques supra n. 87 at 462 per Lord Clyde, later relied upon by Lord MacFadyen in Cummings
or Jackson v Jackson [1999] Fam. L.R. 108. Thomson considers the meaning o f  “fair” as the basis for the 
division o f  matrimonial property, using a series o f  fictional cases to emphasise the need for both assets and 
debts to be divided equally, if  fairness is to be achieved; Thomson J “When is fair division fair?” 2007 SLT 
192.
95 Section 10(1) 1985 Act.
96 Jacques v Jacques supra n. 87 at 24-25. See para 4.5 below, for further consideration o f  the concept o f  
special circumstances as a means o f  deviating from the principle o f  equal division, with reference to 
decided case law and judicial interpretations.
97 Per Lord Gill, Adams v. Adams supra n. 73 at 145.
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separately from the rest [of the property] to meet a special circumstance which bears on it 
primarily”.98 In this regard:
. .a court does not have to confine itself to the global approach in 
assessing and dividing matrimonial property and...there is room for 
the scheme to be applied in different ways in different situations, that 
being very much a matter for the discretion o f the Lord Ordinary.”99
More recently the requirement that the court must be satisfied as to whether the orders are 
reasonable, was again evident in Sweeney v Sweeney,100 regarded by Innes as creating a 
three-tier approach to financial provision on divorce; the identification of the matrimonial 
property, the division of that property between the parties whether in equal shares or 
otherwise, and the consideration of the parties’ resources in order to test whether the 
‘fair’ division arrived at in stage 2 is reasonable.101 This final stage requires the court to 
ensure that the orders made can reasonably be achieved given the circumstances of the 
parties, and acts as a means to allow the courts to avoid the otherwise-presumed equal 
division. Bissett-Johnson relied upon the awards made in Fraser v Fraser102 to illustrate 
the significance of this statutory subjective “reasonable resources” test.103 The case 
involved spouses who were in their sixties with four adult children. At the time of 
separation the collective matrimonial property, valued at £800,000, consisted o f the 
family home and the husband’s pension schemes. On separation the husband had already 
given the wife £106,000 to purchase a new home and subsequently paid her £1,000 
maintenance per month. Later, on divorce, equal sharing would have entitled the wife to a 
further £274,000 which in the view of Sheriff Evans would have been unreasonable as 
the husband required the use of the family home for the foreseeable future. Consequently 
the court ruled that section 8(2) permitted the court to omit the value o f the family home
98 Per Lord Murray Calder or Crockett v Crockett supra n. 92 at 4.
99 Ibid.
100 (No 1) 2004 SLT 892. Innes regards this judicial approach as demonstrating “that after application o f the 
various statutory provisions, the court is to look at the result as a whole and consider whether the outcome 
is justified by the principles set out in the Act and reasonably having regard to the parties’ resources.” Innes 
R “Financial Provision on Divorce: the Scottish Perspective” [2008] IFL 241 at 243.
101 Ibid. The three steps are in essence, the two tier test established by the 1985 Act, with an additional 
preliminary judicial obligation to both identify and value the matrimonial property at issue.
102 2004 Scot (D) 28/2.
103 Supra n. 70 at 40.
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from its calculations and ultimately award the wife a further lump sum of £150,000 
payable in monthly instalments. Thus the inclusion of this statutory, safety-net provision 
allowed for significant judicial scope to be exercised to avoid the unnecessary equal 
division of assets. One shortcoming arising from the inclusion of this test of what is 
‘reasonable in the context of the parties’ resources’, was however highlighted, by Bissett- 
Johnson, where a wife’s interrupted career might have produced a substantial loss to her, 
but the assets available for distribution on divorce are relatively modest.104 Unless that 
wife can prove hardship, she may not be in a position to be compensated, pursuant to the 
principles of the Act if she fails to show that the order(s) so permitted are reasonable 
given the resources of the parties. This inability to deal with individual cases formed the 
basis of the criticisms expressed by Lord Hope in Miller v MillerZMcFarlane v 
McFarlane,105 to be considered later in the context o f spousal support at section 4.7 
below.
In the context o f the equal-division versus equitable-division debate, the Scottish 
legislative position is an interesting hybrid of a regime reliant upon judicial discretion to 
divide the assets equitably, exercisable within the confines o f very detailed statutory 
guidelines, with an underlying presumption in favour of the equal division of community 
property. Thus whilst equal division remains the expected outcome in the calculation of 
spousal financial provision, the court is required to assess, inter alia, the contributions, 
sacrifices and advantages made by each spouse during the course o f the marriage.
Section 9(1) (b): Fair account should be taken of any advantage derived by either party 
from contributions by the other, and of any economic disadvantage suffered by either 
party in the interests o f the other party or o f the family;106
The impact o f the compensation-based approach to justify asset distribution was 
considered by Lord Gill in Adams v Adams, where the career prospects o f the pursuer
Ibid.
,C!i Supra n. 1.
See the comments o f  Dick, supra n. 49 at 188 where she refers to this complex principle as giving rise to 
“a heady brew” which has to be “uncorked” by the courts.
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wife were recognised by the court as having been disadvantaged by her role as the 
primary caregiver for the couple’s two children. The court readily accepted that as a 
direct result of this role she had not fulfilled her career ambitions and that she would have 
had better prospects for promotion if she had not been so restricted. However the 
significant financial contributions o f the defender to the household finances in the course 
of the marriage were deemed to fulfil the ‘counterbalancing consideration’ referred to in 
section 11(2) and thereby had adequately compensated her sacrifices. Given this net 
balancing of the different spousal contributions, the court refused to depart from the 
principle of equal sharing, thereby necessitating the sale o f the large family home 
requiring the pursuer and two children to move to a smaller property. As noted earlier, 
Bissett-Johnson was critical of section 9(l)(b)-(c) insofar as it makes it difficult for “a
• • * 1 0 7wife in her 40’s” to convince the courts that a clean break is inappropriate. He noted 
the Scottish “legislative quest” for a clean break prevents the courts from ordering the 
payment of periodical maintenance where a property transfer would be inappropriate or 
insufficient in the circumstances.108 He highlighted the inability o f the existing provisions 
to provide “continuing support for older wives”, noting that the rights o f the “middle- 
aged wife” are further restricted by the general limitation on the payment o f maintenance 
to a three-year period. This unsympathetic approach to the particular circumstances of the 
homemaker was also evident in the very recent case of P v P .109 The judgment of Sheriff 
Cusine referred to the homemaker’s own recognition of her “very fortunate” position 
having had the benefit of staying at home with the three children o f the union. In addition 
it was noted that she “had the benefit of not requiring to seek employment”.110 This 
approach had been considered by Lord MacFadyen in the earlier case o f Cummings or
107 Supra n. 69.
108 Ibid at 37-38. The distinct approaches to property orders and spousal maintenance under Scottish law, as 
distinct from the collective view adopted by Irish law is considered at section 5 below and again in the 
overall conclusion to the thesis, with reference to the other approaches adopted by the jurisdictions assessed 
in this thesis.
109 2009 WL 6525.
110 Ibid. The court equally recognised the benefits o f  the defender’s role as the homemaker to the husband 
and the negative impact it had on her capacity or opportunity to establish a pension or build upon her 
career. Thus the court was ultimately satisfied that the w ife had suffered economic disadvantage during the 
marriage, justifying the award o f  a capital sum o f  £462,204 under section 9(1 )(a) and £77,400 under section 
9(1 )(b). However the defender was denied her claim o f  ongoing spousal support as the court was satisfied 
that the capital payment ordered was sufficient to meet the requirement o f  fairness and equal sharing 
between the parties, with specific reference being made to the brevity o f  the marriage and the defender’s 
failure, to date, to enquire after employment.
208
Jackson v Jackson111 where it was argued on behalf of the defender that in the course of 
the marriage “the pursuer had enjoyed an economic advantage in the form of gaining 
capital which had been contributed by the defender.” Thus it was argued that it was an 
“obvious case” for the application o f the section 9(1 )(b) principle in order to restore some 
of the capital which had been gained by the pursuer. Having previously regarded the 
presumption of equal sharing not to have been displaced, the court refused to reconsider 
the issue with reference to section 9(l)(b). This ruling suggests a judicial preference for 
an overall view of whether fair sharing in the circumstances means equal division, as 
distinct from a willingness to rely upon the remaining section 9 principles to uncover 
‘special circumstances” as required by section 10, the former approach arguably 
requiring a greater use of judicial discretion and subjective adjudication. Indeed, overall, 
the capacity for subjective judicial treatment of the contributions o f the homemaker is 
just one example of the quite weighty judicial discretion which underlies the Scottish 
system of asset distribution. Notwithstanding the enunciation o f governing principles and 
presumptions it is evident that there remains quite extensive judicial latitude to depart 
from equal sharing, depending on the circumstances of the case and the manner in which 
they are regarded by the presiding judge.
Section 9(1) (c): Any economic burden o f caring, after divorce, for a child of the 
marriage under the age of 16 years should be shared fairly between the parties;
As noted at section 3.7 above, the Commission in its 1981 Report intended that this 
principle should require the court to have regard to future financial arrangements and 
their impact upon the care required for the child(ren). Norrie has noted that the effect of 
section 9(1 )(c) is to allow the court to “make an order that will share the actual costs of 
bringing up the child”.112 In this regard he notes that whilst it can give rise to a periodical
111 Supra n. 94.
112 Norrie K “Marital Agreements and Private Automy in a Comparative Perspective” at 7. Unpublished 
paper presented at Cambridge University on 26-27 June 2009, as a prelude to the forthcoming publication 
o f  a research project o f  the same title, which will compare how marital agreements function in national 
legal and social contexts in Australia; Austria; Belgium; England; France; Germany; Ireland, The 
Netherlands; Scotland; Singapore; Spain; Sweden and USA. It will also examine whether there are 
underlying principles that are to be found in most or even all jurisdictions. Based on the comparative 
analysis, the project will conclude with recommendations for the regulation o f  marital agreements.
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allowance payment order, it is “frequently used to justify that transfer to the parent who 
has residence of the child the half share of the family home that belonged before 
divorce/dissolution, to the non-resident parent.”113 Interestingly, in Adams v Adams the 
court rejected the pursuer’s attempt to secure unequal division of the matrimonial 
property despite her economic burden arising from the caring required for the children 
after the divorce. In the particular circumstances this was rejected by the court given the 
likelihood of the defender shortly being in a position to resume the payment of aliment.114
In seeking to provide for the parties in such circumstances, Jackson et al have identified 
from their empirical research a tendency for practitioners to seek to
“...secure individualized justice, using discretion not simply for its 
own sake but in order to re-allocate (usually) scarce resources by 
giving first priority to meeting the needs of the custodial parent and 
dependent children, and, secondly providing for the basic needs o f 
the non-custodial parent/husband, only after that redistributing the 
remaining matrimonial resources.”115
It was further noted in this context that whilst they identified “a clear preference for 
achieving a clean financial break between spouses, where possible.. .many solicitors 
thought this clashed impossibly with the practical need to maintain a continuing financial 
commitment where there were still dependent children.”116
Section 9(1) (d): A party who has been dependent to a substantial degree on the 
financial support of the other party should be awarded such financial provision as is 
reasonable to enable hint to adjust, over a period of not more than three years from the 
date of the decree of divorce, to the loss of that support on divorce;
Section 9(1 )(d) is designed to provide on a relatively short-term basis, for the spouse, 
who prior to the divorce, has been financially dependent upon the other spouse. Clive
113 Ibid.
114 Supra n. 73 at 148.
115 Jackson E, Wasoff F, Maclean M and Dobash R E, “Financial Support on Divorce: The Right Mixture 
of Rules and Discretion?” (1993) 7(2) IJL&F 230 at 245.
116 Ibid.
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speculates that whilst one possible purpose for such an order might be “to enable a 
spouse who has been economically dependent on the other spouse to undertake a course 
of education or training” he recognises that it should not be limited to such a purpose.117 
However he does regard section 9(1 )(d) as a provision that allows for adjustment on the 
part of the dependent spouse. Whilst internationally, and particularly in common law 
jurisdictions, this might be regarded as a standard judicial power aimed at lessening 
future economic disparity between the parties, the Scottish approach seeks to ensure that 
for the most part, such continued financial dependency does not survive the three-year 
anniversary of the divorce decree. The durational limitations imposed by section 9(1 )(d) 
have been recognised by Norrie and formed the basis o f much o f the criticism levelled at 
the Scottish regime by Lord Hope in the House of Lords in Miller v Miller and 
McFarlane v Mac Far lane } x^  In addition, given that its scope is narrowed further and the 
section demands proof of dependency “to a substantial degree”, it “would not cover, for 
example, a woman who compromises but does not give up completely her earning 
capacity and therefore is not so dependent”.119 This inability to provide for future 
economic disparity between the spouses, where such disparity does not give rise to one 
party experiencing financial hardship has been emphasised by the House o f Lords where 
it has been suggested that the manner in which the 1985 Act currently operates, “excludes 
compensation aimed at redressing a significant prospective disparity between the parties 
arising from the way they conducted their marriages.”120 Lord Hope expressed the view 
that a judicial discretion should be introduced to Scots law whereby in the absence of 
available capital, a spouse, who has sacrificed her career, or the optimal development of 
her career to otherwise contribute to the marriage, ought to be compensated from the 
other party’s future income. It was further claimed that such a judicial power would avoid 
the current regime which has given rise to harsh results, particularly where resources are 
predominantly income rather than property.121 This critical view has, however been 
challenged by a number of commentators, arguing that despite the limitations imposed by
117 Clive E The Law o f Husband and Wife in Scotland (W Green) (Edinburgh ) (4th ed) (1997) at 467-468.
118 Supra n. 1.
119 Norrie K “Clean Break Under Attack” 2006 51(7) JLSS 16.
120 Supra n. 1 per Lord Hope at para 114.
121 Ibid at para 127 per Baroness Hale. In this context, Baroness Hale at para 141, commends the flexibility 
offered by section 25 o f the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which in her view, has permitted “practice to 
develop in response to changing perceptions of what might be fair.”
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section 9(1 )(d), the 1985 Act does not serve to defeat a claim from such an applicant. 
Rather, Norrie warns against seeing this provision “in isolation”, emphasising “the 
cumulative nature of the principles in s 9(1)”122 and the capacity of the judicial powers 
created by the 1985 Act to order division o f the marital assets, equally or unequally as 
well as periodic payments, either for a fixed or indefinite period, as outlined below.
Section 9(l)(e): A party who at the time of the divorce seems likely to suffer serious 
financial hardship as a result of the divorce should be awarded such financial 
provision as is reasonable to relieve him of hardship over a reasonable period.
This is an interesting ‘safety-net’ type provision, which can be invoked to protect a 
particularly vulnerable spouse, typically arising from long-term dependency and/or career 
sacrifices where future independent income generation is not feasible. Thus despite a 
general perception123 that spousal maintenance in Scotland can never exceed a three-year 
period, section 9(1 )(e) does permit the ordering of an indefinite periodical allowance 
payment.124 It formed the basis of the pursuer’s claim for a periodical allowance order in 
Haugan v Haugan125 where, aged 51 and after 27 years o f marriage, the pursuer was in 
poor health and unfit for employment. Given her circumstances, Lord Mamoch was of 
the view “that this is clearly a case in which an award for an unlimited period under 
section 9(1 )(e) of the Act would be appropriate”.126 He noted that without the support of 
the defender, she would “be likely to suffer serious financial hardship and.. .that hardship 
would continue indefinitely”. Whilst the wording of section 9(1 )(e) certainly provides 
scope for the ordering of long-term spousal support payments, an overly-generous
122 For further discussion of this issue and the contrasting views o f the impact o f  the 1985 Act on the 
dependent spouse, see the discussion of spousal support at section 4.7 below.
123 As discussed above in the context o f the general, although not absolute, limitation imposed by section 
9(1 )(d) regarding long-term maintenance.
124 In a private communication with the writer, WasoffF has indicated a general public misconception of 
the regulation of maintenance under Scottish law, criticising the widely-held view that maintenance can 
only ever be ordered for a three-year period, and a general ignorance o f  the financial hardship exception, 
which permits indefinite maintenance and has been utilised by the courts.
125 (N o.l) [1996] SLT 321. The defender sought to deny the claim on the basis that the hardship claimed 
under section 9(1 )(e) was not “as a result o f the divorce” given that the pursuer had not sought support 
upon their separation. However this was rejected by the court, being satisfied that the loss of this right to 
aliment would in itself be a hardship brought about by the divorce, not the separation.
126 Ibid at 324. Lord Marnoch was o f the view that given the “penurious circumstances o f the pursuer, as 
high a sum as could reasonably be paid by the defender should be paid”.
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application of this measure is likely to be limited by the general tenor of the principles of 
section 9 of the 1985 Act which indicates a strong preference for asset allocation on 
dissolution and a relatively swift severing of financial ties. Norrie has commented that as 
all five principles are looked at collectively, a generous award under section 9(1 )(a) may
i on • •very well “obviate the need for an award under... s.9( 1 )(e).” However the inclusion of 
this provision is necessary and serves to highlight the severity o f a stricter clean break 
regime which could not provide the payment of ongoing spousal support in circumstances 
where, to avoid an injustice, such an order is required.
The manner in which the Scottish legislation is drafted is to be commended for its 
willingness to tackle this difficult issue. The inclusion of such provisions demands a 
greater element of judicial accountability and transparency. However notwithstanding 
these carefully-drafted guidelines, and their helpful directing o f the judiciary it has been 
suggested that there remains scope for subjective interpretation resulting in quite different 
outcomes for similar applicants. Dick identifies some of these shortcomings, citing 
Clive’s concern regarding the confusing practice of the courts in dealing with “any 
serious imbalance at the stage of sharing the net value of matrimonial property under 
section 9(1) (a) using the imbalance as a special circumstance justifying an unequal 
sharing.” Further and perhaps more importantly, Dick suggests that the decision to enact 
legislative guidelines in the form of a series of principles has encouraged and facilitated 
the courts to “consider all the appropriate principles.. .as well as that o f economic 
advantage/disadvantage to reach an overall financial settlement without the need to 
quantify amounts due under each principle.”128 Dick thus appears to suggest that this 
bundling of principles together has the capacity to permit the courts to make generalised 
orders, resulting in a lack of transparency and judicial accountability. Ironically, except 
for those practitioners deeply involved in the practice o f divorce law, it is arguable that 
the net effect of this approach is in fact a lack of predictability and consistency of legal
127 Supra n. 119 at 17.
128 Dick supra n. 49 at 190. This generalised judicial approach is evident in the ruling o f the court in Orr v 
Orr 2006 Fam LB 83-5, where in awarding the wife 60% of the matrimonial property and a periodical 
allowance, the court cited the view enunciated in the earlier decision o f Little v Little 1990 SLT 785, that 
the “matter is essentially one of discretion, aimed at achieving a fair and practicable result in accordance 
with common sense”.
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advice. Despite the benefits to democracy and certainty of legislatively enunciated 
principles, the outstanding need for fairness and the consequential inclusion of residual 
discretion can in practice weaken the delivery of those aims of democracy and 
transparency.
4.5 Special circumstances
The section 10 exception to the requirement o f equal division, “save in special 
circumstances” is further informed by section 10(6) which provides that the term “special 
circumstances”, without prejudice to the generality o f the words, may include the 
following:
“(a) the terms of any agreement between the parties on the 
ownership or division of any of the matrimonial property;
(b) the source of the funds or assets used to acquire any o f the 
matrimonial property where those funds or assets were not derived 
from the income or efforts of the parties during the marriage;
(c) any destruction, dissipation or alienation of property by either 
party;
(d) the nature of the matrimonial property, the use made o f it 
(including use for business purposes or as a matrimonial home) and 
the extent to which it is reasonable to expect it to be realised or 
divided or used as security;
(e) the actual or prospective liability for any expenses o f valuation or 
transfer of property in connection with the divorce.”129
This list of relevant circumstances, although non-exhaustive in nature, serves expressly to 
identify those special circumstances and events which the legislature has deliberately 
highlighted as justifying a deviation from the norm of equal division. Whether this 
legislative approach succeeds in achieving its aim of limiting the scope o f judicial 
freedoms in the decision-making process has not been proven (or disproven) to date. It is 
arguable that at the very least, judicial discretion is lessened and those exercising the
129 It was confirmed by the House o f Lords in Wallis v Wallis supra n. 73, that this list o f special 
circumstances is not exhaustive in nature. These circumstances were identified in the 1981 report o f the 
Scottish Law Commission, supra n. 2, at paras 3.78-3.86 following much debate and consideration, in 
consultation with the public as well as those with an interest and/or expertise in the area o f law and social 
policy.
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powers are at least obliged to make orders in accordance with the democratically created 
governing principles. In their 1990 report, Wasoff et al state that the evidence suggests 
that (up to that point) there had been a “limited exercise o f judicial discretion, whether by 
judicial inclination nor lack of opportunity.”130 Although they accepted that the 
effectiveness of the Scottish system might ultimately depend on the judiciary, they 
suggested that it is “likely to depend to a much greater extent upon solicitors themselves 
and how they use the Act in their work with their clients and in their negotiations with
i  ' i  1
other solicitors”.
Clive has noted the significant weight the courts have given to the section 10(6) 
circumstances. For example, in Anderson v Anderson,132 the court relied upon section 
10(6)(a) where, on leaving his wife for another woman, the husband signed a document 
agreeing to transfer everything over to the wife. Despite his subsequent protestations and 
claims for a fair share o f the matrimonial assets, the court relied upon section 10(6)(a), 
which allows the court to take into account any agreement between the parties, to give 
full effect to the agreement in question.133 It is evident from the reported case law that the 
judiciary do at times refer to the relevant principle or principles upon which they premise 
the property orders made. In this regard it has been stressed that it is a matter for the court 
to determine whether a set of circumstances amounts to the statutorily required “special 
circumstances”, and in addition whether such circumstances justify a departure from the 
norm of equal division.134 In Cummings (Jackson) v Jackson35 the court refused to grant 
the defender’s application for an unequal division of the matrimonial property in his 
favour. He had argued that there were special circumstances justifying unequal sharing, 
given the derivation of part of the parties’ wealth from his previous employment and the 
take-over o f his company. He claimed that the purchasers had paid not only for the stock
130 Wasoff F, Dobash R E and Harcus D S The Impact of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 on 
Solicitors” Divorce Practice Scottish Office: Central Research Unit 1990.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid at 6, 7. More recent research focussing on the impact of the 1985 Act on parties’ willingness to 
negotiate a settlement is discussed at section 4.9 below.
132 1991 SLT 11.
133 Ibid at 13, as highlighted by Clive, supra n. 119 at 458-459.
134 Jacques v Jacques, supra n. 87 per Lord Jauncey o f Tullichettle at 22.
135 Supra n. 94.
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but also for his ‘know-how’ and other indemnities and covenants given by him, which 
reflected his work both during and prior to the marriage. With reference to the sale of this 
business, the court was not satisfied that the evidence disclosed any special circumstances 
which were capable of displacing the presumption that equal division was fair. Similarly, 
despite an acceptance by the court in Sweeney v Sweeney136 on appeal, that a contingent 
liability to capital gains tax could constitute special circumstances justifying a departure 
from equal division, the court was satisfied that the defender’s business was capable of 
supporting such an order. Conversely, much debate has surrounded the issue of whether a 
certain instance or set of circumstances might qualify as “special circumstances” thereby 
allowing deviation from the principle of equal sharing. In Farrell v Farrell137 the court 
accepted the fact of special circumstances pursuant to section 10(6) where failure to 
depart from the principle of equal division would necessitate the sale o f the pursuer’s 
home in circumstances where she had voluntarily assumed the defender’s share of the 
mortgage. In Bremner v Bremner, 138 despite strong arguments to the contrary, when 
considering the fair division of the property, the court was prepared to regard the conduct 
of the parties as a circumstance that would permit a deviation from the principle of equal 
division where such conduct had adversely affected their resources. The court held that it 
was not unjust to have regard to the misconduct of the wife where such misconduct had 
an adverse effect on the husband’s capacity to work and thus was the cause o f a 
diminution in his resources. Further the court did not regard it appropriate to require 
proof of any element of intention or foreseeability.
Finally, with reference to several existing decisions,139 the court in Day or Wilson v 
Day140 justified its departure from the principle of equal division given that the primary 
source of the funds used to acquire the matrimonial property was the wife’s pre-marital 
inherited property. More practically, with reference to the earlier views o f Lord Eassie in
136 (No. 2) 2005 SLT 1141.
137 [1990] SCLR717.
138 [2000] SCLR912.
139 Jesner v Jesner 1992 SLT 999; Davidson v Davidson 1994 SLT 506; MacLean v MacLean 2001 Fam 
LR 118.
140 [2009] Fam LR 18.
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R v i?,141 the lower court noted that where a significant amount of the matrimonial 
property is derived from assets donated or inherited by one party, this does amount to a 
special circumstance that justifies the departure from the presumption of equal division.
Although section 10(6) sets out a list o f circumstances which might constitute special 
circumstances and justify a departure from equal division, it serves merely as “guidance 
to the court... [but does not] ... .fetter its discretion in applying the principle set out in sec 
(9)(l)(a)”,142 i.e. a fair division of the property. The outstanding need for underlying 
discretionary scope for the judiciary is regarded as necessary,
“...in a field where individual cases vary so greatly, where legislation 
cannot reasonably provide for so many different eventualities and 
where the court which has heard the evidence is best equipped to 
deal with each situation as it arises.”143
Ultimately Clive emphasises the need for the special circumstances cited to “always be 
such as to justify a departure from the norm of equal sharing.”144 However the list of 
special circumstances included in section 10(6) of the 1985 Act is not exhaustive and 
they are listed “without prejudice to the generality of the words” and the over-riding 
statutory aim of fairness.145
4.6 Statutory factors
As well as the five key principles outlined in s. 9(1) (a)-(e), section 11 sets out a number 
of ‘factors’ to which the court must have regard in determining what orders to make. It 
has been suggested that this presents an opportunity for decisions to be made and
141 [2000] Fam LR 43.
142 Jacques v Jacques, supra n. 87 at 22.
143 Ibid. Lord Jauncey was o f the view that “the matter is essentially one o f discretion, aimed at achieving a 
fair and practicable result in accordance with common sense.”
144 Supra n. 117 at 460.
145 Ibid at 461, quoting from the judgment delivered in White v White [1992] SCLR 769, involving a 
marriage o f very short duration.
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retrospectively justified with reference to the ‘matching’ factor.146 Another instructive 
feature of the 1985 Act is the specific categorisation o f factors relevant to each of the 
underlying principles contained in section 9. Uniquely section 9(1 )(a) which requires the 
net value of the matrimonial property to be shared fairly between the parties, is not 
assisted by the identification of any relevant factors. It is arguable that it is the impact of 
the other four principles,147 and their associated guiding factors, detailed below, which 
will determine what constitutes a fair division o f the property, thereby satisfying the over­
riding aim of the Act.
Where the circumstances of the case cause the court to be influenced by section 9(1 )(b) 
(fair account of any economic advantage/disadvantage derived by a party from the 
contributions of the other), section 11(2) requires the court to have regard to the extent to 
which -
(a) the economic advantages or disadvantages sustained by either 
party have been balanced by the economic advantages or 
disadvantages sustained by the other party, and
(b) any resulting imbalance has been or will be corrected by a 
sharing of the value of the matrimonial property or otherwise.
In applying the principle set out in section 9(1 )(c), (fair sharing o f the economic burden 
of caring after divorce for a child of the marriage), section 11(3) sets out eight factors to 
which the courts must have regard. These factors refer to any child aliment order, cost or 
loss of earnings arising from child care, need for suitable accommodation for the child, 
age and health of the child, the education, financial and other circumstances o f the child, 
the availability and cost of suitable child care facilities or services, the needs and 
resources of the parties and all other circumstances. Section 11(4) focuses more closely 
on the financial position of the claimant spouse, deemed to be o f particular significance 
in relation to the section 9(2)(d) principle (adjustment o f dependent spouse over three- 
year period). The factors deemed relevant to such a decision are fivefold: the age, health 
and earning capacity of the claimant, the duration and extent o f the dependence, any
146 Supra n. 55 at 18, where Dick notes the difficulties o f assessing what particular “pik-n-mix” of 
principles, factors and orders are appropriate in any one case.
147 Sections 9(l)(a)-(d), set out above at section 4. 4.
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intention of the claimant to undertake a course of education or training, the needs and 
resources of the parties and all other circumstances of the case. Finally for the purpose of 
applying section 9(2)(e) (reasonable financial provision for a spouse who on divorce is 
likely to suffer serious financial hardship), section 11(5) sets out five factors that are 
relevant: the duration and nature of the marital relationship; the age, health and earning 
capacity o f the claimant, the standard o f living of the parties during the marriage, the 
needs and resources o f the parties and all other circumstances o f the case.
On the one hand, in identifying specific factors relevant to individual principles, the 
legislature has attempted to reduce the scope of judicial discretion and require the courts 
to select from a series of pre-identified statutory factors. However, given the repeated 
inclusion of the “all other circumstances of the case” factor, there does remain scope for 
the courts to identify any other factor as relevant. Clive regards the inclusion of the 
section 11 statutory factors as essentially a means of further expanding the section 9 
guiding principles and the section 10 special circumstances.148 Further the 1985 Act does 
not expressly require the courts to account for the decisions made nor to refer to those 
factors that have influenced the decision-making process.
4.7 Spousal support
The manner in which the issue of spousal support is governed by the provisions of the 
1985 Act, is premised upon a number of presumptions and stated objectives, similar to 
those governing the provision of financial support generally. Periodical allowance orders 
can be made by the court under section 8(1 )(b), in circumstances where such an order is 
justified by the principles contained in section 9 o f the 1985 Act, and would be 
reasonable having regard to the resources of the parties. However one obvious distinction 
between lump sum and property transfer orders on the one hand and maintenance orders 
on the other is the statutory preference for the former, more easily to facilitate a clean 
financial break between the parties. Thus, typically, orders for post-divorce spousal 
support payments are not made where the division o f the property, equal or otherwise,
148 Supra n. 117 at 473.
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sufficiently provides for the parties. The making of an order for a periodical allowance, 
which is considered in more detail in section 13(2) of the 1985 Act, directs that such an 
order should not be made unless it is justified by a principle set out in section 9(1 )(c), (d) 
or (e) and an order for the payment o f a capital sum or transfer of property would be 
inappropriate or insufficient. Thus, the starting point for the periodical allowance 
payment under the 1985 Act is negative, with the legislature preferring the courts to make 
provision for the spouses through all other means, prior to considering the merits of a 
periodical allowance order.149 Where ongoing spousal support is deemed necessary, 
section 9(1 )(d), as discussed above at section 4.4, expressly limits the payer’s obligations 
to a maximum of three years. As mentioned, only where the proof o f “serious financial 
hardship” arising “as a result of the marriage” are met can the court consider ordering the 
payment of spousal support beyond this term.150
Generally in respect o f the issue of spousal support, the legislative approach is once again 
to limit the scope of the judicial discretion exercisable, yet without eliminating judicial 
freedom to do justice where necessary. It was expressly recognised by the Law 
Commission in the 1981 Report that justice might require the courts to provide for a 
‘transitional measure’, designed to ease the change in marital status and circumstances. 
Such an approach recognises the significant impact of the divorce decree but equally 
demands that both parties eventually take responsibility for their individual 
circumstances, “to look towards an independent future, and to effect so far as possible a 
“clean break” with the past”.151 The Law Society of Scotland has equally emphasised the
149 Supra n. 2 at para 3.43, the Scottish Law Commission noted that with the exception o f one dissenting 
voice, there was “no support for the view that the objective of financial provision on divorce should be the 
continuation of the obligation o f life-long support which existed during the marriage.” It was further noted 
by the Commission that such an approach would be inconsistent with the idea that divorce terminates a 
marriage. The fact of the periodical allowance option being of secondary consideration to the making of a 
capital sum award was considered with reference to the particular facts and circumstances o f the defender 
in P v P, supra n. 109. Although recognising that a periodical payments order should only be made where 
the capital sum award would be inadequate and equally that in this instance the capital sum was sufficient, 
the court conceded that had it been required to make a periodical payments order it would have awarded 
such payments for the full three-year period.
150 Section 9(1 )(e), see further section 4.4 above.
151 Supra n. 2 at para 3.44. The research carried out by Jackson E, Wasoff F, Maclean M and Dobash R E, 
supra n. 115, noted at 245 that an analysis o f the positions adopted by the conflicting parties indicates a 
“clear preference for achieving a clean financial break between spouses, where possible”, although
220
importance of recognising the end to the marriage, noting that financial provision on 
divorce is based on “a fair winding up of a dead marriage, rather than an attempt to keep 
the parties in the financial position in which they would have been had the marriage 
continued”.152
Although the courts have been willing to grant orders for post-divorce spousal support 
where necessary, they have often placed short timeframes on the life span of such 
payments. For example, in Atkinson v Atkinson,152, whilst the wife received a capital 
settlement on divorce, she was also awarded periodical allowance, but only for the usual 
three-year period. Although she had independent earnings, these were only deemed 
insufficient in light of the standard of living enjoyed by the parties in the course o f their 
marriage. Similarly the court in Tyrell v Tyrell154 made an order for the payment of a 
periodical allowance, but only for a 12-month period, where the parties had been married 
for 18 years, there were no children of the union, and the applicant wife was in part-time 
employment at the time of the divorce. In those circumstances, the court held that 
although the pursuer was unlikely to suffer serious financial hardship in the absence of 
the defender’s financial periodical assistance, given her financial dependency upon him 
in the course of the marriage, a short and definite period of extended support was 
appropriate.
The Scottish statutory preference for a clean financial break has been strongly criticised 
by the House of Lords. For example, Lord Nicholls has expressed his failure to 
comprehend why the absence of capital assets should prevent a spouse from securing 
compensation deemed owing to her.155 In his view such an entitlement should always 
triumph over the desire for finality. The three-year restriction on the payment of
practitioners have conceded that seeking to achieve such a goal has often “clashed impossibly with the 
practical need to maintain a continuing financial commitment where there are still dependent children.”
152 “Law Reform: family law” (1992) 37(6) JLSS 235.
153 [1988] SCLR396.
154 1990 SLT 406.
155 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v MacFarlane supra n. 1 at 11. This point is repeated by Ellman who 
stresses that many longer marriages end with the parties “in very disparate financial circumstances that 
cannot be addressed appropriately with a clean break philosophy.” Ellman IM “Financial settlement on 
divorce: two steps forward, two to go.” [2007] LQR 2 at 8.
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maintenance was equally denounced by Lord Hope, who commended the English Law 
Commission’s co-existing goals o f certainty and flexibility. By way o f contrast with the 
approach of the Scottish Law Commission, Lord Hope noted that the English 
Commission had “attached greater importance to the flexibility than they did to certainty 
... [and thus]... avoided an approach that was too prescriptive”.156 These criticisms of the 
Scottish approach have however been rejected as unfounded. Both Norrie157 and more 
recently Clive158 have dismissed the suggestions of Lord Hope as a misinterpretation of 
the Scottish regulatory provisions. Clive explains very clearly how a Scottish court can in 
fact make a compensatory award to a wife who has sacrificed her career to care for the 
interests of the family, even where the husband does not have any available capital on 
divorce. He outlines how the court has the power to make a lump sum order, payable in 
instalments over a period of years, pursuant to section 12(3), which is in effect, akin to a 
maintenance order. This scope for providing for the dependent spouse from the future 
earnings of the breadwinner spouse is further facilitated by section 27(1), which provides 
that for the purposes o f adjudicating upon the concept of fairness, “resources” shall 
include the “present and foreseeable resources” of the parties. To illustrate this power, 
Norrie cites the example of Cunniff v Cw««/^159where the pursuer wife received 100% of 
the matrimonial property “explicitly because the husband had high earning potential and 
she had none”.160
Finally, despite the desire on the part of the legislature to limit both the making of 
periodical allowance orders and, where made, to restrict the period o f such orders, the 
Scottish courts have shown themselves willing to make periodical allowance orders of 
indefinite duration. In Johnstone v Johnstone161 the court ordered a weekly periodical
156 Supra n. 1 at para 105, with reference to para 21 of the Report o f the Law Commission on the Financial 
Consequences of Divorce (Law Com no 112) (England and Wales). Lord Hope noted that in publishing its 
report, the Scottish Law Commission included “a fully worked out system... [with]...no recommendation 
that the legislation that was proposed should be subject to monitoring or review. It was intended to 
establish the law not just for a generation. Like the Forth Bridge, it was built to last for a very long time.”
157 Supra n. 119.
158 Clive E “Financial Provision on Divorce” [2006] Edin LR 413; reacting to the comments of Lord Hope 
in Miller v Miller and McFarlane v Me Far lane.
159 [1999] SLT 992.
160 Supra n. 119.
161 [1990] SLT 79.
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allowance order of £100 until the death or remarriage of the applicant wife, given the 
almost complete lack of available assets and her ongoing ill-health which rendered her 
unable to work. Sheriff Ireland noted that although
“...in ordinary circumstances it should be possible for the parties to 
make a clean break so that one spouse should not be entitled to 
lifelong support from the other...her inability to work would mean 
that she would be totally dependent on state benefits and would 
therefore suffer serious financial hardship”.
Similarly in McKenzie v McKenzie,163 involving a 16-year marriage with no children, the 
court awarded both a capital sum and an indefinite periodical allowance to the applicant 
wife. In the course of his judgment, Lord Prosser explained his reluctance to limit the 
duration of the spousal support, given that he was satisfied at the time o f ordering the 
decree of divorce that, “in the near future.. .the pursuer will be seriously short of money”. 
Further he accepted as reasonable, a description of her situation as one o f “serious 
financial hardship” and thus, given the respondent’s substantial income and the fact that 
the pursuer was 60, he did “not think it appropriate to limit this to the three year 
adjustment period, but would leave it open-ended, with a view to relieving the pursuer of 
the hardship which I expect to continue beyond that period.”164 Thus the Scottish courts 
undoubtedly are vested with scope to maintain inter-spousal financial ties post-divorce. 
Whilst it is evident that the over-riding aspiration of the 1985 Act is to encourage and 
facilitate the parties to become financially independent as quickly as is feasible after the 
divorce, the Act is sufficiently broadly-drafted to allow the courts the leeway, where 
necessary, to provide for the dependent spouse who, because o f her circumstances, and 
the circumstances of the marriage, will “suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the 
divorce.” It appears, however, that whilst the courts have exercised their powers in this 
regard, they have done so very reservedly, thereby reflecting and promoting the general 
over-riding clean break policy of the governing provisions.
162 Ibid at 80.
163 [1991] SLT 461.
164 Ibid at 464.
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4 . 8  R o l e  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a r y
In a similar fashion to the existing Irish legislative position, traditionally the Scottish 
judiciary were accorded a significant amount of discretion in ordering financial relief. 
These powers were premised on the application o f general principles of reasonableness 
and fairness. Interestingly, following an overview of the various legislative regimes under 
Scottish law, (the then) Lord President Hope concluded that the current approach to the 
ordering of financial provision under section 8 o f the 1985 Act remains “essentially one 
of discretion, aimed at achieving a fair and practicable result in accordance with common 
sense”.165 Such a judicial interpretation of the provisions, together with the statutory 
requirement that “the net value of the matrimonial property should be shared fairly 
between the parties to the marriage”,166 suggests a distribution scheme that remains 
heavily reliant upon subjective judicial discretion. Conversely, however, Baroness Hale 
was more recently critical of the effect of the provisions o f the 1985 Act, noting that 
“these can operate harshly in some cases, particularly where the resources consist largely 
of income rather than property.”167 With reference to these views, Lord Hope, in his 
elevated capacity in the House of Lords, regards Baroness Hale as having identified 
where the problem lies.
“The flexibility which sheriffs and judges need to adapt the law to 
what would be regarded as fair today as compared with what was 
regarded as fair 25 years ago is denied to them.”168
The 1985 Act has attempted to place the role and powers o f the judiciary within the 
confines of the enunciated statutory provisions. This statutory guidance and governance, 
although not absolute in nature, narrows the freedom of the judiciary insofar as the 
decisions reached must be premised upon the underlying principles o f the Act. The most 
robust of the statutory presumptions contained in the 1985 Act is that o f the equal 
division of matrimonial property, which is to be the starting point o f every judicial
165 Little v. Little supra n. 130 at 787 per Hope LP. Similarly in McCaskill v McCaskill [2004] Fam. L.R.
123 it was affirmed by the court that in adjudicating upon the most appropriate order to be made, the 
decision was essentially a matter o f discretion.
166 Section 9(1) Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
167 Supra n. 1 at para 127.
168 Ibid at para 115.
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adjudication. However the unbending rigidity o f the Californian equal division of 
community property system169 is avoided by the statutory scope for divergence from this 
presumption. Whilst section 10 develops the section 9 requirement o f fairness by 
equating it to equal division, the Scottish Law Commission, in drafting their proposals 
which ultimately formed the basis for the 1985 Act, was unwilling to adopt this as an 
absolute principle and hence section 9 includes four other governing principles, and 
further, section 11 sets out those matters that should influence the particulars of the 
financial relief orders. By definition, as these factors must be considered, there exists a 
very real possibility that the matrimonial assets will not be divided equally, permitting 
one or more factors to justify an unequal division of the assets. Notwithstanding this, the 
structured approach adopted serves to direct the court in a variety o f pre-identified 
generalised circumstances, with the intention o f providing relatively predictable solutions 
to many, as yet, unheard cases. The impact of this deliberate legislative approach was 
recognised by Lord President Hope when he set out his analysis o f the significant shift 
introduced by the 1985 Act.
“Important new powers have been conferred on the court which 
extend the possible ways in which the financial provision may be 
made. But the whole structure of the legislation is also new. The Act 
sets out in considerable and almost clinical detail the nature of the 
property with respect to which orders may be made, the principles 
which are to be applied and the factors which are to be taken into 
account. No stone seems to have been left unturned in this analysis.
The court is taken step by step through a complicated check list of 
provisions to which it must have regard, so that no point that might 
conceivably be relevant is at risk of being forgotten as it proceeds 
through the exercise to the result.”170
This judgment of (the then) Lord President Hope, delivered in 1990, recognised the 
progressive developments in reforming the law o f asset division introduced to Scottish 
law by the 1985 Act as advocated by the Scottish Law Commission. However by 2006, in
169 See generally part 4 of chapter 4 above, which outlines the operation o f  the equal division rule under 
Californian divorce law.
170 Little v Little, supra n. 128 at 786-787.
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delivering his ruling in the House o f Lords in Miller v Miller and McFarlane v 
McFarlane, Lord Hope was less complimentary in his commentary, as noted above.
4.9 Private ordering in the shadow of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985
It has been suggested by Dick that in most cases of marital breakdown in Scotland,
“...financial arrangements following separation are resolved by 
agreement between the parties rather than by order o f court. So using 
negotiation is how most couples unscramble their finances at the end 
of a relationship.”171
Whether private ordering is an equal or better alternative to judicial determinations of 
matrimonial dispute is always hard to gauge. Wasoff has highlighted the difficult realities 
of the negotiation process, rejecting the oft-used term of ‘agreement’, noting that what is 
more typically reached is a settlement, representing the best possible, though not ideal, 
outcome for each of the parties.172 She regards the term ‘settlement’ as better capturing 
“the sense o f reluctance, duress, perceived absence of reasonable alternatives, and a best 
possible and often grudging solution in the circumstances.”173
When considering the role of the governing legal structure in influencing private ordering 
on divorce, the ability to identify the objectives of the governing regime and reasonably 
predict the approach of the court, does assist in creating an environment more suited to 
settlement. The combined work of Jackson, Wasoff, Maclean and Dobash presents an 
assessment of the weighting of rules and discretion in the asset distribution process on 
marital breakdown and considers the impact of various regulatory approaches on the
171 Supra n. 49 at 187.
172 Wasoff F “Mutual Consent: Separation Agreements and the Outcomes o f Private Ordering in Divorce” 
(2005) 27 JSWFL 237.
173 Ibid at 247. Wasoff states that whilst agreements suggest “a civilised response to separation that is less 
conflictual and acrimonious than a court-mediated outcome”, her research indicates that the outcome of her 
interviews with those who entered into such settlements reported “high emotion, conflict antagonism and 
compromise” as the norm.
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possibility and success o f private ordering.174 Jackson et al have highlighted the 
importance of private ordering, its ability to facilitate individual autonomy, bespoke and 
more durable arrangements that are more likely to be implemented and less likely to 
cause ongoing conflict. In relation to the Scottish data gathered in the course of their 
study, they report that “there was a strong norm favouring a non-adversarial mode of 
negotiation, which sought to identify common ground and minimize conflict”, regarded 
by the writers as arising from a “desire to conserve the matrimonial resources by 
minimizing legal costs... [and]...to minimize the uncertainty o f the outcome of a 
prolonged or defended legal battle”.175 This view is supported by Dick insofar as she 
acknowledges that the
“...underlying principles of the 1985 Act encourage a civilised 
approach to resolving the financial aspects o f the significant 
transition a separation entails. They foster fairness and respect, 
encourage a bespoke approach and discourage apportionment of 
blame.”
The support of the courts in enforcing the agreed terms can further enhance the parties’ 
willingness to utilise the negotiation process to resolve disputes. Approving this position, 
Wise notes that
“...in Scots law, unlike other jurisdictions of the UK, where parties to 
a marriage ...enter into a contract regulating their financial affairs on 
divorce, that contract is enforceable and the courts will not interfere 
with, or enquire into the substance of its terms unless it is challenged 
by one party or the other”.177
In the course of their research on the impact of the 1985 Act on divorce practice, Wasoff, 
Dobash and Harcus have concluded that, despite the research being carried out only 2-3 
years after the legislation came into force, “the main broad objectives and concepts of the
174 Supra n. 115. The research considers the contrasting legal frameworks existing in England/Wales and 
Scotland, and the workings o f “the informal legal processes which operate during divorce between 
solicitors and their clients”.
175 Ibid at 244.
176 Supra n. 49 at 192.
177 Wise M “New Developments in Mediation in Scotland” [2009] IFL 42. See also Junor G “Challenging 
Separation Agreements” 1998 SLT 185.
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Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 had become integrated into normal divorce practice.”178 
Further they concluded that the “principles and concepts introduced by the Act had had a 
major impact in setting the agenda or framework for early discussion of financial 
arrangements”.179 This was regarded by parties engaging in settlement negotiations as 
providing clearer rules thereby reducing the scope for dispute and ultimately was 
regarded by Wasoff et al as encouraging voluntary agreements to avoid determination by 
the courts. Similarly Dick has sought to assess the extent to which the objectives which 
underpin the 1985 Act can assist in negotiations.180 She identifies the usefulness of being 
able to emphasise to clients the starting point of equal sharing and the certainty with 
which such clients can be advised as to the absence o f any circumstances that give rise to 
an automatic right to more than half of the assets. Further, the need for both parties to 
agree to the compromised settlement requires a mutual acceptance that realistically both 
parties and any children must benefit in some manner from the settlement reached. If 
accepted as a basic requirement of any negotiated settlement, she suggests the clients are 
more likely to accept the need for “an objective, rather than subjective test o f fairness”.181 
Ultimately Dick concludes that the
“...principled basis for the Act can be used gently to assist parties to 
step out of a restricted and reactive view of their circumstances and 
see a picture which in turn can help in the process o f adjustment to 
the reality of a separation.”182
Thus private ordering, although ‘owned’ by the parties, operates within a broader context 
influenced significantly by public policy issues and needs.183 Given that the Scottish 
system is fundamentally premised upon a presumption o f fairness demanding equal 
sharing, the individual and social perceptions of this concept are vitally important. Dick
178 Supra n. 130 as part o f opening ‘summary’.
179 Ibid.
180 Supra n. 49 at 189.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid. Later at 192 Dick states that the “combination of a starting point for division but with the flexibility 
of some discretion is particularly well suited to negotiation.”
183 Supra n. 130 at 249, per Wasoff et al. Private ordering is far from private, it does not operate 
independently; rather it “is framed and constrained by the statutory framework on divorce”. Wasoff et al 
emphasise the financial and social public interest in the process and outcomes o f the negotiation process, 
with reference to the cost to the public purse and the over-riding need for fair and reasonable outcomes 
which serve the best interests o f the children.
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highlights the difficulties in attempting to convince the conflicting parties to agree to “an 
objective benchmark for fairness” given the likelihood of “any shared vision of fairness” 
being likely to recede quite quickly at the end of a relationship. Thus Dick regards the 
express inclusion of the section 9 governing principles as providing the benchmark for
184identifying fairness in such circumstances.
5 Conclusion - prioritisation of legislative principles over judicial law-making
The Scottish regulatory approach to asset division on divorce represents an interesting 
hybrid of the contrasting practice of rigidly applied rules o f equal division and the more 
discretion-based concept of equitable division. When compared with the Irish legislative 
position, it is arguable that the Scottish system for asset distribution and financial 
provision represents a more structured and purpose-driven approach, insofar as its 
statutory provisions are underpinned by identified objectives and supplemented with 
guiding factors to assist the judiciary in their decision-making process. What has been 
achieved is the clear identification of the policy goals and principles to be followed.
As regards the process of asset and wealth distribution, unlike in Ireland where the 
available assets and future earnings are examined collectively and the court is empowered 
to make whatever ancillary relief orders required by justice, under Scottish law the 
judicial power to order property transfers and lump sum payments on the one hand, and 
periodic spousal maintenance on the other, are dealt with separately. Section 13(2) 
demonstrates the stated legislative preference for the making o f a property order where 
possible, prohibiting the court from making an order for a periodical allowance under 
section 8(2) unless it is satisfied “that an order for payment o f a capital sum or for 
transfer of property under that section would be inappropriate or insufficient...” The 
regulation and practice regarding the making of property and/or maintenance orders is an 
issue which is treated quite differently in the jurisdictions considered in this work, and 
will be discussed later in the conclusion, with a view to identifying the reasoning and 
outcome of the varied approaches. It is interesting to observe and worthy of mention that
184 Supra n. 49; Dick considers the extent to which the section 9 principles can assist parties to secure an 
agreed settlement of the issues on marital breakdown.
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irrespective of the regulatory approach adopted in respect of asset distribution, there 
remains scope in each o f the four jurisdictions considered, for the ordering of indefinite 
post-divorce inter-spousal periodic payments.
Whereas in other jurisdictions parliamentary debates and contemporary social norms 
might be utilised to identify the fundamental aims o f legislation, the inclusion of 
underlying principles in section 9 of the 1985 Act serves to expressly indicate the aims of 
the Scottish provisions, thereby guiding the decision-making process and more 
successfully eliminating excessive judicial freedoms. Whether they are effective is 
always difficult definitively to determine, a weakness identified generally in this work. 
The success of any approach might best be determined by its capacity to limit 
inappropriate judicial discretion, equally it may be measured by the ‘fairness’ of the 
outcome of the cases and the certainty and democracy a particular approach attracts. 
Under Scots law, the identification of detailed statutory guidelines for the judiciary, 
which comprise both underlying principles to indicate policy aims in allocating marital 
assets, and also the pronouncement of the factors to be taken into account, represent 
attempts to steer the judiciary in directions that have been settled following much public 
and learned consultation. Against this background Lord Hope has critically noted that the 
1985 Act remains “almost unaltered for over twenty years”,185 and has effectively 
eliminated the scope for the “development of general judicial practice.”186
In assessing the Scottish position, it appears that the system in operation successfully 
achieves all three benchmarks of democracy, predictability and fairness. By legislatively 
articulating policy goals which place parameters upon the judicial discretion exercisable, 
the laws are both democratic and relatively predictable in their application. In addition, 
the residual scope to avoid equal division where it would be unfair in the circumstances, 
allows the rigidity of the Californian rule-based approach to be avoided. Thus, although it 
is difficult to pronounce definitively upon the success or otherwise o f a particular
185 Supra n. 1 per Lord Hope at para 110.
186 Judicially developed policy is a well-utilised practice in England and Wales, as mentioned by Lord 
Cooke o f Thomdon in White v White [2001] AC 596. This scope for the judicial development o f practices 
and principles has formed the basis o f the development o f divorce laws in many common law jurisdictions 
where judicial discretion forms the basis o f the regulatory process.
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approach in the abstract, the impact of the Scottish regime will, in the final chapter, be 
considered in comparison with the other approaches examined in this work, with a view 
to identifying considered and effective reforms for the Irish regulatory approach.
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Chapter 6 - The Regulation of Asset Distribution on Divorce -  The New Zealand
approach
1. Introduction
New Zealand divorce laws occupy a relatively central position on the rules/discretion 
continuum, operating from presumptive starting points but also dependent upon the 
exercise of limited judicial discretion. The system is guided largely by the identified 
underlying aims that are expressed as statutory principles, and represents a very clear 
illustration of the mix of rules and discretion advocated by Schneider1 as the optimum 
approach to regulation. As the last jurisdiction to be considered in this work, the New 
Zealand system demonstrates a considered and goal-driven approach to the regulation of 
asset division on divorce and consequently positions itself well to secure all three 
benchmarks identified earlier2 as components of an effective regulatory system: 
democracy, predictability and fairness. As with Scotland, the legislative enunciation of 
both the purpose and principles of the governing legislation gives rise to democratically- 
created laws which, given their application in light of stated aims should be immediately 
more predictable in their outcome. In addition, the enhanced statutory-based judicial 
powers, to bring about substantive equality through the equalisation o f post-divorce 
economic disparity, represent an effective means of guaranteeing fairness whatever the 
circumstances.
In its approach to governing the division of assets on marital breakdown, New Zealand 
presents an interesting history of evolving laws and processes resulting most recently in a 
detailed statutory framework with scope for individualised and creative justice where 
necessary. As part of this legislatively-driven system, the New Zealand lawmakers have 
primarily recognised the merits of identifying underlying policy aims and have expressly
1 The views of Schneider are explained at length in section 2 o f chapter 1 above.
2 The identification of these criteria as the basis for an effective system o f regulation is first mentioned in 
section 2 of the introduction to this work, and subsequently they form the benchmarks for the critical 
assessment of the regulatory systems operating in the four jurisdictions considered in the course of this 
work.
232
incorporated such aims into recent law reforms. The expansion of the asset distribution 
system to provide scope for a multitude o f remedies will be assessed, with these remedies 
being examined as to their capacity singularly or collectively to provide appropriately for 
all parties to a marital dispute. In critically examining the interesting mix of rules and 
discretionary powers which form the foundations of the New Zealand regime, this 
chapter will usefully illustrate an alternative approach which might instruct any critique 
or reform of the Irish approach to asset distribution. The value of selecting New Zealand 
as the basis for comparative study is twofold; firstly New Zealand governance is 
premised upon a system of co-existing lawmakers, with both the legislature and judiciary 
recognised as holding valid and vital roles in the creation o f law and policy. Thus whilst 
the recent reforms are founded upon detailed legislative provisions, they equally rely 
upon judicial law and policy making within that considered context. Secondly, the 
reforms have recognised the importance of identifying the underlying social policy goals 
of state regulation o f marriage breakdown, establishing an agreed structure and set of 
objectives within which individual cases can be adjudicated and resolved.
2. Matrimonial Property Act 1976
2.1 Introduction
When first enacted, the New Zealand Matrimonial Property Act 1976 was regarded as 
innovative in its attempt to bring about financial equality between divorcing spouses. It 
replaced the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 and removed broad-based discretionary 
powers as the basis for deciding issues of asset distribution, substituting for them a strong 
presumption of equal sharing.3 Of its time, Atkin notes the “underlying revolutionary 
nature of the legislation” whereby
“.. .marriage was seen as a partnership, not as before as two separate 
individuals, to be dealt with not according to the property law that 
applies to strangers but according to a specialised law that better
3 See section 2.2 below which sets out the legislative provisions enacted by the 1976 Act which imposed 
the presumption of equal sharing.
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reflects the overall realities o f relationships.”4
At the time of its enactment McLay, the then Minister for Justice, regarded this new 
presumption of equal division as representing “a very important social advance and... a 
bold step forward”5 whilst Vaver regarded it as “the first true matrimonial property 
system in [New Zealand] history”.6 The long title stated that the purpose of the 1976 Act 
was
“...to reform the law of matrimonial property, to recognise the equal 
contribution of husband and wife to the marriage partnership, [and] 
to provide for a just division of the matrimonial property between 
the spouses when their marriage ends by separation or divorce.”7
The 1976 Act was very detailed in its content, which was regarded as necessary, given 
the complexities of the issues to be resolved. McLay noted that whilst some lobby groups 
were critical of this level of detail, their representations were rejected by the Statutes 
Revision Select Committee charged with considering the Bill. The Committee concluded 
that “any substantial simplification” would be deceptive and illusory because it would 
simply “transfer to the unpredictable process of judicial interpretation the answering of 
important questions that pose themselves in any attempt to reform Matrimonial Property
o
law.” Thus a very deliberate policy choice was adopted by the New Zealand legislature 
in favour of statutorily-created rules as the decision-making basis for asset distribution on 
divorce.
The Court of Appeal in Z v Z9 presented an overview of the critical functions of the 1976 
Act, noting that the dual purposes of the Matrimonial Property Act were to recognise “the
4 Atkin B “Harmonising Family Law” 2006 VUWLR 465 at 467-468. This chapter commences with a 
detailed consideration of the 1976 Act and its effect in practice, in order to demonstrate the shortfalls of a 
presumption of equal division and to illustrate the benefits o f a reflective and policy-driven approach to 
reform, as subsequently adopted by New Zealand law-makers.
5 JK McLay The Matrimonial Property Act, 1976 Legal Research Foundation Inc Seminar 2 February 
1977, Auckland University at 12.
6 Vaver P Notes on the Matrimonial Property Act, 1976 Paper presented at the Legal Research Foundation 
Inc. Seminar 2 February 1977 Auckland University at 55.
7 The long title was repealed by section 4 of the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001.
8 Quoted by McLay, supra n. 5 at 13.
9 [1997] NZFLR 241.
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equal contribution of husband and wife to the marriage partnership” and to provide for a 
“just division of the matrimonial property” on the dissolution of the marriage.10 In 
defending its provisions, McLay explained that the 1976 Act had evolved from the 
experiences of the 1963 Act and had essentially sought to address the shortfalls of that 
Act. In this regard he identified a “certain rigidity in the presumptions that are to be 
applied and the rules that are laid down”, a reaction to the shortcomings and excessive 
judicial discretion arising from the 1963 Act and related judicial decisions.11
2.2 Presumption of equal division of matrimonial property
Section 11 of the 1976 Act provided that all matrimonial property was to be divided 
equally on divorce, subject to exceptions, including the right to opt out o f the statutory 
rules generally. The 1976 Act, in defining property, created the subcategories of separate, 
matrimonial and balance of matrimonial property, with each category receiving different 
treatment on divorce. Matrimonial property was defined in section 8 by reference to an 
exhaustive list:
“Matrimonial property shall consist of -
(a) The matrimonial home whenever acquired; and
(b) The family chattels whenever acquired
(c) All property owned jointly or in common and in equal shares by 
the husband and wife; and
(d) All property owned immediately before the marriage by either the 
husband or the wife if  the property was acquired in contemplation of 
his or her marriage to the other and was intended for the common 
use and benefit of both the husband and wife; and
(e) Subject to subsections (3) to (6) of section 9 and to section 10 of 
this Act, all property acquired by either the husband or the wife after 
the marriage, including property acquired for the common use and 
benefit of both the husband and the wife out o f property owned by
10 Ibid at 244-245. The court in Z  v Z, per Richardson J regarded the 1976 Act as having four relevant 
features; the classification o f property, the presumption o f equal contributions and consequently equal 
division on breakdown, the identification of assets available for distribution and the requirement that, 
where possible, the court should make orders permitting a clean financial break between the parties.
11 Supra n. 5 at 22. The 1976 Act also removed the need for spousal contributions to the marriage to be 
reflected, directly or indirectly, in the property held by one or both spouses. See further Parker W New 
Zealand Property Rights Legislation: A Changing Landscape? AIFS Conference Paper 2000.
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either the husband or the wife or both of them before the marriage or 
out of the proceeds o f any disposition of any property so owned; and
(f) Any income and gains derived from, the proceeds of any 
disposition of, an increase in the value of, any property described in 
paragraphs (a) to (e) of this section; and
(g) Any policy o f assurance taken out by one spouse on his or her own 
life or the life o f the other spouse, whether for his or her benefit or 
the benefit of the other spouse (not being a policy that was fully paid 
up at the time o f the marriage and not being a policy to the proceeds 
of which a third person is beneficially entitled), whether the 
proceeds are payable on the death of the assured or on the 
occurrence of a specified event or otherwise; and
(h) Any policy of insurance in respect of any property described in 
paragraphs (a) to (e) of this section; and
(i) Any pension, benefit, or right to which either the husband or the 
wife is entitled or may become entitled under any superannuation 
scheme if the entitlement is derived, wholly or in part, from 
contributions made to the scheme after the marriage or from 
employment or office held since the marriage, and
(j) All other property that the spouses have agreed, pursuant to section 
21 of this Act, shall be matrimonial property; and
(k) Any other property that is matrimonial property by virtue o f any 
other provision of this Act or by virtue of any other Act.”
Conversely, section 9 provided that separate property, defined as “all property of either 
spouse which is not matrimonial property”, and deemed to include gifts, bequests and 
property brought to the marriage, was not to be subject to the presumption of equal 
division. Section 15 referred to property which could not be categorised as either 
matrimonial or separate property as balance o f matrimonial property and provided that it 
should be shared equally unless the contribution of one of the spouses to the marriage 
partnership had clearly been greater than the other spouse. Notwithstanding this over­
riding presumption of equality of division, section 13 provided for an exception in the 
case of a short marriage.12 In such circumstances, the division o f property was to be
12 A short marriage was defined by section 13(3) as “a marriage in which the spouses have lived together as 
husband and wife for a period of less than 3 years”. The subsection also allows the court to regard a 
marriage as one o f short duration where the spouses have lived together as husband and wife for a period of 
more than 3 years where it would be just to do so having regard to all the circumstances of the marriage. 
Atkin and Parker note that this might arise where there have been long periods o f separation during the 
relationship, or where some other factor exists that has affected the quality o f the relationship. In such 
circumstances justice might demand that the marriage is categorised as one o f short duration. Atkin B and 
Parker W Relationship Property in New Zealand (Butterworths) (2001) at 75. This special treatment of 
relationships of short duration has been maintained by section 2 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.
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determined in accordance with contributions to the marriage partnership. Where the court 
determined that equal division would be repugnant to justice it was then required to 
determine the division o f the relevant property “.. .in accordance with the contribution of 
each [spouse] to the marriage partnership”.13
2.3 Exceptions to equal sharing
Section 14 created a second exception to the presumption o f equal division as follows:
“Where there are extraordinary circumstances that, in the opinion of 
the Court, render repugnant to justice the equal sharing between the 
spouses of any property to which section 11 o f this Act applies or of 
any share of each shall, notwithstanding anything in section 11 or 12 
of this Act, be determined in accordance with the contribution o f  
each to the marriage partnership.”
One of the first applications decided under the 1976 Act, Castle v Castle™ considered the 
nature of the circumstances that should exist before the general presumption o f equal 
division could be rebutted. Notwithstanding the factual context o f gifts and dispositions 
received from the wife’s parents and the limited contributions o f the husband, Quilliam J 
considered that as a starting point, equal division of all matrimonial property was “the 
primary and governing intention of the legislature”.15 It was emphasised that the fact of a 
disparity of contributions was not enough. Rather, to order the unequal division of 
matrimonial assets, the governing legislation demanded evidence that “the disparity in 
contributions is so gross as to compel the court to conclude that equal division of the 
property would be repugnant to justice”.16 Similarly in Barton v Barton17 Woodhouse J 
stated that the onus of proof on the spouse seeking to avoid equal division “involves a 
positive demonstration that the contribution is greater to a significant degree so that the
13 Section 14. This test applies to the unequal division of matrimonial property and, pursuant to section 15, 
to non-domestic matrimonial property which was also to be shared equally unless one spouse’s contribution 
to the marriage partnership had clearly been greater than that o f the other.
14 [1977] 2NZLR97.
15 Ibid at 102.
16 Ibid at 103. Later Woodhouse J in Martin v Martin [1979] 1 NZLR 97 stated himself to be “in complete 
agreement” with the views expressed by Quilliam J.
17 [1979] 1 NZLR 130.
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1 8disparity really stands out in the circumstances of the case”. In the earlier case,
Quilliam J emphasised that “no mere imbalance in the contributions of the spouses, nor 
even a substantial imbalance, is intended to be treated as an extraordinary
circumstance”.19 However in McGill v Crozier,20 the court emphasised the importance of
0 1the residual discretionary power not to apply the equal division rule. To adhere to the 
presumption of equal division would have been repugnant to justice in the circumstances, 
given the husband’s malevolent attempts to re-classify the wife’s primary asset as marital 
property and simultaneously to avoid her claim to other assets by creating a trust for the 
benefit of his daughter for that purpose. Despite a pre-marital agreement to the contrary 
and even-though the wife’s total contributions were overwhelmingly greater than his, the 
husband sought to limit her claim in respect o f the family home. Although ultimately the 
circumstances of the parties and their marriage caused much of the property to be 
classified as separate property and thus not subject to equal division under section 11, it 
was noted by the court that had it been necessary to do so, it would have declared the 
circumstances so extraordinary as to warrant a non-equal division o f the assets.
Section 18 provided direction as to what might be regarded as a contribution relevant to 
the calculation o f unequal division; section 18(1) provided that a contribution to the 
marriage partnership meant all or any of the following:
“(a) The care of any child of the marriage or o f any aged or infirm 
relative or dependant of the husband or wife;
(b) The management of the household and the performance of 
household duties;
(c) The provision of money, including the earning o f income, for the
18 Ibid at 132.
19 At the original hearing of Castle v Castle, Quilliam J, having considered the circumstances of the case 
before the court, ordered that the matrimonial property be divided equally between the parties. On appeal, 
Castle v Castle [1980] 1 NZLR 14, the assets were divided 75:25 in favour o f the appellant-wife. Whilst 
Richardson J supported the views o f Quilliam J regarding the very strong presumption in favour of equal 
division, new evidence before the court persuaded him to order an unequal division.
20 [2001] NZFLR 870.
21 Ibid per Inglis QC, who presiding at the hearing, concluded that “the husband has grossly and 
untruthfully overstated his tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage partnership and...the 
wife’s total contributions of both kinds were overwhelmingly greater than his. Apart from the extent to 
which the husband shared in day-to-day living, he was essentially a passenger in the marriage in the 
preservation and creation of capital.”
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purposes o f the marriage partnership;
(d) The acquisition or creation of matrimonial property, including 
the payment o f money for those purposes;
(e) The payment o f money to maintain or increase the value o f -
(i) The matrimonial property or any part thereof; or
(ii) The separate property o f the other spouse or any part thereof:
(f) The performance o f work or services in respect o f—
(i) The matrimonial property or any part thereof; or
(ii) The separate property of the other spouse or any part thereof:
(g) The forgoing of a higher standard o f living than would otherwise 
have been available;
(h) The giving of assistance or support to the other spouse (whether 
or not of a material kind), including the giving of assistance or 
support which -
(i) Enables the other spouse to acquire qualifications; or
(ii) Aids the other spouse in the carrying on of his or her occupation 
or business.
Thus the court’s scope to determine what was to be regarded as a contribution worthy of 
recognition or recompense was expressly limited by this legislative list. However, 
although exhaustive in nature, the breadth of the possible contributions was recognised 
by Cooke J in Reid v Reid,22 who regarded the list as “showing that Parliament had in 
mind a wide conception of the marriage partnership”.23 This view was supported by Tapp 
who regarded the Act as “framed around the concept of marriage as a partnership of 
equals in which each spouse, by his/her unique effort, contributes to the acquisition of the 
partnership assets”.24 Unsurprisingly, in practice, the courts focussed upon those aspects 
of section 18 which applied to the individual case, as per the approach adopted by 
Richardson J in Castle v Castle where he identified three section 18 factors as relevant to 
his determination.
In the circumstances, he regarded the sale of the station wagon in 1971 and the allocation 
of the proceeds to the wife for her own use and benefit as a reflection o f her greater 
contribution to the marriage partnership up to that point. In respect o f the property 
purchased at that time, he noted that the husband did not make any monetary contribution
22 [1979] 1 NZLR 572.
23 Ibid at 598.
24 Tapp P “The New Zealand Matrimonial Property Act 1976” 1 OJLS 3 (Winter 1981) 421 at 422, with 
reference to the judgment of Richardson J in Martin v Martin.
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to its purchase whereas the wife paid the purchase monies from what he regarded to be 
her separate property, a contribution that was “over and above regular contributions made
9 <in the course o f the operation o f the marriage partnership.” Finally he noted that 
following these two events the marriage lasted for only another three years and two 
months and that upon the spouses living apart, the wife, whilst in full-time employment, 
had responsibility for the care of the three children o f the marriage. These disparities in 
contributions caused Richardson J to assess the wife’s contribution at 75% and the 
husband’s at 25% of the matrimonial property.
Notwithstanding the legislative attempts to create a quasi-rule based system of equal 
division of matrimonial property, the inclusion of scope for unequal division in 
exceptional cases granted the judiciary the scope to act as law-makers, and not 
surprisingly caused most contested cases to focus on the fact and scope o f such 
exceptional circumstances. Further the absence of a clear statement regarding the policy 
aims of the 1976 Act invariably encouraged the judiciary to take ownership o f the policy 
direction of its provisions.
2.4 Impact of presumption of equal division upon spousal inequalities
The 1976 Act employed very few traditional property law rules relating to ownership 
and/or property distribution. Rather it sought to ensure that in the event o f the breakdown 
of a marriage, both spouses were treated fairly and in line with their moral as well as 
legal entitlements:
“Although the Act operates upon “property” as a subject-matter the 
law it lays down is not a part of the law of property in any traditional 
sense. Instead it is social legislation aimed at supporting the ethical 
and moral undertakings exchanged by men and women who marry 
by providing a fair and practical formula for resolving the 
obligations that will be due from one to the other in respect of their 
“worldly goods” should the marriage come to an end. In that respect 
it can be regarded as one facet of the wider legislative purpose of 
ensuring the equal status of women in society.”26
25 Supra n. 19 at 26.
26 Supra n. 22 at 580, per Woodhouse J.
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Much has been written about the theoretical aims of the equal division rule under the 
1976 Act. Parker regarded the 1976 Act as a “groundbreaking piece of legislation”, 
noting its significant impact on social policy and its reflection of the push for liberal
77equality, driven predominately by the feminist movement in the 1970s. Tapp confirmed 
the view that the 1976 Act was intended as social legislation of the widest general 
application, “concerned with furthering the legislative purpose o f ensuring the equal 
status of women in society”.28 Similarly Vaver identified the policy behind the 1976 Act 
as reflecting “society’s concept o f marriage as a partnership”.29 By giving each spouse a 
fixed interest in the matrimonial property on divorce, she noted that the 1976 Act “gives 
security and certainty of interest to the wife thereby granting her the independence and 
dignity denied her by the 1963 Act which placed her in the position o f a dependant asking 
for a share in her ‘husband’s property’”.30 In this regard the 1976 Act eliminated the more 
traditional concept of actual contributions to ownership of property, preferring to 
recognise the spousal contributions to the partnership, ultimately rejecting the practice of 
placing a monetary valuation on such contributions.31
Woodhouse J in Reid v Reid recognised that the 1976 Act represented evidence of “the 
statutory recognition of the equal contribution made to the marriage partnership.”32 The 
presumption of equal division was firstly premised upon the fact o f the marriage and 
secondly upon the equal weighting of the monetary and non-monetary contributions, 
representing a significant but necessary departure from traditional principles of property 
law. The legislation in its operation eschewed a market-place valuation and comparison 
of the respective contributions of each of the spouses. The need for the equalisation of the 
spousal contributions was emphasised in the pre-enactment parliamentary debates as 
being driven by a desire to prevent the impoverishment o f the dependent homemaker post
27 Supra n. 11. Parker cites the Equal Pay Act 1972 as an example o f another statutory response to the fight 
for liberal equality.
28 Supra n. 24 at 422.
29 Supra n. 6 at 55.
30 Ibid.
31 Section 18(2) of the 1976 Act stated that there shall be no presumption that a contribution of a monetary 
nature is o f greater value than one o f a non-monetary nature.
32 Supra n 22 at 579.
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divorce.
. .it is no more than a belated recognition of the contribution to the 
property that is made by the partner who works in the home and with 
the children, who gives support and encouragement, and in many 
cases puts up with a lower standard of living to enable the other 
partner to advance a career or build up a business. Without this 
contribution the value o f the matrimonial property would in many 
cases be far less, and it is therefore no more than just to give the 
partner making it a proper share in its ownership.”
The traditionally-held view that equal division rebalanced any inequalities for the 
dependent wife has long been questioned in many jurisdictions.34 Similarly in the New 
Zealand context, despite a lack o f empirical research on the issue, it has been noted that 
there exists a “large amount of circumstantial and anecdotal evidence which corroborates 
the view” that equal division does not bring about equality of financial position between 
the spouses post divorce.35 With reference to such evidence of post-divorce economic 
disparity between spouses and the existing, similar overseas research, “it became de 
rigueur [at that time] to accept that we had a problem”.36 The uncertainty as to how to 
best tackle the issue was where the challenge arose.
The Report o f the Working Group on Matrimonial Property17 in 1988 observed that 
however radical the equal sharing regime may have appeared in 1976, it had in effect 
“failed to secure an equitable division of what might be called the product of the
33 408 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates at 4565; second reading o f the Matrimonial Property Bill.
34 In his reflection upon the enactment of the 2001 reforms, Atkin has noted that the recognition o f the fact 
o f post-divorce inter-spousal economic disparity “can be traced back at least 20 years [and] was not a 
sudden thought that someone had overnight.” He refers to the “rumbles” arising early on from the equal 
division rule of the 1976 Act: Atkin B “Economic disparity -  how did we end up with it? Has it been worth 
it?” (2007) 5 NZFLR 299 at 301. As regards international views on the impact o f equal division, chapter 4 
has already highlighted the research and views o f Weitzman L and others regarding the ‘feminization of 
poverty’, commenting on the widely held, yet misguided belief, that equal division gives rise to equality 
between the spouses. At the very least the strong ongoing earning capacity o f the breadwinner places him 
far ahead of the homemaker in terms of future earning capacity and financial security.
35 St John S Income Expectations of Men and Women after Separation Family Law Conference (1995) as 
cited by Atkin “The Rights o f Married and Unmarried Couples in New Zealand — Radical New laws on 
Property and Succession” 2003 15 CFLQ 173.
36 Per Atkin, supra n. 34 at 301.
37 The Report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection (1988) is considered 
in detail section 2.6 below.
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marriage”.38 This view was supported by the analysis presented at the same time by the 
Royal Commission on Social Policy.39 In its chapter dedicated to the issue of matrimonial 
property, the Royal Commission presented a very critical analysis of the impact of the 
1976 Act insofar as it governed property relations between spouses once a marriage had 
ended. Notwithstanding that the “principles and functioning of the [Act]... are centred on 
the need to achieve a form o f equality between men and women” the Commission relied 
upon the many submissions received to highlight the “perceived lack of equality of 
outcome and.. .consequent sense o f injustice to women and to the children of a marriage 
relationship”.40 In referring to the Act as “giving rise to severe injustice” and the 
consequential “deprivation” experienced by women and children, the Commission was 
damning of the effect of the rule o f equal division.
“An equal division of the family assets has been unable to give both 
the husband and the wife an equal springboard from which to begin 
their new and separate lives.”4
Ultimately the Report noted that the equal division of existing assets at the time of the 
separation/divorce often failed to produce true equality as the spouse with fewer or no 
career prospects was invariably disadvantaged. The Commission thus noted that the Act 
was fundamentally flawed and incapable o f achieving equality between the parties as it 
neither compensated the wife for her financial losses nor could it attack the future 
earnings of the husband.42
Similarly the court in Z v Z was critical o f the effect o f the provisions o f the 1976 Act 
notwithstanding its laudable aims.
38 Ibid at 6. See further at section 2.6 below.
39 Royal Commission on Social Policy Report (NZ Government Printer, April 1988) Volume IV, 217-29. 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy was established by the New Zealand Government in 1986 to 
examine social policy in New Zealand. Thus the focus of the Commission was not limited to family law but 
rather encompassed a whole range of social behaviour. Important aspects o f social policy identified and 
examined by the Commission were the areas of employment, education, housing, the justice system and 
health.
40 Ibid at 217. The Commission regarded women and children as being “economically handicapped by 
marriage breakdown”.
41 Ibid at 218.
42 Ibid at 219. Consequently, it was noted, a reduced standard o f living for the wife and the children was the 
usual outcome of divorce.
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. .while it achieves formal equality between the spouses in that the 
conventional items o f property are divided equally, it does not 
achieve actual equality when the husband is left with the ability to 
earn a significant income and the wife is left with little or no ability 
to earn a living and possibly little or nothing in the way of material 
assets from the marriage to assist her.. .Such an outcome cannot be 
easily reconciled with the objectives of equality and justice 
underlying the Act”.43
Miles supports this position, regarding the presumptive equal division rule under the 
1976 Act as “achieving equality in name only”.44 She refers to the often “uneven 
economic impact of marriage on the parties” which would leave one spouse, typically the 
wife, “in a substantially weaker financial position then the other [spouse] following the 
property settlement” 45 Similarly Atkin is critical of the manner in which the 1976 Act 
was originally framed, highlighting its failure to consider future needs and the fact that 
post-divorce, the parties may have distinctly unequal earning power. Typically he notes, 
it is the woman who is impoverished, be she “the woman with custody o f the 
children...[or]...the older woman who had assisted her professional husband without 
developing any career for herself’.46 More recently, Hammond J in his analysis of the 
2001 amendments noted that despite the original 1976 Act being premised upon the 
philosophical basis that “marriage was to be seen as a partnership with both parties 
contributing equally (albeit in different ways) to the relationship and the family”, the law 
as enacted was “inadequate”.47 Relying upon statutory rules to bring about equality had 
clearly failed, and attention was now focussed upon alternative means of regulation in 
order to achieve substantive equality.
43 Supra n. 9 at 275-276.
44 Miles J. “Dealing with Economic Disparity: An Analysis o f Section 15 Property (Relationships) Act 
1976” 2003 NZ Law Review 535 at 536.
45 Ibid.
46 Family Law Policy in New Zealand (LexisNexis) (Heneghan M and Atkin B ed) (1993) Chapter 5 
“Family Property” Atkin B at 205.
47 M  v B [2006] NZFLR 641 at 679-680. Hammond J was o f the view that the 1976 Act had “failed to 
resolve the problem that the parties might have distinctly unequal earning power. This gave rise to the 
situation that sometimes the woman came away in the worse position from a divorce. This was not because 
she did not have half of the “family assets”, but rather she was simply not in as good a position to support 
herself after divorce”.
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The Royal Commission concluded its report by stating that the division of marital 
property should reflect and take account of the reality of the disparity of earning powers 
post divorce and as a result should seek to achieve equality of result rather than equality 
simpliciter. This would typically involve an element of compensation for career sacrifices 
and responsibility for children, whilst protecting the living standards of the children who 
are likely to be adversely affected by any insecurity regarding housing.
“A principle o f equality o f result would look to the future and 
attempt to ensure that both spouses had equal ability to attain a 
reasonable standard of living.”48
The Commission proposed the development of a multi-faceted approach to securing 
equality of result; incorporating a judicial capacity to compensate for marriage-related 
economic disabilities, together with an assessment of (and capacity to provide for) future 
needs.49 The Commission concluded by noting the significant “social impact” of 
legislation regulating marriage and the family and thus warned that “its application must 
reflect the utmost concern with the social ramifications” of its provisions. To this end the 
Report emphasised the importance o f drafting any legislative changes with a view to 
achieving an equality of result between the spouses over all other outcomes.50
2.5 Judicial views of the 1976 Act
The courts in their application of the 1976 Act appeared immediately anxious to identify 
the Act’s aims and objectives. The consensus reached was that the aim of the 1976 Act 
was the equal division of matrimonial property, unless the circumstances, and in 
particular the contributions of the parties, were so unbalanced as to warrant a departure 
from that approach.
At first instance, Quilliam J in Castle v Castle regarded the Act as “expressly designed to 
exclude a division of property arrived at by a consideration o f respective contributions”
48 Supra n. 39 at 223.
49 Ibid at 224.
50 Ibid at 226. In particular the Commission noted that achieving an equality o f result between the spouses 
should supersede the satisfaction of immediate property rights.
245
which by contrast reflected the “basic theme” of the 1963 Act.51 Similarly in Martin v 
Martin52 Woodhouse J noted the reference in the long title of the 1976 Act to the concept 
of equality and to marriage as a partnership, which “becomes the foundation of the 
operative provisions o f the legislation”.53 Thus, the effect of the 1976 Act was to equalise 
the spousal contributions, irrespective o f their form. It was, he believed, the “statutory 
acceptance of the unique relationship o f marriage as a partnership of equals”.54 The 
important social significance o f the marital union and the deliberate legislative choices 
evident in the 1976 Act were regarded as indicative of a social and state policy in favour 
of the dependent homemaker spouse who deserved to share properly in the collective 
marital wealth and assets.
For the most part, the judiciary were reluctant to limit the application o f the 1976 Act. 
Cooke J in Dalton v Dalton55 warned against the self-imposition o f rule-based restraints, 
encouraging his colleagues to “be slow to fetter themselves by enunciating major 
principles stated nowhere in the Act itself.”56 He rejected the suggestion that Parliament 
had in any way limited the matters that could be taken into account in deciding whether 
extraordinary circumstances existed in any given case. Equally he stated that the 
circumstances which would make it “repugnant to justice” to divide assets equally were 
not statutorily defined. Insofar as this approach empowered the judiciary to decide the 
central issues of any case, he complimented the legislature for being “both deliberate and 
wise in saying no more.”57 He further noted that the broad responsibility o f the court was
“...to arrive at a result which is just in terms of the policies reflected 
in the legislation. It would be wrong to lay down inflexible rules 
which might fetter the discretion of the Court under s 2(2) to do 
justice in a practical way. Factual distinctions should not be elevated 
to the status of matters of principle.”58
51 Ibid at 103.
52 Supra n. 16.
53 Ibid at 99.
54 Ibid.
55 [1979] 1 NZLR 113.
56 Ibid at 117.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid at 159.
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Later in Meikle v Meikle59 Cooke J referred to the decision of the court in Paul v Pauf0 
(regarding the appropriate date for the valuation of property), where Woodhouse J had 
emphasised that it is the role o f the court “to make such order as appears just, and 
accordingly inflexible rules ought not to be laid down”.61
Conversely in Martin v Martin, Woodhouse J, favourably quoting the aforementioned 
views of Quilliam J, regarded the 1976 Act as essentially rule-based, referring by way of 
contrast to the approach under the 1963 Act which had “operated on the basis of a wide 
judicial discretion to achieve justice between husband and wife by leaving it to the Judge 
or Magistrate to make “such order as he thinks fit with respect to the property in 
dispute””.62 He regarded as the “primary purpose” of the 1976 Act, the substitution “for 
abstract and individual notions o f justice a settled statutory concept which must be taken 
from the Act itself.”63 Given this attempt to introduce a more regulated approach to asset 
distribution through statute, Woodhouse J warned against abuse o f this underlying 
judicial discretion and encouraged his colleagues to avoid the “temptation...to bend its 
language to conform to personal estimates o f what some class o f case may deserve”.64 In 
this regard, in the earlier case of Robertson v Robertson55 Quilliam J definitively asserted 
that judicial discretion must always be exercised “within the predominant provisions of 
the Act” and must be used only “for the purpose intended by the legislature in conferring 
it.” It appears therefore, that the only certainty on this issue was the lack of agreement 
amongst the judiciary as to the extent and scope o f judicial discretion exercisable.
It is hard to dispute the existence of judicial discretion under the provisions of the 1976 
Act, given the potential for varying interpretations o f fundamental concepts such as 
“extraordinary circumstances”,66 “repugnant to justice”,67 and how “justice” should be
59 [1979] 1 NZLR 137 at 147.
60 [1978] 2 NZLR 413.
61 Ibid at 415.
62 Supra n. 16 at 98.
“ ibid at 99.
64 “The general aims of the Act are clear enough and some o f the history o f litigation under the 1963 Act 
illustrates the danger of judicial glosses”; per Cooke J in Martin v Martin ibid at 105.
65 (1977) MPC 184.
66 The broad discretion-based decision-making process established by the 1976 Act is outlined in section
2.1 above.
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measured. With regard to the meaning of extraordinary circumstances under section 14, 
Woodhouse J in Martin v Martin noted that since the Act came into effect on 1 Feb 1977 
“there has been a difference o f opinion as to the meaning and effect of the section”.68 He 
highlighted the views o f Jeffries J in Madden v Madden59 where the latter had suggested 
that such circumstances “must be out of the usual course, or not customarily found” and 
further explained that extraordinary is “not a complex concept, although the degree of 
normalcy definitely presents difficulties.” Against this background Woodhouse J 
recognised “the variables and gradations that are associated with justice as an abstract 
concept”.70 Regarding the concept as difficult to define, he noted that there exists “an 
underlying and erroneous assumption that the concept is capable o f precise definition at 
the edges: that a given result will always be either just or unjust.”71 In the same case 
Cooke J, in considering the meaning o f the linked concepts o f “extraordinary 
circumstances” and “repugnant to justice” noted that “two broad schools of thought have 
emerged, although there are various shades o f opinion”.72 He mentioned the view 
espoused by Whits J in Beven v Beven73 that it is enough to show that equal sharing 
would be “clearly unjust”. Conversely he highlighted the view o f Quilliam J in Castle v 
Castle where he placed the emphasis on “extraordinary” and “repugnant”. Although 
Cooke J preferred the view o f Quilliam J, he was in no doubt that in its operation section 
14 required the court to invoke its opinion in each case:
“The Act has expressly left to the opinion o f the Court the question 
whether in the particular case there are extraordinary circumstances 
rendering equal sharing repugnant to justice.”74
The failings of the 1976 Act were clearly evident in the aforementioned case of Z v Z, in 
the determination of the wife’s application for a share in her husband’s future earnings. In
67 Proof that an order for equal division would be repugnant to justice required the court, under section 14, 
to divide the relevant property in accordance with spousal contributions in the course o f the marriage, supra 
section 2.1 above.
68 Supra n. 16 at 101.
69 (1978) MPC 134.
70 Supra n. 16 at 102.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid at 106 per Cooke J.
73 (1977) MCP 23.
74 Ibid at 107.
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delivering its judgment, the court acknowledged that the 1976 Act had failed adequately 
to empower the courts to compensate spousal contributions, as orders could only be 
sought in respect o f marital assets earned or held up to the date of the hearing. Rather 
than achieving its stated aims o f equality by permitting the homemaker spouse to share in 
the husband’s increased earning power, the court critically noted that the 1976 Act 
“perpetuates the injustice the Act was aimed at remedying”.75 It is quite apparent from 
the judgment, the redressing o f post-dissolution economic disparities between the parties 
was not a matter the judiciary felt itself empowered to address, despite its willingness to 
do so.
2.6 Report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property
The Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection was established as 
part of the New Zealand Government’s social policy reform programme and issued its 
report Report o f the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection in 
1988.76 Part I of the Report was concerned with a review of the Matrimonial Property Act 
1976 and included a re-examination of the underlying principles and provisions of the 
Act with a view to considering and ultimately identifying proposals for reform.
The Working Group commenced its analysis by identifying the general principles which 
it regarded as underpinning New Zealand’s divorce laws, in an attempt to place the 
operation of the 1976 Act within its larger regulatory context. The four principles 
identified were; that the law ought to reinforce equality of status between the sexes; that 
the law ought to endorse the concept of marriage as an equal partnership to which both 
partners contribute equally, although in different ways; that when a marriage fails the 
resolution of outstanding issues between the parties should not be unduly protracted and; 
that the State should continue to have an important role in supporting families that have
75 Supra n. 9 at 280.
76 Although established at approximately the same time as the Report o f the Royal Commission on Social 
Policy was issued, the Working Group was expressly established to consider the related issues of 
matrimonial property and family protection. Although their proximity in time and subject matter is obvious, 
(insofar as the Commission Report related to the impact o f the current marital breakdown regulatory system 
on society and social policy), the dedicated and focussed work o f the Working Party was necessary in the 
light of the significant calls at the time for the reform of asset distribution laws on divorce.
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lost the support o f the principal income earner, as in many cases there will not be 
sufficient money available after marriage breakdown to support two households.77
Section A of the Report commenced by recognising the fact of the wife’s domestic 
responsibilities ordinarily causing her to leave the marriage with a lower capacity to earn 
a reasonable income by comparison with the husband.78 Similarly the post-divorce child 
care responsibilities o f the custodial spouse, again, usually the wife, was shown to 
negatively impact upon her living standard generally. The Working Group considered the 
approach of some US states, whereby the earning capacity o f the breadwinner is treated 
as an asset of the marriage.79 By regarding it as an asset the court has the power to 
distribute between the parties, the future earnings o f the breadwinner spouse. However 
the Group ultimately rejected this approach, noting firstly that it would constitute “a 
radical departure from the principles o f present law” and secondly that the existing law of 
maintenance was capable o f providing for the ongoing needs o f the recipient spouse.80 In 
addition the Group highlighted the arbitrary nature of valuing future earnings and feared 
that such an amendment to the law might result in “capricious results”.81 The Group 
preferred the proposal of the Australian Law Reform Commission82 which advocated the 
application of a rule of equal sharing which could be varied where there was evidence of 
an imbalance of contributions and/or future disparity between the spouses arising from 
future child care responsibilities or the limits on potential earnings arising from the
77 Supra n. 37 at 3-4. The Working Group endorsed these existing principles as it was “not convinced that 
change would bring any attendant advantages”.
78 Ibid at 5.
79 Ibid; at 8-9 the Report considered the ruling o f the New York Supreme Court in O ’Brien v O’Brien 66 
NY 2d 57, as confirmed by the New York Court o f Appeals, where it was determined that a medical licence 
constituted marital property and on further appeal the Supreme Court identified the wife’s interest as a 
percentage o f the present value o f her husband’s training. Similarly the Report referred to the decision in In 
re Marriage of Horstmann 263 NW 2d 885 where the Iowa Supreme Court drew a distinction between the 
qualification and the associated increased earning power, determining that whilst enhanced earning power 
is a property interest, the degree per se is not. However the lack o f agreement States-wide was 
acknowledged in the Report, noting that in De Witt v De Witt 98 Wis 2d 44 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
highlighted the variable outcomes arising from securing a professional qualification and the lack of 
certainty or predictability as to a persons ability or willingness to realise its potential worth.
80 Ibid at 8-11. The issue o f classifying future earnings as matrimonial property also received the attention 
of the courts in Z v Z, considered at section 2.5 above.
81 Ibid at 9.
82 Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 39: Matrimonial Property (1987) Australian 
Government Publishing Service Canberra.
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marriage. However the Group was concerned with the extent of judicial discretion 
required to implement such an approach and feared that it might constitute an 
unnecessary encroachment upon the role and function of maintenance payments.83
As regards specific statutory reform to address the issue of spousal inequality post­
divorce, the Working Group made a number o f recommendations. It advocated a clearer, 
less complicated approach to the categorisation of property with a reduction to two 
categories of property; matrimonial and separate property, with all matrimonial property 
to be divided equally. It proposed the elimination of the category o f balance of 
matrimonial property,84 to enhance the scope of the property to be subject to the equal 
division rule, thereby further emphasising “the basic principles o f the Act, particularly 
that of equal contribution”.85 This in turn would acknowledge “the growing acceptance of 
the philosophy of the Matrimonial Property Act, that marriage is a partnership of equals 
to which both spouses make equal though often differing contributions”.86 In relation to 
the division of property, the Group proposed the retention o f the right to avoid equal 
division where not to do so would be repugnant to justice. However it recognised the 
potential difficulties with such scope for departure from a presumption o f equal sharing; 
citing a number of (then) recent cases which had evidenced very different judicial 
approaches to the issue.87 The particular problem of property being placed in trust to 
avoid the claims of the other spouse was considered and the Group proposed that the 
court retain a discretionary capacity to deal with such attempts to avoid spousal 
entitlements.88 As regards maintenance the Group strongly recommended a greater use of 
the power to order the payment of capital maintenance and suggested the express 
inclusion o f such an important judicial power.89
Thus the Report of the Working Group concluded that the problems arising from the
83 Supra n. 37 at 11.
84 Balance of matrimonial property was defined in section 15 o f the 1976 Act, as outlined previously in 
section 2.2 above.
85 Supra n. 37 at 25.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid at 26, with reference to the aforementioned Reid v Reid and Walsh v Walsh [1984] 3 NZFLR 23.
88 Ibid at 28-31.
89 Ibid at 39.
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application of the existing laws could best be addressed by maintaining the presumption 
of equal division, whilst extending the property to which the rule applied, by making it 
easier to reach property that had been placed in family trusts and by revising and 
enhancing spousal maintenance provisions.90
For all its apparent rules and presumptions, the 1976 Act therefore served to encourage 
the exercise of varying levels o f judicial discretion. Conflicting judicial views developed, 
giving rise to calls for reform. For example, with reference to the date for valuing 
property to which an application under the Act might relate,91 Woodhouse J in Meikle v 
Meikle expressed concern about the “divergence of views as to the application of the 
subsection”, highlighting “the need for a clear legislative direction concerning the 
matter.”92 The case o f Z v Z served to highlight the weaknesses o f the use of a rules-based 
approach without scope for judicial discretion on the issue of future earnings. The various 
calls for amendments and the greater empowering of the judiciary to redress injustices 
and inequalities, notwithstanding the presumption of equal division, began to be 
addressed in a meaningful way in the late 1990’s.
3. Property (Relationships) Act 1976
3.1 Introduction
The calls for reform arising from the shortcomings of the 1976 Act were finally 
addressed in the reformulated and renamed Property (Relationships) Act 1976. The 
Property (Relationships) Bill 2000 which introduced the changes was originally tabled as 
two inter-linked Bills; one dealing with changes to the existing workings of the 1976 
Act93 and the second seeking to create a property regime for heterosexual, cohabiting
90 For further commentary see the views o f Atkin supra n. 46.
91 As governed by section 2(2) o f the 1976 Act, which states that “For the purpose of this Act the value of 
any property to which an application under this Act relates shall.. .be its value at the date of the hearing, 
unless the Court in its discretion otherwise decides.”
92 Supra n. 59 at 144 regarding the interpretation o f section 2(2) and whether the court could give credit for 
post separation contributions.
93 Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill 1998.
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couples.94 However a change in the New Zealand Government following the 1999 
general election saw the appointment o f a Labour/Alliance government that modified the 
proposals before they were enacted into law. The reforms were condensed into one Bill; 
the Property (Relationships) Bill 2000, which sought to introduce reform measures in 
respect of the 1976 Act to impact upon both married and de facto couples. The amended 
legislation, the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, was effective from 1 February 200295 
and provides for a two-tiered approach to the issue of asset and income division on 
marital (and relationship) breakdown. The presumption o f equal division is retained,96 as 
is the judicial power to divide the matrimonial assets unequally where justice so 
demands.97 Co-existing with this is the judicial power to compensate the spouse who is 
likely to have a comparatively significantly lower income post-divorce, arising directly 
from the spousal roles adopted in the course o f the marriage.98 Atkin regards the approach 
of the revised 1976 Act, certainly at “first sight” as appearing
“...reasonably harmonious, with a clear message that core assets and 
the product o f the partnership are ordinarily to be divided equally.
...the underlying philosophy was reinforced by narrowing the 
exceptions to equal division...”99
3.2 The express identification ofpurposes and principles
The opening provisions of the new Property (Relationships) Act 1976 state both the 
purposes of the Act and the principles to guide its implementation, thereby seeking to 
expressly identify the objectives o f the new regulatory system. The decision by the 
legislature to create enhanced legislatively-based powers premised upon stated 
underlying principles and purposes reflects its understanding o f the role of law as a social 
tool. The stated purposes and principles together with the individual circumstances of the 
case now represent the primary influencing factors for the court in applying the 
provisions of the Act. Equally it acknowledges the need to guide the judiciary to ensure
94 De Facto Relationships (Property) Bill 1988.
95 The Matrimonial Property Act 1976 was amended and renamed the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 by 
section 5(2) of the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001.
96 Section 11.
97 Section 13.
98 Section 15, discussed at length in section 3.4 below.
99 Supra n. 4 at 471.
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an understanding o f the purpose of the laws and to bring about consistency in their 
application. In stating and committing to legislative goals and objectives the New 
Zealand legislature has created purpose-driven directions for the judiciary. These include 
the principles which underpin New Zealand family law generally, as cited in the Report 
of the Working Group,100 and the principle of equality of result as emphasised by the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy. The Royal Commission had 
emphasised the importance o f retaining a starting premise of equal sharing, particularly if 
the scope as to what constitutes marital property was to be widened, in order to recognise 
the equal contributions o f the parties.101
Section 1 of the amended 1976 Act states as follows:
“1M Purpose of this Act 
The purpose of this Act is -
(a) to reform the law relating to the property of married couples and 
civil union couples, and o f couples who live together in a de facto 
relationship;
(b) to recognise the equal contribution of husband and wife to the 
marriage partnership, o f civil union partners to the civil union, and 
of de facto partners to the de facto relationship partnership;
(c) to provide for a just division o f the relationship property between 
the spouses or partners when their relationship ends by separation or 
death, and in certain other circumstances, while taking account o f the 
interests of any children o f the marriage or children o f the civil union 
or children of the de facto relationship.
IN Principles
The following principles are to guide the achievement o f the purpose 
of this Act:
(a) the principle that men and women have equal status and their 
equality should be maintained and enhanced;
(b) the principle that all forms of contribution to the marriage 
partnership, civil union, or the de facto relationship partnership, are 
treated as equal;
(c) the principle that a just division of relationship property has 
regard to the economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses
100 These four principles are set out in section 2.4 above.
101 The Working Group, at 25, supported this view, regarding it as giving credence to the growing 
acceptance of the philosophy “that marriage is a partnership o f equals to which both spouses make equal 
though often differing contributions”, as discussed in section 2.4 above.
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or partners arising from their marriage, civil union, or de facto 
relationship or from the ending of their marriage, civil union, or de 
facto relationship;
(d) the principle that questions arising under this Act about 
relationship property should be resolved as inexpensively, simply, 
and speedily as is consistent with justice.”
Whilst the original 1976 Act was premised on the fundamental aims of equality and 
justice, it appears that, supported by expressly-identified purposes and principles, the 
2001 amendments have sought to introduce additional mechanisms to equip the judiciary 
to serve those aims. Robertson J in M v B was anxious to emphasise that these purposes 
and principles do not “provide the court with a generalised mandate which can avoid or 
obscure the structural framework which Parliament adopted” but rather represent the 
“underlying philosophy and inspiration” o f the Act.102 Similarly in McGregor v 
McGregor103 Clarkson J quoted favourably from Priestley J in De Malmanche v De 
Malmanche104 as regards the “tight jurisdictional parameters” stipulated by Parliament by 
the enunciation of stated principles in s IN. Whilst he agreed with the view o f Priestley J 
that the “policy of the Act as reforming legislation and the s lN(c) principle clearly 
permit a liberal and compensatory approach to be adopted”, Clarkson J rejected any 
suggestion that “Parliament had .. .conferred a broad and unfettered discretion” on the 
judiciary.105 Thus it appears that the stated purpose and principles o f the Act simply seek 
to place the statutory provisions within a social and policy context, thereby avoiding 
broad-brush judicial powers. Whilst the courts can exercise a power under section 15106 
to eliminate future economic disparity where it arises from the nature o f the marital roles 
and relationship, the provision was not enacted for widespread application. Any powers 
accorded to the judiciary, including the power to make whatever orders are deemed 
necessary to achieve the identified purposes and principles, are exercisable within this 
teleological approach which seeks to give effect to those principles and purposes.
102 Supra n. 47 at 649 per Robertson J; he emphasised that the principles and purposes “do not permit 
Courts to go further than Parliament was willing to legislate for.”
103 [2003] NZFLR 596.
104 [2002] NZFLR 579.
105 Supra n. 103 at 603, quoting directly from the judgment o f Priestley J in De Malmanche v De 
Malmanche.
106 The workings and impact of section 15 are set out in section 3.4 below.
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The decision by the New Zealand legislature to include preliminary provisions setting out 
the principles and purposes o f the regulatory provisions is to be generally welcomed. The 
innovative attitude o f the New Zealand legislature is particularly commendable given that 
neither the Report o f the Working Group nor that of the Royal Commission on Social 
Policy had proposed such a set o f principles and purposes. Sections IN and 1M seek to 
provide a clear, rather than implied statement o f legislative intention. The effect is a 
democratically created policy driven structure with identified principles, to direct the 
exercise of judicial powers. The limiting effects of this structure seek to allow for a 
relatively predictable regime of governance whilst retaining scope for dependent spouses 
to be treated fairly in the circumstances.
3.3 Ancillary relief orders under the Property (Relationship) Act 1976
3.3.1 Expanded concept of relationship property
Although section 11(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 continues to provide for 
a starting point of equal division of relationship property, one significant improvement to 
the rights of the non-owning spouse is the expansion o f the scope o f property to which 
that presumption will apply. Relationship property is the new term for matrimonial 
property and is defined in section 8107 as consisting of -
(a) The matrimonial home whenever acquired; and
(b) The family chattels whenever acquired
(c) All property owned jointly or in common and in equal shares by 
the husband and wife; and
(d) All property owned by either spouse immediately before the 
marriage if-
(i) the property was acquired in contemplation o f the marriage,
(ii) the property was intended for the common use or common 
benefit of both spouses and
(e) Subject to subsections 9(2) to (6), 9A and 10, all property 
acquired by either spouse after their marriage began; and
107 The list of relationship property in section 8 also includes references to the rights o f de facto  partners 
who are deliberately omitted in this explanation o f the scope of the definition in section 8.
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(f) Subject to subsections 9(2) to (6), 9A and 10, all property 
acquired, after the marriage began; for the common use or 
common benefit of both spouses, i f -
(i) the property was acquired out of property owned by either 
spouse or by both o f them before the marriage began, or
(ii) the property was acquired out of the proceeds of any 
disposition o f any property owned by either spouse or by both 
of them before the marriage began; and
(g) the proportion o f the value of any life insurance policy, or of the 
proceeds o f such a policy, that is attributable to the marriage; and
(h) Any policy o f insurance in respect of any property described in 
paragraphs (a) to (e) of this section; and
(i) The pro portion o f the value of any superannuation scheme 
entitlements that is attributable to the marriage; and
(j) All other property that is relationship property under an inter 
spousal agreement made under Part 6; and
(k) Any other property that is relationship property by virtue o f any 
other provision o f this Act or by virtue of any other Act; and
(1) An y income and gains derived from, the proceeds o f any 
disposition of, and any increase in the value of, any property 
described in paragraphs (a) to (k).
The previous category of balance o f matrimonial property is eliminated, and the new 
category of ‘relationship property’ encompasses that old category o f property. Where 
property can be shown to be categorised as ‘separate property’, it remains the property of 
the owning spouse and cannot be divided between the spouses. Section 11 identifies those 
assets in which each spouse is entitled to an equal share; namely, the family home, the 
family chattels and any other relationship property.108 Given the broad scope of the new 
concept of relationship property, more assets of the parties will be subject to the 
presumption of equal division, believed to strengthen the position o f the homemaker.
This expansion of the definition and scope of relationship property has proven a useful 
tool in broadening the rights of the spouse who may have made indirect contributions to 
the acquisition or development of an asset that might historically have been regarded as
108 Where the family home is sold there is a presumption that both parties will share equally in the proceeds 
of sale, once the court is satisfied that both parties intend to apply all or part o f the proceeds towards the 
acquisition of another home as a family home and that home has not yet been acquired -  section 11 A. 
Where there is no family home the court must award each spouse an equal share in such part of the 
matrimonial property as it thinks just in order to compensate for the absence o f an interest in the family 
home -  section 1 IB.
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the separate property o f the earning spouse.109 In making a similar proposal for reform, 
the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection had previously noted 
that expanding the scope o f the category of matrimonial property would “further 
emphasise the basic principles o f the Act, particularly that of equal contribution.”110
3.3.2 Avoiding the presumption of equal division
Notwithstanding the presumption o f equal division of the relationship property, section 
13 permits the court to avoid this, if  it considers
“.. .that there are extraordinary circumstances that make equal 
sharing of property or money .. .repugnant to justice, the share of 
each spouse ... in that property or money is to be determined in 
accordance with the contribution of each spouse to the marriage
M i l l
This is a repeat of the rebuttable presumption of equal division under the original 1976 
Act, which could only be avoided in exceptional circumstances. In considering the very 
recent legislative changes at the time o f the hearing, the court in De Malmanche v De 
Malmanche cited very favourably the pre-2001 case of Kauwhata v Kauwhataul where 
Baragwaneth J, with reference to the equal sharing policy of the original Act, criticised it 
for falling “well short” of economic equality. Commenting on the almost mandatory 
nature of the equal sharing regime under both Acts and the manner in which it lends itself 
to “uniform and predictable results”, Priestley J was of the view that “there is little scope 
for partners to achieve results other than equal sharing”.113 Interestingly in respect of the
109 The importance and impact of the statutory parameters placed on the scope o f relationship and separate 
property are considered in the conclusion of this thesis, with reference to the four jurisdictions considered 
in this work.
110 Supra n. 37 at 25. The Working Group had also concluded at 25-27 that such an approach would assist 
in the avoidance of arbitrary results and lead to greater certainty. See earlier at section 2.4 o f this chapter 
for details o f the proposals of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property regarding a new approach to the 
definition and categorisation of the property o f the spouses.
111 Section 13(1) of the revised 1976 Act. Section 13(2) notes that the scope for unequal sharing under 
section 13(1) is subject to sections 14 to 17A which relate to the power o f the court to make additional 
orders where there is evidence of future economic disparity between the spouses, discussed at length in 
section 3.4 below.
1,2 [2000] NZFLR 755 at 765.
113 Supra n. 104 at 612.
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standards of proof to be satisfied, Parliament, in drafting the 2001 reforms, elected to 
repeat the concepts o f ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and ‘repugnant to justice’ as the 
tests to be applied by the courts, again choosing not to define or provide illustrations of 
such standards. The concept o f ‘extraordinary circumstances’ has been discussed by the 
courts, and it is generally accepted that “most inequalities of contribution” are neither 
extraordinary nor would they cause equal sharing to be regarded as being ‘repugnant to 
justice’.114 This is most evident in the long-standing decision of Martin v Martin where 
the power to avoid equal division was considered but rejected in the circumstances:
“It is vigorous and powerful language to find in any statute and I am 
satisfied that it has been chosen quite deliberately to limit the 
exception to those abnormal situations that will demonstrably seem 
truly exceptional and which by their nature are bound to be rare.”115
More recently in Kauwhata v Kauwhata Baragwanath J recognised that;
“...many marriages entail unequal financial contribution, unequal 
non-flnancial contribution, different ages, experience and 
backgrounds. None o f these is likely of itself to warrant a conclusion 
that the circumstances of the marriage are extraordinary. Still less 
are they likely to constitute repugnancy to justice the very norm that 
Parliament has taken elaborate pains to instil into society”.116
Within this rule-based structure however, it remains within the power o f the courts to 
establish objective findings that extraordinary circumstances do exist.117 Certainly, when 
compared with the test of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under the pre-existing 1976 Act, 
it has been judicially confirmed that, there is nothing “to suggest different thresholds or 
substantive change”.118
114 Supra n. 112 per Baragwanath J as relied upon by Priestley J in De Malmanche v De Malmanche. 
Priestley J emphasised the point by stating at 603 that “Factors o f age, unemployability, ill-health and 
economic vicissitudes cannot in themselves, given the diversity o f the human condition, constitute 
extraordinary circumstances or justify a departure from the regime o f the Act”. In the circumstances the 
court held that the case fell “considerably short” o f constituting extraordinary circumstances.
115 Supra n. 16 at 102. Atkin supra n. 46 notes at 210 that whilst “the Martin marriage had some unusual 
features, it was not so far out o f the mould as to be treated differently”.
116 Supra n. 112 at 765, quoted favourably by Priestley J in De Malmanche v De Malmanche at 602.
117 Supra n. 104 at 605 per Priestley J.
u* Ibid at 601.
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Section 13 provides no further statutory guidance regarding any judicial determination as 
to equal or unequal division but section 18 sets out a definition as to what the term 
‘spousal contributions’ might refer. Section 18(l)(a)-(h) which is almost identical to 
section 18 of the original 1976 Act, indicates the legislature’s view of ‘relevant 
contributions’ stating the eight ways in which a spouse might have contributed to the 
marriage. These contributions include both monetary and non-monetary contributions, 
referring, inter alia, to the provision o f money, including income earned and household/ 
child care contributions.119 Further, as under the original 1976 Act, section 18(2) 
expressly provides that there exists no presumption that a contribution of a monetary 
nature is of greater value than a contribution of a non-monetary nature, thereby ensuring 
that distinctly different spousal contributions are not subjectively valued by the judiciary. 
The equalisation of different spousal contributions represents evidence of the express 
desire to protect the non-earning spouse and to ensure that her contributions to the 
marriage are recognised upon divorce. However, in applying the amended section 18, the 
judiciary has continued to take a very restrictive and limited view o f their capacity to 
order unequal division. In refusing to stray from the presumption o f equal division, 
Priestley J in De Malmanche v De Malmanche noted that;
“What is “extraordinary” and what is “repugnant to justice” must be 
approached in the awareness that Parliament has assessed as a matter 
of public policy, that most inequalities of contribution entail 
neither.”
Interestingly, in the recent Court of Appeal hearing of X  v X, the parties mutually 
accepted the presumption of equal division as a starting point and the focus of the court 
and the parties was upon the making (or not) of supplemental orders as a means of 
equalising the future economic disparity between the parties, as discussed in the section 
to follow. Thus whilst the governing legislation continues to permit the avoidance of the 
equal division rule, the judicial powers introduced in 2001 to permit the equalisation of
119 The listed contributions set out in section 18 include care o f dependents, performance of household 
duties, acquisition or creation o f matrimonial property and the supporting or assisting of the other spouse.
120 Supra n 104 at 602, quoting the judgment o f Baragwanath J in Kauwhata v Kauwhata.
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post-divorce economic disparities appear to have shifted attention to this means of 
equalising the spouses’ position post-divorce.
3.4 Compensatory payments for future economic disparity
3.4.1 Introduction
Section 15 of the new Act creates a residual judicial power to make financial and/or 
property orders to redress post-divorce economic disparity between the spouses. This 
innovative power, which has received significant judicial and academic attention since its 
enactment, was regarded by Atkin as “a leap into the dark for New Zealand law”.121 It 
can be invoked by the court at its own discretion or at the request o f one of the parties, if, 
following the division of relationship property, equally or otherwise, the court is of the 
view that the post-divorce income and living standards o f one spouse are likely to be 
significantly higher than those of the other spouse. Importantly, section 15(1) requires 
that such future disparity must arise from the effects o f the division o f responsibilities and 
functions within the marriage. Consequently, these judicial powers are expected to be 
exercised strictly within the circumstances prescribed by the legislature.
Section 15 has been judicially referred to as “a remedial section” that must result in a fair 
and just outcome from the perspective o f both spouses.122 Miles regards it as “a key 
provision”, intended to “enable the courts to achieve fairer, and in a real sense more 
equal, outcomes on relationship breakdown” than had been possible under the original 
1976 Act.123 This novel judicial capacity to make orders to redress future spousal 
economic disparities represents a significant addition to the less complex equal-versus - 
unequal-division approach to asset distribution and has been seen to “muddy the waters 
enormously”.124 Certainly Atkin has observed that sections 15 and 15A “introduce a 
highly discretionary note into an otherwise largely defined scheme.”125 He debates the
121 Supra n. 35 at 176.
122 Smith v Smith [2007] NZFLR 33 at 50 per Murfitt J.
123 Supra n. 44 at 536.
124 Supra n. 4 at 472. Atkin is critical o f these changes, regarding them as inappropriately confusing the 
fundamentally different concepts o f property division and ongoing maintenance.
125 Supra n. 34 at 299.
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merits of this approach, noting that whilst the future improved career opportunities of the 
breadwinner might very well have arisen by virtue of spousal support in the course of the 
marriage and thus can in “a loose sense” fit within the notion of a community property 
system, he rejects the view that the future income of either spouse can be regarded as a 
product of the period o f marital cohabitation.126
The co-existence of the section 15 judicial power with the power to order equal/unequal
127division of matrimonial assets and/or periodical payments certainly reflects a 
legislative attempt to provide the judiciary with a mix o f statutory powers to deal with 
whatever circumstances come before the court. Atkin notes the anxiety of Priestley J to 
“keep the new powers well within check”,128 emphasising that
“...it would make little sense for Parliament to confer a broad 
discretion under section 15 which would enable the equal sharing 
regime to be subverted in an unpredictable way. Parliament has 
wisely delineated the jurisdictional field”.129
As a means of compensating career sacrifices, Atkin, more positively, notes the 
similarities between this approach and that adopted by Scotland, highlighting in particular 
section 9(1 )(b) of the Family Law Scotland Act 1985130 which requires the court to take 
fair account of “any economic advantage derived by either party from contributions by 
the other, and of any economic disadvantage suffered by either party in the interests of 
the other party or of the family.”131 He observes that these new powers allow “a departure 
from equal sharing, introducing an element of substantive, rather than formal, equality to 
the scheme”.132
126 Ibid at 299-304.
127 Sections 63 and 64 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 as amended by the 2001 Amendment Act. See 
section 4 below for a discussion of the role o f maintenance payments in the overall asset and wealth 
distribution process.
128 Supra n. 35 at 182.
129 Ibid, quoting from the judgment of Priestley J in De Malmanche v De Malmanche at para 159.
130 Section 9(l)(b) is considered within the context o f the five principles included in section 9, at section 4.4 
in chapter 5 above.
131 Supra n. 35 at 182
132 Ibid.
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3.4.2 Calculating quantum -  the significance of spousal needs
The extent of judicial discretion exercisable under section 15 is quite significant, with the 
section requiring retrospective adjudication of the circumstances of the marriage and the 
prospective assessment o f the financial position and earnings potential of the parties post­
dissolution. Within these tests, there is much debate as to the relevance of individual 
needs and the lack of legislative guidance on this point has been criticised by the 
judiciary.133 In determining whether to make a section 15(1) order, section 15(2) provides 
that the court may have regard to
(a) the likely earning capacity o f each spouse
(b) the responsibilities o f each spouse for the ongoing daily care of 
any minor or dependent children o f the marriage or, as the case 
requires
(c) any other relevant circumstances.
The Act has thus directed that the decision to make an order must rely heavily upon the 
circumstances of the parties, with the emphasis being placed upon the post-divorce 
financial and child care responsibilities o f the spouses. This contrasts sharply with the 
reference earlier in section 15 to the effects o f the divisions in the course o f the marriage, 
the test that has been applied repeatedly by the courts. Thus it appears that the right to a 
section 15 order depends upon proof that the effect of the spousal roles in the course of 
the marriage has given rise not only to post-divorce economic disparity but also requires 
specific consideration of the section 15(2), forward-looking factors. The wording of these 
factors suggests that they might more properly inform the court o f the extent of the actual 
disparity, and thus the determination o f the amount of any compensatory order.134 Whilst 
section 15 does not expressly mention the needs o f the applicant spouse, the courts have 
deemed it appropriate to factor them in. Hammond J, in considering the evolution of the 
legal concept and treatment of needs tracked the evolution o f New Zealand law, noted its 
dramatically changing purpose and form over a 30 year period:
133 In M  v B supra n. 47 at 685, Hammond J notes the significant dispute within the legal community as to 
the precise meaning and relevance o f ‘needs’, observing critically that Parliament “has not particularly 
assisted the resolution of disputes in this subject area by the language it has used”.
134 The issue of quantum and the judicial approach to the calculation o f the value of section 15 orders is 
considered in section 3.4 below.
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“What has happened conceptually, over close to a half century, is 
that the basis o f a woman’s claim has been slowly extended from 
obligations once based on purely moral grounds, through claims 
grounded on relatively narrowly perceived “needs”, to an approach 
based on real equality. This last concept is based upon the 
proposition that there are no material differences between men and 
women in the context o f modem, egalitarian marriage. Hence any 
difference in treatment amounts to discrimination and constitutes a 
violation of important equality principles. But the argument goes 
further than that —  what may be needed (and the new legislation 
recognises) is compensation for differences created by the very 
institution of marriage. This is where the notion o f substantive —  or
1 'X ^real — equality comes so strongly into play.”
He refers, by way of illustration, to the principle enunciated in section IN of the new Act 
which emphasises the notions o f equal contribution and just division.136 Ultimately 
Hammond J calls for the making o f a “just” award, having regard to the principles and 
purpose of the legislation. However, exactly how the award is constructed is, in his view, 
a matter for the circumstances o f the particular case.137 Similarly he explains that whilst 
section lN(a) provides that equality must be maintained, section lN(c) requires that 
regard must be had to economic advantages or disadvantages to a spouse upon the 
dissolution of the marriage. Clearly Hammond J is against perceiving needs as 
“something like the necessities of life” and calls for greater judicial flexibility to be 
exercised in light of the amendments to the 1976 Act. Consequently it appears that the 
legal entitlements o f the dependent spouse have been strengthened by the statutory 
enactments but have been even more enhanced by the judicial perceptions of the extent of 
her legitimate claims. Hammond J regards the statutory amendments as “clearly designed 
to address the further social problems which had revealed themselves in the operation of 
the earlier statute”’138 specifically the impoverishment of women. Thus whilst the 
quantification of a spouse’s needs will be relevant to the court, it is unlikely to limit the 
level of provision to be awarded to that spouse.
135 Supra n. 47 at 685.
m Ibid‘Ibid at 682. See section 3.3.2 above for a discussion o f judicial attempts to definite the concept of justice 
and other goals that remain statutorily undefined.
138 Ibid at 681.
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In McGregor v McGregor Clarkson J considered compensation to be the true purpose of 
section 15 and was o f the view that such an order should not be determined on the basis 
of future needs but rather in the light of what has brought the parties to that point. 
Interestingly she regards needs as only relevant to the calculation o f the amount of the 
order, and only then in rare cases. Rather she suggests that future needs “should normally 
be the focus of an application for maintenance.”139 When the compensatory function of 
the section 15 order is considered, the yardsticks of economic disparity and the spousal 
functions in the course of the marriage appear more relevant and appropriate than basic 
needs.
3.4.3 Identifying future economic disparity
As regards the burden of proof to qualify for this novel form of relief, section 15 requires 
that the future income and living standards of the wealthier spouse must be significantly 
higher than those of the applicant spouse. Miller J in JES v JBC140 considered the 
meaning of the term ‘significant’ in this context and debated how it might be best 
determined. In his view “significance must be measured in terms o f income and living 
standards” but such inquiry should not rely upon a relative weighting o f what might 
constitute a significant disparity in the context of the overall disparity. Rather he suggests 
that the relevant considerations in measuring the disparity in income and living standards 
between the parties, must include, with reference to the less wealthy spouse; “that 
spouse’s earning capacity, the size o f the relationship property pool.. .and the asset 
position of each spouse after division.”141 Ascertaining whether a future economic 
disparity will exist has been referred to as being, in essence, “an evaluative assessment 
for the Court”.142 Judicial rulings have rejected attempts by counsel to introduce a 
formulaic approach to the issue, instead placing emphasis on the particular circumstances
139 Supra n. 103 at 606. Clarkson J does qualify her reference to the future needs o f the spouse, agreeing 
with the views of Atkin and Parker, supra n. 12 that “the contemplated payment does not merely concern 
future needs."
140 [2007] NZFLR 472.
141 Ibid at 481.
142 Allen v Allen [2006] NZFLR 735 per France J at para 46.
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of individual cases. In M v B, the court preferred to regard section 15 orders as 
“necessarily a matter o f impression”, 143 rejecting the application of a formulaic approach. 
Similarly Murfitt J in Smith v Smith recognised that there “is no one true way of 
establishing an award of compensation for economic disparity”.144 In recognising the 
extent of the judicial discretion afforded to him and his colleagues, Murfitt J similarly 
suggested avoiding any pre-occupation with formulae for fear that such a debate might be 
allowed to “overwhelm the purpose for which economic disparity was introduced”.145 
Rather he called for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion “in a principled way” 
and in making any award to recognise “the socio-economic inequality” which can often 
arise in marital relationships where career advancement is sacrificed for the benefit of the 
family.146
3.4.4 How to quantity a section 15 order
Although the overall objective is to bridge the future economic disparity caused by the 
spousal functions within the marriage, the Act lacks legislative guidance as to how a 
court might calculate the value o f the order to be made. Despite her generally positive 
views of the 2001 statutory developments, Miles is critical of the manner in which the 
legislature has chosen to draft section 15. The basis upon which the judicial scope and 
discretion is to be exercised is not, in her view, “readily ascertainable from the text of the 
Act.”147 Conversely she regards the New Zealand legislature as having left “rather a lot of 
work to be done by the judges, particularly in determining how to quantify awards.. .”.148 
Ultimately Miles, with reference to the approach of both the American Law Institute and 
the Australian legislature, highlights the value of a statutory quantification scheme for 
section 15 or other such applications. She identifies the current shortfalls, noting that the
143 See further the views o f the court in M v B, supra n. 47. Robertson J at 653 rejected the settling of the 
amount o f compensation by way of the application o f a formula, supported by Hammond J, who agreed that 
the statutory provisions do not demand an outcome of arithmetical equality in determining the level of 
compensation. However, he did emphasise the importance of the judicial elucidation of the reasoning 
behind the levels of payment ordered, if any.
144 Supra n. 122 at 45.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Supra n. 44 at 535.
m Ibid.
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quantification o f a section 15 order can be measured with reference to many yardsticks, 
including: loss o f future earning capacity; loss of share in enhanced income; loss of 
relationship living standard; loss o f shared wealth; economic equalisation and personal 
compensation.149 Further she laments the legislature’s failure to identify the overall 
objectives or possible ceilings for such an award. The consequential scope for judicial 
creativity was evident in the ruling o f Fischbach v Bonnar150 where, once satisfied that 
jurisdiction to award compensation had been established, the court ordered the payment 
of $30,000 to the wife, representing an unexplained 40% of the husband’s share of the 
relationship property. Atkin is similarly dissatisfied with the governing provisions, 
expressing unease with the manner in which this figure was reached by the courts, 
querying whether “the judge thought up the sum of money or thought up the 
percentage.”151 Whichever the origin, he notes that it is not “at all clear where either 
figure comes from”.152 By way o f contrast Atkin points to the case o f V v F153 as evidence 
of “a much more sophisticated process o f calculating the amount o f compensation”. 
Adams J considered and compared the actual and potential incomes o f both spouses, 
deducting amounts for various identified contingencies, including child care costs, in 
order to identify the appropriate financial order to make. Having identified the shortfall of 
income between the parties in the 14-month period from the date o f separation to the date 
of the hearing, he ordered the respondent, Mr V to pay past maintenance in the sum of 
$3618 and a lump sum payment of $33,500 pursuant to section 15, being half the total 
shortfall, given that in paying that sum to the wife the husband would also be poorer by 
that amount. In Smith v Smith, whilst Murfitt J calculated the section 15 order by halving 
the identified value of the economic disparity, he noted, for example, the equally valid 
approach of the High Court in P v P]54 where “there was no attempt by the claimant 
spouse to call expert evidence quantifying the value o f the disparity. A more broad-brush 
approach was taken in fixing the appropriate compensation.”155
149 Ibid at 541, 542.
150 [2002] NZFLR 705.
151 Supra n. 35 at 183.
152 Ibid.
153 [2002] NZFLR 1105
154 [2005] NZFLR 689
155 Supra n. 122 at 45.
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Undoubtedly contradictory judicial approaches to the section 15 power have emerged, as 
is particularly evident in the lengthy litigation between the divorcing spouses in X  v X\ 
beginning with Clarkson J in the Family Court,156 followed by Hansen J on appeal157 and 
most recently, by the judges o f the New Zealand Court of Appeal.158 What was in dispute 
was whether the division o f marital roles caused the economic disparity between the 
parties. The parties, having met in university, both worked in industry for nine years prior 
to the birth of their first child and during that time the husband also completed an MBA. 
Thereafter the wife managed the family and household, having a second child three years 
later, whilst the husband was repeatedly promoted, requiring the family to move on a 
number of occasions. Upon separation, in addition to the equal division of the 
matrimonial property, the wife sought a section 15 order in respect o f the economic 
disadvantage she had suffered as a result of her fourteen-year absence from the 
workforce. Very different judicial views were expressed regarding both the wife’s 
entitlement to a section 15 order, and the manner in which the quantum should be 
determined. The disparity of views serves to illustrate the scope for varying 
interpretations of the factual circumstances before the court, as regards the extent to 
which any economic disparity can be related to the marital roles. In addition the lack of 
legislative guidance as to the means o f calculating the amount o f the order was a major 
ground for judicial disagreement.
Hansen J gave the issue of calculating quantum detailed consideration and although he 
ultimately decided that the decision was a matter to be returned to the lower court, his 
judgment addresses many of the issues arising. He disagreed with the findings of the 
Family Court judge, that the division of roles had not caused the economic disparity, and 
criticised the basis o f her refusal to make the section 15 order. He regarded her ruling as 
“overly influenced by a comparison of assets and lifestyles o f the parties at the date of the 
hearing and [as giving]...insufficient weight to the changes that would follow, including a 
disparity of income”.159 Significantly, at first instance, Clarkson J had regarded the wife’s
156 [2006] NZFLR 361.
157 [2007] NZFLR 502.
158 [2009] NZCA 399.
159 Supra n. 157 at 526.
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decision to act as fulltime homemaker at the expense of her career prospects as a matter 
of choice, and thus not relevant to section 15 considerations. Conversely Hansen J 
regarded the traditional division of functions within the marriage as the dominant cause 
of the economic disparity:
“It is the classic case o f a man being given full rein to develop his 
career and maximise his earning potential while his wife puts her 
career on hold. The causal link between economic disparity and the 
division of roles in the marriage could not be clearer.”160
In recognising the very divergent views, Hansen J emphasised the parameters placed 
upon the judicial discretion exercisable under section 15, noting, with reference to 
sections lM(b) and lN(b) that the purpose o f the Act is “to recognise the equal 
contribution of husband and wife to the marriage partnership” and that all forms of 
contribution to the marriage partnership are to be treated as equal. To permit the judiciary 
to place a valuation on economic and non-economic benefits would, in his view, 
encourage the exercise of judicial discretion that “would become as broad as it is long. Its 
exercise would become a subjective assessment o f the balance of advantage in a 
marriage.”161 However, given the differing judicial interpretations of both the law and the 
circumstances before the court, Hansen J ultimately called for the “opposed views 
expressed... and other considerations in the exercise of the discretion under s 15... [to] be 
addressed and resolved by the Court of Appeal. There is a significant public interest in 
having these matters clarified.”162 Given the extent and scope o f the judicial discretion 
exercisable, clarification from the Court of Appeal could bring welcome clarification. 
When returned to the lower court to quantify the order to be made, Clarkson J ordered the 
payment of $240,000 to the applicant wife. The parties cross-appealed the various orders 
made. Consequently the Court of Appeal o f New Zealand was eventually presented with 
the opportunity to deliver its views in this case.
The outcome of the appeal provides a very interesting illustration of the distinctive
160 Ibid at 528.
161 Ibid at 529-530.
162 XvX[2001]  NZFLR 947 at 951 (Application by the husband for leave to appeal the earlier decision of 
the High Court).
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opinions still held in respect o f the workings of these discretion-based judicial powers. 
Although Robertson and O’Regan JJ163 both affirmed the orders of Clarkson J, they 
displayed very different approaches to the calculation of quantum. Interestingly, with a 
loose reference to the similar approach adopted by the courts in England and Wales in 
personal injuries cases, O’Regan J advocated that
“...with some development o f consensus over time on appropriate 
discount factors...the methodology used in this case or something 
similar [could be used to quantify s. 15 awards]...without the need 
for extensive and expensive expert evidence.”164
Although he acknowledged that the rigidity associated with the English/Welsh model of 
calculating personal injury damages would not be necessary in section 15 awards, 
O’Regan J preferred this system, criticising Hansen J’s express preference for 
individualised justice and an avoidance o f a prescriptive approach. In a similar approach 
to Robertson J, Hansen J based his calculations upon a subjective analysis of the 
circumstances of the parties and expressly rejected the workability o f a formula-based 
approach. He regarded career projections and analysis as “speculative” and “demeaning” 
and identified the court as having responsibility for the determination o f “the justice of an 
award on the basis of its assessment of the parties’ overall financial circumstances, the 
value of the loss sustained by the claimant party, and the future earning potential of each 
party.”165 However, on analysis, the apparently-conflicting approaches do not necessarily 
represent the very distinctive approaches suggested by the respective judges. Ironically 
although O’Regan J strongly criticises the approach to quantum presented by Robertson 
J, the two judges managed to reach the same decision and it appears that a juggling of 
two formulaic approaches led the two judges to the same conclusion. Thus the positions 
adopted are, it is suggested, not as divergent as first appears.166
163 O’Regan J delivered judgment on his own behalf and on behalf o f Ellen France J.
164 Supra n. 162 at para 183. O’ Regan J did not provide the court with any significant detail regarding the 
approach in England and Wales, preferring to refer to McGregor on Damages (17th ed) (2003). He did note 
however, that the formulaic approach, which includes reliance upon discount factors published in tables by 
the Government’s Actuary’s Department, allows the court to assess and calculate compensatory awards for 
claimants in personal injury cases without the need for expert evidence.
165 Supra n. 157 at para 129.
166 Although Robertson J rejected the development or use o f any “rote formulae” to result in the awarding
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Hansen J steadfastly regarded the “but for” test as the starting point in any question of 
quantum in a section 15 application, i.e. to commence with a calculation of the 
applicant’s likely earning capacity, “but for” the nature of the division of functions within 
the marriage. This he regarded as the “crucial determinant” of any section 15 award. This 
starting point had in turn to be adjusted to take account of contingencies and unavoidable 
uncertainties in assessing income with the halving o f the final figure that represents the 
applicant’s notional loss. Despite conflicting approaches to the issue of quantum, the use 
of a “but for” figure, howsoever calculated, was the starting point for both judgments 
delivered in respect o f the appeal o f the awards in X  v X. However the different 
approaches adopted by Robertson and O’Regan JJ and the consequential subjective 
adjudications inbuilt in this approach to quantum again serve to illustrate the difficulties 
in assessing the amount of the orders to be made. Ultimately Murfitt J identifies the 
fundamental need for a presiding judge to “employ a process which is transparent and 
rational and which results in a just division of relationship property, having regard to the 
objectives of the Act”.167 Such an approach, if it could be manifested in practice, would 
arguably have the potential to achieve the optimum balance of judicial discretion 
exercised with a view to securing the pre-identified aims of the legislation.
Murfitt J in Smith v Smith identified fourteen “authoritative principles” relating to 
economic disparity claims, which can be drawn from nine particular decisions of the 
High Court and Court of Appeal.168 In assessing whether there existed significant future 
economic disparity between the parties, he emphasised that the parties’ traditional
of sums that are just, he nonetheless set out his 7-step approach to calculating the sum to be awarded. He 
commenced with the “but for” figure used in the lower courts by both Clarkson and Hansen JJ, estimated 
Mrs X’s likely future income, incorporating time value and other discounts and then calculated the award in 
terms of a 10-year life span, which he regarded as an appropriate time span for compensation. Despite 
criticisms of the approach o f Robertson J, O’Regan J adopted a similar approach to his calculations. Having 
identified Mrs X’s future income had she not adopted the role o f breadwinner, he calculated a figure 
representing the cumulative difference between the parties’ actual and hypothetical incomes and made 
appropriate allowances. He then regarded this as the “but for” figure and made a section 15 award of half 
that amount.
167 Supra n. 122 at 45.
168 Ibid at 42-43. The nine cases relied upon were De Malmanche v De Malmanche; P v  P ; M v  B; Ev  E 
[2005] NZFLR 313; Beran v Beran [2005] NZFLR 204; Nation v Nation [2005] NZFLR 103; Harvey v 
Harvey Family Court 9/9/2005; McLachlan v MacDonald Family Court 14/2/2006 and Chong v Spell 
[2005] NZFLR 400.
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division of spousal roles and the wife’s responsibility for the full-time care of the children 
were jointly-made decisions. The impact of these decisions prevented her from 
continuing on her career path, which he speculated would have led to a high-earning 
executive career. Although a judgment of the Family Court and thus of limited precedent 
value, Murfitt J represented the view o f the overall aim of the Act as being to 
“rehabilitate” one partner for the benefits conferred on the other. Such an aim, given the 
extensive array of orders available, ensures that where by virtue of the spousal roles 
adopted in the course o f the marriage, a financially vulnerable spouse who will by 
comparison be significantly less well-off than her husband post-divorce, can be fairly 
provided for. Equally, the need to prove both a causal link between the future financial 
imbalance and the marital roles, protects the husband from an obligation to pay simply 
because of the fact of the marriage. In addition, Miller J in JES v JBC,169 emphasised that, 
notwithstanding the judicial capacity to make these orders, there remains an obligation on 
the claimant in a divorce case “to recognise that the marriage has ended, that each party 
must go its own way, and that to the extent that it is reasonably possible.. .become self- 
supporting within a reasonable period o f time”.170 He was critical o f the trial judge for 
omitting to apply the principle that the wife is “obliged to take responsibility for meeting 
her own needs within a reasonable period o f time, having regard to the division of 
functions within the marriage”.171 In the circumstances he confirmed that it was the loss 
of future income opportunities that was being compensated, not the loss of the marriage. 
In ordering that the maintenance cease within a period of four months, Miller J allowed 
the wife some time to secure reasonable employment but equally ensured that a clean 
break would be quickly achieved between the parties. Similarly, notwithstanding her lack 
of qualifications and the general difficulty with identifying her work potential, the court 
in H v H m  regarded it as “reasonable”, to expect the applicant wife, “over an extended 
period of time to gain work experience and become more confident in full-time work”.173 
Thus on balance, it appears a fair outcome is achievable for all.
169 Supra n. 140.
170 Ibid at 485.
171 Ibid.
172 [2007] NZFLR 711.
173 Ibid at 716.
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3 . 5  C o n c l u s i o n
It is ultimately left to the judiciary to assess and determine the measure and extent of the 
compensation to be ordered. Critically Atkin has noted that in respect of a section 15 
order,
“Quantum is not determined according to need. In some cases it may 
fall well short o f remedying disadvantage. In others, it may be too 
harsh on the paying party.. .In attempting to cure one injustice 
another may be created in its place.”174
Consequently, notwithstanding the commendable aim of compensating the financially- 
vulnerable spouse, the legislation falls short o f providing all the required solutions. Miles 
criticises the legislation as leaving “key questions regarding quantification unanswered, 
or at least answered only inexplicitly”.175 Consequently the law and its application 
becomes difficult to predict. It is not unreasonable to suggest, however, that this approach 
was deliberately adopted by the legislature. Providing strict rules for the calculation of 
the division of assets and future income based on the actual economic disparity between 
the parties would not be an easy undertaking. Neither would it necessarily be a wise one. 
It appears that the New Zealand legislature has regarded the elucidation of principles and 
purposes as the most strategic means o f guiding the interpretation and application of its 
laws. By so doing it has not imposed a “how to” regime on the judiciary, rather it has 
identified the goals to be achieved, with the exact route being determined by the 
presiding judge in each case. Whatever the approach adopted and irrespective of the 
subjectivity exercised by a presiding judge, the application of the laws to the particular 
circumstances should be utilised to achieve those identified purposes and stated 
objectives. In their 2004 Update on the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 the Family 
Law Section of the New Zealand Law Society noted that in the two years since the 
introduction of the legislative changes, discretionary awards made under the new section 
15 “have generally been modest”, mainly in their view, because o f the continuing 
principle of equal sharing that underlies the Act in general. They regarded the qualifying
174 Supra n. 34 at 304, 305.
175 Supra n. 44 at 540.
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criteria set out in section 15 as sufficiently precise to allow “relatively few spouses” to 
qualify for an adjustment award. As regards the approach of the judiciary, the Family 
Law Section noted the distinctly varying approaches adopted in the first two years, 
referring to the “scientific accounting approach” adopted by some as compared with the 
“more broad brush approach” o f others. Atkin notes that by 2003 it was still too early to 
assess the effect of these provisions but stated that early indications were that securing a
1 7 f \section 15 compensatory payment would not be easy. He observes that the courts 
could reject such an application either for lack of jurisdiction or because an award would 
not be appropriate. At that time he stated that of the eight decided cases to date, 
compensatory payments under section 15 had only been made in two cases. Further, in 
support of the view of a judicial reluctance to grant such relief, Heneghan has more 
recently noted that the maximum compensatory pay-out by a court to date had been 
$138,000 in P v P, following on from a $600,000 claim by the wife.177
Evidently, the lawmakers have recognised the importance of rules, albeit in the form of 
principles and presumptions but equally have incorporated a relatively significant 
reliance upon judicial discretion. Such discretion, to be utilised to bring about substantive 
post-divorce economic equality between the spouses, is regarded as a means to secure a 
fair outcome for both parties, but particularly the economically vulnerable spouse, 
whatever the circumstances before the court. Thus the New Zealand system of regulation 
comprises of a mix of quasi rules in the form of principles and significant judicial 
discretion for their attainment, placing it somewhere at the midpoint o f the 
rules/discretion continuum. Arguably the emphasis upon economic fairness demonstrated 
by the broad-based judicial powers is at the expense of the criteria o f democracy and 
predictability. The necessary reliance upon judicial discretion in the implementation of 
the statutory provisions shifts a significant law and policy making function from the 
legislature to the courts, thereby detracting from the democracy and predictability of the 
laws.
176 Atkin, supra n. 35 at 183/184.
177 Heneghan M “The Normal Order of Family Law” 2008 28 OJLS 165.
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There now exists the need for empirical research to identify the nature and impact of the 
ancillary relief orders being made by the courts. Such research needs to examine the 
position of the spouses not only on the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of 
the assets and wealth, but in the years after the marriage to track the sufficiency of any 
financial relief orders made on divorce. More recently Atkin has re-emphasised the need 
for “proper research into how the rules are in fact operating and what alternative options, 
if any, may more effectively be employed to achieve the ostensible goal of real 
equity.”178
4. Spousal maintenance
4.1 Maintenance on the dissolution o f the marriage
As mentioned in earlier chapters, in Ireland the courts tend to determine all financial and 
property issues, including maintenance collectively. Under New Zealand law, as in 
California,179 spousal maintenance receives distinct legislative attention. The New 
Zealand Family Proceedings Act 1980 governs the ordering of spousal maintenance and 
section 64(1) creates a limited inter-spousal statutory obligation to maintain the other 
where the need arises:
“.. .after the dissolution o f a marriage.. .each spouse.. .is liable to
maintain the other spouse where the other spouse.. .cannot
practicably meet the whole or any part of those needs... because of 
any 1 or more of the circumstances specified in subsection (2).”
These circumstances relate to the impact o f spousal roles on the parties’ capacity to 
become self-supporting after divorce,180 their ongoing custodial and child care 
responsibilities, the standard of living of the spouses in the course of the marriage and the 
existence of an undertaking by one spouse to support the other whilst a reasonable period
178 Supra n. 34 at 305.
179 The distinct treatment of property and spousal support orders has already been considered in the 
Californian context; see above at section 7 o f chapter 4.
180 When factoring in this circumstance, the court is required to have regard to (i) the effects o f the division 
of functions within the marriage, (ii) the likely earning capacity o f each spouse, and (iii) any other relevant 
circumstances.
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of further education or training is completed. This inter-spousal maintenance obligation 
after divorce is expressly limited to the circumstances set out above, thereby removing 
scope for the payment o f maintenance because ‘justice so demands’.181 In addition 
section 64 A  further limits the likelihood o f ongoing or easily accessed maintenance by 
requiring both spouses to “assume responsibility, within a period of time that is 
reasonable in all the circumstances o f the particular case, for meeting his or her own 
needs”. Once such reasonable time has passed the statutory obligation to maintain ceases, 
irrespective of the success or otherwise o f the dependent spouse’s attempts to achieve 
self-sufficiency. However, there remains scope for ongoing ties; 64A(2) permits the court 
to maintain spousal obligations:
“.. .to the extent that maintenance is necessary to meet the reasonable 
needs of party B if, having regard to the matters referred to in 
subsection (3), -
(a) it is unreasonable to require party B to do without maintenance 
from party A; and
(b) it is reasonable to require party A to provide maintenance to 
party B.”
Whatever the underlying legislative intentions in choosing to include this residual power, 
it undoubtedly leaves the issues o f long-term jurisdiction, quantum and duration to the 
significant discretion of the courts.
The limited purpose of post-dissolution maintenance appears relatively clear, especially 
when section 64 is compared with the provisions governing equal division and section 15 
orders, given that it will only be ordered where it is necessary to meet the reasonable 
needs of the claimant spouse. Thus unlike section 15 orders, the fact of division of 
spousal roles which has impacted negatively upon the earning power of one spouse to the 
benefit of the other, will not in itself give rise to any obligation for the rebalancing of this 
economic disparity through the ordering o f maintenance. Although such a factor may 
assist the court in determining the quantum and duration o f maintenance, it will not be 
considered unless the claimant spouse can firstly prove need, thereby invoking the court’s
181 It is presumed that the factors or circumstances set out in section 64(2) were created with a view to the 
over-riding aim of securing justice.
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jurisdiction. The inclusion o f this additional burden of proof serves to encourage the 
courts to avoid making maintenance orders, and the very limited scope for jurisdiction 
serves to ensure that maintenance is only appropriate in very limited cases. The 
dependent spouse faces a heavy evidentiary burden to succeed with an application for 
spousal maintenance:
“Parliament has made it clear that generally speaking a 
spouse/partner is not liable to pay maintenance at the end of their 
relationship: s 64(4). It has created a limited exception to this where 
there is “reasonable need” arising from the different roles the parties 
took in the relationship.”182
The change in legislative approach introduced in 2001 caused a shift in emphasis from a 
tendency to award maintenance as part o f the overall settlement of the parties’ financial 
positions to a greater reliance upon property and financial lump sum orders. Vaver notes 
that whereas under the 1963 Act the courts tended to discount property awards because of 
the availability of maintenance payments, under the 1976 Act property division was 
regarded as an automatic right with maintenance representing “the flexible element in 
achieving an overall just financial result”. However the increased powers to make 
property adjustment orders and/or lump sum awards under the Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976 have permitted the court to address the financial claims of the parties and 
empowered the making of orders with immediate effect, often resulting in an absence of 
maintenance orders where alternative property or lump sum orders can sufficiently 
provide for the parties. Maintenance must now be regarded as a supplemental and very 
secondary means of dealing with asset and wealth distribution.
4.2 Spousal Support — reasonable needs and self sufficiency
In M v B Hammond J suggested that one o f the main consequences of the 2001 
amendments is that the concept of ‘needs’ has been broadened. Certainly in the context of 
maintenance it can be argued that ‘needs’ plays a more immediate role in the court’s 
determinations, particularly in the short-term. As distinct from this, although relevant to
182 M v B, supra n. 47 at 664 per Robertson J.
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the determination o f a section 15 application, bridging the future economic disparity 
arising from the respective roles of the parties in the course of the marriage is more 
directly linked to the past losses o f the dependent spouse and the consequential need to 
compensate her, in order to ensure a real equality between the spouses into the future.183 
As mentioned above, in regarding the applicant to be entitled to a maintenance order, 
Riddell J in FBv BL184 admitted to being influenced by the applicant’s responsibility for 
the care of the children o f the marriage, the unfeasibility of her seeking part-time work, 
and the demands arising from the autism suffered by one of the children. Conversely 
Miller J in JES v JBC emphasised strongly the need for spouses to recognise their 
obligation to become self-sufficient following the dissolution of their marriage. He was 
critical of the trial judge for failing to apply the clean break principle, which “remains an
1 RSimportant consideration in what remains a no-fault dissolution regime”. Failure to do 
so, he suggests, “is to risk compensating a spouse for loss of the marriage”.186 This 
approach to the issue of maintenance fits more neatly into the overall compensation- 
based policy goals of the New Zealand regime as it allows the emphasis to be placed on 
the impact of the marital roles adopted by the parties, and therefore gives rise to a 
consequential obligation to maintain. From a policy perspective this is easier to defend 
and is arguably more in line with the compensatory function of the ancillary relief powers 
under the 2001 Act, as evidenced equally by the section 15 economic disparity orders, 
which serve as a remedy for the losses arising from the parties’ marital roles.
4.3 Section 15 economic disparity order v maintenance order
Where an application for spousal support is successful, as with a section 15 application, 
the court is required to examine the effect of the division of spousal functions in the 
course of the marriage on the earning capacity o f both spouses. However, 
notwithstanding this duplication, the courts have emphasised that “s 15 awards and
183 Typically it is not solely about the economic and career losses o f the homemaker, but also the co­
existing gains and career advancements o f the other spouse. The aim o f the section 15 order is thus to 
bridge the divide between the two worlds. See the earlier discussion o f the relevance o f needs to a section 
15 application in section 3.4.2.
184 Family Court 22 June 2006.
185 Supra n. 140 at 485.
186 Ibid.
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maintenance orders serve distinct purposes and ...should be considered separately”.187 In 
M  v B the court stressed the distinction between a section 15 order which readjusts the 
division of relationship property, and a maintenance order which seeks to provide 
relatively temporary support to assist one party to adjust to their new circumstances. In 
essence maintenance is designed to provide for the spouse’s “reasonable needs for a 
reasonable period of time” but the “need for a maintenance order can only be assessed 
once the division of relationship property has been finalised”.
Whilst the case law to date suggests that the purpose of each award may vary greatly, 
they remain interlinked insofar as the making of one order may remove the justification 
for the making of the other. Thus in awarding the appellant wife compensation for future 
economic disparity, Miller J in JES v JBC emphasised that such an award should not be 
treated as capitalised maintenance, but might yet have the effect of reducing the need for 
maintenance. Atkin is less convinced as to the distinction between a maintenance order 
and a section 15 order, particularly as a maintenance payment can be awarded in lump 
sum form.189 Atkin argues that in essence an economic disparity claim concerned with 
future earning capacity and a maintenance application that is concerned with future needs 
now “deal broadly with the same question”.190 Ultimately he queries the sense of creating 
“two major strategies with different ground rules for tackling roughly the same problem -  
namely the income differential between parties on the breakdown of a relationship.”191 
This leads him to call for the reform o f the law on “the inter-relationship of capital and 
income” to establish “much clearer parameters”.192 He suggests that “economic disparity 
claims should be replaced by an enhanced maintenance regime that takes more fully into
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Supra n. 4 at 473.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid. Atkin cites the decision o f the Court o f Appeal in M  v B as an example o f the capacity for the co­
existing income deficiency remedies doubly to benefit applicants. In that instance, the wife was able to rely 
upon the regulatory structure to gain a significant amount o f relationship property without impacting upon 
her claims for economic disparity and maintenance. He notes that although William Young P at 27, agreed 
with the ruling of the court, he did express concerns that “from the husband’s point o f view, the wife was 
“having her cake and eating it too.””
192 Ibid at 474.
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account the effects o f intimate relationships”.193
5 Conclusion
The New Zealand regulatory system is premised upon legislatively-stated principles to be 
given effect through a combination o f rules, presumptions and judicial discretion. The 
Property Relationships Act 1976, enacted in 2001, has created a system that regards 
marriage as a partnership o f equals, whilst retaining the power to achieve equitable 
results. Given the variable nature of the circumstances that can present before the courts, 
the New Zealand system seeks to provide enough latitude through the exercise of judicial 
discretion to facilitate exceptional circumstances within an otherwise rule-based system. 
The arsenal of ancillary relief powers now available to the New Zealand judiciary, to 
both compensate for sacrificed opportunities and provide for basic ongoing needs greatly 
empowers the courts to secure real equality between the spouses. Underlying these two 
corrective powers lies the strong presumption of equal division which must be ordinarily 
ordered by the courts. However despite this principle-driven system of legal regulation, 
the lack of available empirical research on the impact and effect o f the New Zealand 
divorce regime makes it difficult to ascertain the success or otherwise of the apparently 
well-developed governing provisions. Research is necessary to trace the financial 
circumstances of parties upon the dissolution o f the marriage and very importantly, in the 
subsequent years. Such a project might provide an insight into the real effect of the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976.
Under the new 1976 Act, the certainty provided by the presumption of equal division can 
be avoided where fairness demands an alternative approach. Whilst the legislative source 
for the enunciated guidelines, expressed in the form o f principles and purposes, 
represents a distinctly democratic approach to lawmaking and adds legitimacy to the 
outcome secured, the co-existing scope for judicial discretion arguably has the potential 
to challenge this legitimacy. Despite the statutory guidance, the making of both lump­
sum and/or periodic payments orders is a matter to be determined by the presiding judge
193 Ibid.
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with reference to the circumstances o f the case. Thus the mix of rules and discretion 
evident in the New Zealand regulatory structure, whilst capable of securing fairness 
whatever the individual circumstances, may operate at a cost to the benchmarks of 
democracy and predictability. Notwithstanding the presumption of equal division, the 
judicial right to make additional compensatory payments to the economically vulnerable 
spouse appears to identify fairness as the primary aim of this regulatory approach. Whilst 
representing an approach similar to that operated in Scotland, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, the avoidance o f more definitive limitations, durational and otherwise, has 
resulted in a less decisive and coherent approach in New Zealand. Whatever the merits of 
the policy positions adopted by the lawmakers in Scotland, when assessing their approach 
as a means of regulating law creation and application, their willingness to assert a 
definitive position certainly attracts predictability through democratically created laws.
The experiences of the New Zealand legal system in the context o f divorce offer an 
interesting illustration of an evolution o f purposes and procedures. There now exist 
identified statutory objectives with co-existing flexible judicial powers to facilitate the 
goals to be achieved. Such an approach to regulation, where the lawmaking process 
includes a considered enunciation o f the goals o f the process, can result in more 
democratic and predictable laws. The manner in which these laws are structured can also 
contribute to the securing of the third benchmark of fairness. Whereas the New Zealand 
courts are expected to decide every case with the relevant, identified policy aims to the 
fore, Irish cases are decided in a social policy vacuum.194 The excessive judicial 
discretion and scope for subjective determination under the Irish divorce system, together 
with the failure to enunciate overall policy goals serves to highlight the significant gap 
between the two approaches and the need for the Irish approach to be reconsidered.
194 See chapter 3 above, which presents an overview and critical analysis o f the current Irish regulatory 
approach to asset distribution on divorce.
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Conclusion
1 Introduction
The systems for regulating asset distribution on divorce in Ireland, California, Scotland 
and New Zealand, were selected at the commencement of this work in order to 
demonstrate four quite distinct approaches to regulation. It was envisaged that a detailed 
description and critical analysis o f these regimes would lend itself to the identification of 
an optimum approach to regulation. However what has evolved is a realisation of the 
general workability of each country’s regime, where it has been created within a 
considered legal and social context. It has been shown that once powers are created, 
whether rule- or discretion-based, their effectiveness depends on the co-existence of clear 
pre-identified aims of the regulatory process. In an area of law often less concerned with 
strict rules of property and title and more centred upon notions o f fairness and equity, any 
potential for inconsistent and subjective determinations can be minimised by adherence 
to the goal o f securing these over-riding social policy aims.
Each of the systems considered has demonstrated a tension between the creation and 
imposition of strict rules and the need to permit an element of judicial freedom to achieve 
individualised justice in the circumstances. The mix of legislative and judicial tools 
created to successfully balance this conflict has been diverse and they have varied in their 
outcomes and success. Such success or otherwise has been measured in the course of this 
work with reference to the three benchmarks of democracy, fairness and predictability, 
which have emerged as the three key criteria for assessing the impact and effect of the 
laws and processes adopted in each o f the four jurisdictions considered. Ultimately the 
diverse experiences considered serve as a useful guide for Irish law reform, in 
highlighting the need for such a mix o f rules and discretion, and the co-existing need for 
clearly identified policy aims to provide a principled context within which laws can be 
applied. The approach to the division o f assets also varies, with Ireland uniquely 
(amongst the jurisdictions considered in this work) regarding all possible financial relief
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orders as a collective means o f achieving a just and proper outcome. Conversely the 
approach adopted in California, Scotland and New Zealand mandates a distinct 
consideration of property and wealth division on the one hand and spousal support orders 
on the other. Where this distinction has been properly considered and developed there 
also exist separate motivations and objectives for each element of the financial re­
distribution process. Finally the issue o f private settlements is beginning to emerge as an 
area of growth, most likely in response to dissatisfaction with existing distribution 
regimes. This very current development serves to emphasise the need for Ireland to 
address the significant shortfalls o f its regulatory approach to divorce, if, as a state, it 
wishes to retain control over the financial responsibilities of spouses on the dissolution of 
marriage.
2 Rules versus discretion as a means of regulating asset division on divorce 
2.1 Introduction
The regulatory approaches considered in this thesis vary from a rule of equal division, to 
a presumption of equality with scope for unequal division, to unfettered judicial 
discretion. As distinct from Ireland, the regulatory approaches of California, Scotland and 
New Zealand all commence at a starting point o f equal division, the strength of the rule 
varying, and typically having evolved over time. The four regimes reflect different 
responses to the tension between the aspiration for predictable and democratically created 
laws and the co-existing need for judicial freedom to achieve individualised justice in the 
circumstances. In turn, judicial interpretations have sought to apply the governing laws in 
a manner capable of securing either stated or subsequently identified policy aims.
2.2 California
On the face of it, the Californian approach is entirely rule-based; the courts must award 
an equal division of the community property of the parties. This judicial obligation arises
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from relatively stringent legislative provisions which demand equal division, except in an 
exhaustive number o f instances where such equal division is impossible or entirely 
impractical. Whilst the equal division rule can be understood to reflect the partnership 
theory of marriage, the decision to create exceptions however limited, reflects a shift 
from the original policy of absolute equal division, being mandated by social and family 
policy needs in the context o f what is otherwise a relatively unyielding rule.
2.3 Scotland
In Scotland, the current legislative presumption that fair division necessitates equal 
division, was enacted following a lengthy period of consultation and replaced a regime 
premised upon judicial capacity to make whatever orders were necessary in the individual 
circumstances. However, this starting point of equal division co-exists with a judicial 
capacity to divide the assets unequally, once justified with reference to one or more of the 
enunciated statutory principles. Thus although the Scottish system commences on a 
footing of equal division as mandated by fairness, the governing provisions recognise that 
unequal distribution may be required in order truly to equalise (to the extent possible), the 
positions of the parties. The creation o f the exceptions to the presumption of equal 
division relies upon the exercise o f judicial discretion in order to secure the goal of 
fairness, but in a controlled manner, limited by pre-determined statutory principles.
2.4 New Zealand
In New Zealand the lawmakers have considered and reformed their laws on a number of 
occasions, adopting and later rejecting a presumption o f equal division. Although the 
statutory exceptions to equal division under the original 1976 Act were broad enough to 
allow judicial discretion in “extraordinary circumstances”, the very strong presumption of 
equality reflected the view of marriage as a partnership, “in which each spouse, by his/her
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unique effort, contributes to the acquisition of the partnership assets”.1 Consequently, 
calls for reform led to a detailed legislative response to the financial complexities on 
divorce, with multiple ancillary relief powers being created for the judiciary. Whilst the 
starting point of equal division remains, the demands for individualised fairness linked to 
marital responsibilities and future economic disparity have given rise to significant 
supplemental judicial powers effectively facilitating a return to the historically significant 
discretion-based judicial role.
2.5 Ireland
Irish divorce laws accord considerable discretion to the judiciary, and lack any statutory 
mandate for the equal division o f assets. Equally the judiciary have displayed a marked 
reluctance to identify principles and polices and currently the nature and value of the 
assets available for distribution appear to dictate policy direction. Consequently, the 
judiciary tends to allow varying family circumstances to cloud the more significant policy 
issues and thereby prevent (or perhaps even facilitate the avoidance of) the development 
of over-arching principles. In comparison with the other jurisdictions studied, the Irish 
regulatory approach is entirely lacking in rule or principle based direction.
3 Property orders versus ongoing spousal maintenance
3.1 Introduction
As tools to secure the goals o f the asset distribution process, property and spousal support 
orders co-exist in all four jurisdictions considered, but are regulated and utilised in quite 
diverse ways. It is apparent that whilst Ireland regards the spousal support order as 
merely one of many interchangeable means of resolving the financial claims before the 
court, the other three jurisdictions considered have created a more segregated approach to 
these orders, whereby maintenance is very much a secondary consideration after asset
1 Tapp P “The New Zealand Matrimonial Property Act 1976” 1 OJLS 3 (Winter 1981) 421 at 422, cited 
previously in chapter 5 at n. 24.
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division. In this context two main issues have come to the fore; the restriction of claims 
through limited definitions o f marital property and finite time periods; and the distinctive 
regulatory treatment o f property and maintenance orders by lawmakers. The individual 
approaches to these issues impact significantly not only upon the courts’ powers to grant 
the relief sought but also provide a means of giving effect to underlying policy 
objectives.
3.2 Limiting spousal claims through restrictive definitions of rights
Where possible, ancillary relief orders made at the time of the divorce can allow the court 
to divide the available assets as necessary to best secure the goals of the relevant process. 
Dividing the available assets at the time of divorce and electing to avoid ongoing 
maintenance reflects a policy o f clean break, and a deliberate identification of the funds 
deemed suitable for distribution. In this way, the definition of marital (or relationship) 
property applied in each jurisdiction allows the law-makers to dictate the scope of the 
parties’ possible entitlements. Typically, where a statutory definition is created, it limits 
the assets and wealth available to gains earned in the course of the marriage. In respect of 
the homemaker, this limits (typically) her equitable claim to her spouse’s assets, marital 
earnings and career advancements and prevents her from sharing in his pre-marital or 
post-divorce wealth. Thus whilst marriage may be regarded as a partnership of equals, 
that partnership and any entitlements are severed with the ending of the union 
notwithstanding any long-term benefits or losses arising directly from the spousal roles 
and opportunities in the course o f the marriage. In Scotland, in indicating a clear 
preference for the avoidance o f post-divorce spousal support, the lawmakers have 
expressly categorised post-divorce earnings as non-marital property. Similarly under 
Californian law, the scope o f the community property is confined to assets and wealth 
earned in the course of the marriage. Conversely, the New Zealand approach to post­
divorce earnings has taken a more protective view of the homemaker regarding it as 
unfair to discount the relevance o f future economic disparity where it can be linked to the 
marital contributions. Thus, career sacrifices and absence from the market place for the 
benefit of the family mandate a levelling of the spouses’ financial positions through the
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section 15 compensation order. In addition the broadening of the definition of 
relationship property to include what was previously categorised as ‘balance of 
relationship property’ again strengthens significantly the scope of the homemaker’s 
claim.
Conversely under Irish law, there is little or no limitation placed upon the scope of the 
spouses’ claims, as evidenced by the absolute judicial freedom to consider any assets held 
legally or equitably by the parties, coupled with the spousal right to apply for further 
relief at any time after the divorce is granted. It can be surmised that the lawmakers have 
either deliberately created an open-ended policy or conversely the issues of definition and 
scope of property rights were simply not considered in the drafting of the regulatory 
process. Either way, the dearth o f legislative statement and the inconsistency evident in 
the judicial pronouncements in this context have caused great uncertainty about the 
process. Once again the absence o f stated policies leaves Ireland’s broadly drafted laws 
even more vague and inconsistent in their application.
3.3 Distinctive treatment o f property and maintenance
All jurisdictions considered in this work allow, to some extent, the making of both 
property adjustment and post-divorce maintenance orders. However in addition to the 
different emphases placed on these orders, distinct approaches are also adopted in respect 
of their regulation. The focus o f Californian law is undoubtedly on property division, 
requiring an equal division o f the community property of the parties. Limiting the rights 
of the parties to marital assets and earnings reflects the view that the non-earning spouse 
has no valid claim on post-marriage assets. However notwithstanding this primary 
position, the regulatory regime does operate a residual legislative-based capacity to order 
indefinite spousal support where necessary. In this regard, as noted in chapter 4, the 
legislature has developed distinctive governing provisions which require the court to 
make a subjective determination o f the circumstances of the parties. Although it is 
regarded as a residual power, typically avoided where the equal division of community 
property satisfies the position o f the parties, it represents a very distinct element in the
287
broader context of Californian divorce laws. Certainly it is the one instance where the 
court is required to determine the fact and amount of the order on the basis of the 
individual circumstances o f the parties. Perhaps most fundamentally in this context, it can 
be regarded as evidence o f the inoperability of an absolute rule-based system and the 
importance of scope, however limited, for individualised justice.
By way of contrast to the property-focus of the Californian approach, the New Zealand 
lawmakers have quite deliberately developed a two-tiered regulatory capacity to provide 
for the economically disadvantaged spouse. In addition to the presumption of equal 
division, which is rebuttable where exceptional circumstances exist, the court can identify 
future economic disparity and make compensatory orders to equalise the position. The 
quantum of any future disparity order will be determined on the evidence of the career 
sacrifices of the homemaker and the future income of the wealthier spouse. In addition, a 
share in post-divorce earnings can be claimed in the light of the additional judicial power 
to order spousal support based on the needs of the applicant and her inability to support 
herself because of the circumstances o f the marriage. Whilst this period of post-divorce 
support is not typically envisaged as long-term, it can be ordered for so long as justice 
demands. Whilst Scotland similarly provides scope for property orders and spousal 
support, there is a very clear legislative preference for the resolution of the financial 
position through property orders, with an underlying acceptance that spousal support 
should be avoided where possible. In addition and to compound this view, the Act 
requires spousal support orders to be limited, save in cases of sufficient hardship, to a 
period of three years. Thus in each o f these three jurisdictions, the court first divides the 
marital property between the parties, equally or otherwise, and only then will the court 
consider spousal support orders and/or orders in respect of post-divorce assets or wealth.
The Irish regulatory approach does not draw a distinction between the treatment of 
property and/or maintenance, nor does it identify a legislative preference for property 
orders over maintenance. Rather both the legislature and judiciary regard the assets of the 
parties as a collective asset-pool and the laws permit the making of whatever orders are 
required by justice. This encourages a more holistic approach to key issues such as clean
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break, post-divorce spousal support and sufficiency of property adjustment orders. 
Interestingly the New Zealand multi-faceted approach to marital assets and future 
economic wealth might in fact be regarded as a sophisticated version of the more loosely 
regulated Irish position. Although the source and effect of the income of the spouses is 
considered by the Irish courts and may lead to the ordering of a larger lump sum and/or 
future maintenance, it will do so in a far more generalised manner, but might yet achieve 
similar outcomes to the New Zealand lawmakers; i.e. a share in the marital assets and 
ongoing maintenance to redress the economic imbalance between the parties.
4 Evaluating diverse approaches to regulation 
4.1 Introduction
Each system of regulation, whether primarily rule- or discretion-based, is influenced by 
the law makers’ priorities in respect o f its eventual outcomes. The examination presented 
has sought to identify the consequences o f the varying approaches currently operating in 
Ireland, California, Scotland and New Zealand with reference also to their individual 
historical approaches to asset and wealth distribution on divorce. The impact of the 
existing laws and processes has been critically assessed to demonstrate quite varying 
emphases on the importance o f creating laws that are democratic, predictable and fair. 
The varying prioritisation o f these three criteria has significantly impacted upon the 
choices of law and policy-makers in the regulation of asset distribution on divorce.
4.2 Democracy
Democratic laws are primarily perceived to be legislatively created with the judiciary 
being accorded the secondary role of implementation. Notwithstanding the express 
allocation of precise roles within the Irish legal system, whereby the Oireachtas makes 
law and the courts administer justice, the judiciary have played a very significant role in 
attempting to develop Irish divorce law and policy. Indeed in each of the four 
jurisdictions considered there exists discretion-based judicial powers, resulting in the
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delivery of some element o f individualised justice. However the breadth of the judicial 
powers exercisable in the jurisdictions other than Ireland, is limited to varying extents by 
the co-existing rules, principles or statutory guidelines. The current regulatory approaches 
in California, Scotland and New Zealand all represent reforms of pre-existing regimes, 
which had been reliant almost entirely upon the exercise of judicial discretion.
California is easily identified as being most democratic in both creation and 
implementation insofar as it involves the application of a legislatively created rule with 
little or no scope for deviation. It is really only in considering the merits of an application 
for a spousal support order that the democracy of this regime can be queried. In analysing 
the New Zealand approach, it is arguable that despite focussed legislative attention, there 
remains a lack of clarity o f goals to produce a sufficiently democratic system. Although 
operated within legislatively created structures and parameters, the current approach 
continues to rely heavily upon subjective judicial determinations o f future economic 
disparity and the identification o f the orders necessary to achieve substantive equality. 
However the regime remains instructive for Irish law reform; although judicial discretion 
remains, the legislative confines within which it can be exercised operate to ensure 
legitimacy and transparency exist within the regulatory process. Similarly in Scotland 
the regime is premised upon quasi-rules, manifested in stated principles and policies to 
which the judiciary must adhere on determining property and wealth disputes on divorce. 
However the particular strengths of the Scottish approach lie with the willingness of the 
lawmakers to adopt a definite position on a number of key issues, particularly the 
avoidance of extended post-divorce ties, save in cases of serious hardship. The freedoms 
of the judiciary are thus severely restricted by the legislative approach which avoids 
excessive reliance upon subjective concepts of justice and fairness. In considering the 
need for the reform of the Irish approach to regulation in this context, the distinct lack of 
democracy is very evident in the Irish regime, with the legislature choosing to effectively 
delegate all issues and determinations to the judiciary and in turn, the deliberations of the 
judiciary often remain unknown or unexplained. Ireland lacks a legislative stance on the 
keys issues for determination and whilst the abstract development o f a strict rule might 
take the democratic debate too far, the delivery of principle-based policy directions
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would certainly add credibility and legitimacy to the process. Thus it is suggested that 
whilst necessarily relying to a point on judicial determinations in the particular 
circumstances, the Scottish regime is as democratic an approach to lawmaking as is 
appropriate or possible in the context o f financial determinations upon marital 
breakdown. Critics o f any residual judicial role might argue that such powers serve to 
delegitimize the laws, and encourage subjective adjudications premised upon the 
individual circumstances o f both the judge and the parties involved. However the co­
existing aims o f predictability and fairness demand that democracy and legitimacy cannot 
be the sole criterion o f lawmaking and thus justice demands a less than absolute rule- 
based approach to the creation o f an effective system of regulation.
4.3 Predictability
In the context of dispute resolution, what might constitute a reasonable outcome can only 
be ascertained where, inter alia, the governing laws permit an outcome to be predicted. In 
practice, predictable laws and thus identifiable outcomes, lessen the scope for protracted 
disputes and serve to facilitate private bargaining. Conversely, a system that is premised 
upon very wide discretion serves as a temptation for the fostering o f unreasonable 
expectations regarding outcomes, and can prevent parties from reaching a reasonable 
settlement. Nowhere is this more evident and perhaps important than in family law 
disputes where the cost o f a protracted dispute, both financially and personally, can have 
a detrimental impact upon one or both o f the parties involved. Furthermore, inconsistent 
rulings in relatively similar circumstances cause immense dissatisfaction with the overall 
regime and can prompt discontent amongst those it seeks to regulate.
Relatively unfettered judicial discretion, as is evident in Ireland, suggests to the parties 
that any outcome is possible, instilling either fear or false hope (or both!) in their minds. 
This uncertainty is compounded by the in camera rule and the general secrecy associated 
with family law disputes. In essence parties are effectively negotiating, not in the shadow 
of the law, but rather in the dark. Yet, as with democracy, predictable laws do not 
necessarily mandate the use o f absolute rules, rather there exists a spectrum upon which
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the various regulatory approaches can be placed, with quasi-rules such as principles, 
policies and presumptions being utilised to bridge the gap between absolute rules and 
absolute discretion. Such tools, although unlikely to provide precise insight into the likely 
outcome of a case, will place parameters on the nature and scope of the likely outcome 
which in turn should greatly assist any inter-partes negotiations. These tools, in various 
guises, are utilised in Scotland and New Zealand, adding some element of predictability 
to the resolution process. Interestingly, the almost absolute predictability o f the 
Californian system appears to have increased the reliance upon such agreements, in being 
certain about the outcome, parties are equally certain as to their desire to avoid that 
outcome. In light o f this, it must be queried in a jurisdiction such as Ireland, where the 
predictability o f the regime is weak, whether negotiated settlements are motivated by fear 
of the relatively unbridled judicial powers and the consequential myriad of possible 
outcomes in any given case. The creation o f more principle-driven governance might 
restrict such judicial freedoms and permit those affected by marital breakdown to rely 
with a greater degree o f certainty upon a more predictable regime.
Principles and policies serve to identify the motivations and the goals of the process 
whilst reasoned judicial rulings can illustrate the application of these guides in practice. 
Successful bargaining in the shadow o f predictable and certain laws facilitates private 
settlements, reduces inter partes hostility and is likely to result in more acceptable and 
thus more effective outcomes. Notwithstanding these benefits, predictability equally can 
not exist as the sole aim o f a process that seeks to regulate human behaviour and 
relationships. A regime that over-emphasises the need for predictable laws may do so at 
the cost of fairness.
4.4 Fairness
The regulatory processes governing many aspects o f family law disputes frequently 
identify fairness as the ultimate goal. Although a ubiquitously used term, its impact upon 
the laws and their application depends upon legislative definition and/or judicial 
interpretation in a particular jurisdiction. Given the unique set o f circumstances arising in
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every divorce dispute, individualised fairness often necessitates capacity for 
individualised justice. However, notwithstanding the particular facts and circumstances 
of each case, fairness equally demands that like cases are treated alike. It is difficult to 
defend a system which by virtue o f its structures and laws allows similar cases to give 
rise to very different outcomes. Thus where a system gives rise to inconsistent treatment 
of similar cases, fairness is not secured and predictability is clearly not achieved. Such 
inconsistency is more likely to arise where the judiciary is accorded discretion to decide 
simply with reference to what is ‘just’ in the circumstances, such an adjudication 
allowing consideration o f the subjective views of the presiding judges and/or the strength 
of argument presented by each party to the hearing. Similarly, the universal criticism of 
the test of fairness is its indefinable and uncertain nature, and the fundamental need to 
consider the circumstances o f a case in order to assess whether fairness has actually been 
achieved. A system that relies upon the vague concepts o f fairness and justice and which 
fails to identify what is fair, simply invites subjective determinations and arguably 
prevents fairness in the more general sense.
Adjudicating on the basis o f fairness therefore demands an awareness o f the social policy 
aims of a particular jurisdiction, which in order to satisfy the criterion of democracy, are 
ideally articulated in the governing laws. Where direction is provided as to the aims and 
priorities of a distribution regime, this can allow the legislature, supported by the 
judiciary, to identify what fairness demands, and thus add predictability and consistency 
to its system of regulation. The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 states that fair division 
is presumed to mean equal division and whilst scope exists for unequal division, with 
reference to guiding principles, as a starting point there exists an immediate statement of 
what fairness is presumed to equate to. Interestingly, the equal division rule, applicable in 
California, also aims for fairness, presuming that equality of treatment is the fairest 
means of division in the majority o f cases, and thus on balance, the best rule to apply 
universally. Whilst equitable division might more likely ensure fairness in the particular 
circumstances of a case, the use o f equal division as the basis for asset distribution might 
more readily guarantee an element o f fairness in the more universal sense. However the 
weakness associated with such a simplified view of fairness is evident from the calls for
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reform of the Californian rule o f equal division, given that it only attracts an “illusion of 
equality” and has failed to secure true equality for divorced women. Irrespective of the 
criticisms of the impact o f particular legislative approaches, any attempt to define the 
parameters o f the concept o f fairness within a jurisdiction can provide direction and 
guidance to the presiding judiciary and thereby more easily ensure that fairness, 
howsoever regarded, is secured.
The lack of parameters or guidance in the Irish divorce system, although created to allow 
fairness and justice to be secured in every instance, lends itself to an unguided regime of 
boundless possibilities. By contrast the rule-based system in California, however 
ineffective in securing the aim o f equality of outcome, lends itself to a consistent, 
predictable system o f equal treatment. Less rigidly, the regimes in Scotland and New 
Zealand allow for individual determinations o f fairness, but within identified parameters 
and objectives. Whatever aims o f the process might ultimately be identified, the fairness 
sought by the Irish regime demands greater legislative consideration and control of the 
judicial powers to ensure all aspects o f the process are truly fair.
4.5 Conclusion
The three criteria outlined above, democracy, predictability and fairness have been 
identified as three useful yardsticks to measure the effectiveness o f various regulatory 
approaches to asset distribution on divorce. The Irish judiciary, whilst having regard to 
statutory factors, is both empowered and required to make whatever financial relief 
orders are necessary in the circumstances o f each case. Such an approach provides little if 
any guidance to the presiding judge who is effectively authorised to determine the 
direction of the governing law and policy. In Ireland, this empowers the judiciary to 
shape from its inception, the nature and effect o f Irish divorce law, thereby usurping the 
primary law-making role o f the legislature. In addition it falls to the judiciary to
2 This phrase was coined by Weitzman L to reflect the unequal outcomes arising from the rule so equal 
division. The Divorce Revolution The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences fo r Women and 
Children in America, cited previously in chapter 4 at n. 57.
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determine what outcomes are demanded by justice, and both to identify and to secure the 
policy aims of the regulatory process generally. To date, such clarity and direction has 
not been forthcoming.
It remains unclear whether the Irish legislature has simply abdicated its role as law and 
policy-maker or whether the judiciary has been identified as better placed to develop 
policies and principles in this area. Although it is possible to defend such a legislative 
approach on the basis o f necessary judicial freedom to achieve a fair solution in every 
case, the identification o f underlying objectives would better serve to guide and control 
these otherwise excessive judicial freedoms.
5 Private settlements
Put simply, private agreements are executed for two reasons; either to finalise the divorce 
process in an efficient and speedy manner or alternatively to avoid the impact of the 
governing laws. Reliance upon both pre- nuptial and post-nuptial settlements is evidence 
of attempts by spouses to secure one or both o f these aims, and is linked to their 
acceptance or otherwise o f the regulatory process and practices in place.
The right of spouses to execute an arrangement may be an autonomous one but it is 
undoubtedly exercised in the shadow o f the governing regulatory system. This regulatory 
backdrop will greatly influence the content and enforceability o f such an agreement. 
Whilst it might not be surprising that in such a rigidly regulated system as California pre­
nuptial agreements are often utilised, it is unclear whether such reliance upon private 
settlements is evidence o f the inequity resulting from adherence to the rule-based 
outcomes or simply an individual desire to retain autonomy over the marital relationship. 
It has already been suggested that the reliance by Californian lawmakers upon its 
particularly prescriptive regulatory approach on divorce might serve to encourage the 
wealthier spouse to impose a more restrictive settlement on the dependent party.
Whatever the motivations, the effect is the circumvention o f the powers and policy aims 
of the court and the regulatory process generally.
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Certainly the willingness o f the Irish government in recent years to open the debate 
concerning pre-nuptial agreements suggests an acceptance either of the unworkability of 
the current regime or a growing willingness to loosen the grip on individual and family 
decision-making in Ireland. At the very least, in engaging with the fact and validity of 
pre-nuptial agreements, the Irish lawmakers seem to indicate both the potential scope and 
need for a means to by-pass the current regime. Although facilitating settlements permits 
self-regulation of inter-spousal responsibilities, absolute autonomy in this context allows 
the parties to avoid entirely the social policy aims that can be secured through the 
regulatory process. Where a state permits self-regulation and enforces pre- and post­
nuptial settlements as a matter o f contract law, it demonstrates a willingness to forfeit the 
state’s role in regulating society and the family. In a jurisdiction such as Ireland where 
the State has historically asserted a significant role in the regulation of the family, the 
growth in use and acceptance o f private agreements, particularly pre-nuptial agreements 
might allow parties to avoid state preferences for inter-spousal responsibilities. Currently 
the Irish lawmakers have retained a perpetual power over the rights and property of the 
parties, with a view to maintaining spousal financial ties and reinforcing the lifelong 
nature of the marital bond where necessary. Thus to avoid a growing reliance upon 
private settlements which seek to avoid the overly-broad divorce regime, it is necessary 
that a more structured approach to the fundamental laws governing the family is 
developed. If the regulation o f the family and post-divorce inter-spousal obligations 
remains a priority for lawmakers, a more focussed and policy-led system needs to be 
developed to properly inform the parties to a divorce as to the aims of the process and the 
impact of state intervention in the ownership o f spousal and marital property. Failing that, 
parties will invariably reject the uncertainty and inconsistency o f the current structure and 
ultimately the State will lose control o f this crucial area of social and legal policy.
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6 Conclusion -  Can Irish family law learn from the experiences of California, 
Scotland and New Zealand?
The implications o f the regulatory choices on divorce are immense and any reform 
necessitates consideration within the broader social context. In attempting to regulate 
private relationships and consequential responsibilities it is absolutely imperative that the 
underlying state policy goals are considered and identified. The lack of informed 
direction and the judicial uncertainty in the application of current Irish divorce laws has 
led to unclear and inconsistent attempts to identify and develop such underlying aims. 
The current dearth o f explicit social policy aims leaves the judiciary without a starting 
point for its key role in relation to the further development o f laws and contemporary 
social policy.
Certainly the discretionary-based regulatory system in Ireland appears to recognise 
marriage as a partnership o f equals and is primarily motivated by the need to equalise the 
position of spouses on divorce. To this end, the legislature has chosen not to define 
marital property and thereby makes all assets, howsoever gained, available for 
distribution and does not place any limit, other than remarriage, upon a spouse’s right to 
seek further relief post-divorce. This stands in marked contrast with the strict and 
restrictive rule of equal division in California and the less strict yet still highly regulated 
approaches in Scotland and New Zealand. Whilst it has been suggested by Weitzman and 
others that the rule o f equal division in fact impoverishes women, and the supplemental 
judicial powers in New Zealand suggest the unworkability o f a simple rule of equal 
division, it is entirely unclear whether the unrestricted approach o f the Irish lawmakers is 
any more successful. However, the reliance upon effectively unregulated judicial powers 
and the co-existing failure to identify regulatory aims or policy direction suggest that 
Irish lawmakers have failed to adopt any definitive approach. The Irish system, 
dependent entirely upon judicial determinations lends itself to undirected social and legal 
decision-making in a policy vacuum. The starting point for the reform of Irish law must 
therefore be the gathering o f focussed empirical research to identify the impact o f the 
current approach and the financial and social consequences for parties on divorce and at
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fixed time periods in the subsequent years. Only then can the implications of the current 
regulatory approach, for both spouses and children, be identified and measured in 
context.
This examination of the regulatory systems of Ireland, California, Scotland and New 
Zealand demonstrates varying attempts at the creation o f laws to secure a ‘fair’ economic 
outcome to marital disputes. The varying interpretations o f what might constitute a ‘fair’ 
outcome and the differing underlying aims of each process are reflected in the laws and 
processes enacted. Whilst generally, the rule-based regime in California regards the 
certainty and apparent equality o f  the equal division rule as giving rise to a ‘fair’ 
outcome, the more discretionary systems suggest that fairness is more likely if the 
dependent spouse is sufficiently provided for given the particular circumstances of the 
marriage. Ultimately the Scottish approach is preferred. In expressly identifying the 
underlying principles to guide the process, this regulatory approach has ensured that the 
legislative express priorities do influence the orders made by the judiciary. Statutory 
presumptions, judicial discretion and identified principles co-exist in order to empower 
the court to secure the aims o f the distribution process. For example, given that the 
severing of the financial ties in the short-term is a definite policy aim, the governing 
legislation has deliberately placed a three-year durational limit on claims for spousal 
support post-divorce. This represents a willingness to reduce the scope for judicial law 
and policy-making where the issue has been resolved through pre-enactment consultation 
and debate. In addition, notwithstanding this assertion o f a definite policy-aim, the 
legislature has equally recognised the need for some residual judicial discretion and 
ensured that however limited, such scope has been retained. In contrast, Ireland has 
effectively avoided the challenging questions arising upon divorce and the legislature has 
failed to address the key policy issues, including; the purpose and extent o f state 
intervention in the family, the justification for maintaining financial ties on divorce, the 
objectives to be achieved in distributing marital assets, and the extent of spousal and state 
obligations to maintain a previously dependent spouse.
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In conclusion, any assessment o f the effectiveness of a regulatory process to distribute 
assets on divorce should be less concerned with the process adopted, and focus more 
closely upon the objectives that process seeks to achieve. Where lawmakers create a 
system of regulation which identifies the aims and objectives of that process, the manner 
in which those goals are achieved becomes less critical. It appears that where the 
lawmakers provide the principles and purposes o f the regulatory process, they can direct 
the exercise of whatever decision-making powers have been created, with the over-riding 
objectives becoming the central focus o f the process. The current operation of Irish 
divorce law lacks both purpose and objectives, and consequently the regulatory process 
can operate neither democratically, predictably nor fairly. The policy vacuum that exists 
must therefore be addressed within the broader social and legal context to allow a more 
focussed and purposeful regulatory process to develop.
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